Chapter XVIII: Part 18

“‘During the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will
give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground,
everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of
Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria.
Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not
endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis
in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is
convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once
through a word from him. This word, however, he will not give
for foreign political reasons, being convinced that ends desired
by him may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor
Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not
indicate any disinterestedness in Austria’s independence. Also,
before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party
members in Austria, and must therefore, in spite of the very
real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to
the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria.

“‘As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the
authorization that from then on, 200,000 marks a month were to
be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in
Austria). The control and supervision of this monthly sum was to
be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that
he alone had control over the money, would have a definite
influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be
possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing
difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist
Party.

“‘The hope was also expressed to Herr Von Papen that the
recently authorized foundation of German Ortsgruppen of the
National Socialist Party in Austria, made up of German citizens
in Austria, would be so arranged as not to give the appearance
that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal
affairs.’”

The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Bürckel in July 1939 outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaler.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off until 2 o’clock?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel in July 1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership problem following the retirement of Reinthaler.

In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English text of that report, and I believe from Page 4 of the German text of the Rainer report, which is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61:

“In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which
were, apart from the Gauleiter”—Gau leaders—“also Globocnik
and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction
received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy
country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at
this time also established connection with departments of the
Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German racial agency, _et
cetera_), and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in
the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria.”

And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:

“The principles of the construction were:

“The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the
trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple
manner and without compromise, according to the principle of
organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land Party
Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal
chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal
Party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at
the top of the Party leadership. All connections with the Party
in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
Führer. These said that the German State should officially be
omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP and that
auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, _et
cetera_, should be established in the foreign countries
bordering Austria.

“Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who
had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from
Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side,
Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and
especially well-established relations with Christian Social
politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the
Styrian Heimatschutz”—home defense—“and became a Party member
when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated into the
NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal
field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both
sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by
the activities of these two persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was
designed as trustee to the Führer.”

The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using native personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other Nazis like Captain Leopold.

Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this Styrian Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that agreement will be considered a little later. Rainer’s report, as I have said before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance of Seyss-Inquart’s contribution.

That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is a letter dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Göring. The document is a typed carbon of the letter. It ends with the “Heil Hitler” termination, and it is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by Defendant Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading, “Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Göring’s office.” The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of one Mühlmann, whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately, got into Bürckel’s bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I believe, on Page 7 of the German text:

“At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939;

“To the General Field Marshal

“Sir:

“If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I
know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final
decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced
activism”—Aktivismus—“this will certainly be regarded as a
fault of my personality. Yet I know that I cling with
unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is
Greater Germany”—Grossdeutschland—“and the Führer. And if some
people are already tired out from the struggle and some have
been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready
to go into action. This, after all, was also the development
until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a
regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, in whatever
form, paid my membership dues (the first one, according to a
receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably would have been an
undisputed, comparatively old fighter and Party member of
Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I
told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime
on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use
whatever method he desired.”—I would like to call particular
attention to that sentence.—“I told myself that this Austria
was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron
determination because I and my friends had to fight against the
whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short,
against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we
might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political
annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and
tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria,
as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully
conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not
comprehensible to the masses and also not to my Party comrades.
I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it
again, because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve
the Führer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude
even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party
comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion
which the Führer and the men close to him have of me.”

That letter was written to one of the men close to him—Field Marshal Göring. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal.

It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document from the Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This document is a letter from Von Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. It consists of a report entitled, “Review and Outlook 1 Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a martyr, and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, Von Papen stated—and I quote the last paragraph of the letter, beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text):

“National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian
ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is
only a centralized Reich German Party and therefore unable to
transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups
of people of a different political makeup, the answer must
rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not
have been brought about in a different way. But when the
creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be
completed, National Socialism could, in a much wider sense than
this is possible through the present Party organization—at
least apparently—certainly become the rallying point for all
racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in
regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized
tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated
clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become
possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New
Austria. A Nuremberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as
in old times and the proclamation of a National Socialistic
peoples’ front would be a stirring event for all beyond the
borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
legitimistic Count Dubsky, wrote in his pamphlet about the
Anschluss: ‘The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not
be at all. National Socialism must win it or perish if it is
unable to solve this task.’”

We have other reports from Von Papen to Hitler which I shall offer in evidence presently, showing that he maintained covert contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria. It is certainly interesting that from the very start of his mission, Defendant Von Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism for national Germans outside the border of Germany. Papen was working for the Anschluss, although he preferred to use the principles of National Socialism rather than rely on the Party organization as a necessary means of establishing those principles in the German Reich.

Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The German Government did no more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the economic and internal pressure.

I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA-64. It is a letter from Von Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated May 17, 1935.

Von Papen’s letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright credible statement by Germany reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationship between Austria and German groups in Austria.

He had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Christian Social forces against Starhemberg, the Vice Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Von Papen indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists in Austria.

I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of the second page. This is Von Papen writing to “Mein Führer” Hitler:

“I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The
fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian
Social forces, who are opposed to a home-front dictatorship,
against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures
arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to
him in such a way that he would submit the offer to the
Government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of
interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of
the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian
principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the
beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian Social
elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If
Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and
guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition,
then, as a result of such a compromise, the Austrian Government
would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these
forces. . . . A further consequence of this step would be the
possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact,
which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the
settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a
measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European
situation, and especially on our relationship with England.

“One may object that Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to
follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability
immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.

“Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of
setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of
go-betweens. The possibility exists. If Herr Schuschnigg finally
says ‘no’ and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation
would not be any worse, but on the contrary, the efforts of the
Reich Government to make peace with Austria would be revealed,
without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the
case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider
it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike in
the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course, and in view of
the sharp tensions between the Federal
Government”—Bundesregierung—“Herr Schuschnigg will grasp this
last straw, always under the supposition that the offer could
not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears
all the marks of an actually honest compromise with Austria.

“Assuming success of this step we would again establish our
active intervention in central European politics, which, as
opposed to the French, Czech, and Russian political maneuvers,
would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.

“Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in
the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision
is necessary.

“The Reich Army Minister”—Reichswehrminister—“shares the
opinion presented above, and the Reich Foreign
Minister”—Reichsaussenminister—“wants to discuss it with you,
my Führer.”—Signed—“Papen.”

In other words, Von Papen wanted a strong assurance and a credible assurance of the preservation of Austria’s independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort at peace, and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Von Papen urged haste.

Exactly 4 days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler responded to Von Papen’s suggestion, and asserted:

“Germany neither intends nor wishes, to interfere in the
internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
Anschluss.”

The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well known to history.

It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this point, and to note that for a complexity of reasons Von Papen suggested, and Hitler announced, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria’s internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.

There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure policy.

On May 1, 1936, Hitler blandly in a public speech branded as a lie any statement that “tomorrow or the day after” Germany would fall upon Austria. I invite the Court’s attention to the version of the speech appearing in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, SD—that is South Germany—2 to 3 May 1936, Page 2, and translated in our Document 2367-PS.

Without offering that document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that statement in that well-known speech.

If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria “tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.” For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a little while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.

I now offer in evidence our Document L-150, “Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Defendant Von Neurath, on 18 May 1936” as Exhibit USA-65. This document unfortunately again appears in your document books in German. Due to an error, it has not been mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies.

I shall read from it and at the same time, hand to the interpreter reading the German, a marked copy of a German translation. I might read one sentence from the first paragraph:

“I called on Von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18
and had a long talk on the general European situation.

“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the
Rhineland had been ‘digested.’

“He explained that he meant until the German fortifications had
been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German
Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than
encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue
a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our
fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central
Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all
these countries will begin to feel very differently about their
foreign policies and a new constellation will develop.’”

I skip then two paragraphs.

“Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached
between Germany and Italy, and admitted that the demonstrations
of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations
without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present
time he could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests
of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three
chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian
Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:

“The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his
army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike, and that
he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.

“The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for
the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger
daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more
towards the Nazis, and the dominance of the Nazi Party in
Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.”

The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany.

But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, her diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany and to come to terms.

I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the English text. That is Document 1760-PS.

“Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave
Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the
direction of the nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given
Austria assurance of support of the most definite character
against external German aggression and on one occasion, by
mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive
action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her
Abyssinian adventure. This and the re-occupation of the
Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is
quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian
adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German
aggressive moves against Austria.”

This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact of July 11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria and Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the British Delegation.

I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, 1760-PS.

Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, would regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon which Germany will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But there was much more substance to the day’s events than appears in the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith’s summary as set forth on Page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:

“Even more important than the terms of the agreement published
in the official communiqué, was the contemporaneous informal
understanding, the most important provisions of which were that
Austria would:

“(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s
confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet;
(2) with the devised means to give the national opposition a
role in the political life of Austria within the framework of
the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save
those convicted of the most serious offenses.”

This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsch-National into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

I now offer in evidence Document 2994-PS, which is an affidavit by Kurt von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nuremberg, Germany, on 19 November 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA-66. The defendants have received German translations of that evidence.

