Chapter XXIII: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (19)

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, this document was given to us by the Prosecution, I believe by the American Prosecution, on 26 November 1945. I do not know...

THE PRESIDENT: You mean it never was deposited in evidence by the Prosecution?

DR. NELTE: I do not believe I can decide that. I assume that a document which has been submitted to the Defense Counsel was submitted to the High Tribunal at the same time, if not as evidence, then at least for judicial notice.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the document? Is it an affidavit or not?

DR. NELTE: It is not an affidavit; it is really a study by the American Prosecution. And, I assume, it is a basis for the indictment of the organization OKW, and so forth.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not?

DR. NELTE: No, I do not have it in the document book, because I assumed that was also at the disposal of the High Tribunal. Besides, Mr. President, it is a short document.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Mr. Dodd can tell us what it is.

MR. DODD: If I could see it I might be able to be helpful. I am not familiar with it. It is probably one of the documents which we submitted to the Defense but which we did not actually introduce in evidence, and that happened more than once, I think, in the early days of the Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I refer to a single short paragraph of this study which I would like to read. Perhaps we can thus obviate submitting the document.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the whole of the affidavit? I do not mean at this moment, but are you proposing to offer it?

DR. NELTE: I assume that the Prosecution have already submitted it. I am only referring to it.

THE PRESIDENT: The whole affidavit? What is the number of it, if it has been submitted?

DR. NELTE: This affidavit also does not have a number. The Prosecution...

THE PRESIDENT: It has not been submitted if it has not a number on it then.

It is suggested to me that possibly the Halder affidavit was offered and then rejected.

DR. NELTE: No. At that time a series of affidavits was submitted: By Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, and many other generals who are in Nuremberg. None of these affidavits had an exhibit number.

MR. DODD: This affidavit was put in by the United States as an exhibit. I do not have the number handy, but I think it was submitted at the time Colonel Telford Taylor submitted the case on behalf of the Prosecution against the High Command and the OKW. This Halder “affidavit,” the first document which Doctor Nelte referred to, is not an affidavit. It was a paper submitted to the Tribunal and to the Defense by Colonel Taylor. It set out some of the basic principles of the organization of the High Command and the OKW wholly before he presented his part of the case. It is really just the work of our own staff here in Nuremberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Nelte, as the document you are referring to, not the Halder affidavit, appears to be a mere compilation, the Tribunal thinks it should not go in as an exhibit, but you can put a question to the witness upon it.

DR. NELTE: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the essay which you have before you, the Prosecution asserted the following: After 1938 there were four divisions: The OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht); the OKH (High Command of the Army); the OKL (High Command of the Air Force); the OKM (High Command of the Navy); and each had its own general staff. What can you tell us about that?

KEITEL: I can say only that this is not correct, and also contradicts the description which I have already given of the functions of the High Commands of the Wehrmacht branches and of the OKW. There were not four such departments. There were only three: The High Command of the Army, the High Command of the Navy, and the High Command of the Air Force.

As I have just stated, the High Command of the Wehrmacht as a personal, direct working staff, was in no way an independent authority in that sense. The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches were commanders, had the authority to issue orders and exercised this power over troops which were subordinate to them. The OKW had neither the power to issue orders, nor subordinate troops to which orders could have been issued. It is also not correct, if I recall the speeches of the Prosecution, to use the expression “Keitel was Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.” I am mentioning it only to emphasize this point. Further, I would like, briefly, to call attention to the diagram on the last page of the document which has been shown to me.

DR. NELTE: This sketch is the diagram which is called “The Wehrmacht.” It is an exposition, a diagrammatic exposition of the entire Wehrmacht and its branches.

KEITEL: I believe I should point briefly to the fact that it is this diagram which was the basis for this erroneous conception, because in it the High Command of the Wehrmacht is designated as a special office or office of command, and that is incorrect.

DR. NELTE: What tasks had you in this military sector as the Chief of the OKW?

KEITEL: First of all, it was an essential task to secure for the Führer with and through the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, all the documents and all the numerous informations and reports which he desired. I dare say that the Wehrmacht Operational Staff had, in this connection, the function to one might say arrange and establish direct and close communication between Hitler and the general staffs of the branches of the Wehrmacht. In addition to securing a countless number of such documents which were demanded daily, there was a second function, namely to be regularly present at all conferences in which the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches and the chiefs of their staffs participated as well as the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff. On those occasions as soon as a series of oral orders was given, these orders, in compliance with military principles, naturally had later to be confirmed in writing. Only in this way could we prevent mistakes or misunderstandings from arising, that is, by confirming these orders to those who had already received them orally the orders were made clear. That is the purpose and meaning of the order.

