Chapter XV: Part 15

“I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
undertook this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it
justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to talk
about what will come but one must say frankly what the situation
is. No one, the Führer has ordered, may know more or be told
more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no
doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great
deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your
Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the
widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious rumors are
concentrated. Up and down the country the devil of subversion
strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call
it—a political solution. They say we must negotiate while there
is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use
of to attack the natural feeling of the people, that in this war
there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of
the nation; the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy
propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to
know the true situation, and for this reason I believe that I am
justified in giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account
of the present state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure
of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify
the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided
by force of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire
people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home.
Italy suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke
down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected
but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate a
thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side
would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you,
gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data
concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as
your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, without
restriction, for application in your activities as leaders of
the people.

“The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and
everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of
Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the
danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the
Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the
direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia—these also
aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war, so
long as we were successful. It was not until more serious
set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to
become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask
themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken more than we
could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this
questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for
use in your own work of enlightenment, is one of the main points
of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:

“I. A review of the most important questions of past
developments;

“II. Consideration of the present situation;

“III. The foundations of our confidence in victory.

“In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Führer, I
shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own
personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time,
that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall in this
way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the events.

“I. The review:

“1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its
struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the
outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, is
not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I should
like, however, to mention at this point how clearly all
thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important part
has been played by the National Socialist movement in
reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing
fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming the German
people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the
numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope
with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of
action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at—and has so happily
been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two
forces.

“2. The seizure of power . . .”—I invite the Tribunal’s
attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in
all of these documents.—“The seizure of power by the Nazi Party
in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration of
military sovereignty.”

That is the German word “Wehrhoheit”—a kind of euphemism there—“the highness of defense.” I think it really means “fighting sovereignty.” Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and rearmament, with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armored and air arm.

“3. The Austrian Anschluss . . .”—Anschluss means “locking on
to,” I think. They latched on to Austria and—“The Austrian
Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment
of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of
reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving
our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into
Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base
for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself
was now enclosed by pincers.”

I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see that worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a “wasp waist in the direction of France,” and then he very accurately described what happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss, that the “wasp waist” was “enclosed in the pincers.”

I resume reading:

“Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that
she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with
vigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to
arrive.

“This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by
the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction
to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and
resignation but one intended to afford rear coverage for an
active policy in the East.

“4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn
of 1938 and spring of 1939”—that is—the two phases in
Czechoslovakia—“and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the
territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became
possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or
less favorable strategic premises.”—I think it needs nothing
more than a glance at the progressive chart to see what those
favorable strategic premises were.—

“5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war,
and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the
struggle with Poland, in itself unavoidable, was favorably
selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in
doubt, because the relatively strong opponent collapsed more
quickly than expected, and the Western Powers who were Poland’s
friends, although they did declare war on us and form a second
front, nevertheless made no use of the possibilities open to
them of wresting the initiative from our hands. Concerning the
course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be
said but that it proved to an extent which surprised the whole
world a fact which until then had not been certain by any means,
namely, the high state of efficiency of the young armed forces
of Greater Germany.”

If the Court please, there is a long review by General Jodl in this document. I could read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, it identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.

In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the 6-year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, the Document L-79, which was offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-27. That is the minutes of a conference of the Führer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as large a staff as ours we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo, as Americans say. We also refer to this as “Little Schmundt.” The large file that I offered yesterday, we call “Big Schmundt.”

At this point, I merely wish to read two sentences from Page 1 of that document which we call “Little Schmundt.”

“In the period 1933 to 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our
military system improved enormously.”

And then, just above the middle of the second page of the English translation:

“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.”

One of the most significant direct preparations for aggressive war is found in the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, which I offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-24 and commented on then. I need not repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at the outset that it was to be made public instantly, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday.

General Thomas, Thomas, as we call him, who was in charge of War and Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking member of the German High Council, refers to this law as “the cornerstone of war preparations.” He points out that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program of preparation.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas’ work, _A History of the German War- and Armament-Economy, 1923-1944_, Page 25. We have the volume here, in German, so that anyone who wishes may examine it. I don’t care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court think I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA-35, but I simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable.

THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of showing that General Thomas said that that law was the cornerstone of war? That has already been passed into the record.

MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants that it is here if they care to consult it at any time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, 2353-PS.

This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1938, at which time it was replaced by another secret Defense Law, revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of mobilization, which I think was the euphemism for war.

