Chapter XV: Book 4: , Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain (6)

DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which we have already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe briefly that cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High Tribunal to have the witness picture this session. I believe that a description of this session would save time, rather than to have me ask single questions. Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in telling us what happened.

SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were familiarized with the details of what might be considered a concealment of the budget or violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both gentlemen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, spoke, if I remember rightly.

DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend?

SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two members who were ill, but it was a session which in general might be called a plenary session.

DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present?

SEVERING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present?

SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present. He was still ill in September and whether he had recovered by 18 October, I cannot say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann was not present, certainly someone else was present as an authorized deputy from the Foreign Office.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this meeting expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember, in form of an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred which were mentioned by them?

SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner by affidavit or by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event, at the request of the Reich Chancellor and especially at my own request, they said that no further violations would take place.

DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would be no further violations without the knowledge of the Reich Government?

SEVERING: Yes, exactly that.

DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now the Cabinet knew about everything?

SEVERING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made?

SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made.

DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these secret budgets or violations of the Treaty of Versailles?

SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that since I was used to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was especially interested in the extent of the violations with regard to the sum. I wanted to know what I could do in my new capacity against secret arms-bearers and against illegal organizations; and I asked what was the total sum involved. I was thereupon told—and I believe that this was set down and confirmed in writing later—that perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the amount involved in these secret budgets.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures of those days better than I do. What can we gather from these figures? Must we conclude that they were grave violations involving aggressive intentions or may we gather that in the final analysis they were just trifles?

SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the budget plans of the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures from memory. But the impression I gained from the reports of the two Wehrmacht leaders was that only trifles were involved. It was this impression which caused me to assume a certain political responsibility for these things, and especially in view of the fact that we were assured that further concealment of budget items or other violations were not to occur in future.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session declared that the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely with defense measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications, _et cetera_?

SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might remind you that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time when he was Defense Minister were along these general lines. In all of his speeches in the Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared that he was an advocate of sound pacifism. In answer to your question I reply that Gröner’s statements, and also my own, were based on defense and defensive measures.

DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the Reich Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these infringements and the small secret budget items?

SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear directives of the Reich Government?

SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but I can say that I did not observe any violations on the part of the Navy in respect to the agreements during my term of office as Minister of the Interior.

DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you know Raeder sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to you not to resort to secret violations?

SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an honest man and I believed that he would keep his word.

DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of course, you cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall that on the occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there was discussion about a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats?

SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but I do know that at that period of time, there was much talk—either in another cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag or by a different parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops which had been established for the Army and the Navy in Russia, Sweden, and Holland.

DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops?

SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect. Whether these experimental workshops had been established I cannot tell you from my own experience.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of governmental discussions going on at the time, hope that some day, despite the Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to build U-boats?

SEVERING: The leading statesmen...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there was a hope that they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is what your question was, was it not; was there a hope?

DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were already dealt with by the governments which obtained through the years 1928 to 1932; and I believe that Stresemann carried on these discussions. Since Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to ask Herr Severing on this point.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere political gossip.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was brought up in the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind the back of the Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag? Did Raeder do that?

SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the budget, you mean?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes.

SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts of the various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget was submitted to the Reichstag by the Cabinet.

DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before the Reichstag was a matter for the Reich Government and not for the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is that right?

SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the Reichstag, the competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main committee and the plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political responsibility was assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet.

THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant Raeder that he had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was never put to him.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted...

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you talked with a member of the government with regard to the various leading personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made a comment which subsequently became known concerning certain personalities?

SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been asked to give a personal estimate of certain military personalities. I named Gröner and Raeder in this connection.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps do you know of?

SEVERING: How many do I know of now?

DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know of before the collapse of Germany?

SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse of Germany or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass murders which have been dealt with so frequently in this proceeding?

SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when murder, if I may say so, became professional and when I heard of a few cases which affected me personally very deeply. First of all, I was told that the Police President of Altona, a member of the Reichstag and a Social Democrat of the right wing of the Party, had been murdered in the concentration camp at Papenburg. Another friend of mine, the chairman of the Miners Union, Fritz Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly after his being committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend of mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg Camp according to the reports received by his family.

Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration camp. Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald in the spring of 1939, and in that way I learned of this camp. Columbia House at Berlin I figured to be a concentration camp also.

That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up until the time when the London radio started to report about concentration camps. I perhaps might mention another case. In 1944 a friend of mine, a member of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who had served 3 years in the penitentiary, was put into a concentration camp in or near Linz. After a brief stay there he was murdered, according to reports received by his family.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar individual cases?

SEVERING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands were murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the East?

SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of those cases which were, so to say, authentically reported to me. Everything I learned of later through indirect reports, from my friend Seger or from the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff, had been told me but I had no possibility of checking up on their accuracy.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends have the possibility...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this examination, or are you going on? Do you see the clock?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the High Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand there will be a cross-interrogation so that...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what questions you are going to ask; I don’t.

DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is going to give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter past 2 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday morning.

Now, Mr. Dodd, could you tell us what the position is with reference to the documents of the Defendants Von Schirach, Sauckel, and Jodl?

MR. DODD: As far as Von Schirach is concerned, we are waiting for a ruling on those documents concerning which we were heard on Saturday. I’m sorry, that was on Seyss-Inquart. I wasn’t sure the documents were ready.

These documents are all ready; they are all translated and in book form.

THE PRESIDENT: Will it be necessary to have any further discussion of them?

MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, we can take it that we needn’t have another argument about those documents.

MR. DODD: No, Sir, I comprehend no need for any further argument on Von Schirach’s documents.

With reference to Sauckel, I have asked our French colleagues what the situation is, since they have the primary responsibility. And so far as the Prosecution is concerned, I am told that Mr. Herzog of the French Prosecution staff is on his way here and he will be able to report more accurately.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can mention that at a later stage then. Schirach at any rate then is ready to go on?

MR. DODD: He is ready to go on.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: Sir David has the information about the Defendant Jodl.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Roberts.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the position with regard to Jodl’s documents is that Dr. Jahrreiss produced for me a draft book, just before Easter, which had a certain number of documents, all except four of which had already been exhibited, and therefore no objection could be taken to them.

My Lord, the other four were all short. Two, I thought, were objectionable on the ground that they referred to alleged war crimes by one of the Allies. But, My Lord, they were so short that I thought the best course would be for them to be translated—they were only a page or so, each of them—so that when the books had been translated any objection could be taken, and then the Tribunal could shortly decide the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as there are only four of them and only two which might be objected to, that can be dealt with when we come to hear the case.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there are only two.

THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t have any special hearing for it.

MR. ROBERTS: No, My Lord, certainly not. It could be disposed of in a very few minutes.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I should like to say one more word about these Jodl documents. We are having difficulties over one document. It is the affidavit of Lohmann, which we submitted in German, but which was not translated into English for us on the grounds that only such documents could be translated which the Prosecution had already accepted; and the Prosecution had adopted the standpoint that it cannot express any opinion on that document as it has not been translated into English.

I have mentioned this in a brief petition to the Tribunal, and I hope that the Tribunal will settle the matter.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Lohmann’s affidavit which is very short—it goes principally to character—and it is really not objectionable, but I had to point out that it hadn’t actually been allowed by the Tribunal in their order. The Tribunal ordered it in regard to...

THE PRESIDENT: If it is accepted in the translation, that is all that is necessary.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I entirely agree, and it is all on one page.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Let it be translated.

MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it may be convenient for me to indicate to the Tribunal at this stage of Raeder’s case that with regard to the witness Lohmann, the Prosecution does not now desire to cross-examine that witness in view of the documents which are before the Court, and the fact that the matters his affidavit dealt with were dealt with yesterday by my learned friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in his cross-examination of Raeder, and finally, in view of the passages of time.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution want to cross-examine Lohmann?

MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions of Lohmann?

Very well, then I understand that the witness Lohmann is being kept here and perhaps a message could be given to the Marshal that he needn’t remain.

