Chapter XX: Part 20

In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder:

“Göring: ‘OK’”—What’s the German word for OK? Schön.—“‘I shall
give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get
the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I
shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes
resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial,
the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make any
difference.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer any
resistance.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not
authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’”

I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of 11. I meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German court martial, the leading personalities.

So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A conversation held at 8:48 that night between Göring and Keppler proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is
that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the
radio stations occupied.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen
carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by
Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian
Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg
Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order
in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request
for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this
purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as
soon as possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but
everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the
professional groups.’”

Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as
possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the
office of the Federal Chancellor.’

“Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell
him that we are asking him—well, he does not even need to send
the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, “Agreed.”’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place.
Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’”

Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Göring wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:

“Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’

“Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart
agrees.’

“Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’

“Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’

“Dietrich: ‘Where?’

“Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’

“Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’

“Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’”

Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive, initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:

“Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35
copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has been informed.
Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.

“1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian
Government have not been fulfilled.

“2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw
before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The
Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

“3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of
the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to
Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all
forces to the full as quickly as possible.”

Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont.

And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Göring had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” is the Führer.

“Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce
accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you
his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave
him the news. He had then said it would be a complete
impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be
done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus,
and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that
Austria would be immaterial to him.’

“Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for
this.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes.’

“Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still
ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’

“Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I
shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing
matters.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in
fear of the terrible position which would have existed
militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell
him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I
forget that.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he
should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be
convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even
if the whole world were against him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be found in the official publication _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote—and I quote:

“I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland—order
and tranquility—and to give to the popular will the possibility
of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by
its own decision.”

He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the document reads: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.”

We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene, I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. This is noted in _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our Document 2465-PS.

Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and, accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the day after the invasion, Defendant Göring who had been left in Berlin in charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international “double talk” to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of Document 2949-PS:

“Göring:”—speaking to Ribbentrop in London:—“‘As you know, the
Führer has entrusted me with the administration of the current
government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and
therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in
Austria, that you can hear over the radio.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?’

“Göring: ‘Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely
overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved, when he talked to me
last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw
his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political
things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just
foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist
Ministers and the representatives of the people
(Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more
and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a
natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked
us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten
up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told
them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war,
under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order
or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed
and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed
with “Heil Moskau” and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused
some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that
Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische
Front would fight to the last man. One could not know that they
would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who
already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in
immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before
this, since we could not know whether or not there would be a
civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by
documents.’”

There the Defendant Göring was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Göring said that his story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don’t think he had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents.

Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English text of this Part W—still Göring talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at the bottom of the page:

“Göring: ‘No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you
had spoken already to these people. I want you once more,—but
no, not at all once more, but generally speaking—tell the
following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that
Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg,
because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart,
Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we
have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that
it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a
military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of
a technical question.’”—you will recall that he was a
lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along—“‘He was
supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the
support of German troops, Germany would grant this request.
Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us
expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he
did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and
so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he
could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they
always had had such a big mouth.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘Herr Göring, tell me, how is the situation in
Vienna; is everything settled yet?’

“Göring: ‘Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with
some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were
received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17th division
marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also, I want to
point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw, but that
they got together and fraternized immediately with the German
troops, wherever they were stationed.’”

These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant General Muff, the military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops. But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Göring talked over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text, about in the middle, Part W:

“Göring: ‘Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.’

“Ribbentrop: ‘I shall see you this afternoon.’

“Göring: ‘The weather is wonderful here—blue sky. I am sitting
here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air,
drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in. I have to make
the speech. And the birds are twittering, and here and there I
can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful
over there.’”—that is, Vienna.

“Ribbentrop: ‘That is marvelous.’”

May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the developments which took place after the German troops marched across the border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment. I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy, and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and Göring.

First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their duplicity. I think they are dangerous men.

In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182, Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak, 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27, “Proclamation of Hitler.” The British Government and the French Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz, and they both expressed their joy over the events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find translated in our Document 2485-PS.

For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I quote it in full:

“Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon.

“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets
‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession, National
Socialist Austria and her new Government in true indivisible
Union.’

“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and
impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and SA in undisputed
control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg
and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler and Hess
here.”—Signed—“Wiley.”

The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of them.

First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our translation is in our Document 2466-PS.

In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of Miklas’ delay in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President.

He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I cite for that the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number 21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS.

This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided (by the way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as signatories the following names:

Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess, Deputy Führer.)

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:

“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of
Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty
between that state and the principal Allied and Associated
Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable.”
(JN-2)

Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:

“The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than with
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent
of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might
directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her
independence, particularly until her admission to membership of
the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of
another power.” (JN-3)

This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It could not undo Germany’s union with, and control over, Austria.

To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month.

Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 150.

Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German Reich and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the oath.

I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria, March 15, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24, the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws, including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and State.

I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the translation being in our Document 2310-PS.

Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in our 1060-PS.

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to insure acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.

I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.

The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with Germany.

I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.

The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13.

Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will remember the chart.

The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that she did—that is, with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risk—was due to the importance of Austria in her further plans of aggression.

The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier.

I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.

One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, March 17, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27, translated in our 2313-PS.

Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men, to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding registration for active military service in Austria during 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS.

