Chapter LVI (1)

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.--NON-RENEWAL OF CHARTER.

From the time of President Jackson's intimations against the recharter of the Bank, in the annual message of 1829, there had been a ceaseless and pervading activity in behalf of the Bank in all parts of the Union, and in all forms--in the newspapers, in the halls of Congress, in State legislatures, even in much of the periodical literature, in the elections, and in the conciliation of presses and individuals--all conducted in a way to operate most strongly upon the public mind, and to conclude the question in the forum of the people before it was brought forward in the national legislature. At the same time but little was done, or could be done on the other side. The current was all setting one way. I determined to raise a voice against it in the Senate, and made several efforts before I succeeded--the thick array of the Bank friends throwing every obstacle in my way, and even friends holding me back for the regular course, which was to wait until the application for the renewed charter to be presented; and then to oppose it. I foresaw that, if this course was followed, the Bank would triumph without a contest--that she would wait until a majority was installed in both Houses of Congress--then present her application--hear a few barren speeches in opposition;--and then gallop the renewed charter through. In the session of 1830, '31, I succeeded in creating the first opportunity of delivering a speech against it; it was done a little irregularly by submitting a negative resolution against the renewal of the charter, and taking the opportunity while asking leave to introduce the resolution, to speak fully against the re-charter. My mind was fixed upon the character of the speech which I should make--one which should avoid the beaten tracks of objection, avoid all settled points, avoid the problem of constitutionality--and take up the institution in a practical sense, as having too much power over the people and the government,--over business and politics--and too much disposed to exercise that power to the prejudice of the freedom and equality which should prevail in a republic, to be allowed to exist in our country. But I knew it was not sufficient to pull down: we must build up also. The men of 1811 had committed a fatal error, when most wisely refusing to re-charter the institution of that day, they failed to provide a substitute for its currency, and fell back upon the local banks, whose inadequacy speedily made a call for the re-establishment of a national bank. I felt that error must be avoided--that another currency of general circulation must be provided to replace its notes; and I saw that currency in the gold coin of the constitution, then an ideal currency in the United States, having been totally banished for many years by the erroneous valuation adopted in the time of Gen. Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. I proposed to revive that currency, and brought it forward at the conclusion of my first speech (February, 1831) against the Bank, thus:

"I am willing to see the charter expire, without providing
any substitute for the present bank. I am willing to see the
currency of the federal government left to the hard money
mentioned and intended in the constitution; I am willing to have
a hard money government, as that of France has been since the
time of _assignats_ and _mandats_. Every species of paper might
be left to the State authorities, unrecognized by the federal
government, and only touched by it for its own convenience when
equivalent to gold and silver. Such a currency filled France
with the precious metals, when England, with her overgrown
bank, was a prey to all the evils of unconvertible paper. It
furnished money enough for the imperial government when the
population of the empire was three times more numerous, and the
expense of government twelve times greater, than the population
and expenses of the United States; and, when France possessed
no mines of gold or silver, and was destitute of the exports
which command the specie of other countries. The United States
possess gold mines, now yielding half a million per annum, with
every prospect of equalling those of Peru. But this is not the
best dependence. We have what is superior to mines, namely,
the exports which command the money of the world; that is to
say, the food which sustains life and the raw materials which
sustain manufactures. Gold and silver is the best currency for
a republic; it suits the men of middle property and the working
people best; and if I was going to establish a working man's
party, it should be on the basis of hard money:--a hard money
party, against a paper party."

In the speech which I delivered, I quoted copiously from British speakers--not the brilliant rhetoricians, but the practical, sensible, upright business men, to whom countries are usually indebted for all beneficial legislation: the Sir Henry Parnells, the Mr. Joseph Humes, the Mr. Edward Ellices, the Sir William Pulteneys; and men of that class, legislating for the practical concerns of life, and merging the orator in the man of business.

THE SPEECH--EXTRACTS.