M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. President, in the name of the French Prosecution I should like to say a word about the documents presented by Sauckel’s defense. I have no objection to the presentation of these documents with the reservation, of course, that a ruling on them be made after they are presented. We have no objection to the documents being translated or presented.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary or desirable for there to be a special hearing with reference to the admissibility, or can that be done in the course of the Defendant Sauckel’s case? At the moment I apprehend that the documents have been looked at for the purpose of translation. They have now been translated. If you think it necessary that there should be any special hearing before the case begins, as to admissibility, we should like to know. Otherwise they would be dealt with in the course of the case, in the course of Sauckel’s case.

M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, it will be sufficient if the Tribunal deals with these documents during the course of the defendant’s case. I do not think we need a special hearing as far as these documents are concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, as far as I have been able to ascertain, you have inadvertently not yet answered one of my questions clearly.

With reference to the concentration camps you said that you had heard of certain individual cases, and you named the individual cases. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I just want to ask you in conclusion: did you hear of the mass murders which have been mentioned in this Trial, whereby at Auschwitz, for instance, an average of about 2,000 persons a day were exterminated in the gas chambers? Were you in possession of this knowledge before the collapse, or did you not know anything about that either?

SEVERING: I knew nothing whatsoever about these mass murders, which only became known in Germany after the collapse of the Hitler regime, partly through announcements in the press and partly through trials.

DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, what could you and your friends in the Party do during the National Socialist regime, against the National Socialist terror which you have partly mentioned, and did anyone abroad support you in any way in this respect?

SEVERING: If you will limit the question to asking what I and my political friends could do and did do after 30 January to combat the Hitler regime, then I can only say—but little. If there was any question of resistance against the Hitler regime, then that resistance was not a centrally organized one. It was restricted to the extent that in various cities the opponents of the Nazis met to consider how one might, at least by propaganda, overcome the mental terror. No open resistance was possible.

But perhaps I should here draw your attention to the following: On 30 January I personally made a decisive attempt—or rather an attempt which, in my opinion, might have proved decisive—to oppose the Hitler regime. In the autumn of 1931 I had an interview with the Chief of the Army Command, Von Hammerstein, during which Von Hammerstein explained to me that the Reichswehr would not allow Hitler to usurp the seat of the President of the State. I remembered that conference, and on 30 January 1933 I inquired whether Von Hammerstein would be prepared to grant me an interview. I wanted to ask him, during that interview, whether he was still of the opinion that the Reichswehr would not only declare itself to be against the Hitler regime, but would oppose such a regime by force of arms.

Herr Von Hammerstein replied to the effect that, in principle, he would be prepared to have such an interview with me, but that the moment was not a propitious one. The interview never took place.

If you were to ask me whether in their efforts to fight the Hitler regime, at least by propaganda, my political friends had received any support from foreign personalities whom one might have called anti-Fascists, then I must say—unfortunately no. On the contrary, we quite often noticed, with much sorrow, that members of the English Labor Party, not officials but private individuals, were Hitler’s guests and that they returned to England to praise the then Chancellor Hitler as a friend of peace. I mention Philipp Snowden in that connection and the _doyen_ of the Labor Party, Lansbury. In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the following facts: In the year...

THE PRESIDENT: The attitude of political parties in other countries has nothing to do with any question we have to decide, absolutely nothing.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this is sufficient. I have no further questions to ask, Herr Minister, and I thank you.

DR. LATERNSER: Minister Severing, during your term of office was the figure of 100,000 men, conceded by the Peace Treaty of Versailles for a normal army, ever exceeded?

SEVERING: I have no official knowledge of that. I would assume, however, that that was not the case.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know at all whether, at the end of 1932, the League of Nations made a promise or held out prospects that this Army of 100,000 could be increased to 300,000 men?

SEVERING: Here too I am unable to give you any official information. I can, however, give the following explanation: In 1932 I received a letter from a party friend of mine, Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid, who was a member of the League of Nations Delegation and in which he mentioned rumors of that kind; but he also added other information...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we don’t think that rumors are relevant in the Trial. He says he can’t give us any official information. He then begins to give us rumors. Well, we don’t want to hear rumors.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, what the witness is now saying is rather more than a rumor and I think you will probably be able to judge for yourself when he has entirely answered the question.

