Chapter XIX: Part 19

There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this affidavit:

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling her promises of loot, by continuing her armament, and by another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy; that the Nazis stirred up internal dissensions within neighboring countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims.

I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph beginning in the middle of the page:

“At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward
for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal
dissensions within these countries themselves, and in Austria
and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed so
to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist
groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program.
Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they
came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In
Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten
Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over
6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections
in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old
differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the
restoration of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here
that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a
most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in
Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was
very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties
and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German
elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to
demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in
Poland she played on the fear of communism and communist Russia.
In Romania she aggravated the existing anti-Semitism,
emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Romanian industry
and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also
financed the fascist Iron Guard through Codreanou.

“Such ‘diplomatic’ measures reinforced by Germany’s vast
rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in
Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least to
deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to
German designs, even if not enough to persuade them actively to
ally themselves with Nazi Germany.

“Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become
convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would
gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was
to play along with Germany.”

I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence the detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland were beginning to follow the German line.

As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement with them and to block an east Locarno pact. On that I quote again from Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the second Messersmith affidavit, in the middle of Page 21 of the English version:

“While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in
1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the
opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England,
and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in
exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.”

That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an alliance which they called the “Rome-Berlin Axis.” This, together with Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and greatly increased the relative strength of Germany.

And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war and begin to outline time tables, not binding time tables and not specific ones in terms of months and days, but still general time tables, in terms of years, which were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planning. And that time table was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last.

In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in that order.

In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I have shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in Austria up to this period, that is, November 1937.

I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular.

It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting of 5 November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be recalled that in that meeting, the Führer insisted that Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for different eventualities but all reaching the conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945.

Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near future, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany’s military and political positions, it must be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westward.

Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria could be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation of the two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief since they would provide shorter and better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would make possible the reconstitution of large new German armies.

Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, but that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the position of Nazis internally in Austria.

Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for Austria, in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi conspirators was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine into motion and making a threat of force.

The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this plum without having to fight a blow for it.

The German High Command had, of course, previously considered preparation against Austria.

I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit USA-69. It, again, is “top secret”, with the added legend in German: “Chefsache nur durch Offizier” (matter for the chief only to be delivered through an officer).

This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Von Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, was one of only four copies establishing the directive for a unified preparation for war of all the Armed Forces.

This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although the political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to unleash a European war. It then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, of the German text:

“The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little
by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation,
which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a
continued preparedness for war by the German Armed Forces: (a)
To counter attacks at any time; (b) To enable the military
exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they
occur.”

The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations for war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2, on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:

“(2) The preparations of a general nature include:

“(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German
Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, and full
preparedness for war.

“(b) The further working on ‘mobilization without public
announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to
begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards strength
and time.”

And the directive finally indicates that there might be special preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (1) Special Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text. “Case Otto”, as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for aggressive war against Austria. I quote:

“Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the
monarchy.

“The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed
force to give up a restoration.

“Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian
people, the march in will be made in the general direction of
Vienna, and will break any resistance.”

I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and Göring, in November 1937.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I should like to state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been treated. This document is a study made by the General Staff, which was conceived to meet many different eventualities of war. It even mentions the possibility that Germany might have to go to war with Spain, and might have to carry out a military attack on her.

Only part of this document was read, the part relating to Austria; and thus the impression was given that a plan had been made to march against Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities.

I should like to request that the reading of this document be supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs of this document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The Tribunal has already informed defendants’ counsel that they will have an opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their defense, to refer to any documents, parts of which have been put in by the Prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then, and to make what criticism they think necessary then.

Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to the admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to read any parts of the documents which you wish.

MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished counsel, must have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken.

I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant Göring, in November 1937.

For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered as Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937.

Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.

If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Göring, among others.

On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report:

“Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal
with Hitler was not through political discussion but through
economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in
economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore
possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic
domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be
possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into
arrangements in the political and military field, in which he
was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria
eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy
for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not
vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his”—that is
Schacht’s—“opinion, it might be possible to maintain the
Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia,
and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the
Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”

And for the Defendant Göring’s statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Göring,” on Page 2 of that document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below the middle of the page:

“The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the
refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital
national necessities.

“If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany,
should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in
Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her
legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict
between France and Germany.

“I asked Göring what aims especially he had in mind. He replied:

“‘We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who
are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body
of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by
the Treaty of Versailles.’

“I asked Göring if he meant that Germany was absolutely
determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this
was an absolute determination of the German Government. The
German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this
matter because of certain momentary political considerations,
especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would
tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the
consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.

