Chapter XVI: Part 16

“(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich
Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928
to the taking over of power).

“(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations;
winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and
carrying on of other work.

“(2) Finance question (‘Black Funds’ and the ‘Special Budget’).

“(3) The Labor Committee and its objectives.

“(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under
disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933).

“(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in
Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London
Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931;
the League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

“Part D (1933-1939—The German Navy during the military freedom
period).”

—which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing. A glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate the scope of this proposed work. Whether the history was ever actually written by Scherff, I do not know.

I would like to call attention just to the first two or three headings, under this “Part D—The German Navy during the military freedom period”:

“I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of
prestige at sea.

“II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist
State.”—The main heading III in the middle of the page—“The
Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich
Government in a disguised way.”

The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations.

I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, headed “Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” and marked in large blue printing “Geheime Kommandosache” (Secret Commando Matter), which is identified as our C-153. It has the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end. I assume it is the facsimile; it may have been written with a stylus on a stencil; I can’t tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-43. It is headed with the title: “Armament Plan (R. P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase.” This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament targets, _et cetera_, and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period.

I quote from the third numbered paragraph:

“The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for
the realization of this target; this again requires a
co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This
organization of financial measures over a number of years,
according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament
program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis
for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political
leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military
means available at a given time.”

One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document:

“All theoretical and practical R-preparations”—I assume that
means armament preparations—“are to be drawn up with a primary
view to readiness for a war _without any alert period_.”—And
“without any alert period” is underscored in the original.

The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain.

The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn’t forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.

Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end.

That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-44.

It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the ‘Karlsruhe.’”

“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement
of D. and E. (defensive weapons).

“Führer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a
displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton
ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.

“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet
must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from
1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter
guns (like the King George class.)

“3. The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats
secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite.”

In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy.

We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and I think he will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-45.

It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the ‘Emden’.

“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available
for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a
fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible
that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he
did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He
considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by
1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get
Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the
disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the
workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Göring and
myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the
Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if
the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from
Scandinavia.

“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have
six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political
situation in the first quarter of 1935,”—that’s the following
year, foreseeing—“he stated that he would keep this point in
mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the
assembling should commence.”

Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom:

“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in
the middle of June ’35 according to plan.”

The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need.

We have an original German document, again headed “Geheime Kommandosache” (secret commando matter)—a directive of 31 January 1933 by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament of the Navy.

It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-46:

“Top Secret.

“General directions for support given by the German Navy to the
German armament industry.

“The effects of the present economic depression have led here
and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an
active participation of the German armament industry abroad,
even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no
profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting.
Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing
‘self-sufficiency’ would in any case make such participation
superfluous.

“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the
situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the
following contradictory corrective points:

“a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be
overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war
politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the
assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to
a certain extent.

“b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German
armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere.
It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and
economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the
deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be
increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over
and above our own requirements.

“c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even
those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions.
Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are
making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament
industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the
propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of
sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and
insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially
advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and
foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of
military policy.

“d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions
imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever
increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German
armament industry and preparing the way for it in every
direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the
world.

“e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to
compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of
its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our
own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be
kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the
defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to
issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage
of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem
of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has
not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may
become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always
possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new
better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate
after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that
we should be technically well to the fore in any really
fundamental matters, than that less important points should be
kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

“f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing
the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy,
even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the
purchasers are not made confident that something better is being
offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the
competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the
requirements of the German Navy in case of need.”

This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number—that is, permitted under the Treaty—at a given time, and storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective S-boats was constantly increased.

We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with the heading: “Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, 10 February 1932.” Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47, the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from the first paragraph of the text:

“In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament
Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat
half-flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly
similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a
formation of torpedo-carrying boats”—the German word being
“Torpedoträger”—“and it is not intended to count these S-boats
against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed to us.

“I therefore order:

“1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Lürssen,
Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily
removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for
torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I.”—a
translator’s note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I.
(Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining)—“In agreement with the
Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its
torpedo-tubes on completion of the practice shooting, for
fitting on another boat.