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a document which I introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English text, which is Page 7 of Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in 1938:

“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only
the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect
both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially
improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the
territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
right into Germany—a wasp waist in the direction of France and
an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia
herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position
had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a
victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective
aid from the west could be expected to arrive.”

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia.

Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case.

At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those arrangements could be made.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture will take?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or until the picture is ready?

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr. Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation. Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning.

The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, made in writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ counsel on day before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr. Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film. Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come unless he was forced to come.

I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.

MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words “concentration camp” imply.

This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman’s presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators. We propose to show that concentration camps were not an end in themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_.

We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the defendants retained power and suppressed opposition to any of their policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.

Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD—a part of the SS which tracked down the victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were in charge of the atrocities committed therein.

Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement explaining its source and its authenticity.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS, concerning the motion picture entitled “Nazi Concentration Camps” and to the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however, read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film.

THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel, we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits.

COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps. This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the areas in which these camps were located. The accompanying narration is taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed the camps.

While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of the films is contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers to which I have referred.

As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the supporting affidavits duly translated.

If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.

[_Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affiants were reproduced reading them._]

“I, George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United
States, hereby certify:

“1. From 1 March 1945 to 8 May 1945 I was on active duty with
the United States Army Signal Corps attached to the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and among my official
duties was direction of the photographing of the Nazi
concentration camps and prison camps as liberated by Allied
Forces.

“2. The motion pictures which will be shown following this
affidavit were taken by official Allied photographic teams in
the course of their military duties, each team being composed of
military personnel under the direction of a commissioned
officer.

“3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, these motion
pictures constitute a true representation of the individuals and
scenes photographed. They have not been altered in any respect
since the exposures were made. The accompanying narration is a
true statement of the facts and circumstances under which these
pictures were made.

“(Signed) George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS.

“Sworn to before me this 2nd day of October 1945.

“(Signed) James B. Donovan, Commander, United States Naval
Reserve.”

“I, E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy, hereby
certify that:

“1. From 1929 to 1941 I was employed at the Twentieth Century
Fox Studios in Hollywood, California, as a director of film
effects, and am familiar with all photographic techniques. Since
6 September 1941 to the present date of 27 August 1945, I have
been on active duty with the United States Navy.

“2. I have carefully examined the motion picture film to be
shown following this affidavit and I certify that the images of
these excerpts from the original negative have not been
retouched, distorted or otherwise altered in any respect and are
true copies of the originals held in the vaults of the United
States Army Signal Corps. These excerpts comprise 6,000 feet of
film selected from 80,000 feet, all of which I have reviewed and
all of which is similar in character to these excerpts.

“(Signed) E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy.

“Sworn to before me this 27 day of August 1945.

“(Signed) John Ford, Captain, United States Navy.”

[_The film was then shown._]

COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]

NINTH DAY
Friday, 30 November 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the United States this morning.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as the first witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the evidence of the witness whom you propose to call must be strictly confined to the count with which the United States are dealing, Count One.

COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the Chief Counsel of the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, so far as I know the Prosecution . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do you appear for the Defendant Keitel?

DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached between the Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that whenever possible, questions to be brought up in the proceedings on the following day should be announced beforehand. The obvious purpose of this very reasonable understanding was to enable Defense Counsel to discuss forthcoming questions with their clients, and thus to assure a rapid and even progress of the Trial.

I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called by the Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was to be heard.

It was particularly important to know this, because today, I believe, the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions connected with the Prosecution’s case as presented during the past days.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What I said was that the witness was to be confined to evidence relating to Count One, which is the Count that has been solely discussed up to the present date.

DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to enable the Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a recess after the interrogation by the Prosecution during which Counsel may discuss the questions with their clients? The witness Lahousen, as far as I recall, has never until now been mentioned by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear Counsel for the United States upon the agreement which counsel for the Defendant Keitel alleges, namely, an agreement that what was to be discussed on the following day should be communicated to defendants’ counsel beforehand.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform defendants’ counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would I want to make such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing to Defense Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t need to enlarge upon, I am quite sure.

We did advise them that they would be given information as to the documentary matters, and I think that has been kept.

As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses are not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat different fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their security is a very important consideration where we are trying this case, in the very hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some of Defense Counsel were identified.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is sufficient. If you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, the Tribunal will, of course, accept that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, relating to witnesses. That does apply to documents.

We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling which the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment is a conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which I had supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors until this morning. It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the fact that the act, which was the object of the conspiracy, was performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of the conspiracy.

I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence in a conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to swear the witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their field is being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know how we can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One from the other Counts.

We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would be fair, as between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find it impossible always to please everybody.

With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would like to suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds of the ruling might be, but I think the only way we can find out is to proceed, and have specific objections to the specific things which anyone feels have been transgressed; and in doing that, I want to say that we do it with the greatest respect to the ruling, but that we may find ourselves in conflict with it, because of the difficulty of any boundary on the subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter raised by Doctor Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning of the Trial the Defense and the Prosecution reached an agreement to the effect that the next day’s program should always be made known to the Defense on the previous day. Such an agreement was actually reached, and I cannot understand why the Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the possibility and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further to point out the following:

The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense could not be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called during the next day’s proceedings. The press however received, as early as yesterday, information on the witnesses to be called today. We heard of this through representatives of the press this morning and, as far as I know, the information also appeared in today’s papers. I cannot understand, therefore, why it was withheld from us, and why we were told that for security reasons, it could not be communicated to us. I think this amounts to a mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite unjustified. It is, furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving documents in good time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a document which is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks only this morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete mastery of English.

