Chapter IV: Front Matter (4)

COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you making this speech in Madison Square Garden?

STRÖLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly before been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. I was Lord Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver the address. Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since the Swabians furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason Stuttgart was to be the home city of foreign Germans.

COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the German-American Bund? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many members of the Institute were also members of the German-American Bund? Yes or no.

STRÖLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; they were students who had studied in America and returned to Germany.

COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these members of the German-American Bund, who were likewise members of the Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were indicted and tried and convicted for various espionage offenses in the Federal courts of the United States? Yes or no.

STRÖLIN: No, I know nothing about that.

COL. AMEN: You never heard that?

STRÖLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of Kappe, but that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut.

COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you know some others too, don’t you?

STRÖLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars.

COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather than trying to tell you the answers.

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please question me.

COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it is getting late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger—W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r?

STRÖLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred...

COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you pronounce it.

STRÖLIN: Weninger—yes I am familiar with that name.

COL. AMEN: Who is he?

STRÖLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in France. I believe he is a jurist.

COL. AMEN: Well, don’t you know? Don’t you know whether he is a jurist or not?

STRÖLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist.

COL. AMEN: What is his nationality?

STRÖLIN: He is a Frenchman.

COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one occasion?

STRÖLIN: I provided for his release from prison.

COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943?

STRÖLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean the Alfred Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped during the war so that he was not sentenced to death, and was later released from prison. However, that took place during the period from 1942 to 1944. I do not know another Alfred Weninger. There may be two Alfred Weningers.

COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with 12 other comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy.

STRÖLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped.

COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General at the People’s Court?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler.

COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and Justice in Berlin?

STRÖLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to have the Alsatians pardoned.

COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people received temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked Herr Von Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he wrote to Hitler that these Alsatians were pardoned.

COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under a considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I imagine so.

COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not?

STRÖLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know if the people are grateful for it or not.

COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question the truth of what he might report as a conversation with you, correct?

STRÖLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him in June of 1940?

STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me what it was about.

COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by him to have said and I ask you whether you recall having said that to him, either in the exact words which I put to you, or in substance. Do you understand?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand.

COL. AMEN: Here are the words: “I warn you against National
Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which
makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have
but the one wish—to get out of it.”

Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? “Yes” or “no”?

STRÖLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will you please repeat it?

COL. AMEN: You understand English, don’t you, Witness?

STRÖLIN: Some. I understand just a little.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in English by one of our interrogators, were you not?

STRÖLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but I believe that he did not understand me correctly.

COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just read to you, did you not?

STRÖLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation of what you said and the substance of your question is not clear to me.

COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest that you are merely taking this time in order to find out what answer you want to make. I ask you again whether you said to Weninger in words or in substance, in June of 1940, the following:

“I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil
before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They
are criminals and I have but the one wish—to get out of it.”

Do you understand?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made that statement.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when I tell you that Weninger so states—Weninger, whom you have just told us has every obligation to you?

STRÖLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made critical statements, but I do not recall the wording.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer yes or no.

STRÖLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in this form.

COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that statement?

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having made another statement to Weninger in 1936 in Strasbourg—were you in Strasbourg with Weninger in 1936?

STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot recall.

COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?

STRÖLIN: I cannot recall.

COL. AMEN: It is quite possible?

STRÖLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at a moment’s notice recall the date I was there.

COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg in 1936, in words or in substance, the following: “When I am abroad I am ashamed to be a German”? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, since in the year of 1936 I was very proud of the fact that I was a German.

COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement to Weninger?

STRÖLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement in the year 1936.

COL. AMEN: When did you make it?

STRÖLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to Weninger at all, at least not in 1936.

COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger or anybody else? In what year did you decide to make statements like that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all.

COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?

STRÖLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one was no longer proud of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [_The witness left the stand._]

Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any other evidence to offer?

DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the questionnaire of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the meantime. The Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form of a questionnaire. I would then like to refer to various documents in Document Book Number 3, but before going into that and to conclude today’s proceedings, I would like to establish upon the request of the Defendant Hess—this refers to Volume 2 of the document book—that Lord Simon came to the meeting as the official representative of the British Government; I therefore read a few sentences from Page 93 (Volume II, Page 93):

“Lord Simon said: ‘Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you
had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished
to speak of it to someone who would be able to receive it with
Government authority. You know I am Dr. Guthrie and therefore I
come with the authority of the Government and I shall be willing
to listen and to discuss with you as far as seems good anything
you would wish to state for the information of the Government.’”