DR. NELTE: How did you sign the orders and documents which you drew up?

KEITEL: It is correct that this form of orders and directives were almost exclusively signed by me. They were actually orders which had already been given and which had already long since been transmitted through military channels. As can be seen from the bulk of the documents submitted here, this gave rise to the form which I made a habit of using in which I always wrote at the beginning or after a few preliminary words, “The Führer has therefore ordered...”

In the large majority of cases this order was no longer a surprise to the office which received it. It was nothing new but it was only a confirmation. In a similar way I naturally had also a considerable number of organizational and other directives and orders also in not purely operational fields worked out under my supervision and passed on. In this respect I should like to point out particularly that in no case did I send out orders without having shown them again to my supreme commander when making the daily reports, in order to be certain that I had not misunderstood him in any form or manner or that I was not issuing anything which—and this I would like to emphasize—did not have his approval to the letter.

DR. NELTE: There was another category of orders and directives...

KEITEL: May I perhaps add a few words?

DR. NELTE: Please do.

KEITEL: In order to clarify this: Among the documents submitted here are those which Hitler personally signed and released under the heading “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.” There are some exceptions in which such directives were signed by me “by order of,” I would like to explain this matter also. In this case it is also true that if these directives, which for the most part had been corrected several times by Hitler personally, had to be issued urgently and the Supreme Commander was prevented from signing himself, it was necessary for me to let the signature go out in this form, never as “deputy” but always as “by order of.” Otherwise, orders were issued as I have already stated, in the form of directives which were signed by me.

At the same time I should like to mention that even if we have a series of documents here headed “Chief, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht” or—some of them are different: “High Command of the Wehrmacht”—if they are signed, “by order, Jodl,” I can say that it can be proved almost automatically that I did not happen to be there at the time; otherwise I would have signed it myself, knowing that I was Chief of Staff who, in accordance with military regulations, had to sign such documents.

DR. NELTE: The memorandum which you have before you contains the following sentence:

“The OKW united in itself the activity of a staff and of a
ministry; the matters involved, which had previously been taken
care of by the Reich War Ministry, have probably also been
turned over to the OKW.”

Please clarify the ministerial function of the OKW.

KEITEL: Yes, this formulation as set down in this document is not exactly incorrect, but it is on important points at least, open to misunderstanding, for it was not at all true that all functions which had been previously carried out by the War Minister were turned over to the OKW. There were many functions and rights which the War Minister, in his capacity as minister, and thus the person responsible for them, could and did decide even for the branches of the Wehrmacht and their commanders, which were never transmitted to the Chief of the OKW, that is, to me.

The following things happened at that time: Everything in this connection involving authority to issue orders or exercise supreme command, and which the Führer did not wish to take over personally, was transferred to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht as far as supreme authority and authority to make decisions were concerned. To touch on the subject briefly, I should like to mention a few essential facts which I remember. For example, the officers’ personnel records, decisions on complaints, documentary material on budget questions, court jurisdiction and court authority, which formerly belonged to the Minister of War, were transferred to the commander-in-chief, as well as all questions concerning officials and all questions of the rights of officials. I could mention still more, but I merely wished to point out that even in cases where decisions had to be made, as for example, removing an official or dismissing an employee, the chief of the OKW did not decide. These powers were delegated to the commanders-in-chief in addition to the powers they held previously and which were transferred from the War Minister’s jurisdiction. There were only certain reservations which the Führer made for himself. Similarly some of the other fields of the OKW were limited in their assignments in the course of the following years through the dissolution of the Economic Armament Office. The position of Armament Minister was created because of the dissolution of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, that is, the Counterintelligence Service, of which only the branch self-protection of the troops was left with the Wehrmacht; everything else was transferred, and so forth.

My authority included the following: It was my duty in all cases to get Hitler’s decision on all basic questions with which this ministerial section was concerned. I was free from the necessity of doing this only in current matters or if there was complete agreement between the persons involved in a ministerial or administrative question and the branches of the Wehrmacht in my department. In such a case a decision by Hitler was not necessary. I must emphasize again, in summary, that the OKW had no authority of its own, and that one can say only that Hitler actually functioned as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, just as the functions of the War Minister were combined in his person so as to, to repeat that, to eliminate an intermediary official at all costs. That is, there was to be no intermediary between him and the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, although the Tribunal did say that they would hear Dr. Horn at 2 o’clock, they would not wish to interrupt the examination of the Defendant Keitel if you prefer to go on with that now. It is a matter for you to consider whichever you like.

