Chapter XIV: Part 14

“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a
wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end
would have been different.

“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is
impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the
lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter
measures.

“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy,
has taken the most important positions, industrial production
will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s
battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions.
Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning
battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

“This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be
true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet
had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case
in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be
effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures.

“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be
decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise
and by masterly handling.”

The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more in detail with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary to read further.

The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports the allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating to the meeting of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in those allegations.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the defendants.

MR. ALDERMAN: I didn’t read these, Mr. President, simply because I am convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. I will be glad to have them read in the original German.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.

MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.

MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed “Working principles”?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the original.

BY THE INTERPRETER: “Page 16. Purpose:

“1. Study of the entire problem;

“2. Study of the events;

“3. Study of the means needed;

“4. Study of the necessary training.

“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical
training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with
sober sceptic powers of understanding.

“Working principles:

“1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to know of
it.

“2. No one can find out more than he must know.

“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest?
No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.

“On Göring’s question, the Führer decided that:

a) The armed forces determine what shall be built;

b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed;

c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or
1944.”—Schmundt certified this text.

MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than I had anticipated.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. It demonstrates that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive expansion for food and “Lebensraum.”

In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland.

We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two I shall offer.

The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately, we did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison of those two documents with the first document, we concluded that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches.

On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber).

I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the OKW at Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS and 1014-PS, in our series of documents.

In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second document, 798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS, as Exhibit USA-30.

These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and I shall not necessarily read the entire speech.

Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer speaks to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: “I have called you together. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?

MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.

THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?

MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication “Obersalzberg” came from the first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this speech.

The place is not very significant; it is the time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]:

“I have called you together to give you a picture of the
political situation, in order that you may have insight into the
individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in
order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss
military details.

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the
spring.”—I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the
May document, which I have already read, L-79.—“But I thought I
would first turn against the West in a few years, and only
afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed.
One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation.
I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in
order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which was
agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential
points have changed.

“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a
conflict with the West.

“Poland wants access to the sea.

“The further development became obvious after the occupation of
the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the
circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an
inopportune moment.

“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two
personal constitutions”—I suppose he means “personalities”;
that probably is an inapt translation—“my own personality, and
that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence,
because of my political ability.”

I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man’s personality.

“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have
the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will
probably never again be a man in the future with more authority
than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great
value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an
idiot.

“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also
decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the
Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the
Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in
the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with
the strongest nerves in Italy.

“The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only
benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s
personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness
of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the
fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our
internal unity.

“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive
personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality
in England or France.”—I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must
have overlooked one in England, perhaps many.—

“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to
lose—we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because
of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few
years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must
act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little.
England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have
men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men
of action.”

I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant by no personalities—no masters having the authority that he had over his nation.

“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is
favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy,
France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the
alarming of the Mohammedan world.

“The English empire did not emerge from the last war
strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was
achieved; conflict between England and Ireland, the South
African Union became more independent, concessions had to be
made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries.
A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the
Mediterranean.

“Further favorable factors for us are these:

“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
situation.

“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and
vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since
Kemal’s death Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady
weak men.

“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2
or 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore
conflict better now.

“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement
politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was
achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is
necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by
general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My
propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by
England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The
initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment
is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or
Mussolini’s would change the situation to our disadvantage. One
cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A
suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our
convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again
in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing
prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will
not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution.
A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We
are facing the alternative to strike or be destroyed with
certainty sooner or later.”—We skip two paragraphs.—

“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron
resolution. . . .”

A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, I resume:

“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which
demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute
some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.”—And
then the last paragraph of one sentence—“Göring answers with
thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the Armed Forces
will do their duty.”

I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter note entitled: “Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939.” Reading then from United States Exhibit 30, headed “Second Speech by the Führer on 22 August 1939:

“It may also turn out differently regarding England and France.
One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade
barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most
iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing.
Everybody shall have to make a point of it, that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. A
struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as
she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by
getting used to the heaviest strain. A long period of peace
would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect
everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each
other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental
factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In
1918 the Nation fell down because the mental pre-requisites were
not sufficient. Frederick the Great secured final success only
through his mental power.

“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the
elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of
Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of
the season.

“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting
and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory.

“Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people shall get
what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The
strongest has the right. Greatest severity.

“Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German
soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders
give way.

“First aim: Advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical
superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly
created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war
of attrition.

“New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a
protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be
influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland
is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until
complete elimination.

“Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements.
The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.”

