Chapter XX: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (16)

VON RIBBENTROP: I definitely did not say it in those words. But I would like to reply as follows:

It was apparently an account prepared by “Minister” Schmidt, as was his habit, some days after a long discussion between the Führer and Horthy. I have already said that the Führer had repeatedly charged me to talk to Horthy, to the Hungarian Government, to the Ambassador, in order to reach a solution of the Jewish question. At the time when Horthy visited the Führer the Führer emphasized the question to him in a very irritable manner, and I remember perfectly that subsequent to this discussion I talked the matter over with “Minister” Schmidt, saying that I, strictly speaking, had not quite understood the Führer.

The remark mentioned was definitely not made in this way. M. Horthy had apparently said that he could not, after all, beat the Jews to death. It is possible, since there would have been no question of that in any case, that in this connection I did endeavor to persuade Horthy to do something or other at once about the Jewish question in Budapest, namely, that he should undertake now the centralization which the Führer had already wished to carry out for a long time. My objection or my interpolation may have referred to this question.

I must add that the situation, at that time, was as follows: We had been receiving repeated indications from Himmler, to the effect that Himmler wished to handle the Jewish situation in Hungary himself. I did not want this, since, one way or another, it would probably have created political difficulties abroad.

Consequently, acting on the wish of the Führer, who was extremely obstinate on this subject, I, as is known, repeatedly attempted to smooth matters over and, at the same time, pin the Hungarians down to do something about it in any case. Therefore, if, from a long conversation, some remark has been extracted and summarized in brief, and contains some such statement, it certainly does not mean that I wished the Jews to be beaten to death. It was 100 percent contrary to my personal convictions.

M. FAURE: I do not understand whether you answered my question or not. I will have to ask you again. Is the report correct, or is it not correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, in this form it cannot be correct. These are notes. I personally have never seen these notes before; otherwise I should have said at once that this is nonsense and liable to misconstruction. I did not see these notes before; I saw them for the first time in Nuremberg.

I can say only one thing which may possibly have occurred. I might have said...well yes, “the Jews cannot be exterminated or beaten to death, so, please do something in order that the Führer will be satisfied at long last, and centralize the Jews.”

That was our aim, at that time at any rate. We did not want to render the situation more acute, but we were trying to do something in Hungary so that no other department could take the matter in hand, thereby creating political difficulties abroad for the Foreign Office.

M. FAURE: You knew at that time that many Jews had been deported. That may be gathered from your explanations.

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, please. Are you passing from this document?

M. FAURE: I was continuing to speak of it in more general terms.

THE PRESIDENT: You are passing from it, did you say?

M. FAURE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, the Tribunal would like to know whether you did say to the Regent Horthy that Jews ought to be taken to concentration camps.

VON RIBBENTROP: I consider it possible that such may have been the case, for we had, at that time, received an order that a concentration camp was to be installed near Budapest or else that the Jews should be centralized there, and the Führer had instructed me a long time before to discuss with the Hungarians a possible solution of the Jewish question. This solution should consist of two points. One was the removal of the Jews from important government positions and two, since there were so many Jews in Budapest, to centralize the Jews in certain quarters of Budapest.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand your suggestion to be that this document is inaccurate.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it is not accurate. The way I should like to put it, Mr. President, is that when reading the document, it would appear from this document that I considered it possible or desirable to beat the Jews to death. That is perfectly untrue but what I did say here and what I emphasized later on could be understood to mean only that I wished something to be done in Hungary to solve the Jewish problem, so that other departments should not interfere in the matter. For the Führer often spoke to me about it, very seriously indeed, saying that the Jewish problem in Hungary must be solved now...

THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that, I think, already. What I wanted to ask you was this: Are you suggesting that Schmidt, who drew up this memorandum, invented the last few sentences, beginning with the words:

“If the Jews there did not want to work they would be shot. If
they could not work they would have to perish. They had to be
treated like tuberculosis bacilli with which a healthy body may
become infected. This was not cruel if one remembered that
innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or deer, have to be
killed so that no harm is caused by them. Why should the beasts
who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be shown more leniency?
Nations which did not rid themselves of Jews perished. One of
the most famous examples of this was the downfall of a people
who once were so proud, the Persians, who now lead a pitiful
existence as Armenians.”

Are you suggesting that Schmidt invented those sentences or imagined them?

VON RIBBENTROP: Mr. President, I should like to add that I myself was very grieved by these words of the Führer, and I did not quite understand them. But perhaps this attitude can be understood only if we remember that the Führer believed that the Jews had caused this war, and that he had gradually developed a very fanatical hatred for them.