DR. NELTE: Dr. Horn agrees that I continue the interrogation of Keitel now.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, for the assistance of the Tribunal I have ascertained that the first Halder affidavit, referred to this morning by Dr. Nelte, was introduced as Exhibit USA-531 (Document Number 3702-PS) on 4 January, by Colonel Taylor; and the second Halder affidavit referred to by Dr. Nelte was introduced as Exhibit USA-533 (Document Number 3707-PS) on 5 January, by Colonel Taylor.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd was kind enough to put at my disposal a number of copies of the pamphlet, “Principles of Organization of the German Armed Forces” so that I can submit them to the Tribunal. I do so now.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You last explained that on 4 February 1938, part of the authority of the War Ministry was transferred to branches of the Armed Forces, and part to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. In the decree which has been mentioned it says, concerning this matter:

“The OKW at the same time is taking care of the affairs of the
Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the OKW, on my orders will
exercise the authority which the Reich Minister of War had
heretofore.”

Tell me briefly to which fields this applied. I myself will submit to the Tribunal a diagram which has already been sent to the Translation Division for translation. I do not know, however, if the Tribunal already has the translation.

KEITEL: The ministerial functions actually transferred to the OKW were executed by a number of offices. I shall name the most important now, indicating their functions:

First of all, a few words about the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab) which, being an office of the OKW, was subordinated to it in the same way as the other offices of the OKW were, but which was on a higher level than the other offices. As the name implies, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was an organ of the Führer’s High Command with which he frequently—I might say, mostly—collaborated personally. It had no ministerial powers.

Then there was the General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt) which took care mainly of ministerial and administrative questions. One could almost call it a war ministry on a small scale.

Then the office of Counterintelligence Service (Amt Ausland Abwehr), which was to a large extent ministerial but to some degree an aid in operational questions.

Then the Economic Armament Office, in regard to which I must point out that in the year 1940 this office was dissolved and only a small Defense Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) remained, which was mainly concerned with questions of supply of all consumer goods needed by the Armed Forces, such as fuel, coal, gasoline, _et cetera_, and which I need not mention further.

Then an important field of activity: Replacements Administration for the entire Armed Forces, or abbreviated, Recruiting, a central office which was designed mostly to take care of personnel questions within the OKW.

Then the Legal Administration, the Budget Department, and a number of other offices which it is not necessary to enumerate.

In these offices the ministerial functions of the OKW were carried out. I would like...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think the Tribunal has followed the distinction which the defendant has made between the General Staff for the High Commands and the position of the OKW; but is it necessary for the Tribunal to go into all these details?

DR. NELTE: I had finished dealing with this section.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. NELTE: I want to put just one more...

THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document that you have just put before the Tribunal, this diagram, are you desiring to make an exhibit of that?

DR. NELTE: I would like to submit it in evidence. You will also be given a translation.

THE PRESIDENT: If so, what number will you give it? You must number all your exhibits.

DR. NELTE: Please number it, Keitel-1(a).

THE PRESIDENT: Who prepared it?

DR. NELTE: We prepared it and the technical division of the Prosecution has reproduced it. The Prosecution also are in possession of the diagram.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you asked the defendant to confirm that it is correct?

DR. NELTE: Field Marshal, would you please look at this diagram and confirm whether it is correct?

KEITEL: Yes, I recognize the diagram...

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution have not received this diagram. Therefore, the Prosecution would like, before making conclusions, to acquaint themselves with this diagram.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any more copies of it, Dr. Nelte?

DR. NELTE: They can be obtained and distributed right away. Then I would like the Tribunal to reserve its decision until the diagrams have been submitted in sufficient numbers.

KEITEL: I recognize this diagram as correct. It does not contain the minor changes which occurred from the time of the creation of the OKW up to the time which I have mentioned, changes brought about by the reorganization of the armament ministries, _et cetera_, but it shows the manner in which it actually worked during the last years.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: In order to terminate this group of questions I would like to say the following: Is it correct that according to this, all the Keitel orders, Keitel decrees, which have been submitted by the Prosecution, were in reality Führer orders, that is to say, orders which were the expression of Hitler’s will, based on his instructions and commands?

KEITEL: Yes, that is the correct definition of the summary of the testimony I have given. I would like to state again in summarizing that, as I have stated from the beginning, I assume and have assumed responsibility for these orders insofar as they are connected with my name, for the position was this: I, of course, knew the contents of these orders which I executed. I recognize my signature, of course, in the documents which have been submitted to me and therefore I accept the documents as authentic. I may add that insofar as I had military or other objections to the orders, I naturally expressed them very forcibly and that I endeavored to prevent orders being given which I considered controversial. But I must state in all truth that if the decision had been finally made by Hitler, I then issued these orders and transmitted them, I might almost say, without checking them in any way.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, before I enter upon the next phase of my questions I should like to state the following:

The Prosecution have deduced Keitel’s participation in the many crimes which have been described here from various facts, facts which cannot always be connected with each other and made to agree. The Prosecution have stated that he was a powerful and important staff officer. That is set out in the Indictment. Then the Prosecution stated that he was a tool without a will of his own and that the relation between himself and Hitler was an intimate one.

