Chapter XXXI: Part 1: is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence Department (4)

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall proceed to another question. I shall now refer to one question, the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. I do not intend to examine you in regard to the branding of Soviet prisoners of war and other facts; they are sufficiently well known to the Tribunal. I want to examine you in regard to one document, the report of Admiral Canaris, which was presented to you yesterday. You remember yesterday your counsel submitted to you the Canaris report; it is dated 15 September 1941 and registered under Document Number EC-338. As you will remember, even a German officer drew attention to the exceptional arbitrariness and lawlessness admitted in connection with the Soviet prisoners of war. Canaris in this report pointed to the mass murders of Soviet prisoners of war and spoke of the necessity of definitely eliminating this arbitrariness. Did you agree with the statements advanced by Canaris in his report, with reference to yourself?

KEITEL: I did not understand the last statement. With reference to myself?

GEN. RUDENKO: The last question amounts to this: Were you, Keitel, personally in agreement with the proposals made by Canaris in his report, that the arbitrary treatment permitted should be done away with where Soviet prisoners of war were concerned?

KEITEL: I answered my counsel yesterday...

GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer my question briefly; were you in agreement with it?

KEITEL: Yes, I will be brief—on receiving that letter, I immediately submitted it to the Führer, Adolf Hitler, especially on account of the enclosed publication by the Peoples’ Commissars, which was dated the beginning of July, and I asked for a new decision. On the whole I shared the objections raised by Canaris, but I must supplement that...

GEN. RUDENKO: You shared them? Very well. I shall now present you with the original copy of Canaris’ report, containing your decision.

Mr. President, I shall now present to the defendant the document containing his decision. This decision was not read into the record in court and I shall also present the text of his final decision to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the original?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I gave it to the defendant.

And now, Witness Keitel, will you please follow?

KEITEL: I know the document with the marginal notes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Listen to me and follow the text of the decision. This is Canaris’ document, which you consider a just one. The following are the contents of your decision:

“These objections arise from the military conception of
chivalrous warfare. We are dealing here with the destruction of
an ideology and, therefore, I approve such measures and I
sanction them.” Signed: “Keitel.”

Is this your resolution?

KEITEL: Yes, I wrote that after it had been submitted to the Führer for decision. I wrote it then.

GEN. RUDENKO: It is not written there that the Führer said so; it is said “I sanction them”—meaning Keitel.

KEITEL: And I state this on oath; and I said it even before I read it.

GEN. RUDENKO: This means that you acknowledge the decision. I will now draw your attention to another passage of this document. I draw your attention to Page 2. Please observe that the text of Canaris’ report mentions the following:

“The separation of civilians and prisoners of war who are
politically undesirable, and decisions to be made in regard to
their fate, is to be effected by task forces (Einsatzkommando)
belonging to the Security Police and the SD in accordance with
directives not known to the Wehrmacht establishments and whose
execution cannot be checked by the latter.”

Canaris writes this; your decision, Defendant Keitel, is written in the margin. It says, “Highly expedient.” Is that correct?

KEITEL: Please repeat the last question. The last words I heard were “Canaris writes.”

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and I am now mentioning the fact that your decision “Highly expedient” appears in the margin, opposite that paragraph, and written by your own hand. Have you found this?

KEITEL: Yes. The word “expedient” refers to the fact that the army offices had nothing to do with these Einsatzkommandos and knew nothing about them. It states that they are not known to the Wehrmacht.

GEN. RUDENKO: And furthermore it refers to the fact that the Security Police and the SD should wreak vengeance on civilians and prisoners of war? You consider that expedient?

KEITEL: No, I thought it expedient that the activities of these Kommandos be unknown to the Armed Forces. That is what I meant. That appears here and I underlined “unknown.”

GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you, Defendant Keitel, known as Field Marshal and one who, before this Tribunal, has repeatedly referred to yourself as a soldier, whether you, in your own blood-thirsty decision of September 1941, confirmed and sanctioned the murder of the unarmed soldiers whom you had captured? Is that right?

KEITEL: I signed both decrees and I, therefore, bear the responsibility within the sphere of my office; I assume the responsibility.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. In this connection I would like to ask you, since you have repeatedly mentioned it before the Tribunal, about the duty of a soldier. I want to ask you: Is it in accordance with the concept of a “soldier’s duty” and the “honor of an officer” to promulgate such orders for reprisals on prisoners of war and on peaceful citizens?

KEITEL: Yes, as far as the reprisals of August and September are concerned, in view of what happened to German prisoners of war whom we found in the field of battle, and in Lvov where we found them murdered by the hundreds.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, do you again wish to follow the path to which you resorted once before, and revive the question of the alleged butchery of German prisoners of war? You and I agreed yesterday that as far back as May 1941, prior to the beginning of the war, you had signed a directive on the shooting of political and military workers in the Red Army. I have some...