I remember too that later on, after this conference, I discussed with the interpreter Schmidt and the two gentlemen the fact that this was the first time the Führer had used expressions in connection with the Jewish problem which I could no longer understand. These words were certainly not invented by Schmidt. The Führer did express himself in some such way at that time. That is true.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure.

M. FAURE: It appears from his document that you thought there were concentration camps in Hungary and yet you said yesterday that you did not know there were any in Germany. Is that not so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know that there were any concentration camps in Hungary, but I did say that the Führer had instructed me to ask Horthy to ask the Hungarian Government to concentrate the Jews in Budapest, in certain parts of the city of Budapest. As to concentration camps in Germany, I already spoke yesterday about my knowledge of that subject.

M. FAURE: You admitted that you knew Hitler’s policy to deport all Jews and you admitted that insofar as you were competent as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you assisted this policy, did you not? That is right, is it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: As his faithful follower I adhered to the Führer’s orders even in this field, but I always did my utmost to alleviate the situation as far as possible. This can be stated and proved by many witnesses. Even in 1943 I submitted a comprehensive memorandum to the Führer in which I urged him to alter the Jewish policy completely. I could also quote many other examples.

M. FAURE: If I understand your testimony rightly, you were morally opposed to this persecution of Jews, but you did help to carry them out, is that not so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I repeatedly said at the very beginning of my examination, that in that sense I have never been anti-Semitic. But I was a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler.

M. FAURE: Apart from the Jewish question, you dealt with arrests of French people, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: The arrests of Frenchmen...

M. FAURE: Yes. Did you or did you not give orders to arrest Frenchmen?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that this was so. Quite possible.

M. FAURE: Can you be more precise on that subject?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I cannot, for the moment, remember any details. In any case I know that Frenchmen were arrested. Just how far this depended on us, at that time, I do not know. It was, I think, in 1944, shortly before the invasion that the Führer issued an order to the effect that a large number of important French members of the resistance movement were to be arrested on the spot, and I believe that we were advised accordingly. It is also possible that we co-operated in this action to a certain extent, but I cannot remember any details.

It was a question of arresting those elements who would kindle the flame of the Resistance Movement in the event of an invasion, and would attack the German armies in the rear. But I cannot give you any more particulars now.

M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown a document which will be submitted as Exhibit Number RF-1506 (Document Number RF-1506). It is an affidavit by Dr. H. Knochen. I shall read some passages from this document.

“At the end of 1943—it must have been in December—there was a
conference at the Foreign Office on arrests to be made in
France. As I was in Berlin, I was also summoned to it. Present
at this conference were: The Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop;
the State Secretary Von Steengracht; Ambassador Abetz; another
member of the Foreign Office, whose name I do not know; the
Chief of the SIPO and the SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the Higher SS
and Police Leader in France, Oberg; and representing the
Military Commander-in-Chief was his Chief of Staff Colonel
Kossmann, if my memory serves me right.

“The Minister stated the following: The Führer expects in France
more attention to be paid in the future than hitherto. The enemy
force must not be allowed to increase. Therefore all German
services will have to carry out their duties more meticulously.”

I omit the next paragraph. Then we read the following:

“He sees arising danger, in the event of invasion, of those
prominent Frenchmen who do not wish to collaborate with Germany,
and who are secretly active against her. They might constitute a
danger to the troops. These dangerous elements should be sought
out in business circles, university centers, in certain military
and political circles, and all classes of society connected with
them. He believes that it will be necessary to strike an
immediate blow against these people. He suggests that they
number easily 2,000 people or more. At a moment when it is
necessary to defend Europe against her enemy, there is no reason
why we should shrink from taking preventive measures of this
kind in France. As to the practical means of putting this into
effect, the Minister stated, Ambassador Abetz will have to take
up this matter immediately and draw up a list in collaboration
with the German services in order to take account of all the
questions that arise out of this matter.”

I end the quotation here. Do you admit the accuracy of this document?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I distinctly remember that discussion. This was a Führer order to the effect that immediate action be taken—I have just spoken about this—in view of the pending invasion, to arrest all potentially dangerous elements who could fan the flame of resistance in the rear of the German armies. I considered this a perfectly comprehensible measure which any Government, with the welfare of the troops at heart, would have made.

I then held this conference. The Führer expected a far greater wave of arrests, but only a comparatively small number, I believe, were arrested then.

Subsequently we had comparatively little to do with the actual arrests; they were carried out by the police.

But it is perfectly clear that this conference did take place at the time indicated and that we did what had to be done at the moment, as proposed, namely, the arrest of those elements which might have been dangerous in case of an invasion. That is quite true.