That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading of the Simon minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we went on for a few minutes or not?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are rather long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that the Prosecution also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination and I do not believe this would be possible today.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-FIRST DAY
Tuesday, 26 March 1946

_Morning Session_

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, Defendant Streicher will be absent from this session of the Court.

PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, I now turn to the reading of the interrogation of the witness Alfred Hess.

THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I received this transcript of the interrogation of the witness only last Saturday, and it has thus not been possible for me to incorporate it into the document book as yet. This witness was interrogated at Bad Mergentheim on 19 March.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that we haven’t got copies of it?

DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the General Secretary, from whom I received this transcript, has supplied a copy for the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better go on then. Go on.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. Before answering the first question, the witness made a few preliminary remarks which are as follows:

“It should be noted that I had to terminate my activity in the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP after the flight to England
of my brother Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer. Therefore, the
following statements are valid only for the period up to 12 May
1941.

“Question 1: ‘What were the tasks and the purpose of the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP?’

“Answer: ‘The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was the
cultural, social, and economic care of all German nationals in
foreign countries, regardless of whether they were Party members
or not. The Auslands-Organisation in this sense was to be a
bridge between Germans abroad and the home country. Its purpose
was to foster and maintain love for and ties with the distant
home country and to keep alive understanding for the fatherland,
as well as to awaken the understanding of Germans at home for
the hard battle for existence of their compatriots all over the
world. The German abroad, through his dignified, upright
bearing, was to make himself popular in the country of his
adoption, and thus act as the best representative of his
fatherland.’

“Question 2: ‘Who could become a member of the
Auslands-Organisation?’

“Answer: ‘The question is not understandable. There was no such
thing as a membership in the Auslands-Organisation; just as
little, for example, as there was a membership in the Foreign
Office of the Reich or in a Gau of the NSDAP in the Reich.’

“Question 3: ‘Is it correct that on the membership card of each
Reich German Party member the following principle was printed as
a ruling principle of the Auslands-Organisation: “Follow the
laws of the country whose guest you are, let its people make the
internal policy of that country, do not interfere in this, not
even in conversation”?’

“Answer: ‘It is correct that the above principle, among similar
ones, was printed on the membership card or on its cover. If I
am not mistaken, underneath this principle there was the warning
even of expulsion from the NSDAP if this principle was not
observed. This latter is to be ascertained without great
difficulty by procuring a cover, which was in the possession of
every Party member in a foreign country.’

“Question 4: ‘Did the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP develop
any activity which could appear as Fifth Column?’

“Answer: ‘“Fifth Column” is not a clear concept, uniformly used.
In general, it would probably mean secret espionage or sabotage
activity. According to its guiding principles, the
Auslands-Organisation could not have carried on any such
activity.’

“‘I remember that the slogan “Fifth Column” of the foreign press
was considered in the Auslands-Organisation as a clever bluff of
the antifascist propaganda, and it caused genuine amusement.
Seriously, no state could conceive that such a widely known,
rather suspect and vulnerable organization could be suited for
any service in the nature of the Fifth Column. I consider it
natural that some individual Germans abroad had secret missions,
services such as other nationals performed likewise for their
fatherland, but the Auslands-Organisation was certainly not the
giver of such assignments nor the intermediary for such agents.’

“Question 5: ‘What kind of instructions and directives did the
Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation for its
activity?’

“Answer: ‘The instructions and directives of the Deputy of the
Führer for the activity of the Auslands-Organisation are such as
those mentioned in my answers to Questions 1 and 3. He pointed
out again and again, with special emphasis, his strict
instructions that the groups abroad were not to do anything
which could be detrimental to the countries affording them
hospitality, or which could be considered an interference in the
affairs of those countries. The basic principle must also be
that National Socialism was a purely German movement, not an
article for export which one wanted to force on other countries
as suitable for them.’

“Question 6: ‘Did the Deputy of the Führer give the
Auslands-Organisation any directions or orders which could have
caused them to carry on an activity similar to that of the Fifth
Column?’