“2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the Naval
Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the
torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a
short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, so that only
one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public
consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of
temporary trials by the T.V.A.”

—I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the translator’s note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.—

“It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats of
the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the type.
The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the
torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

“3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as soon
as the situation of the political control allows it.”

Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, written in 1932, was talking about “as soon as the situation of the political control allows it.” The seizure of power was the following year.

Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of ‘Transport Ships 0’. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion.

We have the original German document, again top secret, identified by our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It has the seal of the Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think the Defendant Raeder will admit, or at least will not deny, that this is an official document.

“Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers.

“It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35
(AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary
cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign
waters.

“In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations,
the ships will be referred to as ‘Transport Ships 0’. It is
requested that in future this designation only be used.”

The short paragraph says: “The preparations are to be arranged, so that they can be completed by 1. 4. 35.”

Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are notes kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy’s activities and policies of which I should like to point out some illustrations.

One of these documents discloses that the displacement of the battleships “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” and “F/G”—whatever that is—was actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the British under the Treaty. This document, our C-23, I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-49. That is a set really of three separate documents joined together. I read from that document:

“The true displacement of the battleships
‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’ and the ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent, in
both cases, the displacement reported to the British.”

And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and two columns headed “Displacement by Type”: one column “Actual Displacement” and the other column “Notified Displacement.”

On the “Scharnhorst” the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified was 26,000 tons. On the “F”—actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. On the “HI”—actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the list. I need not read them all.

On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 on the English version, is the statement:

“In a clear cut program for the construction, the Führer and
Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the
aims of his foreign policy.”

The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial explanations or pretexts to explain away these violations.

Following a conference with the chief of “A” section, an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction, and in many instances proposed together with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded.

The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 items under “Measures of Organization.” The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their significance. As I understand it, the “A” section was the military department of the Navy.

We have this very interesting document among the captured documents identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-50. It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it is headed “A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of ‘A’ Section”, dated 9 September 1933, and captured among official German Navy files.

This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should like to call attention to a few of the more interesting items.

There are three columns, one headed “Measure”, one headed “Material Measures, Details,” and the most interesting one is headed “Remarks.” The remarks contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, so I can conveniently refer to the numbers:

“Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.”—Then
figures are given. Remarks—“Further mines are in part ordered,
in part being delivered.”

“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area
for Baltic artillery batteries.”—In the remarks
column—“Justification: Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper
repairs.”

“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The
offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 lies in the fact
that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This
justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures.”

“Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal
batteries.” The explanation: “Possible justification is that,
though the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less.”

“Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any remonstrance
against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve
stores, have been temporarily installed only for training
purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping forces (equality
of rights).”

—Here is one that is rather amusing—“Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns _et cetera_, permitted.” Remarks: “Can be made light of.”

“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” This remark is quite
characteristic: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be
denied.”

“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning
shots. Make little of it.”—And so on throughout the list.

I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference as to the position that they might take.

Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation that “On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.”

That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries. At the same time Germany attached so much importance to this action, that they considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other countries. Anticipating the probable nature of such sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for military preparations for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the air, in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense Blomberg, to the Head of the Army High Command Fritsch, the Head of the Navy High Command Raeder, and the Reichsminister of Air Göring.

We have this captured document in our series C-140, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-151. It is a directive dated 25 October 1933, 11 days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.

“1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of
the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against
Germany.

“2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and
the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in
accordance with the following points:

“(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no
facts become known to the outside world from which preparation
for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is
incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere
of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If
necessary, the preparations must take second place to this
necessity.”

I think that makes the point without further reading. One of the immediate consequences of the action was that following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was still further increased.

I introduced this morning document C-153, as Exhibit USA-43, so that is already in. From that, at this point, I wish to read Paragraph 5. That, as you recall, was a document dated 12 May 1934.