You will understand that if the defendant wants to clarify or to protest against these things he must explain the relation between himself and Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, that is what the defendant has been doing. He has been explaining his relationship to Hitler, and if you want to elucidate it further you must ask him further questions.

DR. NELTE: I only wanted to let him speak about the private relation to Hitler. So far we have been concerned only with the official relation.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you please tell us something about the co-operation between you and Hitler? I ask you to be as brief as possible and tell us only the most necessary facts, but at the same time give us a correct picture.

KEITEL: The co-operation can be characterized only as one between a high military superior and his subordinate. In other words, the same relations as I have always had in my military career with the senior officers of whose staff I was a member. The relation between Hitler and myself never departed from this strictly military and soldierly relationship. Of course, it was my right and my duty to express my opinions. How difficult that was can be judged only by someone who knows that Hitler, after a few words, was wont to take over the entire discussion and to exhaust the subject entirely from his point of view. It was then very difficult, of course, to come back to the subject again. I may say that due to my various positions in high staff offices I was quite used to dealing with the superior commanders, if I may use that expression. However, I was quite unaccustomed to the conditions which I encountered here. They surprised me, and not infrequently they reduced me to a state of real uncertainty. That can be understood if one knows that Hitler, in soldiering or military questions, if I were to express myself very cautiously, was a man with far-reaching plans for reform with which I, with my 37 years of service as a soldier of the old school, was confronted.

DR. NELTE: Was it the same during the war or do you refer to the time before the war?

KEITEL: During the war these controversies were moderated by the events, so that actuality was strongly influenced by the urgency of the situation. Therefore, these things did not appear in that form. On the other hand, the position then was that Hitler in his discussions about the situation had a comparatively large circle of about twenty people assembled around him, and speaking in military terms, unsparingly made his accusations—objections and criticism—directed, as a rule, at people who were not present. I took the part of the absent person as a matter of principle, because he could not defend himself. The result was that the accusations and criticism were then aimed at me, and my training as a soldier finally forced me to control myself, because it is unseemly to answer back or to oppose or to attempt to contradict a superior before very young subordinates, such as those who were present. Opposition to a superior or to personalities, no matter what their rank, was unbearable to the Führer. One could then attempt to speak to him about these things only in private.

DR. NELTE: Had you the feeling that you had Hitler’s confidence?

KEITEL: I could not say yes. I must frankly admit that Hitler’s confidence in me was not without reservations, and today I know only too well that there were many things concerning which he had never spoken frankly to me and about which he never took me into his confidence. It was a fact that Hitler was very suspicious of the old or elderly generals. For him they were products of an old and antiquated school and in this sense he was to us old soldiers a man who brought new revolutionary ideas into the Wehrmacht and wished to incorporate them into Wehrmacht training. This frequently led to serious crises. I believe I do not have to elaborate on that. The real evil, however, was that this lack of confidence led him to believe that I was in conspiracy with the Army generals behind his back and that I supported them against him. Perhaps that was a result of my habit of defending them because they could not defend themselves. At various instances that led to extremely acute and serious crises.

DR. NELTE: Much will depend upon stating how your co-operation with Hitler has to be valued, particularly to what extent you could be considered his collaborator or adviser. Will you tell me whether Hitler discussed his plans with you in the manner which is customary in close collaboration?

KEITEL: In general I must deny that. It was not in any way in keeping with Hitler’s peculiar disposition and personality to have advisers of that kind, that is, if you call an adviser someone who gives advice in the sense of presenting, let us say, a great number of military elements from long experience as an officer, but not in the sense of an adviser to help to formulate a decision, such far-reaching decisions which are doubtlessly meant here. On principle, such a decision was preceded by weeks or months of careful consideration. During that time one had to assist by procuring documents, but concerning the main point, the decision itself, he did not brook any influence. Therefore, strange as it may sound, the final answer always was: “This is my decision and it is unalterable.” That was the announcement of his decision.

DR. NELTE: But if various departments were competent for these decisions, were there no general conferences?

