Chapter XIII: Book 4: , Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain (4)

“‘Evacuated’ was the local expression for the annihilation of
these people.

“All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated it
happened in the following way:

“The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put
them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to
seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to
march and were not taken there in lorries.

“In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine
guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The
police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo.

“I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades told
me all about them.

“Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy.

“About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every day.

“About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration
every day.

“About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office (Navy)
every day.

“Through these contacts and through personal visits to the
houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings
in Libau during these months.

“I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr.
Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the
officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named Müller,
both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them
these abuses which have already been described. The answer I got
was that they could not do anything and that things like that
were best overlooked.

“The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied a
consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few
weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure at the
conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews.

“He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There
again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear at
the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). Whom
he saw there, I do not know, but it was made clear to him that
these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not
talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into most
serious trouble.

“My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy in
Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of
these terrible conditions.”

Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments on the East coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered by the thousands in the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it?

RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if they were not telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff? Do you say you had an efficient staff?

RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we are dealing with things which were not done at all by the Navy. It says here in all places that it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was told—and this is the only thing in connection with this matter—that the peculiar thing was that the Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom, were craftsmen and therefore they were doing useful work there. That was the only thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau?

RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied, probably immediately afterwards.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942?

RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when; I have to look it up somewhere. It does not say here that anything was reported, only that it was apparently discussed in the Navy Headquarters and with the Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), who does not report to me. Of course I would have intervened if I had heard about such happenings.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well, I’ll leave that. Now, tell me about the Commando Order of the 18th of October 1942. You received Hitler’s Commando Order and passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy, did you not?

RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations Staff.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it?

RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have to make a statement if you want to know what I thought about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that’s not what I’m asking you. I’m asking you—first answer my question—did you approve of an order to shoot Commandos or to hand them over to the SD to be shot, did you?

RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as drafted by the Führer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it on as ordered with the same remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to be returned. It was all ordered by Hitler in detail. It was decisive for me that in one of the first paragraphs the reason for this order was given, and the reasons why Hitler considered a deviation from international law justified. Moreover, a short time before I had been in Dieppe in France, and there I was informed that on the occasion of the Commando action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they were from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end of the noose around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose tightened and the man choked.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer my question: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven’t answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?

RAEDER: I always said—yes, I did—no, I do not want to say—I said that twice already. I passed it on because it was an order from my Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs it said that that order should not be applied for the treatment of prisoners taken after a naval action or after large scale landing operations and I, as well as many others in the Navy, concentrated our attention on this point because that was our main activity. But I saw no reason to raise objections to the Führer on account of this order which I thought justified in this way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as a soldier, was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief of State to tell him, “Show me your reasons for this order,” that would have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one example which we have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in with a two-man torpedo, trying to sink the _Tirpitz_. Do you remember that case? Surely you can answer that “yes” or “no,” because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed it about six times.

RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say “yes.” The contrary does not have to be assumed at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the time that you were Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, that there was started a “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände,” under Vice Admiral Helmut Heye, which included in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising, I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was that Kommando in the Navy, “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände”? Did you know that?

RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite openly on the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the North coast.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if the Allies had shot any one of your thousands of personnel in that Kommando that was dealing with one-man and two-man torpedoes and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had shot them out of hand?

RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I would have done in a particular case with which I had nothing to do any more. Secondly, here it is...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t want to answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out in due course to the Tribunal with...

RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought quite openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board and also no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. I know...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I have put with our Commandos, so I will not argue.

I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders that the log on the _Athenia_ was falsified? Was it by your direct order?

RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here that my order was, “First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the Führer. Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High Command of the Navy. Thirdly”—there was a third point—I will find it in a second—“I do not intend to punish the commander because he acted in good faith and committed an error.” That is what I ordered. I did not order anything further concerning that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log was falsified. I have asked the Defendant Dönitz. He cannot tell me. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tell me. I think the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he cannot tell me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under whose orders the log of the Submarine _U-30_, that sank the _Athenia_, was falsified?

RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with it, because in fact I did not have anything to do with such details. I did not order such details. The other day—I do not know whether Admiral Wagner said it—it was discussed who did it. I assumed that it was within the flotilla.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me just this about the _Athenia_. You told us the other day that you gave these orders, and then washed your hands of the matter. Nearly a month later...

RAEDER: I have already said I had nothing further to do with it, for you know...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had nothing to do with it. Nearly a month later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, I think you said on Hitler’s orders—that the _Athenia_ had been sunk by Churchill. Did you not feel that it was your duty as Grand Admiral and head of the German Navy to make any protests against this disgraceful, lying suggestion, that the First Lord of the British Admiralty had deliberately sent to their deaths a lot of British and American subjects? Did you not think it was your duty to do that?

RAEDER: I spoke to Hitler about it—but it had happened without our having any idea about it. I was extremely embarrassed about it when the First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that, one can say, boorish manner but I could not change anything subsequently and Hitler did not admit that he...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you did not bother about that, as I understand it, you didn’t bother at all...

RAEDER: Yes, I had misgivings about it, and I was very indignant about it. Please do not keep twisting what I say...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you translate your indignation into actions? That is what I am asking.

RAEDER: Into what kind of action?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Any action.

RAEDER: Yes, that Hitler should get Goebbels to contradict that article? That Hitler would not do if he himself had been the author of the article.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to get it clear. You did nothing when you knew that Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, who were old friends and comrades of yours, had been framed up by sections of these Nazi plotters; you did nothing about that? You did nothing to protest against the treatment meted out to Von Blomberg or Von Fritsch? You did nothing, did you?

RAEDER: No, but at that time I did not know anything about the background, as you yourself said this morning. I knew nothing about the background. Later when I became acquainted with the details I gradually put the whole picture together. At that time I was not in a position to assume that such methods would be at all possible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I put to you your own statement that you made a year ago. I just want to get it quite clear that the first time in your life that you were moved to protest was, I think, in March 1945, when you saw the actual marks of torture on the hands of your friend, Herr Gessler, and at that time the Soviet troops were over the Oder and the Allies were over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you made any protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn’t it? That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military, political career; is that right?

RAEDER: Not a bit of it. I did not really know what was going on.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then—I put it again. In March 1945 you took off the Party Golden Emblem when you saw the marks of torture on your friend Gessler’s hands. Isn’t that right?

RAEDER: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned from the concentration camp and informed me that he was in extremely pitiful condition, and that in spite of my request in August, when he was sent to the concentration camp and when I had asked the Führer through Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler to be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in connection with the assassination attempt, so that he could be released as soon as possible, then...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my question is, was it then that you took off the Party Emblem. You can answer that. You can give your explanation later.

RAEDER: Yes, but wait a moment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But up to then you did not make any protest against anything that Hitler did, except the purely military one on the invasion of the Soviet Union?

RAEDER: I always made serious protests, and that I have proved here, and the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, “You will be most successful if you try to influence the Führer personally when you are alone with him and tell him quite openly what you think.” This is important enough to mention and I must say it.

Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and told me that during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet had a chance to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the first time that I heard that anywhere in Germany anybody was tortured. There is a letter from Dr. Gessler about that—that I told him immediately, “I am going to the Führer at once to tell him about this because I cannot imagine that he knows about that.” Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for goodness sake not to go to the Führer then, because that would endanger his, Gessler’s, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Führer.

During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach the Führer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in April that he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack, I tried to approach the Führer day after day by calling Admiral Voss over the telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I received that information the first thing I did was that I went, together with my wife, to the lake which was behind our house and tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that to Admiral Voss but unfortunately I could not tell it to the Führer any more. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler wrote, and we would have liked to have him as a witness, but his state of health did not permit it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first protest.

RAEDER: It was not my first protest. That is twisting my words.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination?