"Mr. Benton commenced his speech in support of the application
for the leave he was about to ask, with a justification of
himself for bringing forward the question of renewal at this
time, when the charter had still five years to run; and bottomed
his vindication chiefly on the right he possessed, and the
necessity he was under to answer certain reports of one of
the committee of the Senate, made in opposition to certain
resolutions relative to the bank, which he had submitted to
the Senate at former sessions, and which reports he had not
had an opportunity of answering. He said it had been his
fortune, or chance, some three years ago, to submit a resolution
in relation to the undrawn balances of public money in the
hands of the bank, and to accompany it with some poor remarks
of unfavorable implication to the future existence of that
institution. My resolution [said Mr. B.] was referred to the
Committee on Finance, who made a report decidedly adverse to
all my views, and eminently favorable to the bank, both as a
present and future institution. This report came on the 13th of
May, just fourteen days before the conclusion of a six months'
session, when all was hurry and precipitation to terminate the
business on hand, and when there was not the least chance to
engage the attention of the Senate in the consideration of any
new subject. The report was, therefore, laid upon the table
unanswered, but was printed by order of the Senate, and that in
extra numbers, and widely diffused over the country by means of
the newspaper press. At the commencement of the next session,
it being irregular to call for the consideration of the past
report, I was under the necessity to begin anew, and accordingly
submitted my resolution a second time, and that quite early in
the session; say on the first day of January. It was my wish
and request that this resolution might be discussed in the
Senate, but the sentiment of the majority was different, and
a second reference of it was made to the Finance Committee. A
second report of the same purport with the first was a matter
of course; but what did not seem to me to be a matter of course
was this; that this second report should not come in until the
20th day of February, just fourteen days again before the end of
the session, for it was then the short session, and the Senate
as much pinched as before for time to finish the business on
hand. No answer could be made to it, but the report was printed,
with the former report appended to it; and thus, united like
the Siamese twins, and with the apparent, but not real sanction
of the Senate, they went forth together to make the tour of
the Union in the columns of the newspaper press. Thus, I was a
second time out of court; a second time nonsuited for want of a
replication, when there was no time to file one. I had intended
to begin _de novo_, and for the third time, at the opening
of the ensuing session; but, happily, was anticipated and
prevented by the annual message of the new President [General
Jackson], which brought this question of renewing the bank
charter directly before Congress. A reference of this part of
the message was made, of course, to the Finance Committee: the
committee, of course, again reported, and with increased ardor,
in favor of the bank. Unhappily this third report, which was an
amplification and reiteration of the two former, did not come in
until the session was four months advanced, and when the time of
the Senate had become engrossed, and its attention absorbed, by
the numerous and important subjects which had accumulated upon
the calendar. Printing in extra numbers, general circulation
through the newspaper press, and no answer, was the catastrophe
of this third reference to the Finance Committee. Thus was I
nonsuited for the third time. The fourth session has now come
round; the same subject is again before the same committee on
the reference of the part of the President's second annual
message which relates to the bank; and, doubtless, a fourth
report of the same import with the three preceding ones, may be
expected. But when? is the question. And, as I cannot answer
that question, and the session is now two thirds advanced, and
as I have no disposition to be cut off for the fourth time, I
have thought proper to create an occasion to deliver my own
sentiments, by asking leave to introduce a joint resolution,
adverse to the tenor of all the reports, and to give my reasons
against them, while supporting my application for the leave
demanded; a course of proceeding which is just to myself and
unjust to no one, since all are at liberty to answer me. These
are my personal reasons for this step, and a part of my answer
to the objection that I have begun too soon. The conduct of
the bank, and its friends, constitutes the second branch of my
justification. It is certainly not 'too soon' for them, judging
by their conduct, to engage in the question of renewing the bank
charter. In and out of Congress, they all seem to be of one
accord on this point. Three reports of committees in the Senate,
and one from a committee of the House of Representatives, have
been made in favor of the renewal; and all these reports,
instead of being laid away for future use--instead of being
stuck in pigeon holes, and labelled for future attention, as
things coming forth prematurely, and not wanted for present
service--have, on the contrary, been universally received by the
bank and its friends, in one great tempest of applause; greeted
with every species of acclamation; reprinted in most of the
papers, and every effort made to give the widest diffusion, and
the highest effect, to the arguments they contain. In addition
to this, and at the present session, within a few days past,
three thousand copies of the exposition of the affairs of the
Bank have been printed by order of the two Houses, a thing never
before done, and now intended to blazon the merits of the bank.
[Mr. Smith, of Maryland, here expressed some dissent to this
statement; but Mr. B. affirmed its correctness in substance if
not to the letter, and continued.] This does not look as if
the bank advocates thought it was _too soon_ to discuss the
question of renewing the charter; and, upon this exhibition of
their sentiments, I shall rest the assertion and the proof,
that they do not think so. The third branch of my justification
rests upon a sense of public duty; upon a sense of what is just
and advantageous to the people in general, and to the debtors
and stockholders of the bank in particular. The renewal of the
charter is a question which concerns the people at large; and if
they are to have any hand in the decision of this question--if
they are even to know what is done before it is done, it is high
time that they and their representatives in Congress should
understand each other's mind upon it. The charter has but five
years to run; and if renewed at all, will probably be at some
short period, say two or three years, before the time is out,
and at any time sooner that a chance can be seen to gallop the
renewal through Congress. The people, therefore, have no time
to lose, if they mean to have any hand in the decision of this
great question. To the bank itself, it must be advantageous, at
least, if not desirable, to know its fate at once, that it may
avoid (if there is to be no renewal) the trouble and expense
of multiplying branches upon the eve of dissolution, and the
risk and inconvenience of extending loans beyond the term of
its existence. To the debtors upon mortgages, and indefinite
accommodations, it must be also advantageous, if not desirable,
to be notified in advance of the end of their indulgences:
so that, to every interest, public and private, political
and pecuniary, general and particular, full discussion, and
seasonable decision, is just and proper.