KEITEL: No. I cannot recall that any one of the really important decisions after the year 1938 had ever been formulated as the result of joint counsel for instance between the politicians, the soldiers or other ministers, because it was Adolf Hitler’s own way to speak, privately as a rule, to each department and each department chief, to learn from him what he wanted to know, and then to find out some element that could be used in the elaboration of his plans. Things were not at all as would appear from the documents here of minutes of conferences of generals, of meetings and similar things with a list of those present. Never did such a meeting have the character of a deliberation. There could be no question of that. Rather, the Führer had a certain idea, and if for various reasons he thought that we opposed that idea even inwardly, he used that as a reason to clarify his thoughts before a large circle without any discussion. In other words, in these assemblies, which the documents here speak of as conferences, there was never any deliberation. I must add that even the external form which these things took was such that, following the military example, the senior commander convened a certain number of generals, everyone was seated, the Führer arrived, spoke and went out. No one in such a situation could have found an opening to say anything. To use just one word for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an order but not a conference.

DR. NELTE: To come to a different subject, the Prosecution have asserted that you had been a member of the Reich Government. What do you have to say about that?

KEITEL: I never belonged to the Reich Government and I was also never a member of the Cabinet. I must also state that I never became a minister, but as is stated in the decree of 1938, “he has the rank of a Reich minister,” not “he is Reich minister.” The expression “minister” is, of course, simply intended to indicate the rank of minister and there was a good reason for that. I need point out only what I said this morning: It was not intended that there should be anyone holding an office with the authority of a minister between Hitler and the Wehrmacht, and the branches of the Wehrmacht. I must clarify the question which has been frequently raised by the Prosecution that “He had the rank of a minister,” by saying that, before the decree was issued, I asked whether I was to deal with the State secretaries or with the ministers, and Hitler said, “If on my orders you deal with other ministers of the Reich, then, of course, you can do so only with the rank of a minister, not on the level of a state secretary.”

That is the explanation of the expression in the decree “He has the rank of a Reich minister.”

DR. NELTE: Did you, in the headquarters have any conferences with other important and competent personalities, such as Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Speer, Sauckel, _et cetera_?

KEITEL: Ministers or special plenipotentiaries visited headquarters according to a plan which very seldom led to the simultaneous presence of several of them. Generally, it was carefully arranged so that a special time was set aside for each one. As a rule, I was of course informed that “the Foreign Minister is here” or “Minister Speer is here” or the “Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor Sauckel is here.” However, I was called in only in regard to purely military questions which the Führer discussed with these gentlemen in private and I could give instances of this. However, as has already been mentioned recently, during the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it would be false to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters formed a small or select cabinet. Hitler dealt with each of these officials and functionaries separately, gave him his orders, and dismissed him. It sometimes happened that on the way home, these gentlemen visited me, mostly to ask me about small questions and small favors which I could do for them or with instructions to inform me about a decision or with the order to forward a decision to those military offices which had to be notified.

DR. NELTE: In concluding, I would like to know whether the expression “intimate” which is contained in the Indictment, is correct in order to describe the relations between you and Hitler, privately or officially?

KEITEL: I found the word “intimate” in the Indictment and I asked myself the question, “Where does this conception originate?” To be quite frank, I have but one answer for it, that is that no one ever heard a single word from me about the actual and constant difficulties that I had. I deliberately kept quiet about them. Intimate relations are, according to my definition of “intimate”—I do not know if in the English translation “intimate” expresses the same thing which we call “intim”—relations where there is confidence and frank discussion and these did not exist. I have already characterized it. Intimacy was not Hitler’s attitude towards the generals, to whose senior generation I also belonged. Apart from the very formal intercourse which sometimes lasted for weeks and in which even the external forms were hardly observed—I do not want to discuss this in detail here—the relation never reached a point where it could be classified as that of a close adviser or a close collaborator as I conceived it in my Army staff positions. I must say that for my part I have been faithful and loyal and I always fulfilled my duties in that manner. However, I must also say that a sincere and personal relation based upon mutual understanding and confidence never existed. It has always been correct, but it was military and official, and never went beyond that.

DR. NELTE: By the decree of 4 February 1938 a Secret Cabinet Council was established. According to the contents of that decree, you are supposed to have been a member of the Cabinet Council. In order to save time, I merely wish to ask you: Do you confirm from your own knowledge the statement made by Reich Marshal Göring, that the Secret Cabinet Council was established only for appearances and that a Secret Cabinet Council was never constituted and that it never had a session?

KEITEL: I can answer only, “Yes, never.”

DR. NELTE: I come now to the question of the Reich Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat). In the session of 23 November, the prosecutor submitted in evidence, as proof of the rearmament and the active participation of the Wehrmacht in the planning of war of aggression, among others:

Document EC-177, which was designated as “Meeting of the Reich Defense Council of 22 May 1933.” I must say that I have taken the translation from the minutes and I am not sure whether the expression “Reichsverteidigungsrat” was translated correctly. In the minutes it states that it is a meeting of the working committee. For your information may I say that the Reichsverteidigungsrat was supposed to be a sort of ministerial body and that in addition, there was a working committee.