“He then added a statement which went further than any I have
heard on this subject. He said:

“‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg
at the head of the union. Such a solution is absolutely
unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an
agreement would be an immediate _casus belli_.’ Göring used the
Latin expression _casus belli_; it is not a translation from the
German, in which that conversation was carried on.

“I asked Göring if the German Government was as decided in its
views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it was with
regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final
solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the
German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the
Reich.”

These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report made by a responsible official to his own government, recording contemporaneous conversations and events.

My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further concessions by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938.

As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring under great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure, including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was what the Defendant Von Papen called “slowly intensified psychological pressure.” There were increasing demonstrations, plots, and conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold and approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the new Councillor of the State of Austria. In this situation, Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I invite the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document 2461-PS, the official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the official _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 124, Number 21-a.

The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused by the mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria.

The communiqué lists among those present:

Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen.

The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and I quote:

“Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them
constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the
peaceful development of the European situation.”

A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. But in fact, and as I think history well knows, the conference was a very unusual and a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian communiqué of the reorganization of the Cabinet and the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938.

That communiqué, as taken from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS and I invite the Court’s judicial notice of that communiqué.

That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes.

Two days later another concession was divulged.

I invite the Court’s judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué concerning the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, 18 February 1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128; Number 21-d.

That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single legal political party of Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents were?

MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is exhibit what?

MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn’t read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently established from captured German documents.

I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.

This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen’s own notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own notes:

“I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion
that he”—that is, Schuschnigg—“had acted under ‘brutal
pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been
able to state that he had always and at every point had complete
freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually
been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that.
He had made notes on the talk which, bore that out. I reminded
him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make
any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he
would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in
the evening. He answered: ‘To be honest, no.’”

And then Von Papen says:

“It appears to me of importance to record this statement.

“In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that
Austria could have maintained her status with the help of
non-German, European combinations. This question could be
decided only according to the interests of the German people. He
asserted that he held the same conviction and would act
accordingly.”

Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg’s contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry.

For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.

But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General Jodl’s handwritten diary in German script which I can’t read. It is our Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72.

I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this is his genuine diary in his handwriting.

This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security.

And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas.

I quote from General Jodl’s diary, the entries for February 11, February 13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February:

“In the evening and on 12 February General K.”—Keitel—“with
General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg.
Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under
heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours
Schuschnigg signs protocol.

“13 February: In the afternoon General K.”—Keitel—“asks
Admiral C.”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. He
tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect that military
pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until
the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted
and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.

“14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer
arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence
Office VII and initiates the different measures.

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.”

The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-73.

The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his signature appears a note that the Führer approved the proposal. In the original document that note is handwritten in pencil.

The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the suggested order:

“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or
Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria:

“(a) Through V-men”—V-Männer—“in Austria.

“(b) Through our customs personnel”—staff—“at the frontier.

“(c) Through travelling agents.

“3. Such news could be:

“(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of
the VII A.K.

“(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and
Regensburg.

“(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has
been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact,
this is the case.”

—That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying, “and, incidentally, it is the truth.”

“(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have
called up reinforcements.

“(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the
Mountain Brigade”—Gebirgsbrigade—“in the region of
Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.”

The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, as, we have already seen from the communiqués referred to, President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement which foreshadowed National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual German invasion on 12 March 1938.

Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both German and Austrian National Socialists.

The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of which will be found in our Document 2484-PS.

On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of the National Socialists in Austria—3 weeks after the Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further victories—Schuschnigg made an important announcement.

On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: “Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government.

In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler’s approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.

This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence—our Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61.

I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph beginning on Page 11 of the German original:

“The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite
through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m.
At the session which was called immediately afterwards,
Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a
few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had
given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
talks he made us understand that the illegal information we
received was based on truth, and that in view of the new
situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from
the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and
Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at
10 a.m. There it was decided that:

“First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the
opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by
way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to
Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the
Government until clear instructions and orders were received
from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a
letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to
the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9
March 1938.

“Negotiations with the Government were not successful.
Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with
the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On 10 March
all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already
had been made . . . and the necessary orders given to all unit
leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik
returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer
gave the Party freedom of action . . . and that he would back it
in everything it did.”

—That means the Austrian Nazi Party.

Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force.

When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.

On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10 March:

“By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it.

“This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General
Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee.
General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister
Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter
Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the
facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I
follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn,
to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’

“1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means
Keitel—“informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris,
Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the
Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the
Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini
and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer to take
action.

“1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the
8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without
Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72).

Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy.

I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler’s mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” with some initials; “referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th copy; top secret:

“1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade
Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions
and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German
population.

“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this
operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on
12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right
to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and
to decide the actual moment for invasion.