M. FAURE: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: There are two things that I want to say. One of them relates to the Prosecution and one of them relates to the Defense. It is desired that the Prosecution should furnish documents to the interpreters when they are going to use documents in the course of examination or cross-examination. Documents need not necessarily be in the language which the interpreter is going to use, but there must be some document in some language, one of the languages, placed before the interpreters in order to assist.

The other point is that I am told that the defendants’ counsel are not getting their documents ready for the Translation Division in anything like the 2 weeks beforehand which was specified by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, it is true, said that the documents must be furnished to the Tribunal or the Translation Division 2 weeks ahead, if possible. Those words “if possible” are being treated too lightly and the documents, I am told, are sometimes coming in as late as 48 hours before the case of the particular defendant is to be taken. That is not sufficient and it will lead to delay. That is all.

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, in the course of the cross-examination of this defendant by the French Prosecution, reference was made to Document 3766-PS and I understood Dr. Horn to say that that document was not a captured document. That was my understanding of his statement. I am not altogether sure that that was what he said when he approached the microphone. So that the record will be perfectly clear, I now wish to inform the Tribunal that it is a captured document and I do not know upon what basis Dr. Horn made that assertion.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have not, so far, had any opportunity—it has been stated that we are dealing with a captured document, and I have had no opportunity of checking the matter beforehand. It said on the top of this document that it was a USA exhibit, Document Number 3766-PS, and I had no opportunity of checking this on its arrival. I have therefore requested that this fact be kindly established by the French Prosecution. That was my sole objection. I did not deny that it was a captured document; I was merely unable to prove it.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to ask questions of the defendant? Colonel Amen, the Tribunal hopes that you are not going over ground which has already been gone over.

COL. AMEN: Most certainly not, Sir.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You speak English pretty well, Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: I spoke it well in the past and I think I speak it passably well today.

COL. AMEN: Almost as well as you speak German?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I would not say that, but in the past I spoke it nearly as well as German, although I have naturally forgotten a great deal in the course of the years and now it is more difficult for me.

COL. AMEN: Do you know what is meant by a “yes man” in English?

VON RIBBENTROP: A “yes man”—_per se_. A man who says “yes” even when he himself—it is somewhat difficult to define. In any case, I do not know what you mean by it in English. In German I should define him as a man who obeys orders and is obedient and loyal.

COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you were a “yes man” for Hitler, isn’t that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: I was always loyal to Hitler, carried through his orders, differed frequently in opinion from him, had serious disputes with him, repeatedly tendered my resignation, but when Hitler gave an order, I always carried out his instructions in accordance with the principles of our authoritarian state.

COL. AMEN: Now, you were interrogated frequently by me, were you not, before this Trial?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, once or twice, I believe.

COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read to you certain questions and answers which were given in the course of these interrogations, and simply ask you to tell the Tribunal whether or not you made the answers that I read to you. That question can be answered “yes” or “no”; do you understand?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

COL. AMEN: “I have been a loyal man to the Führer to his last
days. I have never gone back on him. I have been a loyal man to
his last days, last hours, and I did not always agree with
everything. On the contrary, I sometimes had very divergent
views, but I promised to him in 1941 that I would keep faith in
him. I gave him my word of honor that I would not get him into
any difficulties.”

Is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that according to my recollection is correct. I did not see the document and I did not sign anything, but as far as I can remember, that is correct.

COL. AMEN: Well, what did you mean by saying that you would not get him into any difficulties?

VON RIBBENTROP: I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany and the only man who could win this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to create any difficulties for him, and remained faithful to him until the end.

COL. AMEN: Well, what you really meant was that you were never going to cross him, and you promised him that in 1941, isn’t that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: I would never cause him any difficulties, yes, I did say that. He often found me a rather difficult subordinate, and that is when I told him that I would not cause him any difficulties.

COL. AMEN: In 1941 you told him that no matter whether you differed with his opinion in the future, you would never press the point, isn’t that true?

[_There was no response._] “Yes” or “no”?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite that, but...

COL. AMEN: Well, approximately that, is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it cannot be put that way. I only meant, if I may explain it this way, that I would never cause him any difficulties; if a serious divergence of opinion should ever arise, I would just withhold my own view. That was what I meant.

COL. AMEN: Well, you gave him your word of honor to that effect, isn’t that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, yes.

COL. AMEN: And at that time you had talked about resigning, isn’t that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is also true, yes.

COL. AMEN: And that made the Führer lose his temper and become ill, correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. “Ill” is not the correct expression, but he became very excited at that time. I should prefer not to mention the details.