A second document, EC-405, was submitted concerning a meeting of the same body on 7 March 1934; and a third document, 2261-PS, dealing with the Reich Defense Law of 1935 and the simultaneous appointment of Dr. Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.

Beyond doubt, you have been active in questions of national defense. These documents are also submitted as evidence against you. I ask you, therefore, to state whether these meetings in which you participated and which you conducted, were concerned with preparations for war and rearmament.

KEITEL: From the very beginning, as long as we were working on these things and by means of a committee of experts from which everything else evolved, I personally participated in these matters, and I may call myself the founder of that committee of ministerial experts which was set up to co-operate with the War Ministry. As Chief of the Organizational Department of the Army, in the winter of 1929 and 1930, that is, 3 years before Hitler came to power, I formed and personally assembled that committee after the Chancellor—I believe it was Brüning—and the Prussian and Reich Minister of the Interior Severing had consented to it. I would like to add that a representative of Minister Severing was always present to make sure that nothing took place which would have been in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. This work was very difficult, because no Reich minister and no department head was officially obliged to carry out the wishes of the National Ministry of Defense, this was purely voluntary. Consequently, the work went along haltingly and slowly. In this committee of experts which met perhaps two or three times a year, we dealt with, if I may put it briefly, what assistance the Civilian Department could render, in order to set free the small army of 100,000 soldiers for purely military tasks, naturally limiting ourselves to the defense of our frontiers, as stated in the Treaty of Versailles: “The Defense of the Frontiers”; I could perhaps still repeat our discussion from memory, since, with the exception of the period from 1933 to 1935, I conducted every one of these meetings myself, that is as leader of the discussion, not as chairman. I can, however, refer you now to the _Mobilization Handbook for Civil Authorities_, which was the outcome of this work and about which I shall speak later. It may be possible to submit it here. We were concerned only with questions of defense, such as the protection of our frontiers, and, in order to make myself clear, I should like to mention some of them. The Wehrmacht was to be free to protect railway property, post office property, repeater stations, radio stations, and to man the frontiers with security units for which the Customs Services were to be responsible. Cable and sea communications with East Prussia were also to be improved.

I will not bore you with all this. They were all defensive measures with a view to freeing the few soldiers for purely military functions, because for purposes of actual military operations I need not tell you what we could have done with an army of only 100,000 men. Any questions which went beyond this were never dealt with in that committee. The manner in which we worked was this: I asked the experts to submit their wishes to the heads of departments or state secretaries and then to try to persuade the heads of departments to take over the tasks from us, so that we could say that was being done by others and we need not bother about it. I can guarantee that operational questions, strategic questions, armament questions, questions of supply of war equipment, were never discussed in this committee. They were only organizational questions of the taking over of functions which generally should be performed by a soldier, but which we wanted to transfer to the civil authorities.

Now, as to the meeting of 22 May 1933, which has been discussed several times, it was already stated in the heading of the minutes which we have before us: “Competency—heretofore the Reichswehrminister, now the Reich Defense Council”—I have just explained that. Hitherto Reichswehrminister, over the committee, voluntary participation of the ministers of other departments, now obligatory activity of the heads of departments, that is, the group of ministers who received the title of “Defense Council.” I will express that even more clearly, so that it cannot be misunderstood. Every member of the committee represented a ministry. The minister to whom the committee member was responsible, along with his colleagues, formed the Reich Defense Council, as envisaged by us then. They were the Council and we were the Committee. Therefore, “heretofore the Reichswehrminister”—now, one could say, as I have just expressed it, the other ministers were obliged to do that.

In Paragraph 3 the working plans were particularly mentioned. These working plans, in a word, are the forerunner of the _Mobilization Book_, which is the final stage; whereas the working plans of about 1933 were the intermediary stage. Then as regards the concluding words at the meeting of 22 May 1933, which have been given special prominence here by the Prosecution, and which deal with the need for secrecy—the passage where I said, according to the minutes, that nothing which could lead to objections at the Disarmament Conference should be left lying in the desks of the ministries—that is correct. I did say that, and I have said it because the experts told me that, with the exception of a small wooden box or a drawer in a desk which could not be locked, they had no place in which to keep anything, and because Von Blomberg, Reich War Minister at that time, who had been in Geneva at the Disarmament Conference for almost two years, gave me the definite order before this meeting, to point out these things, because in Geneva one was surrounded by an extremely large number of agents who were only waiting to be able to present proof that, in spite of the disarmament negotiations, there were things going on which could be interpreted as violations of the Versailles Treaty. That is what I had to say about the document.