KEITEL: Yes, I also signed the orders before the war but they did not contain the word “murder.”

GEN. RUDENKO: I am not going to argue with you since this means arguing against documents; and documents speak for themselves.

I have a few last questions to ask you: You informed the Tribunal that the generals of the German Army were only blindly carrying out Hitler’s orders?

KEITEL: I have stated that I do not know if any generals raised objections or who they were, and I said that it did not happen in my presence when Hitler proclaimed the principles of the ideological war and ordered them to be put into practice.

GEN. RUDENKO: And do you know that the generals, on their own initiative, promulgated orders on atrocities and on the violation of the laws and customs of war, and that these orders were approved by Hitler?

KEITEL: I know that high authorities in the Army issued orders altering, modifying, and even cancelling in part; for instance, as regards jurisdiction, the March decree and other measures, because they also discussed it with me.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not understand me. I did not ask about modifications, but whether the generals, on their own initiative, ever promulgated orders inciting to the violation of the laws and customs of war.

KEITEL: I do not know of that. I do not know what order you are referring to, General. At the moment I cannot say that I know that.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall refer to one order only. What I have in mind is General Field Marshal Reichenau’s order governing the conduct of troops in the East.

This document, Mr. President, was presented by the Soviet Prosecution as Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number USSR-12). The passages to which I refer are underlined in this document, and I shall read into the record one quotation from this order governing the conduct of troops in the East:

“Feeding the inhabitants and prisoners of war...is...a mistaken
humanity...”

KEITEL: I know the order. It was shown to me during a preliminary interrogation.

GEN. RUDENKO: This order, issued on Reichenau’s initiative and approved by Hitler, was distributed as a model order among all the army commanders.

KEITEL: I did not know that; I heard about it here for the first time. To my knowledge I never saw the order either.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course you would, quite obviously, consider such orders as entirely insignificant. After all, could the fate of Soviet prisoners of war and of the civilian population be of any possible interest to the Chief of the OKW, since their lives were of no value whatsoever?

KEITEL: I had no contact with the commanders at the front and had no official connection with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was the only one who had.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing your cross-examination. When testifying before the Tribunal you very often referred, as did your accomplices, the Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, to the Treaty of Versailles, and I am asking you, were Vienna, Prague, Belgrade and the Crimea part of Germany before the Treaty of Versailles?

KEITEL: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: You stated here that in 1944, after the law had been amended, you received an offer to join the Nazi Party. You accepted this offer, presented your personal credentials to the leadership of the Party, and paid your membership fees. Tell us, did not your acceptance to join the membership of the Nazi Party signify that you were in agreement with the program, objectives, and methods of the Party?

KEITEL: As I had already been in possession of the Golden Party Badge for three or four years, I thought that this request for my personal particulars was only a formal registration; and I paid the required Party membership subscription. I did both these things and have admitted doing them.

GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, before this formal offer was ever made, you already, _de facto_, considered yourself a member of the Nazi Party?

KEITEL: I have always thought of myself as a soldier; not as a political soldier or politician.

GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not conclude, after all that has been said here, that you were a Hitler-General, not because duty called you but on account of your own convictions?

KEITEL: I have stated here that I was a loyal and obedient soldier of my Führer. And I do not think that there are generals in Russia who do not give Marshal Stalin implicit obedience.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have exhausted all my questions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember on the 2d of October 1945 writing a letter to Colonel Amen, explaining your position? It was after your interrogations, and in your own time you wrote a letter explaining your point of view. Do you remember that?

KEITEL: Yes, I think I did write a letter; but I no longer remember the contents. It referred to the interrogations, however.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

KEITEL: And I think it contained a request that I be given a further opportunity of thinking things over, as the questions put to me took me by surprise and I was often unable to remember the answers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of one passage and ask you whether it correctly expresses your view:

“In carrying out these thankless and difficult tasks, I had to
fulfill my duty under the hardest exigencies of war, often
acting against the inner voice of my conscience and against my
own convictions. The fulfillment of urgent tasks assigned by
Hitler, to whom I was directly responsible, demanded complete
self-abnegation.”

Do you remember that?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal, what were the worst matters in your view in which you often acted against the inner voice of your conscience? Just tell us some of the worst matters in which you acted against the inner voice of your conscience.

KEITEL: I found myself in such a situation quite frequently, but the decisive questions which conflicted most violently with my conscience and my convictions were those which were contrary to the training which I had undergone during my 37 years as an officer in the German Army. That was a blow at my most intimate personal principles.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted it to come from you, Defendant. Can you tell the Tribunal the three worst things you had to do which were against the inner voice of your conscience? What do you pick out as the three worst things you had to do?