COL. AMEN: Well, he said it was injuring his health, isn’t that correct, and told you to stop arguing with him about any of these questions and do what he told you to do? Right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not wish to say anything more about the personal reasons, nor do I believe that these are matters which could be of any interest here. Those would be personal matters between the Führer and myself.

COL. AMEN: Well, I am not interested in that. I am interested only in ascertaining if it is not a fact, and if you did not swear under oath, that on that occasion you swore to Hitler that you would never express or press any divergent views to anything which he desired. Is that not correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, no! That is absolutely untrue, the interpretation is false. I told the Führer that I would never create any difficulties for him. After 1941 I had many divergencies with him, and even at that time I always voiced my own opinions.

COL. AMEN: Well, Ribbentrop, whatever divergent views you had you were never able to put any of them into effect after 1941, were you? “Yes” or “no?”

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question. Please repeat it.

COL. AMEN: I say, no matter how divergent your views were, or what views you expressed to the Führer on any of these questions after 1941, your suggestions being contrary to the Führer’s were never put into effect. Isn’t that correct? You always eventually did what the Führer told you to do and what he wished, regardless of your own views.

VON RIBBENTROP: You are putting two questions to me. To the first I must reply that it is not correct that Hitler never accepted suggestions from me. Question Number 2, however, is correct. I can answer it by saying that if Hitler at any time expressed an opinion to me and issued an order, I carried the order through as was natural in our country.

COL. AMEN: In other words, eventually you always said “yes”, isn’t that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: I carried out his order, yes.

COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you some more of your testimony:

“He”—referring to the Führer—“considered me his closest
collaborator. We had a very serious conversation then, and when
I wanted to go away, I promised it to him and I have kept it to
the last moment. It was sometimes very difficult, I can assure
you, to keep this promise, and today I am sorry that I gave it.
Perhaps it would have been better if I had not given it. It put
me from then on in the position that I could not talk to Hitler,
in very serious and important moments of this war, in the way in
which I would have liked to, and in which, perhaps, I might have
been able to talk to him after this conversation in 1941.

“I must explain all this to you. If you do not know the
background of these things you might think perhaps that as
Foreign Minister during these last years I would like to say
more about this. Perhaps I might say one could give some more
information about this, but I want to be and remain loyal to
this man, even after his death, as far as I can possibly do it.
But I reserve the right to prove to posterity that I kept my
promise and also the right to show the role which I have played
in the whole of this drama.”

Did you or did you not make those statements under oath to me?

VON RIBBENTROP: They are...

COL. AMEN: “Yes” or “no”?

VON RIBBENTROP: Here again we have two questions. To question Number 1, I would say that I know nothing at all. To the second question, I answer “no.” I certainly never testified under oath to that. I was put on oath only twice, but that is not relevant here. The statement is not verbatim and must have been wrongly translated. It is correct that I said that I was loyal to the Führer and that I further said that I had many arguments with him, that we were not always of the same opinion, and that is the essence of my statement. That is correct.

COL. AMEN: I asked you only one question, and I ask you again to answer it “yes” or “no.” Did you or did you not make those statements in the exact language that I just read them to you?

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Amen, he really did answer that, because he said it is not verbatim.

COL. AMEN: But it is verbatim.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of opinion. He says it is not verbatim.

COL. AMEN: Well, very good, Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In any event, you can see that you stated the substance of what I just read to you; correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, yes.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, Ribbentrop, you testified and gave this particular testimony in English, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have often spoken English at interrogations, that is quite true, but whether it was precisely this statement which was made in English, I do not know. In any case, I repeat, these statements on both points are to be understood that way; that is how they were meant.

COL. AMEN: And when you gave your testimony in English, that was at your own request, was it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct.

COL. AMEN: At whose request?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know. I believe it just happened that way; I cannot remember. I believe I spoke English mostly, and German a few times. Most of the time, however, I spoke English.

COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you a little more of your testimony and ask you the same question, which I hope you will answer “yes” or “no,” namely: Did you give this testimony in the course of the interrogation:

“Question: ‘Do you feel that you have an obligation to the
German people to set forth historically not only the good
things, but the bad things, for their education in the future?’

“Answer: ‘That is a terribly difficult question to answer.’

“Question: ‘Does that counterbalance the loyalty you feel
towards the Führer?’

“Answer: ‘I do not want to stand before the German people as
being disloyal to the Führer.’”

Did you make those statements?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, though I can no longer remember very exactly. But that is quite possible. So much has been said in the course of the last few months, and then too, from a physical point of view, I have, as you know, not been quite up to the mark, so that I just cannot remember every single word.