“5) Owing to the speed of military political development, since
Germany quitted Geneva, and based on the progress of the Army,
the new R-plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years.
The third ‘A’ phase lasts accordingly from 1. 4. 34 to 31. 3.
36.”

Then the next allegation of the Indictment, if the Tribunal please: “On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany was building a military air force.”

That is an historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice, and I am quite certain that the Defendant Göring would not dispute it.

We have a copy of the German publication known as _Das Archiv_—the number of March 1935; and it is Page 1830 to which I refer, and I would offer that in evidence, identifying it as our number 2292-PS; I offer it as Exhibit USA-52. It is an announcement concerning the German Air Force:

“The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, Göring,
in his talk with the special correspondent of the _Daily Mail_,
Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air
Force.

“General Göring said:

“‘In the extension of our national defenses’”—Sicherheit—“‘it
was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of
defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted
myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line
of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which
would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a
military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any
time, attacks on Germany.’”

Then, at the end of that section of the article in _Das Archiv_:

“In conclusion, the correspondent asks whether the German Air
Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany.

General Göring replied to that exactly as follows:

“‘The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with
the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is
convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to
threaten the peace of other nations.’”

As I said; I believe, this morning, when we cite assurances of that kind from Nazi leaders, we take it that we are not foreclosed from showing that they had different intentions from those announced.

The next allegation of the Indictment is the promulgating of the law for compulsory military service, universal military service.

Having gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training of personnel, the next step necessary to the program for aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty.

I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that law as it appears in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, which is the official compilation of laws, in the Title I of Volume I, yearly volume 1935, or Jahrgang, at Page 369 and I think I need not offer the book or the law in evidence.

The text of the law itself is very brief and I might read that. It is right at the end of the article. I should refer to that as our Document Number 1654-PS, so as to identify it:

“In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the
following law:

“Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.

“The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is
herewith promulgated:

“Paragraph 1. Service in the Armed Forces is based upon
compulsory military duty.

“Paragraph 2. In peace time, the German Army, including the
police troops transferred to it, is organized into 12 corps and
36 divisions.”—There is a typographical error in the English
version of that. It says “16 divisions”, but the original German
says 36 divisions.—

“Paragraph 3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty
of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on
compulsory military duty.”

Signed: “Berlin, 16 March 1935.”

It is signed first by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and then many other officials, including the following defendants in this case:

Von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Göring, Hess, Frank.

Does the Court contemplate a short recess?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution expects, on tomorrow, to offer in evidence some captured enemy moving pictures and in order to give Defense Counsel an opportunity to see them before they are offered in evidence—and in response to their request made to the Tribunal some time ago—the showing of these films for Defense Counsel will be held in this court room this evening at 8 o’clock, for the Defense Counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Colonel Storey.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I have reached now Paragraph IV, F, 2 (e) of the Indictment, which alleges:

“On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent
to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they
would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles
Treaty and comply with the Locarno Pact.”

As a part of their program to weaken resistance in possible enemy states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus on the same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government to respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno.

I offered in evidence this morning, as Exhibit USA-38, our Document 2288-PS, the pertinent volume of the issue of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 21 May 1935, containing Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag on that date. In that speech he said:

“Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely
respect all other articles pertaining to the
cooperation”—Zusammenleben, really meaning the living together
in harmony—“of the various nations, including territorial
agreements. Revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by
it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.

“The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to
sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill.
However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even
if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore,
it will in particular adhere to all the obligations under the
Locarno Pact, as long as the other partners of the Pact also
adhere to it.”

For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and Versailles Treaties include the following: The Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, Article 1:

“The High Contracting Parties, collectively and severally,
guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the
maintenance of the territorial _status quo_, resulting from the
frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and
France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed
by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at
Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the
stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty,
concerning the demilitarized zone.”

That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

Then from the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, Article 42:

“Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
fortifications, either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
right bank, to the West of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the
East of the Rhine.

“Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the
assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and
military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all
permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way
forbidden.”

The next allegation of the Indictment (f):

“On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland,
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of
Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world
that ‘we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.’”