KEITEL: Perhaps, to start with the last, the orders given for the conduct of the war in the East, insofar as they were contrary to the acknowledged usage of war; then something which particularly concerns the British Delegation, the question of the 50 R.A.F. officers, the question which weighed particularly heavy on my mind, that of the terror-fliers and, worst of all, the Nacht und Nebel Decree and the actual consequences it entailed at a later stage and about which I did not know. Those were the worst struggles which I had with myself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take the Nacht und Nebel.

My Lord, this document and a good many to which I shall refer are in the British Document Book Number 7, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, and it occurs on Page 279. It is L-90, Exhibit USA-503.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, I will give you the German document book. It is 279 of the British document book, and 289...

KEITEL: Number 731?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 289. I do not know which volume it is; Part 2, I think it is.

You see, the purpose of the decree is set out a few lines from the start, where they say that in all cases where the death penalty is not pronounced and not carried out within a week,

“...the accused are in the future to be deported to Germany
secretly, and further proceedings in connection with the
offenses will take place here. The deterrent effect of these
measures lies in: (a) the complete disappearance of the accused;

(b) the fact that no information may be given as to their
whereabouts or their fate.”

Both these purposes, you will agree, were extremely cruel and brutal, were they not?

KEITEL: I said both at the time and yesterday, that I personally thought that to deport individuals secretly was very much more cruel than to impose a sentence of death. I have...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn to Page 281—291 of yours—281 of the English Book?

KEITEL: Yes, I have it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that this is your covering letter:

“The Führer is of the opinion:”—Line 4—“In the case of
offenses such as these, punishment by imprisonment, or even
penal servitude for life, will be considered a sign of weakness.
Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved either
by capital punishment or by measures which keep the culprit’s
relatives and the population generally uncertain as to his
fate.”

You will agree that there again these sentences of the Führer which you are here transmitting were cruel and brutal, were they not?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I...

KEITEL: May I add something?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as shortly as you can.

KEITEL: I made a statement yesterday on this subject and I drew your attention particularly to the words: “It is the Führer’s long considered will,” which were intended to convey to the generals who were receiving these orders what was written between the lines.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, you know, Defendant, that that was by no means the end of this series of orders, was it? This order was unsuccessful despite its cruelty and brutality in achieving its purpose, was it not? This order, the Nacht und Nebel Order, in that form was unsuccessful in achieving its purpose; it did not stop what it was designed to stop? Is that right?

KEITEL: No, it did not cease.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in 1944 you had to make a still more severe order. Would you look at Document D-762? My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-298.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It says:

“The constant increase in acts of terror and sabotage in the
occupied territories, committed more and more by bands under
unified leadership, compels us to take the sternest
countermeasures in a degree corresponding to the ferocity of the
war which is forced upon us. Those who attack us from the rear
at the crisis of our fight for existence deserve no
consideration.

“I therefore order:

“All acts of violence committed by non-German civilians in the
occupied territories against the German Wehrmacht, the SS, or
the Police, or against installations used by them, are to be
combated in the following manner as acts of terrorism and
sabotage:”—(1)—“The troops,”—the SS and so on—“are to fight
down on the spot...all terrorists and saboteurs.”—(2)—“Those
who are apprehended later are to be handed over to the nearest
local Security Police and the SD office.”—(3)—“Accomplices,
especially women, who take no active part in the fighting, are
to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.”

Now, would you look at Paragraph II:

“The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive
instructions. He is entitled to make alterations and additions
as far as required by the exigencies of war operations.”

Did you think that was a cruel and severe order or not?

KEITEL: Yes, I do think so, but may I make one small correction? It must have been incorrectly translated. The actual wording is: “Women are to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” So it says in the original version which I have before me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “spared.” “Spared” meant that they were not to be treated thus. I was careful to mention that.

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had authority to make alterations and additions. Did you, by your alterations and additions, attempt to mitigate the severity of that order in any way?

KEITEL: I have no recollection of having issued any additional orders to mitigate its severity. I may also say that I never would have issued anything without first presenting it to the Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you did issue. Would you look at Document D-764, which will be Exhibit GB-299?

Now, that is your executive order, countersigned I think by the Senior Military Judge, putting forward your order based on that decree; and would you look at Paragraphs 4 and 5:

“All legal proceedings now going on in connection with acts of
terrorism, sabotage, or other crimes committed by non-German
civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the security
or readiness for action of the occupying power are to be
suspended. Indictments are to be dropped. Sentences already
pronounced are not to be carried out. The culprits are to be
handed over with a report on the proceedings to the nearest
local Security Police and SD office. In the case of death
sentences which have already become final, the regulations now
in force will continue to apply.