COL. AMEN: All right. Now see if you recall having made these statements:

“I always told the Führer openly my view if he wanted to hear
it, but I kept myself entirely back from all decisions, but if
the Führer once had decided, I, according to my attitude toward
the Führer, blindly carried out his orders and acted in the
sense of his decision. In a few decisive foreign political
points, I tried to give my opinion more forcefully. This was in
the Polish crisis and also in the Russian question, because I
considered this absolutely important and necessary, but from
1941 I had but very little weight and it was difficult to bring
an opinion through with the Führer.”

Do you recall having made those statements? “Yes,” or “no,” please.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is more or less true. Yes, I practically remember it.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal has already heard a very long cross-examination of the defendant, and they think that this is not adding very much to what they have already heard. The defendant has given very similar evidence already.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. I will pass to another subject.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You have testified that there was a sharp line of demarcation between the political and the military situations. Correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Between—I did not understand that.

COL. AMEN: You have testified that there was always a sharp line of demarcation between the political and the military elements.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. The Führer always differentiated rather strongly between these two elements; that is correct.

COL. AMEN: And that information belonging to the military was kept exclusively for the military and not made available to your office, for example? Is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: I heard little of military matters and plans; yes, that is correct.

COL. AMEN: And that the contrary was also true, that the information which you obtained was not made available to the military; is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I am in no position to judge, but I would assume so, since I do not know what information the military received from the Führer.

COL. AMEN: Well, you told us that the Führer’s entire plan was to keep those political and military channels separate each from the other. Correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, in general he kept them very severely apart. I have already said so several times. That is why I have only just now had cognizance of many military documents for the first time. That was perfectly in keeping with the Führer’s decrees on secrecy, that no one department should know more than was absolutely essential.

COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact that was not true at all; was it, Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already given you my answer.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact you had secret agents out who were working jointly in foreign countries for your office, for the Army, and for the Navy; isn’t that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is incorrect.

COL. AMEN: You are quite sure of that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I am certain of that.

COL. AMEN: And you are swearing to that?

VON RIBBENTROP: You mean agents who did something, who...

COL. AMEN: Who were out obtaining information for your office, for the Army, and for the Navy at the same, jointly?

VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that highly improbable. It is, of course, possible that somehow or other, some man may have worked for different departments, but this was definitely not done on an organized scale. The organization—we maintained a very small intelligence service abroad—and the intelligence services of the other departments of the Reich generally worked, as far as I was informed, completely apart from ours. It is possible that here and there some person or other would work for other, for different departments. That is quite conceivable. For instance, some person or other in our legations, as was customary at the English, American, Russian, and other legations, who had dug themselves in as consular assistants or some other kind of assistants, and carried out intelligence work for some organization or other.

COL. AMEN: So you want to change the answer you made a moment ago; is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not wish to change it at all. Fundamentally, as an organized routine matter, I never introduced any of the secret agents who worked for the different departments abroad. It is, however, conceivable that the department of the Foreign Office dealing with such matters may have appointed somebody. It was, however, a fairly insignificant affair. Today I say “unfortunately.” It is quite possible that other agents from this department, working for other departments, for Counterintelligence or the SD, _et cetera_, were correlated. Later on we even—I should like to add the following: I had pronounced differences of opinion with Himmler, over the intelligence services abroad, and it was only through the good offices of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner that I obtained an agreement to the effect that certain items of information would be placed at my disposal. But later this agreement was not honored. I think it was practically ineffective, because it was already too late. That, I believe, was in 1944.

COL. AMEN: Will you look at Document Number 3817-PS, please? Will you first tell the Tribunal who Albrecht Haushofer was, please?

VON RIBBENTROP: Albrecht Haushofer was a former collaborator of mine and was a man who, yes, who dealt with German minority questions. Could I perhaps read the letter first? Is it a letter from Haushofer? It is not signed.

COL. AMEN: Yes, it is. Have you finished reading?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite, not yet. Shall I read the others too, or only the first letter?

COL. AMEN: We shall get to the other letters in a moment. I am trying to make this as short as we possibly can. Does that letter refresh your recollection that Haushofer was out in the Orient investigating various matters and making reports to you as early as 1937?

VON RIBBENTROP: At the moment I cannot recall that Haushofer was in Tokio but it is conceivable, it is possible that such was the case.