These laws will be discussed more extensively in connection with other sections of our presentation. They have been discussed by Mr. Dodd in connection with the economic preparations for the war.

The second secret Defense Law I offer in evidence, as our serial number 2194-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA-36.

As to that document I only intend to read the two covering letters:

“Reich Defense Law; the Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony;
Dresden 6; 4 September 1939; Telephone: 52.151, long distance;
Top Secret.

“Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief
Counsellor Hirche or representative in the office; stamp of
receipt of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; received
Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274.

“Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4
September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich
Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL/W/
10.2212/38, Top Secret, and 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top
Secret, for your information and observance.

“By order, signed Kretschmar. 3 inclosures. Stamp: complete to
Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider.

“Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures,
signed 5 September 1939, and returned to Construction Counsellor
Kretschmar.”

The whole point being that it was enclosing a second secret Reich Defense Law under top-secret cover.

Now, next I refer to Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2 (a). That paragraph of the Indictment refers to four points:

(1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; and, (4) the building of an air force.

All four of these points are included in the general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. The facts of rearmament and of its secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity insofar as the Indictment is concerned, lies in the fact that all this was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Versailles Treaty and of the Locarno Pact, and necessary to the aggressive wars which were to follow. The extent and nature of those activities could only have been for aggressive purposes, and the highest importance which the Government attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised financing, both before and after the announcement of conscription and the rebuilding of the Army, 16 March 1935.

I have, if the Court please, an unsigned memorandum by the Defendant Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled “The Financing of the Armament Program” (Finanzierung der Rüstung). As I say, it is not signed by the Defendant Schacht, but he identified it as being his memorandum in an interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. I would assume that he would still admit that it is his memorandum. That memorandum has been referred to but I believe not introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it by our Number 1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-37.

I think it is quite significant, and with the permission of the Court I shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the German interpreter has the original German before him to read into the transcript. “Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler” identified by Schacht as Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40. May 3, 1935 is the date of the memorandum.

“Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based
upon the thought that the accomplishment of the armament program
with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics;
that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this
purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by
neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935 the
difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open
propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of
armament without endangering our position internationally
(without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly
impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby
exceptionally difficult.

“Another supposition must also be emphasized. The printing press
can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree
as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation
increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the
domestic prices and is therefore like a snake biting its own
tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged
completely till 16 March 1935, and since this date the
camouflage had to be continued to an even larger extent, made it
necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at
the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have
been natural to start it (i.e., the printing press) at the final
point of finance. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are
segregated bills of exchange for this purpose (that is,
armament) of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641
millions, out of which bills of exchange for armament amount to
2,374 million Reichsmark, that is of April 30, 1935. The
Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its
jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners, in bank notes of
armament.

“Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our
political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmark were
used for financing of armaments which originated out of the
federal loans which were invested in the saving banks in the
year 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were
provided for the Armed Forces:

“For the budget period 1933 to 1934—750 million Reichsmark; for
the budget period 1934 to 1935—1,100 million Reichsmark; and
for the budget period 1935 to 1936—2,500 million Reichsmark.

“The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after
the budget 1935 to 1936 to 5 to 6 billion Reichsmark. This total
deficit is already financed at the present time by short-term
credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the
possibilities of utilization of the public market for the
armament. The Reichsfinanzminister”—Minister of
Finance—“correctly points out at the defense of the budget:

“‘As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we
cannot figure with security increased tax revenues in an amount
balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the
other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the
impending great task of military policy,’”—I interpolate that
evidently the Defendant Schacht knew about the impending great
military task to be faced by Germany.—“‘for all these reasons
we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget
policy, which solves the problem of armament financing by
organic and planned reduction of other expenditures, not only
from the point of receipt, but also from the point of
expenditure, that is, by saving.’

“How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following,
that very many tasks have been undertaken by the State and
Party”—it isn’t ever just the State; it is the State and the
Party—“and are now in process, all of which are not covered by
the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be
raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The
existence of various budgets side by side, which serve more or
less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a
clear view of the possibilities of financing the armaments. A
large number of ministries and various branches of the Party
have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities
of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of
finance of the State, but not subject to the control of the
Finanzminister”—Minister of Finance—“and therefore also not
subject to the control of the Cabinet. Just as in the sphere of
politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative
powers to individuals brought about various states within the
State, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches
of State and Party, working side by side and against each other,
has a devastating effect on the possibility of finance. If, in
this territory, concentration and unified control is not
introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible
task of armament finance is endangered.