DR. LATERNSER: In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I wish to protest against the presentation of written evidence by the witness Von Schuschnigg for the following reasons: Today, when a resolution was announced, with respect to the use to be made of the written evidence of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance it might possibly take a different view of the matter. With respect to the Austrian conflict this is the case, since Schuschnigg is the most important witness, the witness who was affected at the time in his position as Federal Chancellor. In the case of such an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered to, in order that the Court be in a position to ascertain the actual truth in this case. The accused and his defense counsel would feel prejudiced in his rights granted by the Charter, should direct evidence be circumvented. I must, therefore, uphold my viewpoint since it can be assumed that the witness Von Schuschnigg will be able to confirm certain facts which are in favor of the accused Seyss-Inquart.

I therefore make the motion to the Court that the written evidence of the witness Von Schuschnigg be not admitted.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments in connection with this accord. It is not for any purpose to incriminate the Defendant Seyss-Inquart that it is being offered at this point.

DR. LATERNSER: May I add to my motion that the witness, Von Schuschnigg, on 19 November 1945, was questioned in Nuremberg, and that if an interrogation on 19 November was possible, then a short time later—that is now—it ought to be possible to call him before the Court, especially as the interrogation before this court is of special importance.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the affidavit of Von Schuschnigg and upholds the objection.

If the Prosecution desires to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can apply to do so. Equally if the Defense wishes to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can apply to do so. In the event Von Schuschnigg is not able to be produced, the question of affidavit-evidence by Von Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis’ concessions as indicated in the portion of the Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian internal affairs.

The release of imprisoned Nazis presented potential police problems, and as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch to the United States State Department quoted on Pages 12 to 13 of his affidavit:

“Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power
would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and
judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the
future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis
even in the line of duty. The preservation of internal peace in
Austria was less dependent upon Germany’s living up to her
obligations under the accord.”

Next, Germany’s continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government. In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of Austrian National Socialism.

On 16 July 1936, just 5 days later, Hitler violated that provision. I quote from Document 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61, the reports of Gauleiter Rainer to Commissioner Bürckel, all of which were forwarded to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—Page 6 of the English, and I believe, also Page 6 of the German version.

“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party
in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian
National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was
arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the
Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik
visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where they received a
clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer.
On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg,
where they received a complete report from Rainer on the
statement of the Führer and his political instructions for
carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiter
received organizational instructions from Globocnik and
Hiedler.”

Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report—in the English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, so I am skipping a paragraph in the German version:

“Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Führer named Lieutenant
General”—Gruppenführer—“Keppler as chief of the mixed
commission which was appointed, in accordance with the State
Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of
the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority
by the Führer for the Party in Austria. After Keppler was
unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked
together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of
the peasants, Kaltenbrunner”—that is the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner in this case—“as leader of the SS, and Doctor
Jury as deputy leader of the Austrian Party, as well as with
Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.”

A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his affidavit, 1760-PS:

“The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have
been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded
happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under
the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who, as was known
definitely, was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program
was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could
carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in
Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations
which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which
the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as
a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was
the Union of the East Mark,”—Ostmärkische Verein—“the sponsor
of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau.
Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi
Neustädter-Stürmer, this organization was declared legal by the
courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it
shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had
disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi
activities directed from Germany.”

At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit USA-67, a captured German document which is a report from Von Papen to Hitler dated September 1, 1936. This document is most interesting because it indicates Von Papen’s strategy after July 11, 1936 for destroying Austria’s independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11. It should be noted incidentally, that after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following terms—I quote the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936 to the Führer and Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph in the English text:

“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National
Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of
finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed
Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the
portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding
principle”—Marschroute (a German word meaning the route of
march)—“I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient,
psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure
directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on
economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be
a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects.
In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders
of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform
completely with the agreement of 11 July I am trying to direct
the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but
nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in
important positions for the time being. However, such positions
are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and
the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in
this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.”—Signature—“Papen.”

To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the following plan:

(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of Security in due course;

(b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front;

(c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet, but using nationalist personalities;

(d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.

My next subject is Germany’s diplomatic preparations for the conquest of Austria.

The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria consisted of weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support from without, as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed in the news of the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor, Austria.

Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign policy program in Europe generally.

I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment from the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of probing all the details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful decade.

It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights of the Nazis’ diplomatic preparation for war.

In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith executed on 30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the defendants in German, as well as in English.