COL. AMEN: Well, the letter is addressed to you and it encloses a report, does it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Isn’t this a letter from Count Dürckheim? Isn’t there some misunderstanding? But if you say this was written by Haushofer, then it is conceivable that he was in Tokio; it is possible. I am not acquainted with the details. I sent Count Dürckheim to Tokio at that time but it is possible that Haushofer was there too. To be candid, I have, at present, forgotten all about it.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just seen that this letter is not fully dated and is unsigned but I hear from Colonel Amen it was allegedly written in 1937. In 1937 Ribbentrop was not yet Foreign Minister. He was appointed Foreign Minister only on 4 February 1938.

COL. AMEN: It has the date on it—3 October—and it was captured with Haushofer’s documents.

VON RIBBENTROP: But I consider it quite probable that this letter is from Haushofer, although, to be quite candid, I no longer remember exactly that he had been to Tokio in 1937.

COL. AMEN: Well, now...

VON RIBBENTROP: He was a collaborator who worked with us in the early years but later dealt more with German minority questions, so that I lost track of him in recent years.

COL. AMEN: I will just pass along through this document. You will find the next document is dated 15 April 1937, requesting reimbursement and funds for this trip.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And then passing to the next document, you will find a letter to the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, saying:

“I am using the courier to send you also personally a short
report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It
contains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could
observe and hear over here in 4 weeks.”

Do you see that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see the letter. Yes, yes!

COL. AMEN: Then you will pass on to the next letter, dated 1 September 1937, addressed to yourself.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Enclosing a report covering the first 4 weeks.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it before me.

COL. AMEN: Now, we will pass the report over just for the moment and you will come to a letter dated 17 December 1937.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is very far from the matters which they have really got to consider.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. If seems to me that this indicates very clearly that copies of the same report which is included here were being sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy—that went to Raeder—and one to the Army and to Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness’ first answer was that they did not have joint agents but he subsequently qualified that and said they might sometimes have had joint agents.

COL. AMEN: That is right, Sir. If you think he has conceded that point...

I should like to put this in as Exhibit USA-790.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but may I be allowed to say that we are not, in this case, dealing with an agent. Herr Haushofer was a free collaborator of ours, interested in politics in general, and in the question of the German minorities in particular. If he was in Tokio at that time, and he doubtless was there, although it has slipped my memory, then I must have told him to speak to several persons over there and report to me. He apparently, as I have only just gathered from this letter, either because he liked to be busy or for some other reason unknown to me, or because he knew the other gentlemen, placed these reports at the disposal of these other gentlemen, on his own initiative. But he certainly was no agent sent out by different departments. I think the only person who knew him well was Rudolf Hess; otherwise, I believe, he knew nobody at all. I fear I am not giving you quite the right ideas; he was a private tourist, who submitted his impressions.

COL. AMEN: Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not very close to Himmler; is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have always said that my relations with Himmler were good during the first few years, but I regret to say that in the latter years I was not on good terms with him. I naturally—it was not very noticeable to the outside world—but I do not wish to discuss this matter in detail. Many things have already been said about it and there were serious and violent divergencies, due to many reasons...

COL. AMEN: I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did you get along closely with him?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand your question.

COL. AMEN: In what years were you close to him?

VON RIBBENTROP: The first divergencies between Himmler and myself arose, I believe, in 1941, over Romania and difficulties in Romania. These divergencies were smoothed over, and naturally to all outward appearances we had to work together as before, and we often exchanged letters on our respective birthdays and on other occasions. But later on relations were not very good. The final break came in 1941. Formerly I had been on good terms with him and also shared his opinion for the creation of a leadership class, at which he was aiming.

COL. AMEN: And you had at least 50 social appointments with Himmler in 1940 and 1941?

VON RIBBENTROP: How many?

COL. AMEN: Fifty?

VON RIBBENTROP: Fifty? No, that certainly could not have been the case. Perhaps five or thereabouts, I cannot say for certain. But after 1941 relations between us were more strained, and later they were not very good. Others, I believe, have already testified to that effect.

COL. AMEN: Well, I do not want to take any more time, except...

THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between Ribbentrop or something other?

COL. AMEN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into?

COL. AMEN: Well, I expect, Sir, that any person that has as many appointments as are indicated by these books certainly has discussed with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler.

VON RIBBENTROP: I wish to repeat my statement that at no time did Himmler discuss this matter with me. As for our 50 meetings, I do not know, we may have met frequently, despite everything, but I cannot remember 50 meetings. Possibly five or ten, I do not know. I do not believe it to be of vital importance since it is not a decisive factor. Of course we had to work together in various fields and this collaboration was mostly very difficult.

