Chapter XC: Public Lands:--Distribution of Proceeds

Mr. Clay renewed, at this session, 1832-'33, the bill which he had brought in the session before, and which had passed the Senate, to divide the net proceeds of the sales of public lands among the States, to be applied to such purposes as the legislatures of the respective States should think proper. His principal arguments, in favor of the bill, were: _first_, the aid which the distribution would give to the States, in developing their resources and promoting their prosperity; _secondly_, the advantage to the federal government, in settling the question of the mode of disposing of the public lands. He explained his bill, which, at first, contained a specification of the objects to which the States should apply the dividends they received, which was struck out, in the progress of the bill, and stated its provisions to be:

"To set apart, for the benefit of the new States, twelve and a
half per cent., out of the aggregate proceeds, in addition to
the five per cent., which was now allowed to them by compact,
before any division took place among the States generally.
It was thus proposed to assign, in the first place, seventeen
and a half per cent. to the new States, and then to divide the
whole of the residue among the twenty-four States. And, in order
to do away any inequality among the new States, grants are
specifically made by the bill to those who had not received,
heretofore, as much lands as the rest of the new States, from
the general government, so as to put all the new States on
an equal footing. This twelve and a half per cent., to the
new States, to be at their disposal, for either education or
internal improvement, and the residue to be at the disposition
of the States, subject to no other limitation than this: that it
shall be at their option to apply the amount received either to
the purposes of education, or the colonization of free people of
color, or for internal improvements, or in debts which may have
been contracted for internal improvements. And, with respect
to the duration of this scheme of distribution proposed by the
bill, it is limited to five years, unless hostilities shall
occur between the United States and any foreign power; in which
event, the proceeds are to be applied to the carrying on such
war, with vigor and effect, against any common enemy with whom
we may be brought in contact. After the conclusion of peace,
and after the discharge of the debt created by any such war,
the aggregate funds to return to that peaceful destination to
which it was the intention of the bill that they should now be
directed, that is, to the improvement of the moral and physical
condition of the country, and the promotion of the public
happiness and prosperity."

He then spoke of the advantages of settling the question of the manner of disposing of the public lands, and said:

"The first remark which seemed to him to be called for, in
reference to this subject, was as to the expediency, he would
say the necessity, of its immediate settlement. On this point,
he was happy to believe that there was a unanimous concurrence
of opinion in that body. However they might differ as to the
terms on which the distribution of these lands should be
made, they all agreed that it was a question which ought to
be promptly and finally, he hoped amicably, adjusted. No time
more favorable than the present moment could be selected for
the settlement of this question. The last session was much less
favorable for the accomplishment of this object; and the reasons
were sufficiently obvious, without any waste of time in their
specification. If the question were not now settled, but if it
were to be made the subject of an annual discussion, mixing
itself up with all the measures of legislation, it would be
felt in its influence upon all, would produce great dissensions
both in and out of the House, and affect extensively all the
great and important objects which might be before that body.
They had had, in the several States, some experience on that
subject; and, without going into any details on the subject, he
would merely state that it was known, that, for a long period,
the small amount of the public domain possessed by some of the
States, in comparison with the quantity possessed by the general
government, had been a cause of great agitation in the public
mind, and had greatly influenced the course of legislation.
Persons coming from the quarter of the State in which the
public land was situated, united in sympathy and interest,
constituted always a body who acted together, to promote their
common object, either by donations to settlers, or reduction in
the price of the public lands, or the relief of those who are
debtors for the public domain; and were always ready, as men
always will be, to second all those measures which look towards
the accomplishment of the main object which they have in view.
So, if this question were not now settled, it would be a source
of inexpressible difficulty hereafter, influencing all the great
interests of the country, in Congress, affecting great events
without, and perhaps adding another to those unhappy causes of
division, which unfortunately exist at this moment."