"I hold myself justified, Mr. President, upon the reasons
given, for proceeding in my present application; but, as
example is sometimes more authoritative than reason, I will
take the liberty to produce one, which is as high in point of
authority as it is appropriate in point of application, and
which happens to fit the case before the Senate as completely
as if it had been made for it. I speak of what has lately been
done in the Parliament of Great Britain. It so happens, that
the charter of the Bank of England is to expire, upon its own
limitation, nearly about the same time with the charter of the
Bank of the United States, namely, in the year 1833; and as far
back as 1824, no less than nine years before its expiration,
the question of its renewal was debated, and that with great
freedom, in the British House of Commons. I will read some
extracts from that debate, as the fairest way of presenting the
example to the Senate, and the most effectual mode of securing
to myself the advantage of the sentiments expressed by British
statesman.

_The Extracts._

"'Sir Henry Parnell.--The House should no longer delay to turn
its attention to the expediency of renewing the charter of the
Bank of England. Heretofore, it had been the regular custom to
renew the charter several years before the existing charter had
expired. The last renewal was made when the existing charter
had eleven years to run: the present charter had nine years
only to continue, and he felt very anxious to prevent the
making of any agreement between the government and the bank for
a renewal, without a full examination of the policy of again
conferring upon the Bank of England any exclusive privilege. The
practice had been for government to make a secret arrangement
with the bank; to submit it immediately to the proprietors of
the bank for their approbation, and to call upon the House the
next day to confirm it, without affording any opportunity of
fair deliberation. So much information had been obtained upon
the banking trade, and upon the nature of currency in the last
fifteen years, that it was particularly necessary to enter upon
a full investigation of the policy of renewing the bank charter
before any negotiation should be entered upon between the
government and the bank; and he trusted the government would not
commence any such negotiation until the sense of Parliament had
been taken on this important subject.'

"'Mr. Hume said it was of very great importance that his
majesty's ministers should take immediate steps to free
themselves from the trammels in which they had long been held
by the bank. As the interest of money was now nearly on a level
with what it was when the bank lent a large sum to government,
he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not listen to any
application for a renewal of the bank charter, but would pay off
every shilling that had been borrowed from the bank. * * * * *
Let the country gentlemen recollect that the bank was now acting
as pawn-broker on a large scale, and lending money on estates,
a system entirely contrary to the original intention of that
institution. * * * * * * He hoped, before the expiration of the
charter, that a regular inquiry would be made into the whole
subject.'

"'Mr. Edward Ellice. It (the Bank of England) is a great
monopolizing body, enjoying privileges which belonged to no
other corporation, and no other class of his majesty's subjects.
* * * * * * * He hoped that the exclusive charter would never
again be granted; and that the conduct of the bank during the
last ten or twelve years would make government very cautious
how they entertained any such propositions. The right honorable
Chancellor of the Exchequer [Mr. Robinson] had protested against
the idea of straining any point to the prejudice of the bank; he
thought, however, that the bank had very little to complain of,
when their stock, after all their past profits, was at 238.'

"'The Chancellor of the Exchequer deprecated the discussion, as
leading to no practical result.'

"'Mr. Alexander Baring objected to it as premature and
unnecessary.'

"'Sir William Pulteney (in another debate). The prejudices in
favor of the present bank have proceeded from the long habit of
considering it as a sort of pillar which nothing can shake. * *
* * * * * The bank has been supported, and is still supported,
by the fear and terror which, by means of its monopoly, it has
had the power to inspire. It is well known, that there is hardly
an extensive trader, a manufacturer, or a banker, either in
London, or at a distance from it, to whom the bank could not do
a serious injury, and could often bring on even insolvency. * *
* * * I consider the power given by the monopoly to be of the
nature of all other despotic power, which corrupts the despot as
much as it corrupts the slave. * * * * * * It is in the nature
of man, that a monopoly must necessarily be ill-conducted. *
* * * * * * Whatever language the [private] bankers may feel
themselves obliged to hold, yet no one can believe that they
have any satisfaction in being, and continuing, under a dominion
which has proved so grievous and so disastrous. * * * * * * I
can never believe that the merchants and bankers of this country
will prove unwilling to emancipate themselves, if they can do
it without risking the resentment of the bank. No man in France
was heard to complain, openly, of the Bastile while it existed.
The merchants and bankers of this country have the blood of
Englishmen, and will be happy to relieve themselves from a
situation of perpetual terror, if they could do it consistently
with a due regard to their own interest.'

