Chapter XVIII: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (14)

VON RIBBENTROP: The situation is that I am not familiar with the message of Dahlerus, I cannot say anything about it. Regarding the meeting between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson, I can say that I read the correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler in the morning, I think it was dated the 22d, and somehow had arrived at a sort of deadlock. I talked to the Führer afterwards, about whether or not another attempt should be made in order to arrive at some kind of a solution with England. Subsequently, towards noon, I think it was 1 or 2 o’clock, the Führer met Sir Nevile Henderson in my presence and told him he should take a plane and fly to London in order to talk to the British Government as soon as possible. After the solution of the Polish problem he intended to approach England again with a comprehensive offer. He gave, I believe, a rough outline of the offer already in the _note verbale_; but I do not recall that exactly. Then Sir Nevile Henderson flew to London. While the Führer was having that conversation, military measures were under way. I learned of that during the day, because Mussolini’s refusal had arrived, I believe, not at 3 o’clock, but earlier in the course of the morning or at noon. Then at 4 or 5 in the afternoon I heard about the ratification of the Polish-British agreement. I went to the Führer immediately and suggested to him to withdraw the military measures; and he did so after short deliberation. There is no doubt that in the meantime certain military measures had been taken. Just how far they went I regret not to be able to say. But when the Führer sent that offer, that _note verbale_ to England I was convinced and under the impression that if England would respond to it in some way, it would not come to an armed conflict, and that in this case the military measures which, I believe, were automatically put in effect, would somehow have been stopped later on. But I cannot say anything about that in detail. I recollect only one thing, and that is that when I received the _note verbale_ from the Führer, which I think was in the afternoon or in the evening, these measures had already either been stopped or were, at any rate, in the process of being stopped. I cannot give it to you in chronological order at the moment. For that I have to have the pertinent documents which, unfortunately, are not at my disposal here. But one thing is certain, the offer of the Führer to England was made in order to try once again to come to a solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the _note verbale_ I even asked him, “How about the Polish solution?” and I still recollect that he said, “We will now send that note to the British, and if they respond to it then we can still see what to do, there will still be time.”

At any rate, I believe, the military measures had either been stopped when the note was submitted, or they were stopped shortly after.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were not present at the meeting of the Führer and his generals on the 22d of August, but you must have heard many times the account of it read out since this Trial started. You remember the Führer is reported, according to minutes, to have said:

“I shall use propagandistic reasons for starting the war; never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making the war, not the right is what matters but victory.”
(Document Number 1014-PS).

That is what was said at Obersalzberg. Has Hitler ever said anything like that to you?

VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say the 27th?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 22d. What I am asking you is, has Hitler said anything similar to that to you?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, at the meeting on the 22d, I was not present; I think I was on my way to Moscow.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said you were not present. That is why I put it in that way. Has he ever said anything similar to you? You say “no.” Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.

VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something about that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No; if you say that he has not said it to you, I am not going to pursue it, because we must not waste too much time on each of these details. I want you to come to the 29th of August when you saw Sir Nevile Henderson, and while accepting, with some reservations, the idea of direct negotiation with Poland, you said that it must be a condition of that negotiation that the Poles should send a plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, well, it was like this...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I really do not want to stop you, but I do want to keep it short on this point.

VON RIBBENTROP: In that case I must say “no”. May I make a statement?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Nevile on the 29th, that you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don’t agree with that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all documents.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told us that your reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile was, first, because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That’s right, isn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, these terms that were given, that were read out by you, were not ready on the 29th, because in your communication demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would have the terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms were drawn up by Hitler with the help of the Foreign Office between the 29th and the 30th?

VON RIBBENTROP: He dictated them personally. I think there were 16 points, if I remember rightly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you really expect after the treatment of Von Schuschnigg, of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing to send a fly into the spider’s parlor?

VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly counted on it and hoped for it. I think that a hint from the British Government would have sufficed to bring that envoy to Berlin.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And what you hoped was to put the Poles in this dilemma, that either these terms would stand as a propagandistic cause for the war, to use Hitler’s phrase—or else you would be able, by putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender from the Poles. Wasn’t that what was in your mind?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, the situation was different. I must say, that on the 29th the Führer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these conditions or this agreement and by the time of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary, would make them also available to the British Government—or he hoped that this would be possible, I think that is what he said. Sir Nevile Henderson took note of that, and I must repeat that the Führer, after the British reply had been received on the 28th, once more, and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland and Germany, agreed to that kind of negotiation. The decisive thing in these crucial days of the 30th and 31st is, therefore, the following: The Führer had drafted these conditions, England knew that the possibility of arriving at a solution existed. All during the 30th of August we heard nothing from England, at least nothing definite. Only at midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this discussion. In the meantime, I must mention that at 7 o’clock in the evening news of the general mobilization in Poland had been received, which excited the Führer extremely. Through that, the situation had become extraordinarily acute. I still remember exactly the situation at the Chancellery where almost hourly reports were received about incidents, streams of refugees, and so forth. It was an atmosphere heavily charged with electricity. The Führer waited all through the 30th; no definite answer arrived. Then, at midnight of the 30th, that conversation took place. The course of that conversation has already been described here by me and also by a witness, the interpreter Schmidt. I did more then than I was allowed to do, in that I had read the entire contents to Sir Nevile Henderson. I was hoping that England perhaps might do something yet. The Führer had told Sir Nevile Henderson that a Polish plenipotentiary would be treated on equal terms. Therefore, there was the possibility of meeting somewhere at an appointed place, or, that someone would come to Berlin, or that the Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authority. Those were the possibilities. I would even like to go further. It was merely necessary, during the 30th or the 31st, until late that night, or the next morning when the march began, for the Polish Ambassador Lipski to have authority at least to receive in his hands the German proposals. Had this been done, the diplomatic negotiations would in any case have been under way and thus the crisis would have been averted, at least for the time being.

I also believe, and I have said so before, that there would have been no objections. I believe the Führer would have welcomed, if the British Ambassador had intervened. The basis for the negotiations, I have also mentioned this here before, was called reasonable by Sir Nevile Henderson personally. One hint from the British Government during the 30th or 31st, and negotiations would have been in course on the basis of these reasonable proposals of the Führer, termed reasonable even by the British themselves. It would have caused no embarrassment to the Poles, and I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals, which were absolutely in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided for a plebiscite in the Corridor area, a solution, perfectly acceptable for Poland, would have been possible.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desire me to say that they think that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative, and too repetitive, and they are upon matters which have been gone over and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to try to keep your answers as short as possible.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did I understand you correctly, Witness, on Friday, that you didn’t know about the connection between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939? It was well before the war, in the spring and summer, before June of 1939?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I knew that Rosenberg had friends in Norway and that the name of Quisling was mentioned, but this name meant nothing to me at that time. On the request of the Führer, at that time I gave Rosenberg certain amounts of money for his friends in Norway, for newspapers, propaganda, and similar purposes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know, as I understand your testimony, that some of Quisling’s men had been in a schooling camp in Germany in August of 1939, before the war?

VON RIBBENTROP: No I do not remember that. I learned of it here through a document. But I do not recall having known anything about it. At any rate, if I knew anything about it, I did not know any of the details.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the Germans living in Norway had been used to enlarge and extend the staff of the various German official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the beginning of the war?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that at the moment, at all. At that time I probably never did learn correctly about that, if that was the case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the quotation from the _Yearbook of the NSDAP_. All I want to know at the moment is whether or not you knew about that. If you say you did not...

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know and cannot say a thing about it, I’m afraid...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know at the time, in December 1939, that Quisling had two interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th of December?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. What was the date, may I ask?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 16th and 18th December 1939, through the Defendant Raeder.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing of these interviews, according to my recollection.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that practically the first matter that you knew about in regard to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that was a letter from Keitel. I believe this is a misunderstanding.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says:

“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been, by
command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht had
therefore ample time to deal with all questions connected with
the carrying out of this operation.”