“Crimes affecting German interests but which do not imperil the
security or readiness for action of the occupying power do not
justify the retention of jurisdiction over non-German civilians
in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders of the
occupied territories to draw up new regulations in agreement
with the Higher SS and the Police Leader.”

And then you ask them to consider among the first, one handing them over to the SD for forced labor.

That was certainly not mitigation of the order, was it? You were not making it any easier.

KEITEL: There are a few sentences to be added here. This arose out of the daily discussion of these matters which I dealt with later on the same lines as the first decree. I made suitable annotations, and signed them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what you called terrorism and sabotage. Let us look at what happened to people who were guilty of something less than terrorism or sabotage. Look at Document D-763. That will be GB-300. “Non-German civilians...”

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Non-German civilians in the occupied
territories who endanger the security or tactical preparedness
of the occupying power otherwise than through acts of terrorism
and sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD. Section I, Number
3...”—that is the part that says women will be employed on
labor and children will be spared—“of the Führer’s order also
applies to them.”

Well, you knew perfectly well what would happen to anyone who was handed over to the SD, that he would probably be killed, certainly be put into a concentration camp, did you not?

KEITEL: I did not interpret it that way; the words “to be allocated on labor” were always used; but it has become clear to me from what I have learned that they frequently ended in the concentration camp. However, it was always described to us, to me, as a labor camp. That was the description, “labor camps of the Secret State Police.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But this is August 1944. You will agree that that is a most severe course to take with people who have been guilty of something less than terrorism or sabotage, do you not?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us...

KEITEL: I assume that you do not wish me to discuss this origin and development here. Otherwise I could explain them; but I will merely answer the question. The answer is, yes, it was a very severe measure. The explanation, if I may state it very briefly, is that, as is known, during the interminable daily situation reports on the incidents in all the occupied territories, I received from the Führer instructions and orders which were afterwards crystallized in a form similar to this document; and I think I have already described in detail the way in which I discussed these things with him and how I worked, that on principle I never issued or signed anything which did not agree in principle with his wishes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was severe enough for you for only 3 weeks, was it not, because on 4 September, which is barely 3 weeks later, you issued another order, Document D-766, Exhibit GB-301. Now, this was issued, as it shows, as an agreement with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the Reich Minister of Justice and Dr. Lammers. Now look at I:

“Non-German civilians in occupied territories who have been
sentenced by German courts for a criminal act against the
security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power, the
sentence having become final, and who are in custody in the
occupied territories or in the home front area, are to be handed
over, together with a report on the facts, to the nearest local
Security Police and SD office. An exception is made only in the
case of those sentenced to death for whom the execution of the
penalty has been ordered.

“II. Persons convicted of criminal acts against the Reich or the
occupying power and prohibited, in accordance with the
directives...issued by the Führer for the prosecution of such
acts, from intercourse with the outside world, are to be given a
distinguishing mark.”

Now, had you any idea how many people would be affected by that order?

KEITEL: No, I cannot say anything about that. I know only that it was made necessary by the increasing tension in the occupied territories, due to lack of troops to keep order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me remind you. You called a conference to consider this matter. That is shown in Document D-765, and I also show you D-767, the report of the conference. You need not worry about 765, which just says that there is to be a conference, but in Document D-767, which will be Exhibit GB-303, there is a report of the conference. The second paragraph says:

“The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“demands in his letter the
immediate surrender to the SD of approximately 24,000 non-German
civilians who are under arrest or held for interrogation.”—Now
listen to this: “No answer was given to the question raised
during the discussion as to why they must be surrendered to the
SD at the present moment, in spite of the considerable amount of
administrative work involved.”

Can you give any answer now as to why 24,000 people who had been sentenced should be transferred to the tender mercies of the SD?

KEITEL: May I read this note? I do not know it; may I read it now, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. You will see that I did not trouble you with it all, but it says what I had already put to you earlier, that the Nacht und Nebel Decree had become superfluous as a result of the terror and sabotage decree, and that the Wehrmacht Legal Department had presented these things for discussion.

Now, can you give us any answer as to why these 24,000 unfortunate persons who had been sentenced should be handed over to the tender mercies of the SD?

KEITEL: I must say that I am surprised by the whole incident. I did not attend the conference, and apparently I did not read the note since, as a matter of principle, I always marked every document which had been presented to me with my initials. I am not acquainted with the figures quoted; this is the first time I have seen them; I am not acquainted with them and I do not remember them, unless another order was...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will give you something which you have read.