“We have the following tasks:

“(1) A deputy is entrusted with, I suppose, finding all sources
and revenues, which have origin in contributions to the Federal
Government, to the State and Party, and in profits of public and
Party enterprises.

“(2) Furthermore experts entrusted by the Führer have to examine
how these amounts were used and which of these amounts in the
future can be withdrawn from their previous purpose.

“(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all
public and Party organizations, to what extent this property can
be used for the purpose of armament financing.

“(4) The federal Ministry of Finances is to be entrusted to
examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new
taxes or the increasing of existing taxes.

“The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank, under
existing political conditions, was a necessity, and the
political success proved the correctness of this action. The
other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now
under any circumstance. For this purpose all absolutely
nonessential expenditures for other purposes must not take
place, and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as
it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament
financing. Whether the problem of financing as outlined in this
program succeeds remains to be seen, but without such
concentration it will fail with absolute certainty.”

Being sort of a hand in finance myself, I can feel some sympathy with the Defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these problems.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn for 10 minutes?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date that they passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our Document 2261-PS. The secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage and, since their program called for still further expansion, they made a unilateral renunciation of the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935.

I refer to Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935; our Document Number 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of the _Völkische Beobachter_ (the “Popular Observer”, I suppose, is the correct translation), Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date 22 May 1935, which gave his speech under the heading (if I may translate, perhaps): “The Führer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.”

I offer that part of that volume identified as our Number 2288-PS, as Exhibit USA-38, and from that I shall read, beginning with the fifth paragraph in the English translation. I am sorry, I said the fifth paragraph—this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses some general conclusions and then there is a paragraph numbered 1, that says:

“1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva
Resolution of 17 March. . . .

“The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany
unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the Dictate of
Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated by those
powers who could not make up their minds to follow the
disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as
agreed upon by the Treaty.

“2. Because the other powers did not live up to their
obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the
German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles,
which are nothing but a discrimination of the German nation”—I
suppose “against the German nation”—“for an unlimited period of
time, since through them, Germany is being nailed down in a
unilateral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement.”

If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, I don’t necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether he is presenting the truth.

In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. This included not only the training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other para-military organizations, such as the police force, which could be, and were absorbed by, the Army.

These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the Prosecution. However, the extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of 90 billion Reichsmark during the period of 1933 to 1939 in the building up of the Armed Forces.

I have another volume of the _Völkischer Beobachter_, Volume 52, 1939—I think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939—which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to translate, reads: “The Führer Announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich.”

That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September 1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our number 2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last paragraph starting on the page:

“For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building up
the German Armed Forces. During this period more than 90 billion
Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are
the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are
superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be
shaken.”

The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training of flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to build a military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess in a letter from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for delivery to Hess. I suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery.

This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization.

This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and I now offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: “Lieber Alfred” (referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: “Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.” Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz.

“Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the
RWM forwarded to me by our confidential
man”—Vertrauensmann—“which indeed is very interesting. I
believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will
not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not
known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our
long friend.”

I suppose that means “our tall friend.” I may interpolate that the Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this “big friend” or “tall friend” as being one Von Alvensleben.

“I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to
transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to
write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere.
Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.”

Then enclosed with that is “Air Force Organization”:

“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to
provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force.

“Entire management as a civilian organization will be
transferred to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of
Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is going
on leave of absence.

“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way
as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.

“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to
be done within the organization for military flying of the
Stahlhelm”—I believe that means the “steel helmet”—“which is
being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired.

“All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for
military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military
flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The
Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per
hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he
himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case
of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization,
proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20. . . .
Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement
(40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of
planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm
organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be
granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.”

The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German Navy in this rearmament program, secret at first.

When they deemed it safe to say so, they openly acknowledged that it had always been their objective to break Versailles.

In 1937 the Navy High Command published a secret book entitled _The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935_. The preface refers to the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of Navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the Government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament and camouflage rearmament from 1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935.

This document points out the significant effect of the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy, which was only hampered in so far as concealment of rearmament had to be considered in compliance with the Versailles Treaty.

With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935 and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.