"Here is authority added to reason--the force of a great example
added to the weight of unanswerable reasons, in favor of early
discussion; so that, I trust, I have effectually put aside that
old and convenient objection to the 'time,' that most flexible
and accommodating objection, which applies to all seasons, and
all subjects, and is just as available for cutting off a late
debate, because it is too late, as it is for stifling an early
one, because it is too early.

"But, it is said that the debate will injure the stockholders;
that it depreciates the value of their property, and that
it is wrong to sport with the vested rights of individuals.
This complaint, supposing it to come from the stockholders
themselves, is both absurd and ungrateful. It is absurd,
because the stockholders, at least so many of them as are not
foreigners, must have known when they accepted a charter of
limited duration, that the approach of its expiration would
renew the debate upon the propriety of its existence; that
every citizen had a right, and every public man was under an
obligation, to declare his sentiments freely; that there was
nothing in the charter, numerous as its peculiar privileges
were, to exempt the bank from that freedom of speech and
writing, which extends to all our public affairs; and that the
charter was not to be renewed here, as the Bank of England
charter had formerly been renewed, by a private arrangement
among its friends, suddenly produced in Congress, and galloped
through without the knowledge of the country. The American part
of the stockholders (for I would not reply to the complaints
of the foreigners) must have known all this; and known it
when they accepted the charter. They adapted it, subject to
this known consequence; and, therefore, the complaint about
injuring their property is absurd. That it is ungrateful, must
be apparent to all who will reflect upon the great privileges
which these stockholders will have enjoyed for twenty years, and
the large profits they have already derived from their charter.
They have been dividing seven per cent. per annum, unless when
prevented by their own mismanagement; and have laid up a real
estate of three millions of dollars for future division; and
the money which has done these handsome things, instead of
being diminished or impaired in the process, is still worth
largely upwards of one hundred cents to the dollar: say, one
hundred and twenty-five cents. For the peculiar privileges which
enabled them to make these profits, the stockholders ought to
be grateful: but, like all persons who have been highly favored
with undue benefits, they mistake a privilege for a right--a
favor for a duty--and resent, as an attack upon their property,
a refusal to prolong their undue advantages. There is no ground
for these complaints, but for thanks and benedictions rather,
for permitting the bank to live out its numbered days! That
institution has forfeited its charter. It may be shut up at any
hour. It lives from day to day by the indulgence of those whom
it daily attacks; and, if any one is ignorant of this fact, let
him look at the case of the Bank of the United States against
Owens and others, decided in the Supreme Court, and reported in
the 2d Peters.

"[Here Mr. B. read a part of this case, showing that it was
a case of usury at the rate of forty-six per cent. and that
Mr. Sergeant, counsel for the bank, resisted the decision of
the Supreme Court, upon the ground that it would expose the
charter of the bank to forfeiture; and that the decision was,
nevertheless, given upon that ground; so that the bank, being
convicted of taking usury, in violation of its charter, was
liable to be deprived of its charter, at any time that a _scire
facias_ should issue against it.]

"Mr. B. resumed. Before I proceed to the consideration of
the resolution, I wish to be indulged in adverting to a rule
or principle of parliamentary practice, which it is only
necessary to read now in order to avoid the possibility of any
necessity for recurring to it hereafter. It is the rule which
forbids any member to be present--which, in fact, requires him
to withdraw--during the discussion of any question in which
his private interest may be concerned; and authorizes the
expurgation from the Journal of any vote which may have been
given under the predicament of an interested motive. I demand
that the Secretary of the Senate may read the rule to which I
allude.

"[The Secretary read the following rule:]

"'Where the private interests of a member are concerned in
a bill or question, he is to withdraw. And where such an
interest has appeared, his voice has been disallowed, even
after a division. In a case so contrary, not only to the laws
of decency, but to the fundamental principles of the social
compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
it is for the honor of the House that this rule, of immemorial
observance, should be strictly adhered to.'

"_First_: Mr. President, I object to the renewal of the charter
of the Bank of the United States, because I look upon the bank
as an institution too great and powerful to be tolerated in a
government of free and equal laws. Its power is that of the
purse; a power more potent than that of the sword; and this
power it possesses to a degree and extent that will enable this
bank to draw to itself too much of the political power of this
Union; and too much of the individual property of the citizens
of these States. The money power of the bank is both direct and
indirect.

"[The Vice-President here intimated to Mr. Benton that he was
out of order, and had not a right to go into the merits of the
bank upon the motion which he had made. Mr. Benton begged pardon
of the Vice-President, and respectfully insisted that he was in
order, and had a right to proceed. He said he was proceeding
upon the parliamentary rule of asking leave to bring in a joint
resolution, and, in doing which, he had a right to state his
reasons, which reasons constituted his speech; that the motion
was debatable, and the whole Senate might answer him. The
Vice-President then directed Mr. Benton to proceed.]

