Chapter XVII: Book 4: , Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain (8)

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of 1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. We had no reason...

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the British Admiralty.

Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and if so, when and in what way?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in addition I no longer recall. I take it for granted because that was the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain’s agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham discussed generally the relations between the German and the British Navy, and between Germany and England?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham and Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be no war between our navies.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?

DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.

DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.

THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?

DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps Admiral Schulte-Mönting can tell us.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question, Doctor.

DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder of the two.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as Raeder recalls.

[_Turning to the witness._] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident that Hitler would not start a war?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed in our building program within that period. That would have been necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for an armed conflict.

DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive war?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give priority at least to the U-boat building program.

DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce result in a war with England?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement. I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich Agreement.

Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate, Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these things would be adjusted politically.

With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger of a second world war.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know anything about that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.

DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called “Little Schmundt File.”

Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. I am submitting this document to the witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] This speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which was customary for military speeches?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered a true account. I have from this record...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when he was not at the meeting himself.

DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put the questions properly. The witness...

THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen to this witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of a meeting at which he was not present.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list. Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents through Admiral Raeder’s immediate reporting. That was the purpose of my question.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if I am correct...

THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether he ever saw the document.

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.

Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first time, here in Nuremberg.

DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23 May?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression which is apparent in this document. But, on the other hand...

THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder said to you.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said, had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the following:

“I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, when
we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep them to
myself; the third, for problems of the future, which I do not
think out to an end.”

Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:

“It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one mark.
Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do you think
that because of this last 1 pfennig you would take me to court?”

And Raeder said “No.”

“You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want by
political means, and I do not believe that because of this last
political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor, as we
called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.”

DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder after this speech had been made?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech.

THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before they were given to Raeder.

DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, I should like to put the question differently.

What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and politics?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him.

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation of Norway?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously considered the occupation of Norway.

DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you could give us quite briefly?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.

DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.

DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these considerations?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings and called his attention to the dangers.

DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn of ’39.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more slowly than usual.

DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939.

DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. At any rate you probably mean that conference.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, make a final decision?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all.

DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take place continually between Hitler and Raeder?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing numbers was that subject taken up again.

DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part in that meeting.

DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already.

DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this conference?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the conference was very short.

DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections with Rosenberg?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just seen him a few times.

DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge.

DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports received from Canaris and other sources?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.

DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.

DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in December 1939?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure, theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March.

DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do so?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, approximately?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April.

DR. SIEMERS: 1940?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940.

DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations Staff of the risks of losses?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.

DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent.

DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.

DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say about that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s character. The plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to the minutest detail covering the distance from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame.

Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.

DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940.

DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources you have mentioned?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details about that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to...

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Böhm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion.

DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, on the other?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because of France.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s attitude in that regard?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France.

DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with France.

DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris.

DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding Admiral in France.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the conversation were favorable?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable results.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.

DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.

DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom curtailed.

DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?

THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination about it.

DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder remained?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides, during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors, due to illness and losses.

And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a sense of responsibility and patriotism.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.

DR. SIEMERS: When was that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of about an hour and a half.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political plans on that occasion?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence in all technical questions.

DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual word.” Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, that is, by stenographers?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.

DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches taken down by stenographers?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative.

THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?

DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection, were these minutes taken by the stenographers?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe.

DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.

DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January 1939?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look like later on? Did you ever see them?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and they too contained contradictions.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.

Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, Page 247.

[_Turning to the witness._] The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting of that directive; is that correct?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of Hitler’s plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940.

DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did he adopt in these conferences?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty—as we called it at that time—to our knowledge was about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea.

We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer to the date. Is that correct?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that is, for reasons of international law.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military reasons.

DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you remember that?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later.

DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive.

DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was it just a precautionary strategic measure?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.

DR. SIEMERS: In what way?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported to Hitler after he had received the directive.

DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also in accordance with your opinion?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary measures” are underlined.

DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia.

DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words “precautionary measures.”

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude, she is...”

THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.

DR. SIEMERS: Very well.

[_Turning to the witness._] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against Russia?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at that time, he returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out of his plan.” And at first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.

DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked that the whole of Greece should be occupied. What were the reasons that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make that suggestion?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and when...

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December 1940.

[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on 18 March?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred in the south of Greece a few days before.

DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the whole of Greece?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar situation.

DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.

DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek political and military circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan front against Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September 1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: “The Führer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg disappear from the face of the earth.” Raeder has been accused of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication in 1941?

[_Turning to the President._] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic copy at this point, instead of the written copy.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have before me?

DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own special use.

Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted to me at this moment for the first time.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had not seen it?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either “the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,” and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation, or “this order or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,” and in this case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question of Leningrad and the Navy?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East.

At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe.

DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all about this document?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear Admiral Hans Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read this document since it is very brief.

THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?

DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number Raeder-111. It reads as follows:

“During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, namely,
the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45, refers, I was
stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was under
Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North. I
declare that the document in question, USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a
communication of 29 September 1941 sent by the Naval Operations
Staff to Group North, and its contents have never come to my
knowledge, as it doubtless would have if Generaladmiral Carls
had passed on the letter to the offices subordinate to him. As
far as I know, no one else in my command received this
communication.

“I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s in
November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with Dr.
Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.

“Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have never
spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the other
commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.”

Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior naval judge before whom this affidavit was made.

Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in view of England’s naval superiority and her co-operation with America.

DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High Command especially, warn Hitler?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us.

Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, Vice Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.

I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United States.

DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder’s reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England’s important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against England.

DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand and Japanese military authorities on the other?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before Japan’s entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan should attack Pearl Harbor?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time over the radio.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the midget U-boat, which attacked the _Tirpitz_ in the Alta Fjord, who after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the _Tirpitz_.

From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities, and the correctness of the treatment became evident.

DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the order of the British Military Government?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, but the British Navy.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I was a commanding admiral.

DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not contested?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.

DR. SIEMERS: And the result...

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned no protests.

DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent British officer?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had to do it.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the _Athenia_ has been dealt with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know, did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that the _Athenia_ had been sunk by a German U-boat?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported on the 3d that the _Athenia_ could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about 70 nautical miles away.

DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the _Athenia_?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after this U-boat returned.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, according to which the date was 27 September.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know that a declaration had been made by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder do about it?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken the oath.

DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer an oath to the others who knew about this?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.

DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not having gone to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval attaché, “I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.”

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible. Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused public feeling. I remember, for instance, the _Lusitania_ case during the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into the war would have had little sense.

DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused Hitler to issue this decree?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also shared.

DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October 1939 in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ a very unfortunate article appeared with the heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you remember that article?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published without Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not know which it was—there was a misrepresentation.

We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several weeks later in the _Völkischer Beobachter_. We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder, because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition, the facts were completely distorted. And besides—this may also be important—this involved Raeder’s opponent whom Raeder did not in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than Churchill.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no.

DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question of my examination. This is the last point.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you have asked.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question on the _Athenia_ problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish to put.

[_Turning to the witness._] The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office and restore his dignity. Is that correct?