DR. NELTE: I have given to you now the _Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration_. It is Document 1639-PS. It has been submitted in order to prove that aggressive wars were being planned. Would you explain to us the purpose of this book?

KEITEL: I have already stated that at an earlier stage, that is, during the years 1932-33, the individual ministries had so-called working plans, indicating what they were to do if something happened which necessitated their participation in defending the country. In the course of years, naturally, a number of new tasks were added and that finally led to this _Mobilization Book_ for the civil authorities and civil administration, the study of which would certainly show nothing which might have anything to do with strategic, operational, or other preparations for war. On the other hand, I am not in a position to prove that everything contained in this book could never have been useful in military operations which could develop from an aggressive war plan. Many measures, one could almost say most measures, in the event of mobilization would not indicate on the surface whether it is a measure for defense or a measure which is necessary or indispensable for aggressive action. That cannot be determined. But I believe I can say, because I, myself, have been engaged so deeply in this work, perhaps more than in any other, that there was no reason at all to burden the civilian experts—they were high government counsellors—with strategic or operational planning. I do not believe that it is necessary to prove that such work is not within their scope. I have looked through and studied this mobilization book here. I do not wish to bore you by citing points which are of a purely defensive nature. I could name them: barriers, reinforcement of the frontier defenses, demolitions, cutting of railroads and similar things, all this is in the book. One of the most important chapters, which, if I remember correctly, we discussed during four or five of these sessions, was the question of evacuation, that is, evacuating territories close to the border of valuable war material and personnel, so that, in case of war with the neighbor, they should not fall into the hands of the enemy. This problem of evacuation was one of the most difficult, because the extent to which one can evacuate, that is, what things can be evacuated, is perhaps one of the most difficult decisions to make.

I would like to say one more thing about the Reich Defense Committee, supplementing the ideas which I expressed before. Until the year 1938, no meeting or session of the Reich Defense Council was ever held, that is, the ministers who were the superiors of the committee members never met, not even once. I would have known about it, although at the cabinet meeting, I believe as early as March 1933, we passed a resolution to make these ministers responsible for a Reich Defense Council which should deal with these tasks, and to oblige them to take over these tasks as their necessary contribution to the defense of the Reich, and, of course, to finance them. That was the main purpose, otherwise the Reich Defense Council never met.

DR. NELTE: Actually, the minutes which have been presented, for the period of ’33 to ’38, are of the meetings of the working committee. But you know that about eight days ago two documents were submitted which appeared to be the minutes of the meetings of the Reich Defense Council. One session or assembly is supposed to have taken place in November 1938, and the second one in March 1939. Unfortunately these documents have not been submitted to me, but I have looked at them and you have also seen them. Can you explain to us how these minutes, that is, these meetings came about and what they mean?

KEITEL: I merely wish to add a few supplementary words to the statement which Reich Marshal Göring has already made. In December 1938, there was passed the Reich Defense Law, which had been drawn up in 1935, a shelved law, that is, a law which had not been made public and which required modification, the reason being that the Reich Defense Law of ’35 was devised by the Reich War Minister, Commander-in-Chief Von Blomberg, who no longer held office. I was with Reich Marshal Göring at that time to discuss this with him and to find a new basis for this law, which until then had not been published. This law of the autumn of 1938 had a number of supplementary clauses as compared to the old one, and perhaps I will be able to give details later. Among other things, according to this law also, Reich Marshal Göring was the delegate of the Führer, a function formerly held by the Reich War Minister and which I could not exercise.

This conference in November 1938, to recall it briefly, had been convened by Reich Marshal Göring in order to present this law which had not been published, and which was not to be published, to a large circle of members of the ministries. There were about seventy or more persons present to whom the Reich Marshal explained the purpose and the essence of this law in the form of a speech. There was no discussion, apart from that speech, and there was certainly no question of a meeting of the Reich Defense Council at that time.

You also recently showed me the second document of a meeting of the Reich Defense Council as it is called and as also appears in the heading of the minutes of the summer 1939.

DR. NELTE: No, March 1939.