The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland obviously was a sore wound with the Nazis ever since its establishment, after World War I. Not only was this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany, east of the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations or for any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early.

We have a document, a German captured document, in German script, which we identify as C-139, and which appears to be signed by the handwriting of Blomberg. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-53.

The document deals with what is called “Operation Schulung”, which means schooling, or training. It is dated 2 May 1935 and even refers to prior Staff discussions on the subject dealt with. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army Command, who at that time, I believe, was Fritsch, the Chief of the Navy High Command, Raeder, and the Reich Minister for Air, Göring.

It does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to it. It is our view that it was a military plan for the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno.

I read from the first part of the document which is headed “top secret”:

“For the operation suggested in the last Staff talks of the
Armed Forces, I lay down the code name ‘Schulung’”—training.—

“The supreme direction of Operation Schulung rests with the
Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of the
three services.

“Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according
to the following directives:

“1. General.

“(1) The operation must, on issue of the code words ‘Carry out
Schulung’, be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.
Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the
very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed
in the drafting of reports, drawings, _et cetera_, and these
officers only in person.

“(2) There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking
part. These will be employed in their peacetime strength and
with their peacetime equipment.

“(3) The preparation for the operation will be made without
regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every
improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a
greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better
prospects of success.”

The rest of the order deals with military details and I think it is unnecessary to read it.

There are certain points, in the face of this order, which are inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed (Schlagartig als Überfall).

The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, this document is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of the Conscription Law on 16 March 1935, and so it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription Law.

Of course the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 March 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily have been totally revised to suit the existing conditions and specific objectives. As I say, although the plan does not mention the Rhineland, it has all of the indications of a Rhineland operation plan. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not at all detract from the vital fact that as early as 2 May 1935 the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a Staff plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary, to resist French sanctions against their Conscription Law.

It is significant to note the date of this document is the same as the date of the signature of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.

The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was actually carried into execution, on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, and Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Göring. We have that order signed by Blomberg, headed, as usual, “top secret,” identified by us as C-159. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-54.

The German copy of that document bears the Defendant Raeder’s initial in green pencil, with a red pencil note: “To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy.”

The first part of the order reads:

“Supreme Command of the Navy:

“1. The Führer and Reich Chancellor has made the following
decision:

“By reason of the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact, the
obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as
they apply to Articles 42 and 43, of the Treaty of Versailles
which referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as
obsolete.

“2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be
transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of
the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the
following orders. . . .”

There follow the detailed orders for the military operation.

We also have the orders for naval cooperation. The original German document, which we identify as C-194, was issued on 6 March 1936, in the form of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, Blomberg, signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, setting out detailed instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. I offer the document in evidence as Exhibit USA-55.

The short covering letter is as follows:

“To: C-in-C Navy.

“The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

“1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not
over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has
been approved. C-in-C Air Force will instruct the Air Command VI
from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance
aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.

“2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat
reconnaissance line until the evening of 7 March. The immediate
transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshafen has been
approved.

“3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed
Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as
the first countermeasures to be taken against military
preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to
examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A,
to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous
measures could not be omitted.”

That is signed “Keitel”.

The rest of the documents are detailed naval orders—operational orders—and I think I need not read further.

For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a momentous speech on 7 March 1936. I have the volume of the _Völkischer Beobachter_, Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936, our Document 2289-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-56.

This is a long speech which the world remembers and of which I shall only read a short portion:

“Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated
friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by
infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the
Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this
manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner
meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany
regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this
dissolved treaty. The German Government is now constrained to
face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation
which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet
treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In
accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its
frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German
Government has today restored the full and unrestricted
sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland.”

The whole matter of the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland caused extensive international repercussions and study. As a result of the protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council of the League made an investigation and announced the following finding, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as being carried in the _League of Nations Monthly Summary_, March 1936, Volume 16, Page 78; and it is also quoted in an article by Quincy Wright, in the _American Journal of International Law_, Page 487, 1936.