COL. AMEN: Well, there were many business appointments which you had with him also, were there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries from Himmler’s appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to your...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone into any further.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir, but these were business appointments as distinguished from social. There are no further questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, during the last sessions of the Tribunal you explained in great detail the bases of German foreign policy. I should like to ask you a few comprehensive questions and request you to answer these questions laconically in terms of “yes” or “no.” Do you consider the Anschluss as an act of German aggression? Please answer this.

VON RIBBENTROP: Austria?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression. It was the accomplishment of a purpose.

GEN. RUDENKO: I must request you...

VON RIBBENTROP: But I presume I can say a few sentences at least, after saying “yes,” or must I never say anything else but “yes” and “no”?

GEN. RUDENKO: I must beg you to answer my questions. You have replied far too extensively. I would like you to summarize your replies, precisely by saying “yes” or “no.”

VON RIBBENTROP: That depends on my state of health. I must ask you to forgive me.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand.

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not consider the Anschluss as an act of aggression, that is “no.” I consider it the realization of the mutual purpose of both nations involved. They had always wished to be together and the government before Adolf Hitler had already striven for it.

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more: Please answer “yes” or “no.” Do you consider that the Anschluss was not an act of German aggression? Do you consider...

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, he gave you a categorical answer to that; that it was not an aggression.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to be confined to answering “yes” or “no.” They must answer “yes” or “no” first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow, with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically.

GEN. RUDENKO: The second question: Do you consider the seizure of Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression in that sense, but a union in accordance with the right of self-determination of nations, as laid down in 1919 by the President of the United States, Wilson. The annexation of the Sudetenland was sanctioned by an agreement of four great powers in Munich.

GEN. RUDENKO: You evidently have not understood my question. I asked you whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia, of the whole of Czechoslovakia, as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not an act of aggression by Germany. I consider, according to the words of the Führer, and I believe he was right, that it was a necessity resulting from Germany’s geographical position. This position meant that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia, the part which still existed, could always be used as a kind of aircraft-carrier for attacks against Germany. The Führer therefore considered himself obliged to occupy the territory of Bohemia and Moravia, in order to protect the German Reich against air attack—the air journey from Prague to Berlin took only half an hour. The Führer told me at the time that in view of the fact that United States had declared the entire Western Hemisphere as its particular sphere of interest, that Russia was a powerful country with gigantic territories, and that England embraced the entire globe, Germany would be perfectly justified in considering so small a space as her own sphere of interest.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Poland as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No. I must again say “no.” The attack on Poland was rendered inevitable by the attitude of the other powers. It might have been possible to find a peaceful solution to the German demands, and I think the Führer would have trodden this path of peace, had the other powers taken this path with him. As matters stood, the situation had become so tense that Germany could no longer accept it as it was, and as a great power Germany could not tolerate Polish provocations any further. That is how this war arose. I am convinced that primarily the Führer was never interested in conquering Poland.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Denmark as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, the “invasion” of Denmark, as it is called, was, according to the Führer’s words and explanation, a purely preventive measure adopted against imminent landings of British fighting forces. How authentic our information was is proved by the fact that only a few days later English and German troops were engaged in battle in Norway. That means that it was proved that these English troops had been ready for a long time for fighting in Norway, and it came out from the documents discovered later on and published at the time, and from orders issued, that the English landing in Scandinavia had been prepared down to the smallest detail. The Führer therefore thought that by seizing Scandinavia, he would prevent it from becoming another theater of war. I do not therefore think that the invasion of Denmark can be considered as an act of aggression.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not consider this attack on Norway as an act of aggression on the part of Germany either?

VON RIBBENTROP: We have just been talking about Norway. I was talking about Norway and Denmark, a combined action.

GEN. RUDENKO: Together with Denmark. All right, it was a simultaneous action. Do you consider the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is the same question. I must again say “no,” but I would like to add an explanation.

GEN. RUDENKO: Just a moment. I would like you to give shorter replies because you explain the basic questions far too extensively. You deny that this was an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: The Russian Prosecutor will understand that we are dealing with very important questions, which are not easily explained in a sentence, especially since we did not have the opportunity to explain the matter in detail. I shall be quite brief.

GEN. RUDENKO: I quite appreciate that you have already been answering questions of this nature for 3 days running.

VON RIBBENTROP: I shall now be very brief. After the Polish campaign military considerations proved to be the decisive factors. The Führer did not wish the war to spread. As for Holland, Belgium, and France, it was France who declared war on Germany and not we who declared war on France. We therefore had to prepare for an attack from this direction as well. The Führer told me at the time that such an attack on the Ruhr area was to be expected, and documents discovered at a later date have proved to the world at large beyond a shadow of doubt that this information was perfectly authentic. The Führer therefore decided to adopt preventive measures in this case as well and not to wait for an attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. And so the timetable of the German General Staff was put into practice.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Greece as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: The attack on Greece and Yugoslavia by Germany has already been discussed. I do not believe I need give any further details on this point. That is here...