So really, Witness—I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter—you are really not a very good person to ask about the earlier preparations with regard to Norway, because you weren’t in on these earlier discussions with Quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will leave the subject.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not in on these discussions. But I should like to clarify one thing briefly: that I received this letter—why, I do not know—only some days later. The first intimation of the intention to occupy Norway, due to the anticipated landing of the British, I received about 36 hours ahead of time from the Führer. The letter was probably longer under way than it should have been. I saw it only afterwards.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall not occupy time, because there is a good deal to cover, and I will take you straight to the question of the Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read, more than once, the statement of Hitler’s on the 22d of August 1939:

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well
as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available
means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
these countries.” (Document Number 798-PS)

That is what Hitler said on the 22d of August. You weren’t there, and I ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that from a very early date, on the 7th of October 1939, an army group order was given that Army Group B is to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so demands. Did you know of that order on the 7th of October?

VON RIBBENTROP: No; I believe I have seen it here; I did not know it before.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that on the 9th of October Hitler issued a directive:

“A longer delay would not only result in the abandonment of
Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality in favor of the
Western Powers, but would also serve to strengthen the military
power of our enemies to an increasing degree, and would lessen
the confidence of neutral states in final German victory.
Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern
flank of the Western Front, crossing the area of Luxembourg,
Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon
and as forcibly as possible.” (Document Number C-62)

Did you know that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that as far as you were concerned you are telling the Tribunal that Hitler gave his assurance, the many assurances, in August and October, without telling his Foreign Minister that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the attack on the Low Countries, that he did not tell you about his order or his directive for his attack on the Low Countries? Are you sure of that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it. I know one thing, that such ideas, as to whether or not an offensive should be assumed in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had occasionally been discussed, but I never heard about any orders.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. If you say that is the state of your knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I saw the document, the minutes, about it, here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I want you just to look at that document, and it is on Page 181. I want you to follow while I read one passage, which should be about 182. It is on my second page and it is a paragraph which begins, “As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict...”

VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look for that “As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude...”

VON RIBBENTROP: On Page 2?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It should be on Page 2, on my Page 2. It may be further on in yours.

VON RIBBENTROP: Is that the beginning of the paragraph?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. “As Poland makes it clear...” It is two paragraphs on from a single line that says at the point “Count Ciano showed signs of...”

VON RIBBENTROP: I have found it, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next sentence: “Generally speaking...” This is the next sentence but one:

“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This could be done fairly
easily if one Axis partner protected the rear of the other, who
was just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and _vice
versa_. For Italy, Yugoslavia was to be considered such an
uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, (the
Führer) had suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy,
that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis
by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the
Axis, and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince
Paul had agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent had
been in London and sought reassurance of the Western Powers. The
same thing was repeated that had happened in the case of
Gafencu, who had also been very reasonable during his visit to
Germany, and had denied any interest in the aims of the Western
democracies.” (Document Number 1871-PS)

Now, that was Hitler’s formulation of his policy, and may I take it that that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must state the following in this connection. The situation was this at that time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to keep Italy on our side. Italy was always a very unreliable partner. For that reason the Führer spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy, so to speak, that, if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, he would support Italy. It can be understood only from the situation which was this: Germany, with Italy’s assistance, had already peacefully carried out some of her revisions in Europe, except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which Mussolini supported Hitler. I remember the situation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. But it is not an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing. “It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other.” Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain neutrals?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken so literally, for in diplomatic discussions—and I do not think it is different in other countries—many things are said sometimes...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to...

VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini’s view, hadn’t it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible opportunity?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember this is the secret additional protocol to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and appended to it there are some comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May 1939. Do you see?

VON RIBBENTROP: What page?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages. Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the Pact itself, do you see the comment by Mussolini?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, Number 1 says:

“The war between the plutocratic and, therefore, selfishly
conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations
is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this situation.”