“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we
do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in
our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out
without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry
welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be
avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken
ruthlessly by force of arms.”

I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:

“Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.

“Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces Number 427/38,”—with some symbols.—

“Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops
or militia units on Austrian soil.

“1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered
in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.

“2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends,
especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in
the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.”

Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938 deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of the day’s events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and following the sentence, “Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiter.”

“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in
Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with
Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the
Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer,
Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and
Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks
with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the
proposal of the two ministers.

“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the
Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400
hours, signed by legal political ‘front’ men, including both
Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the
establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret
ballot in accordance with the constitution.

“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had
brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of
copies, and a telegram to the Führer calling for help were
prepared.

“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions
in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a
session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with
Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer
and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same
time he would start all necessary actions to take over power
unless he received news from the session of the Ministers’
Council before that time. During this time all measures had been
prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed
him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and
had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new
plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for
maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had
resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, ‘No.’ Rainer informed the
Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer
from Göring through the same channels, that the Führer will not
consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign.
Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann.
Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg.
Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures
the Party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the
Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and
calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force.
Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but
very soon the announcement followed that everything might be
threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile
word arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected
the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a
national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission
for the Legion”—that is the Austrian Legion in Germany—“to
return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise
German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer
and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, went to the Chancellor’s
office to carry out this errand.

“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a
government which included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists,
and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The
latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to
negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and
therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the
cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of
the Cabinet Hüber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation
Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the
Gruppenführer Keppler,”—whose name I told you would reappear
significantly—“who had arrived in the meantime, were already
negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations
again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to
appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case
of a German invasion.

“Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet
have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first
be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most
dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any
moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at
3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor’s
palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government.
The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by
Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA
and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and
all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m.
Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of
Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with
the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all
Government representatives who try to resist, should be told
that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

“With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the
complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking
over of all important posts by the Party.

“The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the
Führer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of
Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form
of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to
the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the
political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on
the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation
to the Führer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian
problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently
issued by the Führer.”

We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the Defendant Göring and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed as usual “Geheime Reichssache” (top secret). The letterhead is stamped “Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt”. If I can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research Department of Göring’s Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic German folder and on the back it says, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to read; but it looks to me as if it is “Privat, Geheime Archive,” which is Secret Archive, Berlin, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Case Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job’s outcry, “Oh, that mine enemy would write a book!”

The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant Göring, states in substance—well, I will read the English translation. It starts; “To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations.”

Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department. Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have offered, were conducted by the Defendant Göring, although at least one interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from “A” through “Z” and then to “AA.” Eleven of these conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated conversations.

I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Göring, who was identified by the letter “F” for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as “S”. The transcript prepared by the Research Institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in full.

“F”—hereafter I shall use Göring and Seyss-Inquart—

“F: ‘How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘No.’”

Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

“Göring: ‘How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you
have any news?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for
Sunday, and therefore he has put S’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘and the
other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called
off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being
ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.m.’

“Göring replied that in his opinion the measures taken by
Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At
this moment he could not commit himself officially. Göring will
take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he
could see a postponement only, not a change of the present
situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the
Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

“Thereafter a conversation took place between Göring and the
Führer. Afterwards Göring again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This
conversation was held at 15:05.

“Göring told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever
with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did
not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he
had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further
confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the
national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being
requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the
Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Göring
added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come
through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would
no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the
gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was
then told to send the telegram to the Führer as agreed upon. As
a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal
President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow
Schuschnigg’s resignation.”

Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Göring told Seyss-Inquart over the telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Göring showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript:

“Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been
legalized?’

“Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss
that?’

“Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’

“Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this
country.’

“Göring: ‘In uniform?’

“Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’

“Göring: ‘Good.’

“Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have
already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything
is all right.”

In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian Cabinet—must be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:

“Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer,
and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One
thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department of
Economy and Commerce.’

“Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’

“Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security
and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be
taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the
Justice Department.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’

“Göring: ‘Give me the name.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’”

—That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Göring.—

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’”

And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with the news that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, Pages 1 and 2:

“Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately,
together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal
President that if the conditions which are known to you are not
accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at
and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the
whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General
Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference
immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas’
position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just
through the false report we received before, action was delayed,
but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will
begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be
stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are
informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal
Chancellorship.’”

—There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken
up.—“‘M.’”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General
Muff.—“‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate
restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’”

—There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“‘And then
call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They
should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given
by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with
you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not
understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in
4 minutes.’”

An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Göring said—I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page:

“Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go
upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S.
I.’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘shall call on the National Socialist
guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.’”

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of the page:

“Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he
comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the
Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can
hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do
so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power.
All right?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’

“Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’”