We have, if the Court please, a photostat of the German printed book to which I have referred, entitled _Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles_ (The Fight of the Navy against Versailles) _1919 to 1935_, written by Sea Captain Schüssler. It has the symbol of the Nazi Party with the swastika in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed “_Secret_”, underscored. It is our Document C-156. It is a book of 76 pages of text, followed by index lists and charts. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-41. I may say that the Defendant Raeder identified this book in a recent interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. I should like to read from this book, if the Court please, the preface and one or two other portions of the book:

“The object and aim of this memorandum, under the heading
‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on
documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in
the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the
Peace Treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich Navy, after
the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow,
did not rest but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable
enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man
Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so
create, by the work of soldiers and technicians, the primary
condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more
clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in
wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and
responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace
Treaty. Thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they
risked, particularly in the early days of their fight,
themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially
self-ordained tasks. This compilation makes it clearer, however,
that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to
a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the
whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the
soldier. Only when the Führer had created the second and even
more important condition for an effective rearmament in the
coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the
political, financial, and spiritual power, could the work of the
soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this Peace
Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed
under the driving power of this united will.

“Signed, the Compiler.”

Now I wish to invite the Court’s attention merely to the summary of contents because the chapter titles are sufficiently significant for my present purpose.

“I. Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of
Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the
Ruhr, 1923).

“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction.

“2. Removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and
machine weapons.

“3. Limitation of destruction in Helgoland.

“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lohmann
case in 1927).

“1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich
Navy.

“2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among the
people.

“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.

I am ashamed to say, if the Court please, that I am not familiar with the story about Captain Lohmann.

“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.

“5. Building up of the Air Force.

“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm.

“7. Economic rearmament.

“8. Miscellaneous measures: a. The N. V. Aerogeodetic; b. Secret
reconnaissance.

“III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich
Government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1928
to the seizure of power in 1933.

“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in
camouflaged form (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions,
1935).”

Now if the interpreter who has the original German volume will turn to Chapter IV, Page 75—“Aufrüstung”—Concealed rearmament under the leadership of the Government of the Reich (from 1933 until military freedom in 1935):

“The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the
taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of decisive
influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.

“While the Reichsrat approached its dissolution and withdrew as
a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which
could only take a decisive attitude toward the rearmament of the
Armed Forces. The Government took over the management of the
rearmament program upon this foundation. . . .”

Then a heading—“Development of the Armed Forces”:

“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government
developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War
Minister, General Von Blomberg, and through him the three
branches of the Armed Forces, received far-reaching powers from
the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The
whole organization of the Reich was included in this work. In
view of these powers, the collaboration of the former inspecting
body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then
on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of
the accounting office of the German Reich.”

Another heading—“Independence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy”:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary
doctor, had received thereby a far-reaching independence in the
building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered in
so far as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be
continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the
ordinary budget there remained the previous special budget,
which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit
for the provision of labor, which was made available by the
Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given
to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934
Commodore Schüssler, afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took
into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of
the Budget.”

Another heading—“Declaration of Military Freedom”:

“When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed
Forces, executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of
the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned
limitation on rearmament works, namely, the external camouflage,
was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered
our ability to move freely on and under water, on land, and in
the air, for one and a half decades, and carried by the
newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed
Forces, and as a part of it, the Navy, can lead with full
strength towards its completion, the rearmament already under
way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful
position in the world.”

If the Tribunal please, at this moment I have a new problem about proof which I believe we have not discussed. I have in my hand an English translation of an interrogation of the Defendant Erich Raeder. Of course he knows he was interrogated; he knows what he said. I don’t believe we have furnished copies of this interrogation to defendants’ counsel. I don’t know whether under the circumstances I am at liberty to read from it or not. If I do read from it I suggest that the defendants’ counsel will all get the complete text of it—I mean of what I read into the transcript.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the counsel for the Defendant Raeder any objection to this interrogation being read?

DR. SIEMERS: As far as I have understood the proceedings to date, I believe that it is a question of a procedure in which either proof by way of documents or proof by way of witnesses will be furnished. I am surprised that the Prosecution wishes to furnish proof by way of records of interrogations, taken at a time when the Defense was not present. I should be obliged to the Court if I could be told whether, in principle, I, as a defense counsel, may resort to producing evidence in this form, i.e. present documents of the interrogation of witnesses; that is to say, documents in which I myself interrogated witnesses the same as the Prosecution without putting witnesses on the stand.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if interrogations of defendants are to be used, copies of such interrogations should be furnished to defendant’s counsel beforehand. The question which the Tribunal wished to ask you was whether on this occasion you objected to this interrogation being used without such a copy having been furnished to you. With regard to your observation as to your own rights with reference to interrogating your defendants, the Tribunal considers that you must call them as witnesses upon the witness stand and cannot interrogate them and put in the interrogations. The question for you now is whether you object to this interrogation being laid before the Tribunal at this stage.