That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in fact the start was actually postponed until September 1.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, may I make a short statement on the two documents which have just been read. Both the documents which were read and also the third which was not read but to which reference was made, are not recognized by the Defense. I do not wish this objection to appear unjustified; may I therefore give this explanation:

Both the documents which were read contain a number of factual errors. They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting took place, and that is the cause for the inaccuracy of these documents. No one present at that meeting was charged with taking down the events in the meeting stenographically, and since there are no signatures, it cannot be determined who wrote the documents and who is responsible for their reliability. The third document which was not read is, according to the photostatic copy in the Defense’s document room, simply typewritten. There is no indication of place or time of execution.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the third document, because it has not been read.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless been published in the press and was apparently given to the press by the Prosecution. Consequently both the Defense and the defendants have a lively interest in giving a short explanation of the facts concerning these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance with the evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, and the third document is not in evidence before us.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that counsel wonder how these two documents which I have just read are in our hands. They come to us from an authentic source. They are German documents. They were found in the OKW files. If they aren’t correct records of what occurred, it surprises us that with the great thoroughness with which the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had these records that didn’t represent the truth in their OKW files.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course hear what evidence the defendants choose to give with reference to the documents.

MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that if any of these defendants have in their possession what is a more correct transcription of the Führer’s words on this occasion, the Court should consider that. On the other question referred to by counsel, I feel somewhat guilty. It is quite true that, by a mechanical slip, the press got the first document, which we never at all intended them to have. I feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in the document books that were handed up to the Court on Friday, because we had only intended to refer to it and give it an identification mark and not to offer it. I had thought that no documents would be released to the press until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an organization as we have, it is very difficult to police all those matters.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of these documents are given to the press.

MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that.

COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as and when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made available to the press.

THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?

COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250 mimeographed copies.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ counsel should have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press the defendants’ counsel should have the documents.

COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand that these gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning. They had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents that have been read today, down in the Information Center.

THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangement which was made, and which was made upon your representations, that 10 copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents should be given to the defendants’ counsel.

COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited in the room.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey, is that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then the defendants’ counsel should not be limited to five copies.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the mimeographed copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my hands, or in my briefcase here, a receipt that the document books and the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance.

THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am putting to you, which is this: That if you can afford to give 250 copies of the documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five copies to the defendants’ counsel—one each. Well, we do not need to discuss it further. In the future that will be done.

DR. DIX: May I say, then, that of every document in evidence each defense counsel will receive one copy; it will not be just one for several members of the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the Four Chief Prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the British Chief Prosecutor.

Another change that we have made in our plan, which I perhaps should mention, is that following the opening statement by the British Chief Prosecutor on Count Two, we expect to resume the detailed handling of the later phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British, instead of the Americans, will deal with the details of aggression against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and then, as a joint part of the American case under Count One and the British case under Count Two, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects, with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, and now by presentation of specifically significant documents, are the case of the attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 22nd of June 1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December 1941.

As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at this point present two documents. The first of these two documents establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation “Case Green”, so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name “Case Barbarossa.”

THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?

MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer’s headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series.

I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31.

If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to read the first page of that directive, the first page of the English translation. The paging may differ in the German original.

It is headed “The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces,” with a number of initials, the meaning of which I don’t know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando chiefs:

“The Führer’s headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only
through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21,
Case Barbarossa.

“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England.
(Case Barbarossa.)

“For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available
units with the reservation that the occupied territories will
have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

“For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free such
strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick
completion of the ground operations may be expected and that
damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much
as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East
is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle
and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently
protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on
England, and especially the supply for them, must not be
permitted to break down.

“Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains
unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

“If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for
action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended
beginning of operations.

“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not
yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15
May 1941.

“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an
attack will not be recognized.

“The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the
following basis:

“1. General Purpose:

“The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be
destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges
with tanks, and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into
the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

“In quick pursuit, a line is to be reached from where the
Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich
territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from
Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. In case of
necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia
could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

“In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet
will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to
fight.

“Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be
prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the
operations.”

Another secret document, captured from the OKW files. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, another secret document captured from the OKW files, we think establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941, concerning the result of a discussion on that day with the state secretaries concerning the Case Barbarossa. The document is initialled by a Major Von Gusovius, a member of the staff of General Thomas set up to handle the economic exploitations of the territory occupied by the Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document is numbered 2718-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-32.

I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this document, including the introductory matter:

“Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a. Second copy
to General Schubert, May 2, 1941.”

“Memorandum about the result of today’s discussion with the
state secretaries about Barbarossa.

“1. The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by
Russia in the third year of war.

“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us.”

That document has already been commented on and quoted from in Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening statement. The staggering implications of that document are hard to realize. In the words of the document, the motive for the attack was that the war which the Nazi conspirators had launched in September 1939 “can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by Russia in the third year of the war.” Perhaps, there never was a more sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which reads:

“There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will
be starved to death if we take out of the country the things
necessary for us.”

The result is known to all of us.

I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan and the resulting attack on the United States on 7 December 1941. With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators, and in particular, the Defendant Ribbentrop, called upon the eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show that they incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they maintained their preference that the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the military implication of an entry of the United States into the war. However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict break out. It was in reliance on those assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall offer only one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, signed by “Schmidt,” regarding discussions between the Führer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-33. In the original, it is in very large, typewritten form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs; first reading the heading, the heading being:

“Notes regarding the discussion between the Führer and the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Reich
Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of State Meissner, in
Berlin, on 4 April 1941.

“Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Führer should
instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as
broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military
Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly
concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making
available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as
the latest technical improvements and inventions.”—For the
record, I am reading on what is page 6 of the German original.—

“Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United
States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore,
the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight
with the United States, because in that case America probably
would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed
that the United States could be restrained, by diplomatic
exertions, from entering the war at the side of Great Britain.
Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst
situation,—that is, with war against America. They were of the
opinion that such a war would extend for 5 years or longer, and
would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific, and
would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German
experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to
Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted
and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all
details such as periscopes and such like, could best be
exploited by Japan.

“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Führer should see to it
that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal
of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning
navy and army which were needed by the Japanese.

“The Führer promised this and pointed out that Germany, too,
considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but
that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In
Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contributions
depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this
again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war
against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening, not merely
against England, but also against America. Germany has made her
preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would
conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which
would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the
German soldiers naturally rank high above the Americans.

“In the further course of the discussion, the Führer pointed out
that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the
consequences if Japan would get involved with the United States.
It did not matter with whom the United States would first get
involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. They would always
try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an
understanding with the other country subsequently, but to
liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would
strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a
conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the
tripartite powers lies in their joint action; their weakness
would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Führer might
give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German
authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the
latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to
them because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a
conflict with the United States.

“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained
further that he has always declared in his country that sooner
or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if
Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion
this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His
argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not
decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon
herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained
predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan,
many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka
was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous
thoughts. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk
along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway
and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances
than at present.

“The Führer replied that he could well understand the situation
of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar situations
(the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of
Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit
favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow
unavoidable fight, at a time when he himself was still young and
full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by
events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to
reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be
it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers
come to them, but who will bravely face them.

“Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their ruling
politicians, had recently still attempted a last maneuver
towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan
on account of China or the South Seas, provided that Japan gave
free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to
their place of destination. However, America would war against
Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the
intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an
argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the
Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines
which many had received.

“The Führer commented on this, that this attitude of America did
not mean anything, but that the United States had the hope that,
as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could
advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in
case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally
isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

“The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans
precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the
powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other
hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a
joint action of Japan and Germany.

“Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give
to the Führer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude
inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him
regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity as
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in Japan
a single word of all that he had expounded before the Führer and
the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause
him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once
before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something
about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these
things, and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he, as
Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, though as a rule
he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also
could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions
discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would
have to study exactly and carefully, in the first place, the
development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable
moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the
Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to
be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be
spoiled by talk.

“Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that
would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of
conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he
succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He
himself felt confident that he would succeed.

“On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the
Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the
Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however,
state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

“Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in
the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to fear that by
cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, he would send a
courier.

“The Führer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest
entirely assured of German reticence.

“Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
unfortunately could not say the same for Japan.

“The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some
personal parting words.

“Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt.”

This completes the presentation of what I have called the “handful of selected documents,” offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was carried out.

I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation of the various stages of the aggression.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]

SIXTH DAY
Tuesday, 27 November 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr. Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer to them not only by the United States exhibit number and the PS document number, but also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I understand it, has either a letter or a number. They are numbered alphabetically, I think. If that is not done, when we have got a great number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where the particular exhibit is.

MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes.

May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents which I presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running account of the entire matter.

Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it might be helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal a chart. This chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am quite certain that, as your minds go back to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press, as these tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have formed the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually developing head of a wolf.

In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took over Austria—the Anschluss—that red portion became solid black. It became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia was already, with its head and the main part of its body, in the mouth of the wolf.

Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland territories which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon Czechoslovakia’s head became diminutive in the mouth of the wolf.

And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with its neck practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf’s head became a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions, which, of course, occurred.

That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe out of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything that went along after the taking over of Austria.

The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933 to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechoslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the initiation of actual war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression, by invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the United States.

I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936. The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal will recall the allegation. It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make reference to certain provisions of the Charter, and to certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this document book should have some identifying letter or number?

MR. ALDERMAN: “M”, I am informed. I do not offer those treaties in evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case.

The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World War I. Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the fact that they could have been interrupted at numerous points, do not detract from the continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment on the period from 1933 to 1945, does not disassociate these events from what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933, was already a well-advanced milestone on the German road to progress.

By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and potentialities.

As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry out their plans on the basis of existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind of future commitments.

The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial notice.

It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently committed.

To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bringing to light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were hitherto unavailable.

The three things of immediate international significance referred to in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are:

First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious than the matter of international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanction being applied by other countries and, in particular, a strong military action from France, with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly, that no one or combination of Big Powers would undertake the responsibility of such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plans for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action with a more overt significance. It was a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they boasted about their long planning and careful execution.

I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, Hitler’s speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November 1939. I need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual war, the Defendant Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to the Reich and to the Gauleiter in which he traced the development of German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces.

I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It is a photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only a part of that, but starting at the beginning.

The speech is entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the Fifth Year of War.” It is a kind of retrospective summary by the Defendant General Jodl. “A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, delivered in Munich on 7 November 1943.” I am reading from the English translation:

“Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you
a review today of the strategic position at the beginning of the
fifth year of war.