COL. POKROVSKY: On 18 May 1946, during the morning session of the Tribunal you testified that during your service as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy you twice made application to resign. The first time you tried to resign was in November 1938 when you were dealing with the building up of the Navy, and Hitler was not pleased with your plans, and the second time was when Hitler, without your knowledge, permitted his adjutant who was a naval officer to marry a certain young girl. Is that not so?

RAEDER: Yes, but I put in further applications for resignation which were not so sensational, once in 1937, and I believe even in 1935, when I was not in good health. But these were two typical examples which show how such things came about.

COL. POKROVSKY: I understood that in the first of these two cases Hitler finally persuaded you not to resign.

RAEDER: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: And in the second case, he complied with your wish but he never forgot it.

RAEDER: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, is that not so?

RAEDER: In actual fact, yes. But I must add that during the war I felt I could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a difficult situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain extent so that I could be useful.

COL. POKROVSKY: On the morning of 18 May you said here in the Court in regard to your resignation, that it seemed to you then that Hitler, at that particular moment, wanted to get rid of you. Is that so?

RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made such serious accusations and when he considerably contradicted his previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I therefore considered that that was a particularly favorable moment to leave.

COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by your naming a few people to Hitler.

RAEDER: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz. Did you mention his name?

RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of that in writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate on submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest authority in that field.

COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your answer to my questions, that the answer which you gave to Dr. Laternser on 18 May, when you mentioned the absolute impossibility of resigning from the general staff, was not a proper answer? It was possible to resign, was it not?

RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites. The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more and I knew it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw up my post for some reason or other.

Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that conversation, for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy because it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and Hitler, and I had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical moment of the war.

COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question correctly.

RAEDER: Yes, I understand...

COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites which might have been required for granting an application for resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:

Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you did resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I could tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there is no sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to release me. But what one could not do was to throw up the job and give the impression of being insubordinate. That had to be avoided at all costs, I would never have done that. I was too much of a soldier for that.

COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to hear from you in reply to my question.

Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, is that correct?

RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said.

COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you always strove to make the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union quite normal, is that not so?

RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we should have a common policy with Russia.

COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly the day before yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union.

RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia, given certain circumstances. Even in the directive he mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me at that time that in any circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says in Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to make objections to him.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when you maintained that the explanations which had been given by official governmental organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet Union gave you and the others the impression that it was a deliberate propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in their effect? Do you remember that?

RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? I did not quite get it...

COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing the view that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a way as to give the impression that it was deliberate propaganda, and the total effect was repulsive. Do you not remember it?

RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the Foreign Office when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda to make the German people understand the reason for this war. That is right. As regards breaking the Pact...

COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document. This is a document written by you, and I would like you to tell us whether this document contains the precise subject matter of my question.

RAEDER: Where is it?

COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...”

RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it?

“The propagandistic, political and military announcements given
out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office and the
High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to justify the
breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the Soviet Union,
found very little credence among the people as well as among the
Armed Forces. They showed too clearly that they were propaganda
for a certain purpose and had a repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.)

I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents, together with Goebbels.

COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have another question for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that your divergence of opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in particular in regard to aggressive wars, was less strongly defined than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage of a naval officer with a certain girl? Did you understand me?

RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were military questions where the political decisions remained with the Führer. I was very insistent about the moral issues also, where they concerned the Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum because in this matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did not have the final decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, it was up to me to decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that which I was supposed to sign.

COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question of morals. Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack on a country with which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do you not think that such a question is always connected with the question of morals?

RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case too I laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as the highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the threat of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to be able to do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.

COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your counsel here in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which was delivered by you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the Russian text in the Raeder document book, My Lord—the speech where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s policies—you mentioned that this speech was not in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or is it not?

RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the experience that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had strongly undermined our power of resistance, and that for this reason it could be understood, if a National Socialist government took certain measures against both of them in order to stem their influence, which was excessive. That was the sense of my statements and I made absolutely no mention of any further steps which might come into question.

COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when you delivered that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was fully in accord with your ideas and your views. Is that correct?

RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government had in some way to stem that influence which was generally recognized to be excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National Socialist Government had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did not entirely approve of where they went to extremes. But if the Government was so disposed, it was not possible for me in an official public speech, which I gave on the orders of that Government, to express my personal views which were different. That had to be considered within this address to the nation.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few moments? It is now five minutes past five.

COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes will be sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more questions left.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

COL. POKROVSKY: [_Turning to the defendant._] In order to save time I am not going to argue with you in regard to the motives which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that you should confirm what you said, and that is, that this speech was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to the next question.

On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker?

RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations Staff.

COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in regard to the future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document I mean, or must this document be shown to you?

RAEDER: No. I know that document very well.

COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your consent?

RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was no necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was. I had...

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief.

RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard that he intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, that he should spare the port and dock installations because they would be useful for us later, as we had to keep moving our bases back to the East on account of the British air attacks in the Baltic. Shortly before the date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Führer’s headquarters—I do not know for what reason—and had there spoken with the Führer in my absence, and the Führer had explained to him that plan to bombard Leningrad, especially with aircraft, and he used those very exaggerated words which were then written down in the document. The Navy had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which I mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should be spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in a position to do that because the attack, especially if made with aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could do was to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it should be taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral Carls had to stop the preparations which he had already begun by allocating German workers and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad later on. Carls had to know of that and, as the document says, the so-called Quartermaster Department of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately he included in this paper the expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing to do with the whole affair as far as we were concerned, because we had nothing to do with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any way the responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only believed that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order.

The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have been necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily that expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, nothing happened and that document was not passed on from Generaladmiral Carls to our Finland Commander. That is the whole story.

COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know about the directive?

RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also from the photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to me for passing on, and that shows that it was not considered to be very important. It was not a directive to undertake any operation or anything important. It was just a directive to stop anything that might have been done with regard to bases; so that really nothing happened. Thus, when that document was passed on by Admiral Fricke, nothing happened at all. It was quite superfluous.

COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of one of the biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in this document about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain now that it is a more or less trifling question, that this question was not important enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief? Do you want us to believe that?

RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor question which concerned us, the question as to whether we would later be able to establish a naval base there, and whether we could bring workers and machines and such things to Leningrad. That was a minor issue. The shelling of Leningrad was a major issue.

COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to understand you correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions, both from this document and from your testimony.

Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in Moscow, did you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s defeat?

RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse.

COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the Tribunal in the form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from this affidavit.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You will be shown where they can be found on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it.

“My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous
influence on the fate of the German State...”

Did you find this place?

RAEDER: Yes, I have it.

COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...”

DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so that I can follow?

COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable ambition
were his main peculiarities; running after popularity and
showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness, which
were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He was
outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate
unsoldierly manner.”

Then, a little further on:

“It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his
character, but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and
burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid his
becoming dangerous to himself.”

On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic:

“The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that from
the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good. He knew
I was well thought of in all the really respectable circles of
the German people, and that in general everybody had great faith
in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von Ribbentrop, Dr.
Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.”

Now I will ask you to find Page 27.

RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way, as for instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Schacht, Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side.

COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to you. I will read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27, this place is underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination to the Party...”

THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] I think the Tribunal could read this themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that there are no inaccuracies.

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to put a very brief question.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask you to take a look at a place on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.

Will you confirm that?

RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...

COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything that I read into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. I would like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm all that?

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to.

RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation for the cause of our collapse.

COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.

RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment. But I should like to add that I wrote those things under entirely different conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I never expected that that would ever become public. These were notes for myself to help me form my judgment later on. I also want to ask especially that what I said about Generaloberst Jodl should also be read into the record, or where it belongs, that is, right after the statement about Field Marshal Keitel. With regard to Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize that I intended to convey that it was his manner towards the Führer which made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody else had been in that position, who had a quarrel with the Führer every day or every other day, then the work of the whole of the Armed Forces would have been impossible.