Now, if you will turn to Paragraph 7, you will see Mussolini is hoping that the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if the war comes; he says that:

“The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war of
exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst premise,
which contains 100 percent probability. The Axis will get
nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption is
hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis diminish
considerably the vicissitude and the danger of a war of
exhaustion. For this purpose one must take the whole Danube and
Balkan area immediately after the very first hours of the war.
One will not be satisfied with declarations of neutrality but
must occupy the territories and use them for the procurement of
necessary food and industrial war supplies.”

Do you see that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you agree that it was Mussolini’s view that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible moment?

VON RIBBENTROP: They are utterances of Mussolini which I see here for the first time. I did not know them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the Simovic _coup d’état_ on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy:

“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. With
regard to foreign policy neither will diplomatic inquiries be
made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav
Government, which cannot be trusted in any case in the future,
will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the
means and troops available for it are ready.” (Document Number
1746-PS)

Do you remember Hitler’s saying that on the 27th of March?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. Could I perhaps see the document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember it? It has been read many times in this court, Hitler’s statement.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in general.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I read his words. Now, that was the policy...

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what you mean by “the sense of it.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’ll put it to you now. What I mean is this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them for assurances, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn’t that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was entirely different; and I ask to be permitted to explain the actual state of the case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want your explanation of these points which I have specifically read and mentioned to you. “No diplomatic inquiries will be made.” Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you help, to attack Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries, without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why did you do it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Because the new government had been formed mainly by England, as one of the British interrogation officers himself, in the course of the preliminary hearings, admitted to me. Therefore it was perfectly clear to the Führer, when the Simovic Putsch was carried out, that the enemies of Germany at that time stood behind Simovic’s government and that it mobilized the army—this information had been received—in order to attack the Italian army from the rear. It was not my policy, for I was called into the conference of which you are speaking only later, I believe, and at that time Hitler categorically announced his position without being contradicted by anyone. I ask you to question the military men about that. I was present, and had a serious encounter with the Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it right to attack this country without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, to cause military destruction, to use Hitler’s words, “with unmerciful harshness” and to destroy the capital of Belgrade by waves of bomber attacks? Did you think that was right? I ask you a simple question: Did you think it was right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot answer this question either with “yes” or “no,” as you want it, without giving an explanation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you need not answer it. If you cannot answer that question “yes” or “no,” you need not answer it at all. And you come on to the next point, which is the question of Russia. Now, as far as I could understand your statement, you said that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union after Mr. Molotov’s visit to Berlin on, I think, the 12th of November of 1940.

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not say that, because I did not know it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as I understood it, one of the reasons which you were giving as a justification for the attack on the Soviet Union was what was said by Mr. Molotov during his visit of November 1940. Isn’t that what you said?

VON RIBBENTROP: That was one of the reasons that caused the Führer concern. I did not know anything about an attack at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the Defendant Jodl says that even during the Western campaign, that is, May and June 1940, Hitler had told him that he had made a fundamental decision to take steps against this danger, that is, the Soviet Union, “the moment our military position made it at all possible.” Did you know that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I learned that first now here in Nuremberg.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Document L-172, USA-34, Jodl’s lecture. And did you know that on the 14th of August 1940 General Thoma was informed during a conference with Göring that the Führer desired punctual deliveries to the Russians only until the spring of 1941; that “later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.” Did you know that?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that in November of 1940, General Thoma and State Secretaries Körner, Neumann, Becker, and General Von Hannecken were informed by Göring of the action planned in the East? Did you know that?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know now, don’t you, that a long time before any of the matters raised in Molotov’s visit came up for discussion, Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet Union?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that at all. I knew that Hitler had apprehensions but I knew nothing about an attack. I was not informed about military preparations, because these matters were always dealt with separately.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even on 18 December, when Hitler issued the directive Number 21 on “Barbarossa,” he told you nothing about it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, because just in December, as I happen to remember exactly, I had another long talk with the Führer in order to obtain his consent to win the Soviet Union as a partner to the Three-Power Pact, and to make it a four-power pact. Hitler was not altogether enthusiastic about this idea, as I noticed; but he told me, “We have already made this and that together; perhaps we will succeed with this too.” These were his words. That was in December. I believe there is also an affidavit about that from a witness, which the Defense is going to present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you understand what you are saying? This is after the Defendant Göring had announced it to General Thoma and these under-secretaries, after the directive had actually gone out for Barbarossa, that Hitler let you suggest that you should try to get the Soviet Union to join the Tripartite Pact, without ever telling you that he had his orders out for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you really expect anyone to believe that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was, do you really expect anyone to believe that after it had been announced time and again that the Reich was going to attack the Soviet Union, and after the actual directive had gone out for the attack, that Hitler let you tell him that you were thinking of asking them to join the Tripartite Pact? Is that your evidence?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is exactly the way it was. I suggested this to Hitler again in December, and received his consent for further negotiations. I knew nothing in December of an aggressive war against the Soviet Union.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it was quite clear that, as far as your department was concerned, you were getting the most favorable reports about the Soviet Union and about the unlikeliness of the Soviet Union making any incursion into political affairs inimical to Germany? Is that right, so far as your reports from your own ambassador and your own people in Russia were concerned?