GEN. RUDENKO: I also do not think it is necessary to give detailed replies. I ask whether you consider the attack on Greece as an act of aggression on the part of Germany? Answer “yes” or “no.”

VON RIBBENTROP: No, and I consider that the measures adopted in Yugoslavia and the measures taken by Greece in granting bases, _et cetera_, to the enemies of Germany justified the intervention of Adolf Hitler, so that here too one cannot speak of aggressive action in this sense. It was quite clear that British troops were about to land in Greece, since they had already landed in Crete and the Peloponnesos, and that the uprising in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany, in agreement with the enemies of Germany, as I mentioned yesterday, had been encouraged with the intent of launching an attack against Germany from that country. The documents of the French General Staff discovered later in France showed only too clearly that a landing in Salonika had been planned...

GEN. RUDENKO: Witness Ribbentrop, you have already spoken about that in much detail. You explained it yesterday at great length. Now will you please answer “yes” or “no” to my last question: Do you, or do you not consider the attack on the Soviet Union as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was no aggression in the literal sense of the word, but...

GEN. RUDENKO: You say that in the literal sense of the word it was not an act of aggression. Then in what sense of the word was it an aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: You must let him answer.

VON RIBBENTROP: May I offer a few words of explanation? I must be allowed to say something.

GEN. RUDENKO: You...

VON RIBBENTROP: The concept of “aggression” is a very complicated concept, which even today the world at large cannot readily define. That is a point I should like to emphasize first. We are here dealing, undeniably, with a preventive intervention, with a war of prevention. That is quite certain, for attack we did. There is no denying it. I had hoped that matters with the Soviet Union could have been settled differently, diplomatically, and I did everything I could in this direction. But the information received and all the political acts of the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941 until the outbreak of war, persuaded the Führer, as he repeatedly told me, that sooner or later the so-called East-West pincers would be applied to Germany, that is, that in the East, Russia with her immense war potential, and in the West, England and the United States, were pushing steadily towards Europe with the purpose of making a large-scale landing. It was the Führer’s great worry that this would happen. Moreover, the Führer informed me that close collaboration existed between the General Staffs of London and Moscow. This I do not know; I personally received no such news. But the reports and information which I received from the Führer were of an extremely concrete nature. At any rate, he feared that, one day, Germany, faced with this political situation, would be threatened with catastrophe and he wished to prevent the collapse of Germany and the destruction of the balance of power in Europe.

GEN. RUDENKO: In your testimony you have frequently stated that, in the pursuit of peaceful objectives, you considered it essential to solve a number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now this testimony is obviously arrant hypocrisy since you admitted just now that all these acts of aggression on the part of Germany were justified.

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not mean to say that; I said only that we were not dealing with an act of aggression, Mr. Prosecutor, and explained how this war came to pass and how it developed. I also explained how I had always done everything in my power to prevent the war at its outbreak during the Polish crisis. Beyond the precincts of this Tribunal, history will prove the truth of my words and show how I always endeavored to localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That, I believe, will also be established. Therefore, in conclusion I should like to say once more that the outbreak of war was caused by circumstances which, at long last, were no longer in Hitler’s hands. He could act only in the way he did, and when the war spread ever further all his decisions were principally prompted by considerations of a military nature, and he acted solely in the highest interests of his people.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now I beg you to answer the following questions:

I understand that you have submitted to the Tribunal a document, Number 311, written by yourself, which is an appreciation of Hitler entitled the “Personality of the Führer.” You wrote that document not so very long ago. I am not going to quote from it, since you doubtlessly remember it, as you wrote it a very short time ago.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am not quite sure what document that is. May I look at it?

GEN. RUDENKO: This document was submitted by you to your own defense counsel, as Exhibit Number 311, and submitted to the Tribunal by your attorney. On Page 5 there...

VON RIBBENTROP: Will you be kind enough to give a copy of this document?

GEN. RUDENKO: It is Document Number 311.

THE PRESIDENT: It cannot have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111, without anything more. What is it, 111-PS or 111?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is a document of the Defense submitted as Ribbentrop-311. We have only a Russian translation here, which came to us together with a German document book. I presume that the document book has been submitted to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: It is R-111—it is Ribbentrop-111, you mean. It is not 111; it is Ribbentrop-111.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document 311.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I’ve got it now. It is in Document Book Number 9.

GEN. RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.