“Answer: ‘The Deputy of the Führer not only never issued any
such directions or orders, but as stated above in Answer 5, laid
down principles which absolutely prohibited any activity of the
sort carried on by the so-called Fifth Column.’

“Question 7: ‘Is it correct that, on the contrary, the Deputy of
the Führer took meticulous care that in all circumstances
interference in the internal affairs of the country of adoption
was to be avoided?’

“Answer: ‘I can repeat only that it was a chief concern of the
Deputy of the Führer to direct the work of the
Auslands-Organisation abroad in such a way that no interference
of any kind should take place in the internal affairs of the
country of residence. The few insignificant offenses, which were
unavoidable with the then very large number of German nationals
abroad—already amounting to several million—were
correspondingly severely punished.’

“Question 8: ‘What were the tasks and the aims of the Volksbund
für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League for Germans Abroad)?’

“Answer: ‘The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland had the
cultural care of the so-called Volksdeutsche. Volksdeutsche are
racial Germans who had lost their German citizenship either
voluntarily or through the laws of other countries, that is, had
acquired the citizenship of another country, for instance,
America, Hungary, Transylvania, _et cetera_.’

“Question 9: ‘Did the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland
ever, in particular however before 10 May 1941, develop any
activity which could have given it the appearance of a Fifth
Column?’

“Answer: ‘I must state in this connection that the activity of
the Auslands-Organisation did not have anything to do with the
Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, so I can have no
insight into its work. But I consider it entirely out of the
question that my brother could have given the Volksbund tasks of
a Fifth Column nature. It would neither have fallen within the
jurisdiction of the Deputy of the Führer, nor have corresponded
with his views as to the mission of the Volksbund für das
Deutschtum im Ausland.’

“Question 10, and last question: ‘What kind of directions and
instructions did the Deputy of the Führer give as to the
activity of this Bund?’

“Answer: ‘Directions, _et cetera_, which my brother gave as to
the activity of this Bund are unknown to me, for, as already
stated, my activity in the Auslands-Organisation was in no way
connected with the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im
Ausland.’”—Signed—“Alfred Hess. Sworn to and subscribed on 19
March 1946.”

The witness Alfred Hess was then cross-examined in connection with his interrogation. I assume that the Prosecution want to submit this cross-examination themselves to the Tribunal. But if this cross-examination and the questions belonging to it have not yet been translated, it might perhaps be practicable if it were done directly, in this connection.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If it please the Tribunal, we have received the cross-interrogatories but I suggest respectfully that, rather than take the time to read them, we offer them and if the Court will permit us, have them translated into the four languages. It will take another 10 minutes or so to read them and we are not interested in doing it unless the Tribunal feels that we should.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Mr. Dodd.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I do not know whether the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus submitted by me yesterday has been translated and whether the Tribunal has received these translations already. Yesterday at midday I gave six copies to the information office and have heard nothing further since.

THE PRESIDENT: Can the Prosecution inform the Tribunal what the position is?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has not had a copy of this affidavit yet so we do not know what is in it. We suggest that perhaps Dr. Seidl could postpone the reading of that until we have had a chance to consider it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am afraid that must be postponed.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. Now I turn to Volume 3 of the document book.

If it please the Tribunal, this volume of the document book contains, in substance, statements and quotations taken from books and speeches of foreign statesmen, diplomats, and political economists, regarding the history and origin of the Versailles Treaty, the contents of the Versailles Treaty, the territorial changes made by this treaty, such as the question of the Polish Corridor, and above all the disastrous economic consequences which this treaty had for Germany and also for the rest of the world.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have read the documents in this book and I should like just to say one or two words about them.

They are opinions expressed by a great variety of gentlemen, including politicians, economists, and journalists. They are opinions that are expressed polemically and some of them journalistically, and with most of them one is familiar and knew them when they were expressed 15 to 25 years ago.

Now, while I submit, as I have submitted to the Tribunal, that the whole subject is too remote, I have a suggestion which I hope the Tribunal will consider reasonable, that the Prosecution should, as I suggested yesterday, let this book go in at the moment _de bene esse_ and that when Dr. Seidl comes to making his final speech he can adopt the arguments that are put forward by the various gentlemen whom he quotes, if he thinks they are right. He can use the points as illustrations, always provided the thesis that he is developing is one which the Tribunal thinks relevant to the issues before it. That will preserve for Dr. Seidl the advantage of the right to use these documents subject, as I say, to the relevancy of the issues, but I suggest that it would be quite wrong to read them as evidence at the moment. They are merely polemical and journalistic opinions and directed to an issue which the Prosecution has submitted, and I do submit, is too remote.