This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS which was executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable extent it merely states facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from the third paragraph in the affidavit:

“As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and
Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary
categories openly acknowledged Germany’s ambitions to dominate
southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they
freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the
case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in
the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of
southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and
they did not, at that time, speak so definitely of actual
absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions,
however, were not limited to southeastern Europe. From the very
beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power,
important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that ‘it
must be our granary’ and that ‘even with southeastern Europe
under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part
of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater
Germany.’ After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post
in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German
designs in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen
shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in
1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that ‘southeastern Europe
to Turkey is Germany’s hinterland and I have been designated to
carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria
is first on the program.’

“As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen in
Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest were openly
propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption
of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.”

Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:

“Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a
vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate
objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact the two
immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power,
had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently
made to me: First, to bring about the complete and absolute
establishment of their power over Germany and the German people,
so that they would become in every respect willing and capable
instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; Second, the
establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in
order that the political and economic program in southeastern
Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if
necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was
characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they
emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering
air force. Göring and Milch often said to me or in my presence
that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the
weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position
and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in
the shortest time.”

Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next:

“At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, the Nazi
regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people
for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for
example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in
military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the
throwing of hand grenades, et cetera. In this connection I wrote
in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as
follows:

“‘ . . . Everything that is being done in the country today has
for its object to make the people believe that Germany is being
threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside
influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to
use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises,
and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German
people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all
comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be
otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace
unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of
complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler
and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the
moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if
it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so
carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the
German people will be with them when they want to use force and
when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry
through their objects. . . .’”

One further sentence following that I quote:

“Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled
with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite and isolate
their intended victims as to render them defenseless against
German aggression.”

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the East.

“The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian
Alliance, guaranteed the territorial _status quo_ in the West.
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were allied in the
Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by
mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France and Poland had
likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made
plain her special interest in Austrian independence.”

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and the other eastern European powers.

Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland. She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.

As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit—that is 2385-PS, on Page 5:

“Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program
of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors
of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To
Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the
Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

“‘The major factor in the internal situation in the last week
has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian
Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. . . . There is very little doubt
but that Göring, when he made his trip to various capitals in
southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that
they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist
Government came into power in Austria. . . . The Nazi seed sown
in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are
undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal
of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in
the days following July 25.’

“Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and
to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their
acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As
I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and
Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading
the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division
Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland
the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they
knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

“The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make
inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I
recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or
1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav
territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions
of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later
gave me the same information.

“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made
these promises were not only the ‘dyed in the wool’ Nazis but
more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to
lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to
the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I
wrote as follows:

“‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,
and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are
“diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile
instruments of the regime and just because the outside world
looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more
effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they
propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the
regime.’”

I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that the Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s hand was its rearmament and more than that, its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by those considerations alone.

With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are not always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want to believe, and if an apparently substantial and conservative person like the Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be apt to believe them, or at least to act upon that hypothesis. And it would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with the designs of the Nazis.

Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air pact. In the case of both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and harped on fears of communism and war.

In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis, including Göring, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do so.

I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning on the 10th line:

“High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official
contact, particularly men such as Göring, Goebbels, Ley, Frick,
Frank, Darré, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as
to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me
that Germany would observe her international undertakings only
so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do so. Although these
statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made
to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any
secret, for on many occasions they expressed the same idea
publicly.”

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter Germany’s moves.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]

EIGHTH DAY
Thursday, 29 November 1945

_Morning Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the consideration of Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the following general statements:

First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward that end.

Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the surface, to have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction.

Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they referred to as Nationalist Opposition, and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively—that is as an entire group.

Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Bürckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, showed:

First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the Führer.

Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency.

Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of July 11, 1936 between Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically pledged the German Government not to interfere either directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and received new instructions; and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner as his “contact man” with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act for the Führer in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian Nazis.

Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von Papen’s letter to Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von Papen had been in contact with Captain Leopold and it showed how Von Papen got Hitler to make a solemn promise of Austria’s independence in order to further Papen’s internal political gain in Austria.

Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von Papen’s letter of July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year after Dollfuss’ death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made the link for the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian ideologies, and in which he identified himself completely with the National Socialist goal.

We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen’s letter to Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen advised using both economic and continuing psychological pressure; that he had conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front, and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with collaborators like Glaise-Horstenau.

I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith’s conversation with the Defendant Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think those matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the defendant’s guilt and complicity.

Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating to the diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the Tribunal excerpts which established the following propositions:

First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break up the diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first—in the West the Locarno Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; second—in the East the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and their respective mutual assistance pacts with France, and the French-Polish Pact; third—as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her independence, that is for Austrian independence.

In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von Neurath and Von Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in doing their other work, just because they, and I quote: “propagated the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.”

In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated that Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it suited her to do so.