KEITEL: That has been mentioned here, and I believe it was the second meeting of the Reich Defense Council. I can explain that. This is how it was: I called a meeting of the committee and, of course, furnished Reich Marshal Göring with the agenda and the names of the people who were to be present. Reich Marshal Göring informed me that he would come himself and that since he wished to discuss other questions, he would accordingly enlarge the attendance. This conference, therefore, had an agenda which I had planned for the committee, and concrete questions were also brought up for debate. It is, however, remarkable that according to the list of those present, that is, according to the numbers, the members of the Reich Defense Council were represented by only a very small number, almost not at all, although there were about forty or fifty people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was a body of 12 people, and it needs no further explanation that, from the form in which these two conferences took place, one could not say that this was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Council based upon a clearly defined agenda, but rather that there were two meetings, the motive and extent of which I have described here.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you might get on a little more quickly with the defendant. The Tribunal recall that you asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit of the defendant’s evidence, and there is in your document book an affidavit. You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at very much greater length than you would have gone into them if you read the affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal more shortly with the evidence in future.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I made every effort to be as brief and concise as possible in my questions, but testimony is, of course, always subjective. The defendant is unfortunately the one who is mentioned most frequently in this Trial and naturally he is interested in clarifying those matters which he considers essential in order to present his case clearly.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I do not think it is necessary to discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed their wish.

DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your request, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._]

Field Marshal Keitel, you have just given us an explanation of the Reich Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee. You probably realize that we are not and should not be so much concerned with whether decisions are made by a Reich Defense Council or a Reich Defense Committee. We are interested in what actually took place and whether or not these things justify the imputations of the Prosecution. In this respect I ask you to tell me if those things which you discussed and planned on the Reich Defense Committee justify the suspicion that you were considering aggressive war?

KEITEL: I realize fully that we are not concerned with the formality of whether it was the Council or the Committee, since the Council was a board of ministers while the Committee was a board of minor experts. We are concerned with what actually did take place and what was done. With the exception that in the year 1934 and until the autumn of 1935 I was not present at these discussions, and therefore cannot vouch for every word which was spoken at that time, I must state that nothing about the planning of wars, the preparing for wars, the operational, strategical, or armed preparedness for war, was ever discussed.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has labeled you as a member of the Three Man College, from which they have deduced that you had special powers to act within the German Reich Government. I am submitting to you Document 2194-PS. In this document in the Reich Defense Law of 1938, Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, you will find the source of this term which in itself is not official.

KEITEL: The Reich Defense Law of 1938 provided for a plenipotentiary general for administration in order to restrict the size of the body. The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office and further, according to Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, the Supreme Command of the Army was to have priority influence in regard to the State Railways and the State Postal Services, for in the event of mobilization, transports must run and the services for the transmission of news must be available, as is the case in all countries.

The Three Man College is a concept which I have never heard of until just now. It probably refers to the Plenipotentiary General for Administration, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and the Chief of the OKW. It referred to these three. There is no doubt about it, because, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they were already supposed to have a number of decrees ready in the drawers which were to be published when this law was made public, and each one of the three had to make the necessary preparations in his own sphere. From the right to assume these functions by reason of these authorities the Three Man College concept originated.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution then contended that according to Document 2852-PS you were a member of the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich. Did you become a minister through this membership in the Reich Defense Council?

KEITEL: I might perhaps say a few words to begin with about the Council of Ministers, insofar as the Reich Defense Law, the Reich Defense Committee and the Reich Defense Council, disappeared as a result of the law regarding the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, that is, they were never made public and never put into effect. The Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich was newly created on 1 September 1939 and this made all these preparations on paper in the Reich Defense Council, Reich Defense Committee and the law null and void and put in its place a new thing, an institution. This institution, the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, was now the small war cabinet, which, if I may say so, should previously have been the Reich Defense Council with their limited number of members. Thus, a new basis was established, and new decrees which were necessary were put into effect by the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, after it had been created and officially confirmed.

I was called into this Council of Ministers or rather I received a chair in this Council of Ministers. I prefer not to give the reasons, because they were entirely private. It was a compensation for opposition against these things—I never became active in this Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, but I was a member; it was not necessary to be active since in the purely military sphere, that is, things with which the Wehrmacht immediately was concerned, the Führer personally, without the Council of Ministers, issued the necessary decrees with his own signature and the detour via the Council of Ministers in Berlin was not necessary; and in my opinion I must deny that I became a minister by this appointment. The authority to exercise the functions of a minister was in no way given. I was only the representative of the Wehrmacht in this Council of Ministers.

DR. NELTE: However, your name is indisputably at the bottom of many laws and decrees which were issued. How do you explain the signature on these laws?

KEITEL: Yes, I did sign a series of decrees issued by the Council of Ministers because they were submitted to me by the Secretariat, that is, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Minister Lammers, with a request for my signature. When I questioned the necessity for doing this, I received a formal answer from Lammers to the effect that other Reich departments might see that the Wehrmacht was not excluded from these decrees or laws. That is why my signature is included. It means that the Wehrmacht must also obey these decrees and laws. That is why I had no misgivings in signing my name.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution further accuse you of having been a political general. Undoubtedly you appeared at various special functions. Will you please answer this accusation and tell us how it came about?