The finding is this:

“That the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43
of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936,
military forces to enter and establish themselves in the
demilitarized zone referred to, in Article 42 and the following
articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno.”

At the same time, on 7 March 1936, as the Germans reoccupied the Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, they again tried to allay the fears of other European powers and lead them into a false sense of security by announcing to the world: “We have no territorial demands to make in Europe.”

That appears in this same speech of Hitler’s, which I have offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-56, which is Document 2289-PS. The language will be found on Page 6, Column 1:

“We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above
all that all the tensions resulting either from false
territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers
of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be
solved by war.”

Most of the acts set forth in the paragraph of the Indictment which I have been discussing, I think do not need judicial proof because they are historical facts. We have been able to bring you a number of interesting documents illuminating that history. The existence of prior plans and preparations is indisputable from the very nature of things. The method and sequence of these plans and their accomplishment are clearly indicative of the progressing and increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, international obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding.

The detailed presentation of the violations of treaties and international law will be presented by our British colleagues, in support of Count Two of the Indictment.

In clear relief, there is shown the determination of the Nazi conspirators to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany. In this process, they conspired and engaged in secret rearmament and training, the secret production of munitions of war, and they built up an air force. They withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. They instituted universal military service on March 16, 1935. On May 21, 1935 they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On March 7, 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland and at the same time, falsely announced that they had no territorial demands in Europe.

The objectives of the conspirators were vast and mighty, requiring long and extensive preparations. The process involved the evasion, circumvention, and violation of international obligations and treaties. They stopped at nothing.

The accomplishment of all those things, together with getting Versailles out of the way, constituted an opening of the gates toward the specific aggressions which followed.

I pass next, if the Tribunal please, to the presentation of the story of the aggression against Austria. I do not know whether Your Honor desires me to start on that or not. I am perfectly willing to do so.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to use this volume of documents marked “M” tomorrow?

MR. ALDERMAN: There will be a new one marked “N”.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 November 1945 at 1000 hours._]

SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 28 November 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the United States.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point we distribute document book lettered “N”, which will cover the next phase of the case, as I will now undertake to present it. Of the five large phases of aggressive warfare, which I undertake to present to the Tribunal, I have now completed the presentation of the documents on the first phase, the phase lasting from 1933 to 1936, consisting of the preparation for aggression.

The second large phase of the program of the conspirators for aggression lasted from approximately 1936 to March 1939, when they had completed the absorption of Austria and the occupation of all of Czechoslovakia. I again invite the Court’s attention to the chart on the wall. You may be interested in glancing at it from time to time as the presentation progresses.

The relevant portions of the Indictment to the present subject are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing on Pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text. This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts: First, the 1936 to 1938 phase of the plan, planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia; second, the execution of the plan to invade Austria, November 1937 to March 1938; third, the execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March 1939.

As I previously indicated to the Tribunal, the portion of the Indictment headed “(a) Planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia” is proved for the most part by Document Number 386-PS, which I introduced on Monday. That is Exhibit USA-25. That was one of the handful of documents with which I began my presentation of this part of the case. The minutes taken by Colonel Hossbach of the meeting in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November 1937, when Hitler developed his political last will and testament, reviewed the desire of Nazi Germany for more room in central Europe, and made preparations for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia as a means of strengthening Germany for the general pattern of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression.

I shall present the material on this second, or Austrian phase of aggression, in two separate parts. I shall first present the materials and documents relating to the aggression against Austria. They have been gathered together in the document book which has just been distributed. Later I shall present the material relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. They will be gathered in a separate document book.

First, we have the events leading up to the autumn of 1937, and the strategic position of the National Socialists in Austria. I suggest at this point, if the Tribunal please, that in this phase we see the first full flowering of what has come to be known as Fifth Column infiltration techniques in another country, and first under that, the National Socialist aim of absorption of Austria.