However, I am most anxious that Dr. Seidl should have every advantage for his final speech. Therefore, I suggest it would be convenient if they were put in without being read at the moment and were left subject to the limitation of relevancy, which can be considered when all the evidence is before the Tribunal, for him to make use of in his final speech.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I shortly...

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Seidl. We will hear you in a moment—perhaps it would be better to hear what you have to say now. Do you think the suggestion made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe would be one which would be acceptable to you?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, at first glance the suggestion of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe seems to be very reasonable. But I believe I must say that if the matter is treated in that way great difficulties will arise for the Defense. For example the arguments on relevancy, which in their nature belong in the presentation of evidence and must be heard there, will be postponed until the final speech of the Defense. This would mean that the defense counsel in his final speech would be interrupted again and again; that he would have to argue for the relevancy of his quotations; that perhaps whole parts of his speech would fall by the wayside in that manner; and that in that way the danger would arise that the cohesion of the speech will be broken completely.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is a danger which every advocate has to meet, that certain portions of his speech may not be deemed relevant, but I thought that that might be a helpful way out. But if it is not accepted, then the Prosecution must respectfully but very strongly submit that the issues of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles are not relevant to this Tribunal.

I have already argued that and I do not want to develop it at great length. I do want to make it clear that the questions which are raised by the quotations here were, of course, the subject of political controversy in practically every country in Europe, and different opinions were expressed as to the rightness and the practicality of the provisions, especially the economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. I am not disputing that that is a matter of controversy, but I am saying that it is not a controversy that should come before this Tribunal. I myself have replied to practically all the quotations from the English statesmen here as a politician over the past years, and I am sure many people in this Court must have taken one view or the other, but that is not a relevant issue to this Tribunal, and, of course, especially is it wrong in my view to put forward as evidential matter opinions expressed by one side in the controversy. Every one of these speeches, as far as they were English, was either preceded by matters to which it was a reply or was followed by a reply, and I should think the same applies to those of Senator Borah in the United States.

These matters—this is my second point—are not really evidential, and this is a point for argument; and it will have to be decided what is a convenient time for the Tribunal to decide on whether this is a relevant issue. But that was why I put forward this suggestion that it was better to decide it when the whole of the true evidence of fact had been put before the Tribunal. But I do want, apart from my suggestion, to make quite clear that as regards relevance, the Prosecution unitedly submit that the rightness or practicality of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles is not a relevant matter. The other argument—I want to distinguish between the two—the other argument has been adumbrated by Dr. Stahmer as to the actual terms of the preamble to the military clauses. That is quite a different point which we can discuss when, as I understand, certain propositions of law are to be put forward by one of the defense counsel on behalf of the Defense. But, as I say, the rightness and practicality of the Treaty and especially the economic clauses is a subject of enormous controversy on which there are literally thousands of different opinions from one shade to the other, and I submit it is not an issue before this Court, and, secondly, I submit this is not evidence. It is not evidential matter, even if it were an issue.

DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps reply briefly?

THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, your proposition would be that Dr. Seidl could not quote from any of these documents?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, certainly, yes, on my premise that it is irrelevant matter, he could not.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are not admissible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My original suggestion was of course, leaving over the discussion of whether they are admissible until all the evidence had been filed, but if that is not accepted, I submit bluntly if I may use the word with all respect—that they are not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: May I reply briefly, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

DR. SEIDL: It would indicate a complete misinterpretation of my intentions if one were to assume that by the submission of this document book I wanted to show whether or not the Treaty of Versailles is an expression of statesmanly wisdom. I am not concerned with that here.

With the submission of this document it is to be shown, or rather there is to be brought under discussion:

Firstly: Whether the opposite side at the conclusion of the Treaty, in the preliminary negotiations—I call your attention to Wilson’s Fourteen Points—was not guilty for its part, of violation of the general treaty obligations, whether a _culpa in contrahendo_ is not to be assumed here.

Secondly: The presentation of the documents should show whether the opposite side complied with the obligations arising from the treaty, in order to establish—that is, to give the Tribunal the opportunity of establishing—in this way the legal inferences which Germany might draw from this.