VON RIBBENTROP: Reports of this sort came from the embassy in Moscow. I submitted them repeatedly, or rather always, to the Führer but his answer was that the diplomats and military attachés in Moscow were the worst informed men in the world. That was his answer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was your honest view, based on your own information, that there was no danger from Russia, that Russia was keeping honestly to the agreement that she had made with you. That was your honest view, was it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that. I said those were the reports from the diplomats, which we received from Moscow.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you believe them? Didn’t you believe your own staff yourself?

VON RIBBENTROP: I was very skeptical myself as to whether these reports were reliable, because the Führer, who received reports, had reports of an altogether different nature and the political attitude also pointed in a different direction.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, in the spring of 1941, your office joined in the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, did it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know precisely when, but in the spring things came to a head and there must have been conferences between some offices that dealt with the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union. However, I do not recall details about that any more.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Again, I do not want to occupy too much time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in April of 1941 you were co-operating with Rosenberg’s office in preparing for the taking over of Eastern territories, and, on the 18th of May, you issued a memorandum with regard to the preparation of the naval campaign?

VON RIBBENTROP: So far as the preparations with Rosenberg are concerned, that is in error. I spoke, according to my recollection, about this matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. So far as that Navy memorandum is concerned, I saw that document here; I had not known of it previously. I believe it is an expert opinion on international law about matters which might arise in connection with a war in the Baltic Sea. Such expert opinion was doubtless submitted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It says, “The Foreign Office has prepared, for use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones.” Don’t you remember anything about that?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that did not reach me at all at that time. That was acted upon by another office. Of course I am responsible for everything that happens in my ministry.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Ambassador Ritter the liaison officer between your office and the Wehrmacht?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, again, I want you to help me about one or two other matters. You have told us that you negotiated the Anti-Comintern Pact back in 1936; and, of course, at that time the Anti-Comintern Pact—and I think you said so yourself—was directed against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it was more an ideological pact, which, of course, had certain political implications. That is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was extended by the Tripartite Pact of the 27th of September 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact, because this one was a purely political, economic, and military pact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the fact is—and I think I can take this quite shortly—that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite early in March of 1941, weren’t you?

VON RIBBENTROP: That could be; at that time for an attack on England.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your point, is it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not believe that I did anything other than what other diplomats would do, for instance, what those of Great Britain have done in America, and later in Russia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to put any points to you on that actual fact; but it did occur to you quite early, didn’t it, that if Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United States might be brought in very shortly after? And you agreed, in April of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan would be involved with the United States, you would be prepared to fight the United States too. That is right isn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. I believe I did everything I could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I believe also that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, since you said that, I would like you to look at the Document 352 of your book, at Page 204 of the English document book.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know this document; I have read it here already.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was a week before Pearl Harbor, on the 29th of November; and according to the Japanese Ambassador, you are saying this to him—if you look at Paragraph 1:

“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been,
and probably never will be, a time when closer co-operation
under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at
this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European
New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United
States will be concentrated against Japan. As the Führer Hitler
said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right
to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We
have received advice to the effect that there is practically no
hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded
successfully, because of the fact that the United States is
putting up a stiff front.