In his arguments in support of his bill, Mr. Clay looked to the lands as a source of revenue to the States or the federal government, from their sale, and not from their settlement and cultivation, and the revenue to be derived from the wealth and population to which their settlement would give rise; and, concluding with an encomium on his bill under the aspect of revenue from sales, he said:

"He could not conceive a more happy disposition of the proceeds
of the public lands, than that which was provided by this bill.
It was supposed that five years would be neither too long nor
too short a period for a fair experiment. In case a war should
break out, we may withdraw from its peaceful destination a sum
of from two and a half to three and a half millions of dollars
per annum, and apply it to a vigorous prosecution of the war--a
sum which would pay the interest on sixty millions of dollars,
which might be required to sustain the war, and a sum which is
constantly and progressively increasing. It proposes, now that
the general government has no use for the money, now that the
surplus treasure is really a source of vexatious embarrassment
to us, and gives rise to a succession of projects, to supply for
a short time a fund to the States which want our assistance,
to advance to them that which we do not want, and which they
will apply to great beneficial national purposes; and, should
war take place, to divert it to the vigorous support of the
war; and, when it ceases, to apply it again to its peaceful
purposes. And thus we may grow, from time to time, with a fund
which will endure for centuries, and which will augment with the
growth of the nation, aiding the States in seasons of peace, and
sustaining the general government in periods of war."

Mr. Calhoun deprecated this distribution of the land money as being dangerous in itself and unconstitutional, and as leading to the distribution of other revenue--in which he was prophetic. He said:

"He could not yield his assent to the mode which this bill
proposed to settle the agitated question of the public lands.
In addition to several objections of a minor character, he
had an insuperable objection to the leading principle of the
bill, which proposed to distribute the proceeds of the lands
among the States. He believed it to be both dangerous and
unconstitutional. He could not assent to the principle, that
Congress had a right to denationalize the public funds. He
agreed that the objection was not so decided in case of the
proceeds of lands, as in that of revenue collected from taxes
or duties. The senator from Ohio had adduced evidence from the
deed of cession, which certainly countenanced the idea that
the proceeds of the lands might be subject to the distribution
proposed in the bill; but he was far from being satisfied that
the argument was solid or conclusive. If the principle of
distribution could be confined to the proceeds of the lands, he
would acknowledge that his objection to the principle would be
weakened.

"He dreaded the force of precedent, and he foresaw that the time
would come when the example of the distribution of the proceeds
of the public lands would be urged as a reason for distributing
the revenue derived from other sources. Nor would the argument
be devoid of plausibility. If we, of the Atlantic States,
insist that the revenue of the West, derived from lands, should
be equally distributed among all the States, we must not be
surprised if the interior States should, in like manner, insist
to distribute the proceeds of the customs, the great source
of revenue in the Atlantic States. Should such a movement be
successful, it must be obvious to every one, who is the least
acquainted with the workings of the human heart, and the nature
of government, that nothing would more certainly endanger the
existence of the Union. The revenue is the power of the State,
and to distribute its revenue is to dissolve its power into its
original elements."

Attempts were made to postpone the bill to the next session, which failed; and it passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 20.

YEAS.--Messrs. Bell, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson,
Dudley, Ewing, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Holmes,
Johnston, Knight, Poindexter, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles,
Seymour, Silsbee, Sprague, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Wilkins--24.

NAYS.--Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buckner, Calhoun, Forsyth,
Grundy, Hill, Kane, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Rives,
Robinson, Smith, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright--20.

The bill went to the House and received amendments, which did not obtain the concurrence of the Senate until midnight of the first of March, which, being the short session, was within twenty-four hours of the constitutional termination of the Congress, which was limited to the 3d--which falling this year on Sunday, the Congress would adjourn at midnight of the 2nd. Further efforts were made to postpone it, and upon the ground that, in a bill of that magnitude and novelty, the President was entitled to the full ten days for the consideration of it which the constitution allowed him, and he would have but half a day; for if passed that night it could only reach him in the forenoon of the next day--leaving him but half a day for his consideration of the measure, where the constitution allowed him ten; and that half day engrossed with all crowded business of an expiring session. The next evening, the President attended, as usual, in a room adjoining the Senate chamber, to be at hand to sign bills and make nominations. It was some hours in the night when the President sent for me, and withdrawing into the recess of a window, told me that he had a veto message ready on the land bill, but doubted about sending it in, lest there should not be a full Senate; and intimated his apprehension that Mr. Calhoun and some of his friends might be absent, and endanger the bill: and wished to consult me upon that point. I told him I would go and reconnoitre the chamber, and adjacent rooms; did so--found that Mr. Calhoun and his immediate friends were absent--returned and informed him, when he said he would keep the bill until the next session, and then return it with a fully considered message--his present one being brief, and not such as to show his views fully. I told him I thought he ought to do so--that such a measure ought not to be passed in the last hours of a session, in a thin Senate, and upon an imperfect view of his objections; and that the public good required it to be held up. It was so; and during the long vacation of nine months which intervened before the next session, the opposition presses and orators kept the country filled with denunciations of the enormity of his conduct in "_pocketing_" the hill--as if it had been a case of "flat burglary," instead of being the exercise of a constitutional right, rendered most just and proper under the extraordinary circumstances which had attended the passage, and intended return of the bill. At the commencement of the ensuing session he returned the bill, with his well-considered objections, in an ample message, which, after going over a full history of the derivation of the lands, came to the following conclusions:

"1. That one of the fundamental principles, on which the
confederation of the United States was originally based, was,
that the waste lands of the West, within their limits, should be
the common property of the United States.

"2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the
States which claimed them, and the cessions were accepted, on
the express condition that they should be disposed of for the
common benefit of the States, according to their respective
proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no
other purpose whatsoever.

"3. That, in execution of these solemn compacts, the Congress of
the United States did, under the confederation, proceed to sell
these lands, and put the avails into the common treasury; and,
under the new constitution, did repeatedly pledge them for the
payment of the public debt of the United States, by which pledge
each State was expected to profit in proportion to the general
charge to be made upon it for that object.

"These are the first principles of this whole subject, which,
I think, cannot be contested by any one who examines the
proceedings of the revolutionary Congress, the sessions of
the several States, and the acts of Congress, under the new
constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed upon the mind, let
us proceed to examine how far the objects of the cessions have
been completed, and see whether those compacts are not still
obligatory upon the United States.

"The debt, for which these lands were pledged by Congress,
may be considered as paid, and they are consequently released
from that lien. But that pledge formed no part of the compacts
with the States, or of the conditions upon which the cessions
were made. It was a contract between new parties--between the
United States and their creditors. Upon payment of the debt,
the compacts remain in full force, and the obligation of the
United States to dispose of the lands for the common benefit, is
neither destroyed nor impaired. As they cannot now be executed
in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is,
in what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of
for the common benefit of the several States, 'according to
their respective and usual proportion in the general charge and
expenditure?' The cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and
Georgia, in express terms, and all the rest impliedly, not only
provide thus specifically the proportion, according to which
each State shall profit by the proceeds of the land sales, but
they proceed to declare that they shall be 'faithfully and _bona
fide_ disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or
purpose whatsoever.' This is the fundamental law of the land, at
this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the
constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union
itself was erected.

"In the practice of the government, the proceeds of the public
lands have not been set apart as a separate fund for the payment
of the public debt, but have been, and are now, paid into
the treasury, where they constitute a part of the aggregate
of revenue, upon which the government draws, as well for its
current expenditures as for payment of the public debt. In this
manner, they have heretofore, and do now, lessen the general
charge upon the people of the several States, in the exact
proportions stipulated in the compacts.

"These general charges have been composed, not only of the
public debt and the usual expenditures attending the civil and
military administrations of the government, but of the amounts
paid to the States, with which these compacts were formed; the
amounts paid the Indians for their right of possession; the
amounts paid for the purchase of Louisiana and Florida; and
the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks, &c.,
employed in preparing for market, and selling, the western
domain. From the origin of the land system, down to the 30th
September, 1832, the amount expended for all these purposes has
been about $49,701,280 and the amount received from the sales,
deducting payments on account of roads, &c., about $38,386,624.
The revenue arising from the public lands, therefore, has not
been sufficient to meet the general charges on the treasury,
which have grown out of them, by about $11,314,656. Yet, in
having been applied to lessen those charges, the conditions
of the compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State
has profited according to its usual proportion in the general
charge and expenditure. The annual proceeds of land sales have
increased, and the charges have diminished; so that, at a
reduced price, those lands would now defray all current charges
growing out of them, and save the treasury from further advances
on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore,
would be accomplished, as fully as it has hitherto been, by
reducing the price, and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the
proceeds into the treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in
which the objects of the original compact can be attained, it
may be considered, for all practical purposes, that it is one of
their requirements.