"Mr. B. resumed. The direct power of the bank is now prodigious,
and in the event of the renewal of the charter, must speedily
become boundless and uncontrollable. The bank is now authorized
to own effects, lands inclusive, to the amount of fifty-five
millions of dollars, and to issue notes to the amount of
thirty-five millions more. This makes ninety millions; and, in
addition to this vast sum, there is an opening for an unlimited
increase: for there is a dispensation in the charter to issue
as many more notes as Congress, by law, may permit. This
opens the door to boundless emissions; for what can be more
unbounded than the will and pleasure of successive Congresses?
The indirect power of the bank cannot be stated in figures;
but it can be shown to be immense. In the first place, it has
the keeping of the public moneys, now amounting to twenty-six
millions per annum (the Post Office Department included), and
the gratuitous use of the undrawn balances, large enough to
constitute, in themselves, the capital of a great State bank.
In the next place, its promissory notes are receivable, by law,
in purchase of all property owned by the United States, and in
payment of all debts due them; and this may increase its power
to the amount of the annual revenue, by creating a demand for
its notes to that amount. In the third place, it wears the
name of the United States, and has the federal government for
a partner; and this name, and this partnership, identifies the
credit of the bank with the credit of the Union. In the fourth
place, it is armed with authority to disparage and discredit
the notes of other banks, by excluding them from all payments
to the United States; and this, added to all its other powers,
direct and indirect, makes this institution the uncontrollable
monarch of the moneyed system of the Union. To whom is all this
power granted? To a company of private individuals, many of
them foreigners, and the mass of them residing in a remote and
narrow corner of the Union, unconnected by any sympathy with the
fertile regions of the Great Valley, in which the natural power
of this Union--the power of numbers--will be found to reside
long before the renewed term of a second charter would expire.
By whom is all this power to be exercised? By a directory of
seven (it may be), governed by a majority, of four (it may be);
and none of these elected by the people, or responsible to
them. Where is it to be exercised? At a single city, distant a
thousand miles from some of the States, receiving the produce of
none of them (except one); no interest in the welfare of any of
them (except one); no commerce with the people; with branches
in every State; and every branch subject to the secret and
absolute orders of the supreme central head: thus constituting
a system of centralism, hostile to the federative principle of
our Union, encroaching upon the wealth and power of the States,
and organized upon a principle to give the highest effect to
the greatest power. This mass of power, thus concentrated, thus
ramified, and thus directed, must necessarily become, under
a prolonged existence, the absolute monopolist of American
money, the sole manufacturer of paper currency, and the sole
authority (for authority it will be) to which the federal
government, the State governments, the great cities, corporate
bodies, merchants, traders, and every private citizen, must,
of necessity apply, for every loan which their exigencies may
demand. 'The rich ruleth the poor, and the borrower is the
servant of the lender.' Such are the words of Holy Writ; and
if the authority of the Bible admitted of corroboration, the
history of the world is at hand to give it. But I will not
cite the history of the world, but one eminent example only,
and that of a nature so high and commanding, as to include all
others; and so near and recent, as to be directly applicable to
our own situation. I speak of what happened in Great Britain,
in the year 1795, when the Bank of England, by a brief and
unceremonious letter to Mr. Pitt, such as a miser would write to
a prodigal in a pinch, gave the proof of what a great moneyed
power could do, and would do, to promote its own interest, in a
crisis of national alarm and difficulty. I will read the letter.
It is exceedingly short; for after the compliments are omitted,
there are but three lines of it. It is, in fact, about as long
as a sentence of execution, leaving out the prayer of the judge.
It runs thus:

"'It is the wish of the Court of Directors that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer would settle his arrangements of finances for
the present year, in such manner as not to depend upon any
further assistance from them, beyond what is already agreed for.'