“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan
herself.’” (Document D-656)

Do you still say, in view of that document and that statement that you made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying to prevent war with the United States? I suggest to you that you were doing everything to encourage Japan to go to war with the United States.

VON RIBBENTROP: I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; that is not true. I do not know this document, nor do I know where it comes from. At any rate, under no circumstances did I express it that way; and I regret that all the other documents which prove that I tried again and again to keep the United States out of the war, have not yet been read here. I have seen this document here and I have been pondering all the time as to how this passage would have gotten into the document. All the other documents, I believe a dozen or a dozen and a half, which have been presented here prove clearly my wish to keep America out of the war. I can prove that for years I had made efforts in all fields, despite the intransigent attitude of the United States, not to undertake anything against America. I can explain this only as follows: The Japanese Ambassador earnestly desired that his country should take some action and I know he sent many telegrams to Tokio in order to get Japan to participate in the war, particularly against Singapore. I can only presume that this is perhaps, if I may say so, an incorrect interpretation of this conference. I ask you to give the Defense an opportunity to submit all the other documents up to this date, which will prove the exact opposite of what is laid down in this one paragraph.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is the official report to the Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he is wrong when he says that you told him—he gives your exact words—that you were comforted that it would not only be in the interest of Germany and Japan jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.

Well, just look at the next document, if you deny that one, on Page 356. This is another report of the Japanese Ambassador and he said, the day after Pearl Harbor:

“At 1 o’clock... I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal
declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that
Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general
headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war
could be carried out, so as to make a good impression on the
German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at
once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out
properly.”

Now, look at the last three lines:

“At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th,
Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.”
(Document Number D-657)

That was 3 days before the declaration of war. You say that that report of the Japanese Ambassador is also wrong?

VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that it is an error.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is wrong about it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I believe it is an error. That was after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Exactly, the day after Pearl Harbor.

VON RIBBENTROP: That was an order of Adolf Hitler’s to attack America who, as everyone knows, had been attacking our ships for months. This is an altogether different affair.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you say “attacking German ships,” do you mean defending themselves against German submarines?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, so far as I know, some months earlier, I cannot tell you the exact date; but it was a long time before Pearl Harbor, we had delivered an official protest to the United States, in which we pointed out, in the case of the two ships _Greer_ and _Kerne_, that these two boats had pursued German submarines and had thrown depth charges at them. I believe the Secretary of the Navy Knox admitted this openly in a press conference. I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech in Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is this: Did you approve of the policy of ordering the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them 3 days before war was declared? Did you approve of that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that now, because I do not remember it and do not even know the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. Do you remember that the...

VON RIBBENTROP: It would have been understandable, that I must add.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given your answer. Do you remember, in June 1944, that there was a conference about which we have heard evidence, regarding the shooting of what is known as “terror-fliers”?

Now, just listen to this question and try to answer it directly, if you would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you wished to include among terror-fliers every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, including bombing attacks on cities? Is it right that you wished to include the airmen engaged in attacks on German cities as terror-fliers?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not true like that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at Page 391. This is a report signed by General Warlimont on the conference on the 6th of June, and in the fourth line—well, let me read it. It says:

“Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief of
the Operations Staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th
that a conference on this question had been held shortly before,
between the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign Minister, and
Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by
Ribbentrop, who wished to include every type of terror attack on
the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on
cities, it was agreed at the above conference that only attacks
carried out with aircraft armament should be considered as
criminal actions in that sense.” (Document Number 135-PS)

Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said that you wished to include every type of attack?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yesterday I answered this question at length. I do not know whether I should refer to this point again. I dealt with this point, I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, I can repeat it now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I do not want you to repeat it. I want you to answer my question. Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said at this conference that you wished to include those who were engaged in bombing of cities?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is not so. First of all, so far as I remember, this conference never took place; and, secondly, I stated my attitude perfectly clearly yesterday, how I wished to treat terror-fliers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, answer my question.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true as you have stated it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Then answer this question. Did you approve that those you called “terror-fliers” were to be left to be lynched by the population or handed over to the SS?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not my attitude.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look on Page 393, Page 214 of the English? This, as you know, is a memorandum from the Foreign Office; and it is stated on Page 396 that General Warlimont states that Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft (Document 740-PS). The draft deals with the two actions in Paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the draft says, “The German authorities are not directly responsible, since death occurred before a German official intervened” (Document 728-PS).

Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching of fliers?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not my view. I explained that yesterday quite exhaustively and stated what my attitude was toward this document. This document is an expert opinion of the Foreign Office, which was submitted to me. I do not know how it originated, upon my order or upon a statement of the military authorities. I did not approve this expert opinion as it is submitted to me here, but I did send it to the Führer and asked him to decide about it. The Führer then called this document “nonsense,” I believe, and therewith this expert opinion of the Foreign Office was rejected and did not come into effect.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, with regard to this, you say that when Warlimont says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warlimont is not speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth?

VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, it is not true, because it can be seen from another document which I have also seen here that this document was sent to the Führer and that I said there that the Führer must approve it. I did see also another document regarding it. That is also my recollection of the matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, if you referred to the Führer’s view, let us just have a look at what that was. Have a look at Document 3780-PS, which will be GB-293, which is an account of a meeting that you and Hitler had with Oshima on the 27th of May 1944. It is on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oshima that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot, that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did you agree with that view?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this document, that is not my meaning, not my opinion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now...

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not even know where what you said here is in the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will find it on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that, but I can only say that this attitude of Hitler’s as it appears in this document was brought about by the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I heard all that before. I asked you whether you agreed or not; you said “no.” I want you now to deal with another point.

VON RIBBENTROP: I want to say something further, however, regarding this point because it is of decisive importance.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will say that to learned Counsel after you have answered my question on this. I want you now to direct your attention to Stalag Luft III. You may have heard me asking a number of witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the 50 British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you know that? Do you know what I am talking about?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I do.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murderers? Do you remember that, in June of 1944?

VON RIBBENTROP: I heard of this through the speech made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that the Reich Government issued a statement saying that, in a communication by the Reich Government conveyed to the British via Switzerland, this unqualifiable charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that being issued in July 1944? Do you remember that being issued?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember it. I remember only the following: That at that time we received evidence of what had happened and that it was communicated to us in a note from the protecting powers. That is all I know about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know at the time that this statement was issued—did you know that these officers had been murdered in cold blood?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot while trying to escape. At that time, to be sure, we did have the impression that everything was not in order, I know that. I remember that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it in two stages. Who told you the lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of that lie?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember in detail. At that time we received the documentation from the competent authorities and a memorandum was forwarded to the Swiss Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From whom did you get your documentation which contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Göring?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you told us, I think, that you had a good idea that things were not all right, hadn’t you?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at this stage that you were merely an honorary member of the SS? It has been suggested by your counsel, and I am sure it must have been on some misunderstanding of information, that you were merely an honorary member of the SS. That is not the case, is it?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is no misunderstanding. This is exactly how it was: I received the SS uniform from Adolf Hitler. I did not serve in the SS, but as ambassador and later as Foreign Minister it was customary to have a rank of some sort and I had received the rank of SS Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you that that is entirely untrue, that you joined the SS by application before you became ambassador-at-large in May 1933, isn’t that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I know that. At any rate I always belonged to the SS.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said just now it was honorary, because Hitler wanted you to have a uniform. I am putting it to you; you applied to join the SS in May 1933, in the ordinary way. Did you?

VON RIBBENTROP: Of course, one had to make an application; but the fact was this, that I occasionally went around in a grey greatcoat and thereupon Hitler said I must wear a uniform. I do not remember when that was. It must have been 1933. As ambassador I received a higher rank, as Foreign Minister I received a still higher one.