"The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every
one of the compacts by which the United States became possessed
of their western domain, and treats the subject as if they never
had existence, and as if the United States were the original and
unconditional owners of all the public lands. The first section
directs--

"'That, from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there
shall be allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and
Louisiana, over and above what each of the said States is
entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between
them, respectively, upon their admission into the Union and the
United States, the sum of twelve and a half per centum upon the
net amount of the sales of the public lands, which, subsequent
to the day aforesaid, shall be made within the several limits
of the said States; which said sum of twelve and a half per
centum shall be applied to some object or objects of internal
improvement or education, within the said States, under the
direction of their several legislatures.'

"This twelve and a half per centum is to be taken out of the
net proceeds of the land sales, before any apportionment is
made; and the same seven States, which are first to receive this
proportion, are also to receive their due proportion of the
residue, according to the ratio of general distribution.

"Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy, in regard
to this provision, what more need be said to demonstrate
its objectionable character, than that it is in direct and
undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the
States, before a single cession was made; that it abrogates the
condition upon which some of the States came into the Union;
and that it sets at nought the terms of cession spread upon the
face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the
public land is held by the federal government?

"In the apportionment of the remaining seven eighths of
the proceeds, this bill, in a manner equally undisguised,
violates the conditions upon which the United States acquired
title to the ceded lands. Abandoning altogether the ratio of
distribution, according to the general charge and expenditure
provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the federal
representative population. Virginia, and other States, which
ceded their lands upon the express condition that they should
receive a benefit from their sales, in proportion to their
part of the general charge, are, by the bill, allowed only a
portion of seven eighths of their proceeds, and that not in the
proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the ratio
of their federal representative population.

"The constitution of the United States did not delegate to
Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary,
by declaring that nothing in it 'shall be so construed as to
prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular
State,' it virtually provides that these compacts, and the
rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative
power, which shall only make all 'needful rules and regulations'
for carrying them into effect. All beyond this, would seem to be
an assumption of undelegated power.

"These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of
virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the
price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to
pay for that Union, without which, they plainly saw, it could
not be preserved. It was not for territory or State power that
our revolutionary fathers took up arms; it was for individual
liberty, and the right of self-government. The expulsion, from
the continent, of British armies and British power was to them
a barren conquest, if, through the collisions of the redeemed
States, the individual rights for which they fought should
become the prey of petty military tyrannies established at
home. To avert such consequences, and throw around liberty the
shield of union, States, whose relative strength, at the time,
gave them a preponderating power, magnanimously sacrificed
domains which would have made them the rivals of empires, only
stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common
benefit of themselves and the other confederated States. This
enlightened policy produced union, and has secured liberty. It
has made our waste lands to swarm with a busy people, and added
many powerful States to our confederation. As well for the
fruits which these noble works of our ancestors have produced,
as for the devotedness in which they originated, we should
hesitate before we demolish them.

"But there are other principles asserted in the bill, which
would have impelled me to withhold my signature, had I not
seen in it a violation of the compacts by which the United
States acquired title to a large portion of the public lands.
It reasserts the principle contained in the bill authorizing
a subscription to the stock of the Maysville, Washington,
Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was
compelled to withhold my consent, for reasons contained in my
message of the 27th May 1830, to the House of Representatives.
The leading principle, then asserted, was, that Congress
possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the
moneys of the United States for objects of a local character
within the States. That principle, I cannot be mistaken in
supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American
people, and all subsequent reflection has but satisfied me
more thoroughly that the interests of our people, and the
purity of our government, if not its existence, depend on its
observance. The public lands are the common property of the
United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a
part of the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from,
and appropriate a portion of, this public revenue to certain
States, providing expressly that it shall 'be applied to objects
of internal improvement or education within those States,' and
then proceeds to appropriate the balance to all the States,
with the declaration that it shall be applied 'to such purposes
as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem
proper.' The former appropriation is expressly for internal
improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind
of improvements, and, therefore, in express violation of the
principle maintained in my objections to the turnpike road bill,
above referred to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and
gives the money to be applied to any local purpose whatsoever.
It will not be denied, that, under the provisions of the bill,
a portion of the money might have been applied to making the
very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference, and must,
of course, come within the scope of the same principle. If the
money of the United States cannot be applied to local purposes
through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus
expended through the agency of the State governments.