Thirdly: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation by the defendants forms the nucleus of Count One of the Indictment, namely, the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution, in replying to a question of the Tribunal as to when the conspiracy may be said to have started, has said that the date might be set as far back as 1921.

Fourthly: The Prosecution has extensive...

THE PRESIDENT: I have not the least idea what you meant by the last point. I do not understand what you said in the last point in the least.

DR. SEIDL: I wanted to say that for the beginning of the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution, the Treaty of Versailles played a decisive part, and that there is at least some causal nexus between the origin of this treaty and the alleged Conspiracy. Before there can be talk of illegality and of guilt, the facts have to be established which were causative for the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution.

Fourthly: The Prosecution has submitted extensive evidence on the development of the NSDAP. Numerous document books were submitted to the Court to show the growth in membership, to demonstrate the increase in the Reichstag mandates. Now, if this evidence was relevant, it is my assertion that also the circumstances and the facts that first enabled this rise of the Party at all must be relevant, if only from the viewpoint of causal nexus.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it your contention that the opinion of a journalist after the Treaty of Versailles was made, stating that, in his opinion, the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to Germany, would be admissible either for the interpretation of the Treaty or for any other purpose with which this Tribunal is concerned?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I admit that of course the isolated opinion of a foreign journalist has not in itself to be a relevant document. But I do maintain that the opinion of Secretary of State Lansing on the coming about of the Treaty of Versailles and his connection with the history of this treaty must be of some evidential relevance. What weight attaches to his opinion is a question which cannot yet be established at this point. This question can be decided by the Tribunal only when the complete evidence has been submitted. I maintain further that the opinion of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate of the United States on the Treaty of Versailles, about its formulation, about its effects within the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution which purportedly is said to be directed chiefly against the Treaty of Versailles can _prima facie_ have value as evidence. The same applies to most of the other statements quoted in this document book. I would like to call attention to Gustav Cassel, to John Maynard Keynes, the official financial advisor of the British Government, and to a number of others.

THE PRESIDENT: It is your contention that because of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty or because of an infraction of those provisions by the signatory powers, Germany was justified in making an aggressive war?

DR. SEIDL: I cannot answer that now definitely, so long as I have not heard the evidence of the other defendants. I do assert, however, that by violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the opposite side, under certain circumstances Germany or the defendants could infer the right to rearm, and that is an infraction of the Treaty of Versailles with which the defendants are charged. As far as the right to an aggressive war is concerned, I should not like to make any positive statements at least until such time as the Tribunal has taken official notice of the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.

THE PRESIDENT: One more question I should like to ask you: Are you saying that the Fourteen Points which were laid down by President Wilson are admissible evidence to construe the written document of the Versailles Treaty?

DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, _per se_, are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that the connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of causal significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles Treaty, insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an unjust treaty?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is a point which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. Whether the treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which perhaps is beyond the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, however, that the treaty, at least in many of its terms, did not bring that which the victorious states themselves expected of it.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: Not at this point.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a very fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion by Sir David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the possibility that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision on the question of whether and how far such documentary material as that discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to add to the statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I agree fully, just a few supplementary words. And I would like to reply to the very precise question of Your Lordship which starts, “Do you consider it relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any repetition—that a very vital point as far as relevancy is concerned has not been brought out yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that is the relevancy of the investigation of evidence and of facts regarding the subjective state of the individual defendant, that is, of the facts as seen from within.

If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which was, considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles, then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it from the subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the opinion of reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted with an attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his special viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various nations and also of those nations which fought against Germany in the years 1914-18. In order not to be too abstract, I should like to cite a concrete example:

A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not to aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers rearmament justified, either because the treaty has not been kept by the other side or because owing to _expressis verbis_, or to some action, it is to be considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive relevancy whether this defendant with this point of view, which explains his action, is alone in all the world, or whether the opinion which guides his action is held by men who are to be taken seriously, and who belonged to other nations, even to those who in the years 1914-18 stood on the other side and were his enemies.

Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is not a crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a charge for the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive war. If, now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean and decent views, views which, as stated, were held by such men of other nations as I have described, and acted conscientiously and with a clear conscience both as regards international law and international morals and also as regards the needs of his country, then this material, which contains opinions, literary statements, speeches, that coincide with the views of the defendant in question, is not only of relevant, but of entirely decisive significance. This viewpoint I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it desires to decide now the question of principle which Sir David has just now raised for debate, and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize. Moreover I am also now in the agreeable position of being able to agree with Sir David in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am speaking now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as I am concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is right in seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal decides this question at that time, since it will then have a much larger view on all questions and shades which are important for the decision. And at this point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively about them, for I do not want to make any summarizing speech, but just to treat one aspect of this question of evidence.

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): I should like to add a few remarks to those made by my colleague Dr. Dix. I request the Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how many of the Defense Counsel think that they are entitled to address them. If Dr. Horn wishes to add a short argument, the Tribunal are prepared to hear it, but they are not prepared to hear all the defendants’ counsel upon points such as this, at this stage, and if any of the other defendants’ counsel desires to address them, they will decide now whether they will hear any more or not.

It is understood, then, that Dr. Horn alone will address a short argument to the Tribunal. If it is not, then the Tribunal will decide whether they will hear any more argument upon the subject.

DR. HORN: I cannot encroach on the rights of my colleagues in this question, naturally, Mr. President. I should like personally to make only a very brief statement on the legal points.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must consult your colleagues then.

DR. HORN: If you wish a decision on this question now, Mr. President, I must ask my colleagues beforehand, of course.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]

DR. HORN: May I make first a preliminary remark, Mr. President, to what has just been said to me by my colleagues. Firstly, this decision has for the Counsel for the organizations a very particular interest.

For myself personally I would like to make the following remarks: The Prosecution...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I asked you to consult the other defendants’ counsel and ascertain whether they were willing that you should be heard, and you alone. That is the only terms upon which I am prepared to hear you.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, my colleagues are agreed that I shall make the last statements on this point.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment—very well. Go on.

DR. HORN: There is no doubt that the Prosecution, as far as vital questions are concerned, base their case on infractions of the Versailles Treaty. To these treaty infractions, it is absolutely necessary, in my opinion, to submit the facts which allow the legality of this treaty to be judged. There is no doubt that this treaty was signed under duress. It is recognized in international law that such treaties from the legal point of view have grave deficiencies and are infamous. In my opinion we must be allowed to submit the facts that serve to show the soundness of this assertion and legal viewpoint. A further question—and if I have understood correctly, this is Sir David’s point—is that of the polemic analysis of the legal, political, and economic consequences of this treaty.

I do not wish to make any further statements on this point, but I would like to ask that my first request be granted, that the legal documentary facts be allowed which would permit a judgment on the legal value of the Versailles Treaty.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if I might deal first with the argument which Dr. Dix has put forward. As I understood his first main proposition, it was this: That if a defendant has committed an act which is an infraction of the treaty and can show that in the opinion of reasonable and just and educated men in the states who were the other parties to the treaty, the treaty was so bad that an infraction was justifiable, that is a permissible argument.

I submit that it is, with great respect to Dr. Dix, an unsound argument and baseless, from any principle either of law or of materiality. Once it is admitted that there is a treaty and that an infraction is made, and it follows from the example that Dr. Dix was dealing with that, these are the conceded facts. It is no answer to say that a number of admirable people in the countries which were parties to the treaty believed that its terms were wrong. The treaty is there and the person who knowingly makes an infraction is breaking the treaty, however strong is his support.

In his second point Dr. Dix moved to quite different grounds. He said that this evidence might be relevant in the special reference to the question of rearmament because it might show that the treaty was considered obsolete. Now, it is a rare but nonetheless existing doctrine of international law that treaties, usually minor treaties, can be abrogated by the conduct of the contracting parties. I would not contest that you cannot get examples of that, although they are very rare and generally deal with minor matters. But this evidence which is before the Tribunal at the moment is not directed to that point at all. This is, in the main, contemporary polemic evidence saying that certain aspects of the treaty were bad, either as regards political standards or economic standards. That is a totally different argument from the one which Dr. Dix admirably adumbrated—which is one which if it came up would have to be faced—that a treaty has become obsolete or that the breaches have been condoned and that, therefore, the terms have really ceased to exist.

My answer to that is that this evidence is not directed to that point at all.