KEITEL: As regards the facts about which you ask, I must answer in the affirmative. I do not know the figures, only the facts.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you cannot answer my question. You cannot give us any reason as to why the Wehrmacht and these other offices were sending the 24,000 people, who had been sentenced by ordinary courts, over to the SD? You cannot give us any reason for that?

KEITEL: No; I may say that up to a point I can. I think “SD” is a misinterpretation. I think police custody was meant. That does not mean the same thing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly not.

KEITEL: I do not know if it might have been the same thing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely you have been at this Trial too long to think that handing people over to the SD means police custody. It means a concentration camp and a gas chamber usually, does it not? That is what it meant in fact, whether you knew it or not.

KEITEL: I did not know it, but it obviously led to the concentration camp in the end. I consider it possible; in any case, I cannot say that it was not.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the last paragraph but one refers to the OKW.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I am just coming to that.

[_Turning to the defendant._] If you will notice that, Defendant, two paragraphs below the one I put to you it states:

“As the OKW is not particularly interested in trying the minor
matters still remaining for the military tribunals, they are to
be settled by decrees to be agreed upon by local authorities.”

It is quite clear that your office was deeply concerned in this business, was it not, Defendant?

KEITEL: I do not know exactly what it means, but it was obviously mentioned at that conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I put the next document, I want you to realize how we have been going. We started with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, which disappeared, and we went on to the Terror and Sabotage Decree. We then proceeded to acts which were less than terror and sabotage, but were criminal acts under the rules of the occupying power.

I now want you to consider what was done to people who simply refused to work. Would you look at Document D-769? That is Exhibit GB-304. That is a telegram from Luftwaffe General Christiansen, who was in the Netherlands, Commander of the Air Forces in the Netherlands, through his Chief of Staff.

Now listen to this:

“Owing to railway strike, all communications in Holland at
standstill. Railway personnel does not respond to appeals to
resume work. Demands for motor vehicles and other means of
transport for moving troops and maintaining supplies are no
longer obeyed by the civil population. According to the Führer’s
decree of 18 August 1944”—that is the Terror and Sabotage
Decree, which you have already had—“and the supplementary
executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW”—which we have
already seen—“troops may use weapons only against persons who
commit acts of violence as terrorists or saboteurs, whereas
persons who endanger the security or tactical preparedness of
the occupying power in any other way than by terrorism or acts
of sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD.”

Then General Christiansen comes in with this:

“This regulation has proved too complicated, and therefore
ineffective. Above all, we do not possess the necessary police
forces. The troops must again receive authority to shoot also,
with or without summary court-martial, persons who are not
terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree, but
who endanger the fighting forces by passive resistance. It is
requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as
the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively
against the population, which in its turn, appears to endanger
the conduct of operations.”

Now, Defendant, will you agree that shooting, with or even without trial, railway men who will not work, is about as brutal and cruel a measure as could well be imagined by the mind of man? Do you agree?

KEITEL: That is a cruel measure, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your answer to that cruel measure?

KEITEL: I cannot say. I do not recollect the incident at all, but perhaps the answer is there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at the Document D-770, which is, I think, your answer; it is Exhibit GB-305. You will notice on the distribution list that that goes to the Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands, and further to the signal which we have just been looking at. Now, you say:

“According to the Führer’s order of 30 July 1944, non-German
civilians in the occupied territories who attack us in the rear
in the crisis of our battle for existence deserve no
consideration. This must be our guiding principle in the
interpretation and application of the Führer’s decree itself and
the Chief of the OKW’s executive decree of 18 August 1944.

“If the military situation and the state of communications make
it impossible to hand them over to the SD, other effective
measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. There is,
naturally”—and I ask you to note the word “naturally”—“no
objection to passing and executing death sentences by summary
court-martial under such circumstances.”

I can not remember, Defendant, whether you have ever had an independent command yourself or not. Have you? Have you had an independent command, apart from your division? I think that was the last independent command you had. You have not had an independent command yourself, have you? Don’t I make myself clear?

KEITEL: I did not understand. What do you mean by “independent”?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I mean that you have not been a commander or chief of an army or army group yourself, if I remember rightly, or of an area, have you?

KEITEL: No, I have not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I ask you to put yourself in General Christiansen’s position. That answer of yours was a direct encouragement, practically amounting to an order, to shoot these railway men out of hand, was it not? “To take other effective measures ruthlessly and independently.”

KEITEL: That is explained by the form of summary court-martial. It is not left to the discretion of the individual; jurisdiction of summary court-martial was provided.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the way it is put, Defendant. I suggest to you that it is quite clear. One sentence states: “If handing over to the SD is impossible, owing to the military situation and the state of communications, other effective measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently.”

Then, the next sentence: “There are, naturally”—look at the word “naturally.” I suppose that it was “natürlich” in German. Is that correct?