"Such were the words of this memorable note, sufficiently
explicit and intelligible; but to appreciate it fully, we must
know what was the condition of Great Britain at that time?
Remember it was the year 1795, and the beginning of that year,
than which a more portentous one never opened upon the British
empire. The war with the French republic had been raging for
two years; Spain had just declared war against Great Britain;
Ireland was bursting into rebellion; the fleet in the Nore was
in open mutiny; and a cry for the reform of abuses, and the
reduction of taxes, resounded through the land. It was a season
of alarm and consternation, and of imminent actual danger to
Great Britain; and this was the moment which the Bank selected
to notify the minister that no more loans were to be expected!
What was the effect of this notification? It was to paralyze
the government, and to subdue the minister to the purposes of
the bank. From that day forth Mr. Pitt became the minister of
the bank; and, before two years were out, he had succeeded in
bringing all the departments of government, King, Lords, and
Commons, and the Privy Council, to his own slavish condition.
He stopped the specie payments of the bank, and made its
notes the lawful currency of the land. In 1797 he obtained an
order in council for this purpose; in the same year an act of
parliament to confirm the order for a month, and afterwards a
series of acts to continue it for twenty years. This was the
reign of the bank. For twenty years it was a dominant power in
England; and, during that disastrous period, the public debt
was increased about £400,000,000 sterling, equal nearly to two
thousand millions of dollars, and that by paper loans from
a bank which, according to its own declarations, had not a
shilling to lend at the commencement of the period! I omit the
rest. I say nothing of the general subjugation of the country
banks, the rise in the price of food, the decline in wages, the
increase of crimes and taxes, the multiplication of lords and
beggars, and the frightful demoralization of society. I omit all
this. I only seize the prominent figure in the picture, that
of a government arrested in the midst of war and danger by the
veto of a moneyed corporation; and only permitted to go on upon
condition of assuming the odium of stopping specie payments, and
sustaining the promissory notes of an insolvent bank, as the
lawful currency of the land. This single feature suffices to
fix the character of the times; for when the government becomes
the 'servant of the lender,' the people themselves become its
slaves. Cannot the Bank of the United States, if re-chartered,
act in the same way? It certainly can, and just as certainly
will, when time and opportunity shall serve, and interest may
prompt. It is to no purpose that gentlemen may come forward, and
vaunt the character of the United States Bank, and proclaim it
too just and merciful to oppress the state. I must be permitted
to repudiate both the pledge and the praise. The security is
insufficient, and the encomium belongs to Constantinople. There
were enough such in the British Parliament the year before,
nay, the day before the bank stopped; yet their pledges and
praises neither prevented the stoppage, nor made good the damage
that ensued. There were gentlemen in our Congress to pledge
themselves in 1810 for the then expiring bank, of which the one
now existing is a second and deteriorated edition; and if their
securityship had been accepted, and the old bank re-chartered,
we should have seen this government greeted with a note, about
August, 1814--about the time the British were burning this
capitol--of the same tenor with the one received by the younger
Pitt in the year 1795; for, it is incontestable, that that bank
was owned by men who would have glorified in arresting the
government, and the war itself, for want of money. Happily, the
wisdom and patriotism of Jefferson, under the providence of God,
prevented that infamy and ruin, by preventing the renewal of the
old bank charter.

"_Secondly._ I object to the continuance of this bank, because
its tendencies are dangerous and pernicious to the government
and the people.

"What are the tendencies of a great moneyed power, connected
with the government, and controlling its fiscal operations?
Are they not dangerous to every interest, public and
private--political as well as pecuniary? I say they are; and
briefly enumerate the heads of each mischief.

"1. Such a bank tends to subjugate the government, as I have
already shown in the history of what happened to the British
minister in the year 1795.

"2. It tends to collusions between the government and the
bank in the terms of the loans, as has been fully experienced
in England in those frauds upon the people, and insults upon
the understating, called three per cent. loans, in which the
government, for about £50 borrowed, became liable to pay £100.

"3. It tends to create public debt, by facilitating public
loans, and substituting unlimited supplies of paper, for
limited supplies of coin. The British debt is born of the Bank
of England. That bank was chartered in 1694, and was nothing
more nor less in the beginning, than an act of Parliament for
the incorporation of a company of subscribers to a government
loan. The loan was £1,200,000; the interest £80,000; and the
expenses of management £4,000. And this is the birth and origin,
the germ and nucleus of that debt, which is now £900,000,000
(the unfunded items included), which bears an interest of
£30,000,000, and costs £260,000 for annual management.

"4. It tends to beget and prolong unnecessary wars, by
furnishing the means of carrying them on without recurrence to
the people. England is the ready example for this calamity. Her
wars for the restoration of the Capet Bourbons were kept up by
loans and subsidies created out of bank paper. The people of
England had no interest in these wars, which cost them about
£600,000,000 of debt in twenty-five years, in addition to the
supplies raised within the year. The kings she put back upon the
French throne were not able to sit on it. Twice she put them
on; twice they tumbled off in the mud; and all that now remains
of so much sacrifice of life and money is, the debt, which is
eternal, the taxes, which are intolerable, the pensions and
titles of some warriors, and the keeping of the Capet Bourbons,
who are returned upon their hands.

"5. It tends to aggravate the inequality of fortunes; to make
the rich richer, and the poor poorer; to multiply nabobs and
paupers; and to deepen and widen the gulf which separates Dives
from Lazarus. A great moneyed power is favorable to great
capitalists; for it is the principle of money to favor money. It
is unfavorable to small capitalists; for it is the principle of
money to eschew the needy and unfortunate. It is injurious to
the laboring classes; because they receive no favors, and have
the price of the property they wish to acquire raised to the
paper maximum, while wages remain at the silver minimum.