In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded, after the meeting of 5 November 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, it is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in Austria by the Nazi Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position which the Nazis had reached by the fall of 1937 made it possible for them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with much less cost than had been contemplated at the time of the meeting covered by the Hossbach minutes.

The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German National Socialists. On the first page of _Mein Kampf_ Hitler said: “German Austria must return to the Great German Motherland.” He continued by stating that this purpose of having common blood in a common Reich could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. Moreover, this aim of absorption of Austria was an aim from 1933 on and was regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to carry out.

At this point, I should like to offer in evidence our Document Number 1760-PS, which, if admitted, would be Exhibit USA-57. This document is an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August of this year by George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador, now in Mexico City. Before I quote from Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, I should like to point out briefly that Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin from 1930 to late spring of 1934. He was then made American Minister in Vienna where he stayed until 1937.

In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into frequent contact with German Government officials, and he reports in this affidavit that the Nazi Government officials, with whom he had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and concealed none of their aims.

If the Court please, this affidavit, which is quite long, presents a somewhat novel problem of treatment in the presentation of this case. In lieu of reading this entire affidavit into the record, I should like, if it might be done in that way, to offer in evidence, not merely the English original of the affidavit, but also a translation into German, which has been mimeographed. This translation of the affidavit into German has been distributed to counsel for the defendants.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): An affidavit of a witness who is obtainable has just been turned over to the Court. The content of the affidavit offers so many subjective opinions of the witness, that it is imperative we hear the witness personally in this matter.

I should like to take this occasion to ask that it be decided as a matter of principle, whether that which a witness can testify from his own knowledge may, without further ado, be presented in the form of an affidavit; or whether if a witness is living and can be reached the principle of oral proceedings should be applied, that is, the witness should be heard directly.

MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should like to be heard briefly on the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: You have finished what you had to say, I understand?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will hear Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize, of course, the inherent weakness of an affidavit as evidence where the witness is not present and subject to cross-examination. Mr. Messersmith is an elderly gentleman. He is not in good health. It was entirely impracticable to try to bring him here; otherwise, we should have done so.

I remind the Court of Article 19 of the Charter:

“The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.
It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent
expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any
evidence, which it deems to have probative value.”

Of course, the Court would not treat anything in an affidavit such as this as having probative value unless the Court deemed it to have probative value; and if the defendants have countering evidence, which is strong enough to overcome whatever is probative in this affidavit, of course the Court will treat the probative value of all the evidence in accordance with this provision of the Charter.

By and large, this affidavit and another affidavit by Mr. Messersmith which we shall undertake to present cover background material which is a matter of historical knowledge, of which the Court could take judicial notice. Where he does quote these amazingly frank expressions by Nazi leaders, it is entirely open to any of them, who may be quoted, to challenge what is said, or to tell Your Honors what they believe was said. In any event, it seems to me that the Court can accept an affidavit of this character, made by a well-known American diplomat, and give it whatever probative value the Court thinks it has.

As to the question of reading the entire affidavit, I understand the ruling of the Court to be that only those parts of documents, which are quoted in the record, will be considered to be in the record. It will be based upon the necessity of giving the German counsel knowledge of what was being used. As to these affidavits, we have furnished them complete German translations. It seems to us that a different rule might obtain where that has been done.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, have you finished what you had to say?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution takes the point of view that the age and state of health of the witness makes it impossible to summon him as a witness. I do not know the witness personally. Consequently, I am not in a position to state to what extent he is actually incapacitated. Nevertheless, I have profound doubts regarding the presentation of evidence of such an old and incapacitated person. I am not speaking specifically now about Mr. Messersmith. I do not think the Court can judge to what extent old age and infirmity can possibly influence memory and reasoning powers; so, personal presence would seem absolutely indispensable.

Furthermore, it is important to know what questions, _in toto_, were put to the witness. An affidavit only reiterates the answers to questions which were put to the person. Very often conclusions can be drawn from unanswered questions. It is here a question of evidence solely on the basis of an affidavit. For that reason we are not in a position to assume, with absolute certainty, that the evidence of the witness is complete.