DR. SIEMERS: I should like first of all to have an opportunity of seeing every record before it is submitted in Court. Only then shall I be able to decide whether interrogations can be read, the contents of which I as a defense counsel am not familiar with.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn now and it anticipates that the interrogation can be handed to you during the adjournment and then can be used afterwards.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should like to ask the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance, on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of Mr. A. I. Vishinsky of the Foreign Office, and General K. P. Gorshenin, Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Republic who has been able to join us in the Prosecution only now.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, and observes that Mr. Vishinsky has taken his seat with the Soviet Delegation of Chief Prosecutors.

DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the minutes. I should like to observe that I don’t think it is very agreeable that the Prosecution should not depart from their point that the Defense should only receive the documents during the proceedings, or just before the proceedings, or at times, even after the proceedings. I should be grateful if the Prosecution could see to it in the future that we are informed in good time.

Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented today was made in our room, number 54. I find that the documents presented today are not included in yesterday’s list. You will understand that the task of the Defense is thereby rendered comparatively difficult. On principle, I cannot in my statement of today, give my agreement to the reading of minutes of interrogations. In order to facilitate matters, I should like to follow the Court’s suggestion, and declare that I am agreeable to the minutes presented here being read. I request, however—and I believe I have already been assured by the Prosecution to that effect—that only the part be read which refers to Document C-156, as I had no time to discuss the remaining points with the defendants.

As to the remaining points, five other documents are cited. Moreover I request that the part which refers to the book by Kapitän zur See Schüssler, should be read in full, and I believe that the prosecutor agrees with this.

THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder that you were substantially in agreement as to what parts of this interrogation you should read. Is that right, Mr. Alderman?

MR. ALDERMAN: If I understood the counsel correctly, he asked that I read the entire part of the interrogation which deals with Document C-156, but I understood that he did not agree for me to read other parts that referred to other documents. I handed counsel the original of my copy of the interrogation before the lunch hour, and when he returned it to me after the lunch hour, I substituted in his hands a carbon copy. I didn’t quite understand his statement about documents being introduced which hadn’t been furnished to the defendant. We did file the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the document book?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book contains all the documents except these interrogations. They did not contain the interrogation.

THE PRESIDENT: Then he is right in saying that.

MR. ALDERMAN: He is right as to the interrogation, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you in agreement with him then, that you can read what you want to read now, and that it is not necessary for you to read the parts to which he objects.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. I understand he objects to my reading anything other than the part concerned with C-156. I would anticipate that he might be willing for me to read the other parts tomorrow.

This deals with the book which I offered in evidence this morning, Document C-156, Exhibit USA-41. The Defendant Raeder identified that book, and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time make progress in naval development. I refer to the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder at the part we had under discussion:

“Q. I have here a Document C-156, which is a photostatic copy of
a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy and covers the
struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to
1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the
work.

“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.

“Q. Was that an official publication of the German Navy?

“A. This Captain Schüssler (indicating the author) was a
commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, it was an idea
of this officer to put all these things together.

“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the
authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?

“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he
tells here in the foreword.

“Q. And in the preparation of this work he had access to the
official Navy files and based his work on the items contained
therein?

“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons,
and he would have had the files which were necessary.

“Q. Do you know whether, before the work was published, a draft
of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for
comment?

“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it
only when it was published.

“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?

“A. It was a secret object. I think all upper commands in the
Navy had knowledge of it.

“Q. It was not circulated outside of Navy circles?

“A. No.

“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained
in the work, regarding the circumventing of the provisions of
Versailles?

“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only
remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word
of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have some advantages.
But the flying men were exercised 1 year before they went into
the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of
Versailles was filled. They did not belong to the Navy, as long
as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were
developed, but not in Germany and not in the Navy, but in
Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an
industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built only much
later, when we began to act with the English Government about
the Treaty of 35 to 100, because we could see that then the
Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with
England, and so, in order to keep the word of Versailles, we
tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but we tried to have
advantages.