As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution in writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this matter as soon as possible.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of the witness who is to be used today was given to the press. The question of our policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted to me last night after Court recessed, because we had not been using witnesses heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that witnesses’ names must not be given to the Defense Counsel for security reasons.

He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that later it had been given to the press. They, of course, have had adequate information therefore as to this witness. However, I am speaking about the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to inform these counsel of the names of witnesses who will be called, who are here in Nuremberg, but not in prison; the situation does not permit that. Neither can we furnish transcripts of testimony or that sort of thing of witnesses in advance.

Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in the fair conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now receiving much more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts of the United States, in some respects, as to advance information and copies and help and service, and I do think that to ask us to disclose to them in advance either the names or substance of testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose the witness—would not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we would take up a witness today.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel on behalf of the Defense. Have you anything to add which is different to what they have said?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and clarify the whole problem.

Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what was discussed in my absence—the situation is this:

Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between the Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship knows, only a decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; that decision is known and I need not repeat. As far as witnesses are concerned I think I may assume that we are all agreed that the desire of the Defense to know the names of witnesses ahead of time is justified.

The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere with this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter which the Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. Justice Jackson correctly in saying that if the press is being told what witnesses will appear on the next day, then it is a matter of course that the same information should be given to Defense Counsel at the same time. This was only a series of unhappy circumstances, which can be overcome by mutual understanding and good will.

As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was present here. I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, in this matter. I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding arose as a result of the decision of the Court to have documents submitted to us 48 hours in advance and to have the film shown to us beforehand, a decision which led my colleague to the conclusion—and I consider it a justified conclusion—that all matters of this sort were to be submitted to us in advance. We do not, of course, expect to be informed of the contents of the witness’ testimony.

After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in the future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to be called; and I should also like to ask that the security considerations be guided by the knowledge that the Defense as a body is reliable, determined and capable of assisting the Court in reaching its verdict by submitting to the discipline of the proceedings. I ask, therefore, that the cases in which the security officer believes that he should not communicate the name of the witness beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute minimum.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions which have been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with reference to what shall or what shall not be communicated to them. With reference to the witness whom the United States desire to call, they will now be permitted to call him. With reference to what I said about confining his evidence to the first count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course would be for the other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask any questions which they think right, and that they may have the opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their own counts.

As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be allowed to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if they wish to have an opportunity of communicating with their clients before they cross-examine, they may have the opportunity of doing so. Now we will continue.

COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before the Tribunal? What is your name?

ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen.

COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it?

LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n.

COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit down?

COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly since he has a heart condition which may be aggravated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down.

COL. AMEN: Where were you born?

LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna.

COL. AMEN: On what date?

LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897.

COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation?

LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier.

COL. AMEN: Where were you trained?

LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy in Wiener-Neustadt.

COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer?

LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry.

COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry.

COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations valid in Austria at the time.

COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain.

COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional training?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which corresponds to the Military Academy in the German Army. There I received the training of an officer of the General Staff.

COL. AMEN: How long did this training last?

LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years.

COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you assigned?

LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian Division, that was the Vienna Division.

COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there?

LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the service for which I was already destined at the end of my training.

COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion?

LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the regulations valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I became a major. About 1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred to the General Staff, and in June, or at any rate, in the summer of 1936, I became a lieutenant colonel of the Austrian General Staff.

COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division at or about that time?

LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which corresponds technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I must add that an Intelligence Division was only added to the Austrian Army about this time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did not exist. Since it was planned to re-establish within the framework of the Austrian Federal Army the military Intelligence Division which had ceased to exist after the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, I was trained to assist in organizing this division within the framework of the Austrian Army.

COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, how were your activities principally directed?

LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible chief at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. He was the division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from whom I received my orders and instructions; later on it was the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We really need not have all this detail.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important for the Tribunal to understand more of this information than you ordinarily would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over subsequently to a corresponding position in the German Army, which I did want the Tribunal to appreciate.

Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal activities were after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? What information were you interested in and seeking to obtain?

LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you correctly—I was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, and not of the German Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume?

LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken into the High Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did the same work. In that position I was then a member of the Abwehr and my chief was Admiral Canaris.

COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German Abwehr, the German Intelligence.

COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of the principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the division called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization known as “Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the organization in my time. How it was composed before I became a member of it, I cannot say exactly.

COL. AMEN: And what were your duties?

LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division I. That was the division concerned with collecting information. It was also called the Secret Information Service. I worked under a divisional chief, the then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, whom I knew already from my Austrian past. I also knew Canaris from my time in Austria.

COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior?

LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior.

COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal representative?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his actual deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or when Canaris, for one reason or another, considered it necessary or advisable to have me appear as his representative.