"It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our
revenue which could be speedily effected by Congress, without
injury to the substantial interests of the country, there might
be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the treasury;
and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning
them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal
accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable,
it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to
it, to hand them over to the State governments, the more
immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied
to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The
principle and the object was, to return to the people an
unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by
them under a system which could not at once be abandoned; but
even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the
only alternative to save the general government from grasping
unlimited power over internal improvements, was suggested with
doubts of its constitutionality.

"But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to
return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in
by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the
States. It seizes the entire proceeds of one source of revenue,
and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise
the money for supporting the government, and meeting the general
charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land
system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public
lands a perpetual charge upon the treasury. It does not return
to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them
to the government by which they are not wanted; but compels the
people to pay moneys into the treasury for the mere purpose of
creating a surplus for distribution to their State governments.
If this principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to
perceive to what consequences it may lead. Already this bill,
by throwing the land system on the revenues from imports for
support, virtually distributes among the States a part of those
revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time,
without any departure from the principle now asserted, until
the State governments shall derive all the funds necessary for
their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if
a sufficient supply should be obtained by some States and not
by others, the deficient States might complain, and, to put
an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming
any new principle, need go but one step further, and put the
salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers,
with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general
appropriation bill.

"It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation
cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that government which
pays all the public officers of the States, will all political
power be substantially concentrated. The State governments,
if governments they might be called, would lose all their
independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes
them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the
extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general
government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all
their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names
they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be
prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendaries and
instruments of the central power.

"I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several
States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is
neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local
legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes
necessary to support their State governments, and vest it in
Congress, over most of whose members they have no control.
They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the
tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their State governments, thus
amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest
and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would
subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately
deprive us of the blessings now derived from our happy union.

"However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the
treasury should be returned to the people through their State
governments, I cannot assent to the principle that a surplus may
be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill
as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus
for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury
among the States without limitation, from whatever source they
may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate
money for the support of every State government and institution,
as well as for making every local improvement, however trivial,
I cannot give it my assent.

"It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to
the old States or the new from the system of distribution which
this bill proposes, if it were otherwise unobjectionable. It
requires no argument to prove, that if three millions of dollars
a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the treasury
by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same
sum collected from the people through some other means. The old
States will receive annually a sum of money from the treasury,
but they will pay in a larger sum, together with the expenses
of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of
seven eights of the proceeds of land sales which they are to
receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole.
Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss in
the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other
incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true because
it may not at first be palpable. Their receipts will be in
large sums, but their payments in small ones. The governments
of the States will receive seven dollars, for which the people
of the States will pay eight. The large sums received will be
palpable to the senses; the small sums paid, it requires thought
to identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people
that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were
given them from the public treasury, for which they were at the
same time required to pay in taxes, direct or indirect, eight
hundred.

"I deceive myself greatly if the new States would find their
interests promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their
true policy consists in the rapid settling and improvement of
the waste lands within their limits. As a means of hastening
those events, they have long been looking to a reduction in the
price of public lands upon the final payment of the national
debt. The effect of the proposed system would be to prevent
that reduction. It is true, the bill reserves to Congress the
power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details, as now
arranged, would probably be forever to prevent its exercise.

"With the just men who inhabit the new States, it is a
sufficient reason to reject this system, that it is in violation
of the fundamental laws of the republic and its constitution.
But if it were a mere question of interest or expediency, they
would still reject it. They would not sell their bright prospect
of increasing wealth and growing power at such a price. They
would not place a sum of money to be paid into their treasuries,
in competition with the settlement of their waste lands, and
the increase of their population. They would not consider a
small or large annual sum to be paid to their governments, and
immediately expended, as an equivalent for that enduring wealth
which is composed of flocks and herds, and cultivated farms.
No temptation will allure them from that object of abiding
interest, the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase
of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory in peace and their
defence in war.