KEITEL: I have not the word “natürlich” here. Two words, so far as I can make out, have been inserted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it says: “There are, naturally, no objections to passing and executing death sentences by summary court-martial procedure.” What you are saying is that, of course, there is no objection to a summary court, but you are telling him, in addition to that, that he is to take effective measures ruthlessly and independently. If General Christiansen had shot these railway men out of hand, after getting that letter from you, neither you nor any other superior could have blamed him for it, could you?

KEITEL: According to the last sentence, he was obliged to carry out summary court-martial procedure. It says: “There are no objections to the executing of this sentence by summary court-martial under such circumstances.” That is how I meant it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what did you mean by “effective measures to be taken ruthlessly and independently”? What did you mean by that, if it was only an ordinary summary court procedure?

KEITEL: Not apart from summary court procedure, but by means of the same. That is what the last sentence means. It is already unusual to appoint a summary court-martial in such cases.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, even on your basis, to use a military summary court to shoot railway men who will not work is going rather far even for you, is it not? It is going rather far, isn’t it?

KEITEL: That was a very severe measure, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that when you make all these additions, taking you through the chain of additions that you make to the order replacing the Nacht und Nebel Order, of which you disapproved, do you say that you went to Hitler for every one of these executive orders and answers that you made?

KEITEL: Yes. I went to him on the occasion of every one of these orders. I must emphasize the fact that I did not issue any of these orders without previously submitting it to the Führer. I must expressly point out that that was so.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think a misunderstanding has crept into the translation. The translation interprets “Standgericht” as summary court. I do not believe that the words “summary court” reflect accurately what we understand in the German language by “Standgericht.” I do not know just what you understand in the English or American language by “summary court,” but I can imagine that this means some summary procedure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was taking it in favor of the Defendant that it meant the court he referred to yesterday, one officer and two soldiers. I was taking that. If I am wrong, the Defendant will correct me. Is that right, Defendant?

KEITEL: I described this Standgericht (summary court-martial procedure) briefly yesterday, and the criterion of a summary court-martial was that it was not always necessary for a fully trained legal expert to be present, although it was desirable.

THE PRESIDENT: While you are on the subject of translation, the Defendant seemed to suggest that there was no word in the German which is translated by the English word “naturally.” Is that true?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had it checked and I am told that the translation is right.

THE PRESIDENT: There is a German word which is translated by “naturally”? I should like to know that from Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: I am told that a false conception or false judgment might be produced in this connection since in British and American law a summary court has no right to pass sentences of death. I am told that a summary court...

THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Nelte, I did not ask that question. The question I asked you was whether there was any German word which is translated into English by the word “naturally.” Is that not a clear question?

DR. NELTE: In the German text it says “under such circumstances, of course.” I think the English translation is incorrect in using the word “naturally” and in putting it after “in these circumstances” instead of at the beginning, so that one is led to conclude that it means, “there are naturally no objections (es gibt natürlich keine Einwendungen),” whereas the German text says, “Against the passing and executing of death sentences by summary court procedure there are—under such circumstances, of course—no objections (Gegen die Verhängung und Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen im standgerichtlichen Verfahren bestehen unter solchen Verhältnissen selbstverständlich keine Bedenken).”

THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer to my question is “yes.” There is a word in the German which is translated “naturally.”

DR. NELTE: Yes, but the words “naturally” and “under such circumstances” are separated in the English version, while in the German version they belong together. “Naturally” refers to “under such circumstances.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to come to another point. You told us yesterday that with regard to forced labor you were concerned in it because there was a shortage of manpower and you had to take men out of industry for the Wehrmacht. Your office was concerned with using military forces in order to try and round-up people for forced labor, was it not?

KEITEL: I do not think that is quite the correct conception. The Replacement Office in the High Command of the Wehrmacht...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are going to deny it, I put the document to you. I put General Warlimont’s views to you and see if you agree. I think it saves time in the end. If you look at Document 3819-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-306, Page 9 of the English version. It is the report of a meeting at Berlin on 12 July 1944. You have to look on through the document after the letters from the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant Speer, the account of a meeting in Berlin. I think it is Page 10 of the German version. It starts with a speech by Dr. Lammers and goes on with a speech from the Defendant Sauckel, then a speech from the witness Von Steengracht, then a speech from General Warlimont: “The Deputy of the head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer order.” Have you found the portion? I will read it if you have.

KEITEL: Yes, I have found the paragraph “The Representative of the Chief of the OKW...”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The Representative of the Chief of the
OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer
order, according to which all German forces had to participate
in the task of raising manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was
stationed, if it was not employed exclusively in pressing
military duties (as, for example, in the construction of coastal
defenses), it would be available, but it could not be assigned
expressly for the purpose of the GBA. General Warlimont made the
following practical suggestions:

“a) The troops employed in fighting the partisans are to take
over, in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan
areas. Everyone who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his
presence in these areas is to be recruited by force.