THE PRESIDENT: He is speaking of rumors. If you have any fresh question to ask him, you can ask him.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the increase of the Army from 100,000 to 300,000 men ever assume any palpable shape in the sense that the question was discussed elsewhere, too?

SEVERING: I have just told you that Dr. Breitscheid was a member of the League of Nations Delegation and that his information to me was not a fabric of his own invention. That information stated that an extension of the Army had been envisioned but that this extension would probably be made at the expense of the police. Dr. Breitscheid informed me accordingly.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, I have no further questions to ask.

DR. HAENSEL: You have just told us that you had no knowledge of the Jewish mass murders in Auschwitz before the collapse. Did you have any knowledge of other measures or deeds perpetrated against Jews which you could define as criminal?

SEVERING: I experienced one such case personally. In 1944 a friend of mine in Bielefeld, Karl Henkel, was arrested and transferred to a labor camp near Emden, and he was shot on the third day.

DR. HAENSEL: Do you know who arrested him, what authority?

SEVERING: He was arrested by the Bielefeld Gestapo.

DR. HAENSEL: Did that occur in connection with some large scale action or was it an individual case?

SEVERING: It appeared to me to be an individual case.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you hear of a number of such individual cases at that time, that is in 1944?

SEVERING: In 1944 I did not hear of any individual cases of murder, but I did hear of deportations from Westphalian towns to unknown destinations.

DR. HAENSEL: What authorities dealt with these deportations?

SEVERING: I cannot say for certain, but I assume that it was the Gestapo.

DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that considerable sections of the population knew of these occurrences?

SEVERING: You mean, of the deportations?

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

SEVERING: They usually took place quite publicly.

DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that the people were generally just as well acquainted with these events as the members of the organizations as, for instance, the ordinary SS man, or would you say that the ordinary SS man knew more than other people?

SEVERING: Oh yes. He was informed of the places of destination of these transports.

DR. HAENSEL: But I understood you to say, that the convoys were not escorted by the SS; you said it was the Gestapo.

SEVERING: Yes, I have just stated that I assumed that the Gestapo had conducted the arrests and the lootings, but I did not receive any assurances that this was exclusively the work of the Gestapo.

DR. HAENSEL: And as to the other measures—apart from such deportations—which might be called a kind of local pogrom, have I understood you to say that you did not hear of them often?

SEVERING: Local pogroms occurred in November 1938.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you, during the execution of such measures, of which we have frequently heard, make your own observations or did you remain at home?

SEVERING: I remained at home. I only saw the results of these pogroms afterwards in the shape of destroyed Jewish firms, and in the remains of the synagogues.

DR. HAENSEL: And to which organizations or groups do you attribute these events of November 1938?

SEVERING: My own judgment would not have any decisive value, but I tell you quite frankly, it was the SA or the SS.

DR. HAENSEL: And what makes you think that it was precisely these two groups?

SEVERING: Because the members of these groups, in my home town of Bielefeld, were called the instigators of the synagogue fires.

DR. HAENSEL: By whom?

SEVERING: They were indicated by name by the population in general.

DR. HAENSEL: You knew about the concentration camps. Can you still remember when you heard about them for the first time? It is important at least to determine the year.

SEVERING: No. I cannot tell you that at the present moment. I can only reply to your question by referring to individual dates. The first murder in a concentration camp became known to me when I heard that, in the Papenburg Concentration Camp, the former member of the German Reichstag and Police President of Altona had been shot. That could have been either in 1935 or 1936, I am no longer sure when.

DR. HAENSEL: And later, did you hear of many other such cases, or did you have personal knowledge of them?

SEVERING: From personal knowledge which is so certain that I could give it with a clear conscience to the Tribunal only in the cases I mentioned this morning.

DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were places in which the political opponents of the regime were to be interned without anything worse happening to them than loss of liberty?

SEVERING: Whether I was told that?

DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard that?

SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration camps meant to the population the very incarnation of all that is terrible.

DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by “population”? Do you also mean those sections of the population who had some official connection with the Party: small Party members, small SA men and small members of the SS?

SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed nearly exclusively with opponents of the system.

DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom you conversed presented a united front against anyone who wore a party emblem or a badge of some organization?

SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling affects wide sections of the population, their general humanitarian feeling, and their feeling of indignation about conditions in the camps, as and when the facts became known.

DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of hearing whether this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in people who actually wore the emblem of the Party.

SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal as a fact.

DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable pressure which you have alluded to?

SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership rendered them, in a certain sense, immune.

DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members in order to benefit by this immunization?

SEVERING: Yes, I believe so.

DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the NSV; is that true?

SEVERING: No.

DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July 1944?

SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning. I was not arrested.

DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all?

SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which I also mentioned this morning.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that what had been achieved in Germany in the social sphere after 1933 did, to a considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous governments?

SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: “What was new was not good, and what was good was not new.”

DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party member, a member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge of events at Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all?

SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this knowledge. I would not go so far as to say that. But he might, perhaps, have known about it.

DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by “He might, perhaps, have known about it”?

SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons. They did not always remain in the area of the concentration camps; they usually returned.

DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy?

SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything.

DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned for speaking of such matters?

SEVERING: No.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities of the “special courts”?

SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with these particular activities of the “special courts.”

DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people who listened to foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhörer) and to people accused of spreading so-called false rumors, were published very often in the papers. Did you never read them?

SEVERING: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask you. You told us this morning that in 1919 you were a member of the Weimar National Assembly. May I ask what the attitude of the National Assembly was—particularly of the faction of the Social Democrats of whom you too were a leader—towards the problem of the Austrian “Anschluss”?

SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar National Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the Rhineland and Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in the debates of the Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have no detailed knowledge as to how these matters were formulated or expressed. But one thing I do know and that is, that it was practically the unanimous wish of the Assembly to include a paragraph, or an article in the Constitution, ratifying the “Anschluss” of Austria to Germany.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that in 1928 the Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there would be no further violations of the Treaty of Versailles without the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that assurance?

SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot answer that in any positive sense. I can only state that violations of the agreement of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did not come to my knowledge.

MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction in Cadiz, in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction between the years 1927 and 1931?

SEVERING: No, no.

MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of fact is the Document D-854.

And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in 1931 that U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction and with German personnel?

SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either.

THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn’t know of any violations.

MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest to you, Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being deceived during this time. Do you agree with me about that?

SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but I must very definitely declare that I did not know anything of the construction of a submarine.

MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156. This is a new extract from Captain Schüssler’s _Fight of the Navy against Versailles_. You will see that the following entry appears on Pages 43 and 44.

“In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making
preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to the
military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief of Staff,
Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the reports of
the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral Heusinger
Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach, to supply the means
required for the construction of the vessel in Finland. A
250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat, so that the amount of
1½ million Reichsmark was sufficient for carrying out the
project.

“The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat which
would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the largest
possible number of units which could be assembled at shortest
possible notice.”

Herr Minister, did you know that 1½ million Reichsmark were spent in 1930 in connection with this U-boat construction?

SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in the Reich Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it necessary to determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned on 30 March 1930. If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way, then it is not impossible that everything mentioned here was carried out after 30 March 1930.

MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went on when you were connected with the Government of Germany was purely defensive. When did you realize that the Nazi Government’s rearmament was not defensive but aggressive? At what date did you come to that conclusion?

SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war, was not in the least doubted by me and my political friends.

MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi power that the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat of force to achieve its political aims; is that right?

SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are identical. I was convinced of it, and so were my political friends.

MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the Putsch which brought him to power in July 1932?

SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force, but he did order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused to surrender voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my successor, I explained to him that I had no intention of doing so and in order to make my protest more emphatic, I pointed out that I would only give way to force. And then force was used in the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly appointed police president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied by two police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were authorized by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to carry out this mission. When they answered “yes,” I stated that I would leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood.

MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured power, purge the police and the government of anti-Nazis?

SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention existed to purge the police of all republican elements and to replace them with men who were first devoted to Von Papen and then to the National Socialists.

MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant Göring.

The Defendant Göring has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837 of the transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that the institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the Nazis came into power. Is that true?

SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody did exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian Police Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of office protective custody was never applied in normal civilian life. The regulations in Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law stipulated quite definitely that if anybody was taken into protective custody the police administration was obliged to bring him before the courts within 24 hours. This procedure is in no way identical with that protective custody, the threat of which for decades remained suspended over the peaceful citizens of the State.

MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration camps in pre-Nazi Germany, I take it?

SEVERING: Never.

MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues of the Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration camps while Göring was still Chief of the Gestapo?

SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might say 500, you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now being collected. My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats, or trade-union officials, or editors were murdered.

MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you think were murdered during Göring’s period of power over the Gestapo?

SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist leaders also such trade union officials, who considered themselves members of the Communist Party, then approximately the same figure would be reached.

MAJOR JONES: Did Göring personally have any knowledge of these murders?

SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question, then I should have to ask myself what I would have done in case it had been one of my functions to administer camps in which the fate of tens of thousands was being decided.

I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if I were to give you one or two examples from my own experience.

In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland.

MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr Minister.

SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my first and foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which I had installed, the principles of humanitarianism were being adhered to. I was under the impression that this was not being done. I always reminded my police officials that they were servants of the people and that everyone in those camps should be humanely treated. I told them that never again should the call resound in Germany, “Protect us from the police.” (“Schutz vor Schutzleuten”). I myself demanded punishment for police or other officials when I was under the impression that defenseless prisoners were being ill-treated by members of the police.

MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become familiar with the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi population of Germany in the years after 1921?

SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed organizations was one of my most important tasks during my term of office in Prussia. The roughest of all the armed organizations proved to be the SA. They sang songs such as: “Clear the streets for the Brown Battalions” and with the same arrogance with which they sang these songs, they forcibly became masters of the streets, wherever they encountered no adversary worth mentioning. Another rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated their program: “Hang the Jews and shoot the bigwigs.” Wherever the SA could exercise terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such style. They waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion. These were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the first Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those customers from buying in department stores who were accustomed to buy in these stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized the terror actions of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged numerous Jewish shops in Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to the convening of the Reichstag into which 107 National Socialists entered at the time, as we know.

MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant Schacht.

When did you first hear of Schacht’s relations with the Nazi leaders?

SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police administration in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place between Mr. Schacht and the leaders of the National Socialist German Workers Party.

MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht in 1944?

SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody, I actually refused these connections. Schacht—although I held him in high esteem as an economic expert—was known to me as a rather unreliable person in political matters. By joining the Harzburg Front, Schacht betrayed the cause of democracy. This was not only an act of ingratitude, for it was only through the Democrats that he ever reached the post of President of the Reichsbank, but it was also a great mistake since he and others of the same social standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the National Socialists—so to speak—socially acceptable.

I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to join a government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically refused to do so, giving Schacht’s machinations and sundry other circumstances as my excuse.

MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that?

SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend Leuschner, who was hanged, together with other young Social Democrats—Von Harnack, Weber, Maas—my friend Leuschner and I discussed the composition of such a government. Leuschner informed me that a general would probably be the President of the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for War. I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become financial or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a post through his actual or alleged connections with American business circles. But these connections between Schacht and—in National Socialist parlance—between plutocracy and militarism, this connection, I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of democracy, especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was under no circumstances prepared to become a member of any cabinet in which Schacht would be the financial dictator.

MAJOR JONES: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?

DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked about the construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in Cadiz. With regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz, he has referred to D-854. I presume that this document is unknown to you.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew nothing about either of those instances.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you not remember that during that discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Gröner mentioned the Finland U-boat?

SEVERING: I do not remember.

DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now—a leading question: Is it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928 stipulated that the Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated to keep the Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the Reichswehr, in his turn, would inform the other Ministers of the Cabinet?

SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the promise of the two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the Cabinet should, generally speaking, be kept informed about all questions. That was technically possible only in the manner in which you have just indicated, that is to say, that the Reichswehrminister would be the first to be informed and that he, in turn, would pass this information on to the Cabinet.

DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder’s part, currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet?

SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure, just as the meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members of the Cabinet consisted either of the Ministers or of their official representatives.

DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter would technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister?

SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically by the Cabinet.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions to put to the witness.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): On what legal regulation was your exemption from the duties of Minister of the Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based?

SEVERING: The release from my duties?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties.

SEVERING: It was based on Article 48.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued emergency decrees?

SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich President, who alone was entitled to do so.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from office on 20 July, under the circumstances which you have just described, based on the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who issued the decree, were of the opinion that the emergency decree was legal, whereas it was your point of view that the legal basis for the emergency decree did not exist and in consequence you remained in your office?

SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich was authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for the maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the Prussian Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police, sufficient guarantee that this peace and order would be insured in Prussia, he had the right to relieve us of our police functions, and especially to exclude us from all other executive measures. But he did not have the right to discharge us as ministers.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in Germany, the State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a statement to the effect that the decree of the Reich President of 20 July 1932 was compatible with the Constitution insofar as it had appointed the Reich Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for Prussia and authorized him temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers of their official functions and to assume these functions personally.

SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision of the High Court of Justice.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then Reich Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel, bring National Socialists into the police force?

SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police officials was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case with Oberpräsidenten, Regierungspräsidenten and police presidents, but not with every simple police official.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key position of police president in Berlin to the former police president of Essen, Melcher, who in your time was already police president of a large city?

SEVERING: That is correct.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the Tribunal will now adjourn.

How many more witnesses have you got?

DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsäcker and Vice Admiral Schulte-Mönting, the Chief of Staff. The examination of Schulte-Mönting will take up some time, whereas I shall be through with Freiherr Von Weizsäcker in a short while.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr Von Weizsäcker, be called?

[_The witness Von Weizsäcker took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsäcker.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsäcker, at the beginning of the war you were State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939, that is on the first day of the war between Germany and England—the English passenger ship _Athenia_ was torpedoed northwest of Scotland. There were American passengers on board. The sinking of the ship naturally caused a great sensation. Please tell the Tribunal how this matter was treated politically, that is, by you.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I remember this incident, but I am not certain whether it was a British or an American ship. In any case, the incident alarmed me very greatly at the time. I inquired of the Naval Operations Staff whether a German naval unit could have sunk the ship. After this was denied, I begged the American Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to call on me and told him that no German naval unit could have participated in the sinking of the _Athenia_. I asked the Chargé d’Affaires to take cognizance of this fact and to cable this information to Washington without delay, adding that it was most important in the interests of our two nations—Germany and America.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you had contacted the Navy before taking these steps?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to Admiral Raeder personally or did you speak with some other officer?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I could not say that now, but I did get definite information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details. But I did receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was involved. That satisfied me.

DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the same day or shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this matter further with him?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that is true. I can recall. Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it could not have been a German U-boat, since reports coming in from the U-boats said that the distance from the nearest U-boat was too great, that is—about 75 nautical miles?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Raeder informed me that no German U-boat could have been involved. He may also have mentioned details, concerning the distance of the U-boats from the point where the ship went down, but I cannot today tell you about this with any certainty.

DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you declare that everything should be done to avoid war with the United States, referring particularly to incidents like the sinking of the Lusitania in the previous war?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for at that time the recollections of similar past incidents during the first World War were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I drew his attention to the urgent necessity of avoiding all naval operations which might cause a spreading of the war and—as I used to say in those days—decrease the “neutral substance.”

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: To the best of my recollections—yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsäcker, that Raeder gave you truthful answers in this report about the _Athenia_?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.

DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number _30_ returned from her combat mission on 27 September 1939, that is—about three weeks after the sinking of the _Athenia_, and her commander reported that he had inadvertently sunk the _Athenia_. He had not noticed the fact at the time but was apprised of the incident later by various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it at the end of September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order to decide what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order enjoining silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would like you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently established, of the sinking by a German U-boat.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, certainly not.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler’s order enjoining silence?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I naturally did not hear of that either.

DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS handed to you and I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an article entitled “Churchill Sinks the _Athenia_,” taken from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this article?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to assist the Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document Book Number 10a, Page 97, to be correct—Page 99.