"On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my
annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the
public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source
of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges
which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey,
and sale. Although these expenses have not been met by the
proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will be
hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By
meeting in the treasury so much of the general charge as arises
from that source, they will be hereafter, as they have been
heretofore, disposed of for the common benefit of the United
States, according to the compacts of cession. I do not doubt
that it is the real interest of each and all the States in the
Union, and particularly of the new States, that the price of
these lands shall be reduced and graduated; and that, after they
have been offered for a certain number of years, the refuse,
remaining unsold, shall be abandoned to the States, and the
machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It cannot be
supposed the compacts intended that the United States should
retain forever a title to lands within the States, which are of
no value; and no doubt is entertained that the general interest
would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the States.

"This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no
principle, violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already
has the price of those lands been reduced from two dollars
per acre to one dollar and a quarter; and upon the will of
Congress, it depends whether there shall be a further reduction.
While the burdens of the East are diminishing by the reduction
of the duties upon imports, it seems but equal justice that
the chief burden of the West should be lightened in an equal
degree at least. It would be just to the old States and the
new, conciliate every interest, disarm the subject of all its
dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity of our happy
Union."

_Statement respecting the revenue derived from the public lands, accompanying the President's Message to the Senate, December 4th, 1833, stating his reasons for not approving the Land Bill:_

Statement of the amount of money which has been paid by the
United States for the title to the public lands, including the
payments made under the Louisiana and Florida treaties; the
compact with Georgia; the settlement with the Yazoo claimants;
the contracts with the Indian tribes; and the expenditures for
compensation to commissioners, clerks, surveyors, and other
officers, employed by the United States for the management and
sale of the Western domain; the gross amount of money received
into the treasury, as the proceeds of public lands, to the 30th
of September, 1832; also, the net amount, after deducting five
per cent., expended on account of roads within, and leading to
the Western States, &c., and sums refunded on account of errors
in the entries of public lands.

Payment on account of the purchase of Louisiana:

Principal, $14,984,872 28
Interest on $11,250,000 8,529,353 43
------------- $23,514,225 71

Payment on account of the purchase of Florida:

Principal, $4,985,599 82
Interest to 30th September, 1832, 1,489,768 66
------------- $6,475,368 48
Payment of compact with Georgia, 1,065,484 06
Payment of the settlement with the Yazoo
claimants, 1,830,808 04
Payment of contracts with the several Indian
tribes (all expenses on account of Indians), 13,064,677 45
Payment of commissioners, clerks, and other
officers, employed by the United States for
the management and sale of the Western
domain, 3,750,716 43
--------------
$49,701,280 17
--------------
Amount of money received into the treasury
as the proceeds of public lands to 30th
September, 1832, $39,614,000 07
Deduct payments from the treasury on account
of roads, &c., 1,227,375 94
--------------
$38,386,624 13
--------------

T. L. SMITH, _Reg._

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, }
_Register's Office, March 1, 1833_. }

Such was this ample and well-considered message, one of the wisest and most patriotic ever delivered by any President, and presenting General Jackson under the aspect of an immense elevation over the ordinary arts of men who run a popular career, and become candidates for popular votes. Such arts require addresses to popular interests, the conciliation of the interested passions, the gratification of cupidity, the favoring of the masses in the distribution of money or property as well as the enrichment of classes in undue advantages. General Jackson exhibits himself as equally elevated above all these arts--as far above seducing the masses with agrarian laws as above enriching the few with the plundering legislation of banks and tariffs; and the people felt this elevation, and did honor to themselves in the manner in which they appreciated it. Far from losing his popularity, he increased it, by every act of disdain which he exhibited for the ordinary arts of conciliating popular favor. His veto message, on this occasion was an exemplification of all the high qualities of the public man. He sat out with showing that these lands, so far as they were divided from the States, were granted as a common fund, to be disposed of for the benefit of all the States, according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever; and that by the principles of our government and sound policy, those acquired from foreign governments could only be disposed of in the same manner. In addition to these great reasons of principle and policy, the message clearly points out the mischief which any scheme of distribution will inflict upon the new States in preventing reductions in the price of the public lands--in preventing donations to settlers--and in preventing the cession of the unsalable lands to the States in which they lie; and recurs to his early messages in support of the policy, now that the public debt was paid, of looking to settlement and population as the chief objects to be derived from these lands, and for that purpose that they be sold to settlers at cost.