"6. It tends to make and to break fortunes, by the flux and
reflux of paper. Profuse issues, and sudden contractions,
perform this operation, which can be repeated, like planetary
and pestilential visitations, in every cycle of so many years;
at every periodical return, transferring millions from the
actual possessors of property to the Neptunes who preside over
the flux and reflux of paper. The last operation of this kind
performed by the Bank of England, about five years ago, was
described by Mr. Alexander Baring, in the House of Commons, in
terms which are entitled to the knowledge and remembrance of
American citizens. I will read his description, which is brief,
but impressive. After describing the profuse issues of 1823-24,
he painted the reaction in the following terms:

"'They, therefore, all at once, gave a sudden jerk to the
horse on whose neck they had before suffered the reins to hang
loose. They contracted their issues to a considerable extent.
The change was at once felt throughout the country. A few days
before that, no one knew what to do with his money; now, no
one knew where to get it. * * * * The London bankers found
it necessary to follow the same course towards their country
correspondents, and these again towards their customers, and
each individual towards his debtor. The consequence was obvious
in the late panic. Every one, desirous to obtain what was due to
him, ran to his banker, or to any other on whom he had a claim;
and even those who had no immediate use for their money, took
it back, and let it lie unemployed in their pockets, thinking
it unsafe in others' hands. The effect of this alarm was, that
houses which were weak went immediately. Then went second rate
houses; and, lastly, houses which were solvent went, because
their securities were unavailable. The daily calls to which
each individual was subject put it out of his power to assist
his neighbor. Men were known to seek for assistance, and that,
too, without finding it, who, on examination of their affairs,
were proved to be worth 200,000 pounds,--men, too, who held
themselves so secure, that, if asked six months before whether
they could contemplate such an event, they would have said it
would be impossible, unless the sky should fall, or some other
event equally improbable should occur.'

"This is what was done in England five years ago, it is what may
be done here in every five years to come, if the bank charter is
renewed. Sole dispenser of money, it cannot omit the oldest and
most obvious means of amassing wealth by the flux and reflux of
paper. The game will be in its own hands, and the only answer
to be given is that to which I have alluded: 'The Sultan is too
just and merciful to abuse his power.'

"_Thirdly._ I object to the renewal of the charter, on account
of the exclusive privileges, and anti-republican monopoly, which
it gives to the stockholders. It gives, and that by an act of
Congress, to a company of individuals, the exclusive legal
privileges:

"1. To carry on the trade of banking upon the revenue and
credit, and in the name, of the United States of America.

"2. To pay the revenues of the Union in their own promissory
notes.

"3. To hold the moneys of the United States in deposit, without
making compensation for the undrawn balances.

"4. To discredit and disparage the notes of other banks, by
excluding them from the collection of the federal revenue.

"5. To hold real estate, receive rents, and retain a body of
tenantry.

"6. To deal in pawns, merchandise, and bills of exchange.

"7. To establish branches in the States without their consent.

"8. To be exempt from liability on the failure of the bank.

"9. To have the United States for a partner.

"10. To have foreigners for partners.

"11. To be exempt from the regular administration of justice for
the violations of their charter.

"12. To have all these exclusive privileges secured to them as a
monopoly, in a pledge of the public faith not to grant the like
privileges to any other company.

"These are the privileges, and this the monopoly of the bank.
Now, let us examine them, and ascertain their effect and
bearing. Let us contemplate the magnitude of the power which
they create; and ascertain the compatibility of this power with
the safety of this republican government, and the rights and
interests of its free and equal constituents.

"1. The name, the credit, and the revenues of the United States
are given up to the use of this company, and constitute in
themselves an immense capital to bank upon. The name of the
United States, like that of the King, is a tower of strength;
and this strong tower is now an outwork to defend the citadel of
a moneyed corporation. The credit of the Union is incalculable;
and, of this credit, as going with the name, and being in
partnership with the United States, the same corporation now has
possession. The revenues of the Union are twenty-six millions
of dollars, including the post-office; and all this is so
much capital in the hands of the bank, because the revenue is
received by it, and is payable in its promissory notes.

"2. To pay the revenues of the United States in their own
notes, until Congress, by law, shall otherwise direct. This is
a part of the charter, incredible and extraordinary as it may
appear. The promissory notes of the bank are to be received in
payment of every thing the United States may have to sell--in
discharge of every debt due to her, until Congress, by law,
shall otherwise direct; so that, if this bank, like its
prototype in England, should stop payment, its promissory notes
would still be receivable at every custom-house, land-office,
post-office, and by every collector of public moneys, throughout
the Union, until Congress shall meet, pass a repealing law, and
promulgate the repeal. Other banks depend upon their credit for
the receivability of their notes; but this favored institution
has law on its side, and a chartered right to compel the
reception of its paper by the federal government. The immediate
consequence of this extraordinary privilege is, that the United
States becomes virtually bound to stand security for the bank,
as much so as if she had signed a bond to that effect; and must
stand forward to sustain the institution in all emergencies,
in order to save her own revenue. This is what has already
happened, some ten years ago, in the early progress of the bank,
and when the immense aid given it by the federal government
enabled it to survive the crisis of its own overwhelming
mismanagement.