Now, if Dr. Dix will forgive me, and I am sure the fault was mine, I did not quite appreciate what he termed his subjective argument. But insofar as I did appreciate it, there seems to be a very good answer: that if he seeks to suggest that a defendant’s guilt may be less because he, that defendant, believed that the treaty was bad, that is essentially a matter which can be judged by the Tribunal who will hear that defendant and appreciate and evaluate his point of view. It really does not help in deciding whether the Defendant Hess acted because he thought that the Treaty of Versailles was a bad treaty, to know what the editor of the _Observer_, which is a Sunday paper in England, expressed as his views some twenty years ago, or the _Manchester Guardian_ or indeed, with all respect to them, what distinguished statesmen have said in writing their reminiscences years after a matter occurred. The subjective point is—this is my submission—an important point in deciding on evidence. The subjective point can be answered by the defendant himself, and the view of the defendant which the Tribunal will receive.

Now, Dr. Horn has opened up a much wider question, and one which I submit is entirely irrelevant and beyond the scope of these proceedings.

He wishes the Tribunal to try whether the Treaty of Versailles was signed under duress. Well, that, of course, would involve the whole consideration of the Government of the German Republic, the position of the plenipotentiaries, and the legal position of the persons who negotiated the treaty.

The answer to that is that this Tribunal is concerned with certain quite clearly stated offenses, fully particularized, which occurred at the time that is stated in the Indictment; and all the evidence that is given as to the actions of the pre-Nazi German Government, and indeed of the Nazi Government, shows that for years Versailles was accepted as the legal and actual basis on which they must work, and various different methods were adopted in order to try to secure changes of the treaty, and I need not go into, with the Tribunal, the whole frame work of the Locarno Treaties, recognizing Versailles, which were signed in 1925, and which were treated as existing and in operation by the Nazi Government itself.

With that, these actual facts, it would, in my submission, be completely remote, irrelevant, and contrary to the terms of the Charter, for this Tribunal to go into an inquiry as to whether the Treaty of Versailles was signed under duress.

As I gathered, Dr. Horn was not so much interested in the economic clauses and their rightness or wrongness; but I should respectfully remind the Tribunal that that is a matter which is before them at the moment—that here we have, as I have pointed out before—and I do not want to repeat myself—a number of opinions expressed by people of varying eminence and with varying degrees of responsibility at the time that they expressed them. And while strongly maintaining the position which I have endeavored to express with regard to the treaty, I do equally impress my second point: That to accept as matters of evidence statements which in the main are made from a polemical standpoint, either in answer to an attack or in an attack with background of the politics of the state in which they were made, is simply a misuse of the term “evidence”. That is not evidence of any kind, and I equally—not equally because the first point is one of primary importance, which I respectfully urge to the Tribunal—but I also suggest that to tender in evidence matters of that kind is a misuse of the term “evidence,” that they are matters of argument which an advocate may adopt if the argument is a relevant one, but they should not be received in evidence by the Tribunal for that reason.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Sir David, is there anything in the Versailles Treaty that either calls for disarmament by the signatories other than Germany or which looks to such disarmament; and, if there is, could you give us the reference to it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is the preamble to the Military Clauses. That is the point which is usually relied on. It is about four lines at the beginning of the Military Clauses, and, in quite general terms, it looks to a general disarmament after Germany has disarmed. Of course, the position was that—I think I have got the dates right—disarmament was accepted. Whether, in view of the evidence in this case, it should have been accepted does not matter; it was accepted in 1927. After that, you may remember, there were a number of disarmament conferences which examined that question, and eventually in 1933 Germany left the then existing disarmament conference.

Now, I am trying to be entirely objective. I do not want to put the Prosecution view or the Defense view, but that is the position.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not quite clear. When you say “accepted,” you mean that the extent of the disarmament called for had been accepted by Germany?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the other way around: that Germany’s response to the demand of Versailles was accepted by the Allies in 1927, and the Disarmament Commission which had been in Germany then left Germany under, I think, a French General Denoue.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, what I understand you to argue is that nothing contained in this folder has anything to do with that possible issue.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the point.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is not on that issue. I mean we will deal with that issue when we come to it. I rather thought from some words that Dr. Stahmer dropped that that would be one of the points which we should meet in the general argument on law which will be presented, which the Defense Counsel...

DR. SEIDL: I believe that Sir David is under a slight misconception. In