“Q. Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command was
interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of armaments, but
would attempt to fulfill the letter of the Treaty, although
actually avoiding it?

“A. That was our endeavor.”

MR. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that counsel for the defendant asked me to read:

“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?

“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war
by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, and so
we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in
this way; and so all our efforts were directed to the aim of
having a little more strength against the Poles should they
attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking Poland in this
stage by the Navy. A second aim was to have some defense against
the entering of French forces into the Ostsee (East Sea),
because we knew that the French had the intention to sustain the
Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, Gdynia, and so the Navy
was a defense against an attack of Poland and against the
entrance of French ships into the East Sea; quite defensive
aims.

“Q. When did this fear of an attack from Poland first show
itself in official circles in Germany, would you say?

“A. In all the first years. They took Vilna; in the same minute
we thought they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly
the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the
German Government Ministers, the Army and Navy Ministers—Gröner
and Noske.

“Q. Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held and
existed perhaps as early as 1919-1920, after the end of the
first World War?

“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and
about those years in the beginning I cannot give you a very
exact picture, because I was then 2 years in the Navy Archives
to write a book about the War and the fighting capacity of
cruisers. For 2 years I was not with those things.”

MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise the same kind of planning and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy. Although a copy of the book has not been found by us, the project was to have been written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s personal military historian. We have found the table of contents; it refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes of documents, which evidently were intended as the working materials for the basis of chapters, to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The titles in this table of contents clearly establish the Navy planning and preparation to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way and to rebuild the naval strength necessary for aggressive war.

We have here the original captured document which is, as I say, the German typewritten table of contents of this projected work, with a German cover, typewritten, entitled _Geschichte der Deutschen Marine, 1919-1939_ (_History of the German Navy, 1919-1939_). We identify it as our series C-17 and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-42. This table of contents includes such general headings—perhaps I had better read some of the actual headings:

“Part A, 1919—The Year of Transition. Chapter VII: First
efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its
effects.

“(a) Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of
naval offices in Civil Ministries _et cetera_. (For example:
Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime
observation station and the sea-mark system in Helgoland and
Kiel, of the Ems-Jade Canal _et cetera_ into the Reich Transport
Ministry up to 1934: Noske’s proposal of 11. 8. 1919 to
incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical
High School, Berlin; formation of the Naval Arsenal
Kiel.)”—With a reference to a group of documents numbered
75.—”

“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and
guns.

“(1) North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new
batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking
effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control
Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result
of efforts.)”—referring to the group of documents numbered
85.—

“(2) Baltic (taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pillau and
Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars
there.)”—I may interpolate that when the British offer in
evidence the Treaty of Versailles, you will see the detailed
limitations which this document indicates an effort to avoid.—

“(3) The beginnings of coastal air defense.

“Part B, 1920-1924—The Organizational New Order. Chapter V: The
Navy. Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty.
Foreign countries.

“(a) The Interallied Control Commissions.

“(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles
Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich
Government and the legislative bodies.

“(1) Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and
automatic weapons.

“(2) Limitation of demolition work in Helgoland.

“(3) Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923.

“(4) The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous
associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of
‘sports’ unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in
naval recruitment).

“(5) Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since
1920 (projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey,
Argentina, and Finland; torpedo testing).

“(6) Participation in the preparation for building of the
Luftwaffe (preservation of airdromes, aircraft construction,
teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air-raid
defense, training of pilots).

“(7) Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.

“Part C (1925-1932—Replacement of tonnage). Chapter IV: The
Navy, the Versailles Treaty, foreign countries.

“(a) The activities of the Interallied Control Commission (up to
31. 1. 27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace
Commission).

“(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich
Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.

“(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their
significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work
from 1935.

“(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat
arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection
with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925,
relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war
U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927 . . .
250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly;
electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain
and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an
anti-U-boat school.

“(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of
the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air Arm,
Finance Aircraft Company Severa, later Luftdienst”—or Air
Service—“GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; air station
list, training of sea cadet candidates, military tactical
questions ‘Air Defense Journeys,’ technical development,
experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development
Do X _et cetera_, catapult aircraft, arming, engines, ground
organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland flight 1925,
and the seaplane race 1926.

“(4) Economic rearmament (‘The Tebeg’—Technical Advice and
Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for
investigating the position of raw materials for industrial
capacity and other war economic questions).

“(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret
investigations).