“b) When large cities are wholly or partly evacuated on account
of the difficulty of providing food, those members of the
population suitable for labor are to be utilized for labor with
the assistance of the Wehrmacht.

“c) The refugees from the areas near the front should be rounded
up with special vigor with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.”

After reading this report of General Warlimont’s words, do you still say that the Wehrmacht...

KEITEL: I am not aware that the Armed Forces have ever received an order mentioning the rounding-up of workers. I would like to say that I know of no such demand and I have not found any confirmation of it. The conference as such is unknown to me and so are the proposals you mentioned. It is new as far as I am concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear that General Warlimont is suggesting that the Wehrmacht should help in the rounding-up of forced labor, isn’t it?

KEITEL: But as far as I know it has never happened. I do not know that such an order was given. According to the record, this is a proposal made by General Warlimont, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps in those circumstances you should read the three lines after the passage you have read.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should. The next line:

“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and
expressed the expectation that a certain amount of success could
be achieved by this means.”

KEITEL: May I say something about that? May I ask that Gauleiter Sauckel be asked at a given time whether and to what extent troops of the Armed Forces did actually participate in such matters. It is not known to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No doubt the Defendant Sauckel will be asked a number of questions in due time. At the moment I am asking you. You say that you do not know anything about it?

KEITEL: No, I do not recollect that any order was given in this connection. I gather from the statement by Warlimont that discussions took place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to ask you a few questions about the murder of various prisoners of war. I want to get it quite clear. Did you mean yesterday to justify the order for the shooting of Commandos, dated 18 October 1942? Did you wish to say that it was right and justified, or not?

KEITEL: I stated yesterday that neither General Jodl nor I thought that we were in a position, or considered it possible, to draft or submit such a written order. We did not do it because we could not justify it or give reasons for it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next question that I put to you is this: Did you approve and think right the order that was made that Commandos should be shot?

KEITEL: I no longer opposed it, firstly on account of the punishment threatened, and secondly because I could no longer alter the order without personal orders from Hitler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that that order was right?

KEITEL: According to my inner convictions I did not consider it right, but after it had been given I did not oppose it or take a stand against it in any way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that your orders had contained provisions for the use of parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes, don’t you? Your own orders have contained that provision of parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes. Don’t you remember in the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia? I would put it to you if you like, but I would so much prefer that you try to remember it yourself. Don’t you remember that your own orders contained a provision for parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes in Czechoslovakia?

KEITEL: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You don’t?

KEITEL: No, I do not remember the order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I refer you to it. My Lord, it is Page 21 and 22 of the document book.

KEITEL: Which document book, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It ought to be your first document book, and quite early on. It is part of the Fall Grün, which is Document 388-PS, and it is Item 11. I think it is somewhere about Page 15 or 16 or 20. You remember the Schmundt minutes and then it is divided into items.

The Tribunal will find it at the foot of Page 21:

[_Turning to the defendant._]

“For the success of this operation, co-operation with the
Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the
Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops, and
with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.”

KEITEL: May I read the paragraph that I think you mean?

SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; it is headed “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces...”

KEITEL: “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.” It states:

“For success, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier
population and the deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with
parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage
service can be of importance.”

These parachutists and airborne troops were in fact to be set to work on frontier fortifications, as I explained yesterday, since army authorities believed that the artillery resources at our command were insufficient to permit our combating them with artillery.

This does not mean parachutists or saboteurs, but actual members of the German Air Force, and the sabotage service is mentioned at the end.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sabotage service must be people who are going to do sabotage if they are going to be of any use, must they not? They do sabotage, don’t they?

KEITEL: Undoubtedly; but not by means of airborne troops and parachutists, but through saboteurs in the frontier areas who offer their services for this kind of work. Yes, that is what they are thinking of. We had many such people in the Sudeten region.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you, but I want to have it clear. I now want to come to the way in which this order of the Führer was announced. You will find the order—the Tribunal will find it on Page 64—but what I want him to look at if he would be so kind, is Page 66 of the book, Page 25, Defendant, of your book. The second sentence of the Defendant Jodl’s “To the Commanders” about this order. That is on Page 25, and Defendant Jodl says: “This order is for the commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.” Was that because you and the Defendant Jodl were ashamed of the order, that you had this secrecy provision put on it?

KEITEL: I have not found it yet, and I would like to know the connection. Page 25 is a teletype letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, dated 19 October. Now have you got it, the second sentence?