That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to express by that statement.

COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document before you? Was that the original document you had before you?

RAEDER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?

RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers.

Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document? Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to putting in that document?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for permission to do that after I have read this document, so that I can also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this document—do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? There are matters with respect to the defendants on which the Counsel might want to examine. They might be surprised.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the document.

MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, that in the document there is reference to defendants other than the defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not made known to the others by the reading of it or by the turning over to them in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.

THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should be made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted with the terms of the document.

MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH DAY
Tuesday, 21 May 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._]

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination yesterday, I have to put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the law-making bodies. I think that question, as such, has been clarified; but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the Reichstag?

RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.

DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that time?

RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to get.

DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the extract from the Constitution which I have recently submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-3, according to which Article 50 lays down that the Reich President gives all orders and decrees even where the Armed Forces are concerned. For their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the Minister concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent Reich Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Sir David has submitted to you Document C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel Scherff, called _The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939_. Was this book ever written?

RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if anything had been written, then it would have been submitted to me a long time ago, but I never heard of that at all.

DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as they knew the book was not written.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I believe that it is very difficult to base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, when did you learn of this index?

RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation by an American prosecutor.

DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, was put to you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David. On Page 1 Sir David had been reading as follows:

“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament where
the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in
the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at least its
violation was prepared—a long time before the 16th of March
1935....”

Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is untrue?” You answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at least it never became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?

RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as have been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides, only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense measures—Assmann’s representations are just a great exaggeration.

DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that Assmann’s way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament” is wrong?

RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to that conclusion because there were so many points. However, on closer examination they turn out to be very minor points.

DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, that is to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not violate the Treaty, did it?

RAEDER: No, no.

DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a supplementary question to you: Did you have that much confidence in him, that in your opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a lawyer?

RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned; but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.

DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a final and corrected edition?

RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.

DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460):

“If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the
construction’ in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton
submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have to
consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.”

Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year 14 submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures correct in your opinion?

RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build 900-ton boats.

DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the following sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs clarification.

“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the
German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats which had
already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided
for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed and constructed.”

I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note Number 6 referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget Department...

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing statistics on the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that these figures need to be clarified.

According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 U-boats were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to say, in accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You probably have not got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct?

RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.

DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to material at my disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure which corresponds to the 100 percent equality in regard to the tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time. Is that so?

RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on 30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build; that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great mistake, of course, that we did it.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a complete untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one ought not to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Do you not think, Admiral, that there was possibly a legal error on his part when...

RAEDER: Yes, that may be.

DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not really thinking of what you have just told us had happened; namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according to which Germany could now build 100 percent?

RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,” I meant incorrectness.

DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval Agreement of 1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning and that Germany at first renounced that but had the right at any time to increase to 100 percent, provided that Great Britain was notified. The notification is presumably what you described, Witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham?

RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have been 31 December.

THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? Is that what you said; that there was notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?

RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30 December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of 45 percent, 100 percent would be built.

THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?

RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals, but I cannot remember the details. However, I am pretty certain that minutes were taken.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been able to trace any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit Number Raeder-11, that is the agreement of 1935, that Germany could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of ’37, that Germany had the duty to give notification. Generally, notification is only in writing in diplomatic relations, although, in my opinion, it was not necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place.

RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.

DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; it is USA-51. You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on Page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you again, which has not been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears under Figure 2-c. There is the following statement—I want to add that this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being I prohibit any practical preparations.”

Witness, I want to ask you...

THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that—as I have also the English translation before me—that there are two documents C-140; one has one page and the other has two. One has not got a heading and is dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my opinion it is the document...

THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?

DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from Major Elwyn Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the heading, “Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?

DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It is 1933.

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): There appears to be another document which is not in the document book.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Document C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the one I have referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of the session of 27 November. That is the document to which I have just now referred.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?

DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same as USA-51.

Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after today’s session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, here presented, English and German text.