"3. To hold the moneys of the United States in deposit, without
making compensation for the use of the undrawn balances.--This
is a right which I deny; but, as the bank claims it, and, what
is more material, enjoys it; and as the people of the United
States have suffered to a vast extent in consequence of this
claim and enjoyment, I shall not hesitate to set it down to
the account of the bank. Let us then examine the value of this
privilege, and its effect upon the interest of the community;
and, in the first place, let us have a full and accurate view of
the amount of these undrawn balances, from the establishment of
the bank to the present day. Here it is! Look! Read!

"See, Mr. President, what masses of money, and always on hand.
The paper is covered all over with millions: and yet, for all
these vast sums, no interest is allowed; no compensation is
made to the United States. The Bank of England, for the undrawn
balances of the public money, has made an equitable compensation
to the British government; namely, a permanent loan of half a
million sterling, and a temporary loan of three millions for
twenty years, without interest. Yet, when I moved for a like
compensation to the United States, the proposition was utterly
rejected by the Finance Committee, and treated as an attempt
to violate the charter of the bank. At the same time it is
incontestable, that the United States have been borrowing these
undrawn balances from the bank, and paying an interest upon
their own money. I think we can identify one of these loans.
Let us try. In May, 1824, Congress authorized a loan of five
millions of dollars to pay the awards under the treaty with
Spain, commonly called the Florida treaty. The bank of the
United States took that loan, and paid the money for the United
States in January and March, 1825. In looking over the statement
of undrawn balances, it will be seen that they amounted to near
four millions at the end of the first, and six millions at
the end of the second quarter of that year. The inference is
irresistible, and I leave every senator to make it; only adding,
that we have paid $1,469,375 in interest upon that loan, either
to the bank or its transferrees. This is a strong case; but I
have a stronger one. It is known to every body, that the United
States subscribed seven millions to the capital stock of the
bank, for which she gave her stock note, bearing an interest of
five per cent. per annum. I have a statement from the Register
of the Treasury, from which it appears that, up to the 30th day
of June last, the United States had paid four millions seven
hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars in interest upon that
note; when it is proved by the statement of balances exhibited,
that the United States, for the whole period in which that
interest was accruing, had the half, or the whole, and once the
double, of these seven millions in the hands of the bank. This
is a stronger case than that of the five million loan, but it
is not the strongest. The strongest case is this: in the year
1817, when the bank went into operation, the United States
owed, among other debts, a sum of about fourteen millions and
three-quarters, bearing an interest of three per cent. In the
same year, the commissioners of the sinking fund were authorized
by an act of Congress to purchase that stock at sixty-five per
cent., which was then its market price. Under this authority,
the amount of about one million and a half was purchased; the
remainder, amounting to about thirteen millions and a quarter,
has continued unpurchased to this day; and, after costing the
United States about six millions in interest since 1817, the
stock has risen about four millions in value; that is to say,
from sixty-five to nearly ninety-five. Now, here is a clear loss
of ten millions of dollars to the United States. In 1817 she
could have paid off thirteen millions and a quarter of debt,
with eight millions and a half of dollars: now, after paying
six millions of interest, it would require twelve millions and
a half to pay off the same debt. By referring to the statement
of undrawn balances, it will be seen that the United States had,
during the whole year 1817, an average sum of above ten millions
of dollars in the hands of the bank, being a million and a half
more than enough to have bought in the whole of the three per
cent. stock. The question, therefore, naturally comes up, why
was it not applied to the redemption of these thirteen millions
and a quarter, according to the authority contained in the act
of Congress of that year? Certainly the bank needed the money;
for it was just getting into operation, and was as hard run to
escape bankruptcy about that time, as any bank that ever was
saved from the brink of destruction. This is the largest injury
which we have sustained, on account of accommodating the bank
with the gratuitous use of these vast deposits. But, to show
myself impartial, I will now state the smallest case of injury
that has come within my knowledge: it is the case of the _bonus_
of fifteen hundred thousand dollars which the bank was to pay to
the United States, in three equal instalments, for the purchase
of its charter. Nominally, this _bonus_ has been paid, but out
of what moneys? Certainly out of our own; for the statement
shows our money was there, and further, shows that it is still
there; for, on the 30th day of June last, which is the latest
return, there was still $2,550,664 in the hands of the bank,
which is above $750,000 more than the amount of the _bonus_.