KEITEL: Dated 18 October 1942?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 19 October, issuing order of the 18th. “This order is for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.” Was that because you were ashamed of the order, that it was put like that?

KEITEL: I have not seen the letter and I think General Jodl should be asked about it. I do not know the contents, but I have already stated the opinion of both of us. I cannot give you the reason.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t give me the reason for this secrecy?

KEITEL: I do not know the motives behind it and I would ask you to put this question to General Jodl. I have not seen it. But I have already stated my own views and those of General Jodl.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want you to look at the way that even Hitler expresses it with regard to this. If you look—I guess it is Page 31 in our book. It is a report from Hitler wherein he says:

“The report which should appear on this subject in the Armed
Forces communiqué will state briefly and laconically that a
sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.” (Document Number 503-PS)

You were doing your best—and when I say “you,” I mean you collectively, Hitler, yourself, and Jodl and everyone else concerned. You were doing your best to keep quiet about this, about anything being known about this order, weren’t you?

KEITEL: That was not my impression; on the contrary, in every case we subsequently published the facts in the Wehrmacht orders, the Wehrmacht report. It is my recollection, namely, that in the Wehrmacht report we stated that such and such an incident had occurred, followed by such and such consequences. That is my recollection.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am now only going to ask you to look at one document further on, because in that regard, you remember, after the Soviet Union tried certain people at Kharkov, when you were trying to get up some counterpropaganda—now, look at this document, about these executions, it is Page 308, Document UK-57. You have got a copy of it. I am going to ask you about only two incidents. You see it is a memorandum and the passage that I want you to look at is Number 2, the fourth memorandum, Paragraph 2, which is headed “Attempted Attacks on the Battleship _Tirpitz_.” Do you see that?

KEITEL: Just one moment, I have not found it yet. Battleship _Tirpitz_, oh, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got it? Just listen, now:

“At the end of October 1942 a British Commando that had come to
Norway in a cutter, had orders to carry out an attack on the
Battleship _Tirpitz_ in Drontheim Fjord, by means of a two-man
torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes, which were
attached to the cutter, were lost in the stormy sea. From among
the crew, consisting of six Englishmen and four Norwegians, a
party of three Englishmen and two Norwegians were challenged on
the Swedish border; however, only the British seaman in civilian
clothes, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 January 1922, in London,
could be arrested and the others escaped into Sweden.

“Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession, such as are used to
carry weapons under the armpit, and also a knuckle duster.”

And now the next page:

“Violence representing a breach of international law could not
be proved.”

Did incidents such as that, under this order, come to your attention?

KEITEL: I do not remember the actual incident, but I can see that it has been reported by the department.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now you have told us that you have been a soldier for 41 years; that emphasizes your military position. What, in the name of all military tradition, has that boy done wrong by coming from a two-man torpedo to make an attack on a battleship; what had he done wrong?

KEITEL: No, this is an attack against a weapon of war, if carried out by soldiers in their capacity of members of the armed forces, it is an attack made with the object of eliminating a battleship by means of sabotage.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But why, why should you not if you were prepared to go on a two-man torpedo for an attack against a battleship, what is wrong with a sailor doing that? I want to understand what is in your mind. What do you, as a man who has been a soldier for 40 years, what do you see wrong for a man doing that, towing out a torpedo against a battleship? Tell us. I cannot understand what is wrong.

KEITEL: This is no more wrong than an attack with an aerial bomb if it is successful. I recognize that it is right, that it is a perfectly permissible attack.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you did not see that incident I will not go through putting the others in, as they are all just the same, men in uniform coming up to the Gironde to attack German ships.

What I want to understand is this. You were a Field Marshal, standing in the boots of Blücher, Gneisenau, and Moltke. How did you tolerate all these young men being murdered, one after the other without making any protests?

KEITEL: I have stated here in detail my reasons for not making any further resistance or objection; and I cannot alter any statement now. I know that these incidents occurred and I know the consequences.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Field Marshal, I want you to understand this. As far as I know, in the German military code, as in every military code, there is no obligation on the part of a soldier to obey an order which he knows is wrong, which he knows is contrary to the laws of war and law. It is the same in your army, and our army, and I think in every army, isn’t that so?

KEITEL: I did not personally carry out the orders of 18 October 1942. I was not present either at the mouth of the Gironde or at the attack on the battleship _Tirpitz_. I knew only that the order was issued, together with all the threats of punishment which made it so difficult for the commanders to alter or deviate from the order on their own initiative. You, Sir David, asked me yourself whether I considered this order to be right or to serve any useful purpose and I have given you a definite answer: that I could not have prevented the action taken at the mouth of the Gironde or in the case of _Tirpitz_ if I had wanted to.