Chapter D: V. L., Berlin-Adlershof (5)

It does not seem feasible to me to classify as criminal, experiments which tend to make more bearable and less dangerous a recognized method already applied on millions of people.

In addition, there is no reply from the defendant Rose to this letter from Professor Haagen of 4 October 1943. It is not certain whether he actually received it. However, the possibility that he did receive it cannot be denied.

Chronologically, the next letter in this correspondence is Haagen’s letter to Rose of 29 November 1943. (_NO-1059, Pros. Ex. 490._) The defendant Rose cannot remember ever having received this letter.

It is true that after this letter had been submitted to him by the prosecution during cross-examination, Professor Rose assumed that he must have received it, judging by the date and the conditions of the postal service at that time. (_Tr. p. 6428._) However, he was misled when making this statement by a mistake in the reproduction. Whereas this letter is actually dated 29 November 1943, the date on the letter is given as 29 November 1942 in the German mimeographed copies distributed by the prosecution in the course of the cross-examination. Thus it was sent at a time when large quantities of mail were destroyed in trains or at post offices by the heavy air raids on German towns and communications. According to the resultant state of affairs, it is probable that he actually did not receive this letter. In this very letter Professor Haagen mentions that 18 of the 100 inmates had already died en route. The answers the defendant Rose gave on cross-examination before this letter had been submitted to him show clearly that he could not remember such information. (_Tr. p. 6424-5._) He would hardly have been able to forget such a gruesome report if he had actually received this letter.

It also cannot be stated that the defendant Rose could only have written his letter to Haagen of 13 December 1943 (_NO-122, Pros. Ex. 298_) after having received Haagen’s letter of 29 November 1943. Prosecuting counsel, Mr. McHaney, however, alleged this when cross-examining Rose (_Tr. p. 6431_) thus causing confusion in the mind of the defendant Rose. For, in reality, Rose’s letter of 13 December 1943 is the reply to a further letter from Haagen dated 8 December 1943, as appears clearly from the introductory sentence in Rose’s letter of 13 December 1943. From this state of affairs it can only be concluded that either Professor Haagen did not mail this letter at all—perhaps in view of the information contained therein about the unfavorable conditions of health of the inmates—or else the defendant Rose did not receive the letter because it was destroyed along with a lot of other mail of the same date in the heavy air raids. The prosecution, no doubt, would not have failed to introduce this letter into evidence if the defendant Rose had replied to Haagen’s letter dated 29 November 1943. Professor Haagen’s suggestion in his letter of 4 October 1943 that the Copenhagen vaccine be tested, is again dealt with in Rose’s letter of 13 December 1943. In this letter Rose exclusively speaks of the testing of vaccine, without mentioning infections at all. In the letter a parallel is drawn to the Buchenwald typhus experiments only insofar as he indicated the advantage of the simultaneous testing of several vaccines. On direct examination, that is, prior to the submission of other documents which give greater clarification to the whole matter, the defendant Rose stated quite clearly and in agreement with subsequent evidence and the later testimony of Haagen, that the point in question was the application of the Copenhagen vaccine for preliminary vaccination, aiming at the weakening of the vaccination reaction in connection with subsequent vaccination with a live, avirulent vaccine nonpathogenic to human beings.

The two biologically parallel conditions which are obvious to every layman, one, the weakening of a reaction following vaccination with a live vaccine, and two, the weakening of a natural sickness, were explained in detail by Professor Rose on direct examination. (_Tr. p. 6281._)

Finally, it must be emphatically pointed out that the plan discussed in this correspondence to test the effect of the Copenhagen vaccine on the weakening of vaccination reactions followed by the application of the new live avirulent typhus vaccine pathogenic to human beings as compared with other vaccines, was not carried out at all. After Haagen had succeeded in weakening the reaction in another way, namely by long storage, he was no longer interested in the Copenhagen vaccine. (_Becker-Freyseng 62_[58]; _German, Tr. 9614-5_.)

Therefore, there only remains the examination of the question of whether the defendant Rose was responsible for Haagen’s activities, knowing that Professor Haagen had performed experiments on inmates with live avirulent typhus vaccines still in the testing stage. Apart from the correspondence discussed just now (part of which did not deal with experiments at all, while the other part referred to the discussion of an experimental plan which had been temporarily under consideration), the defendant Rose was only informed of Haagen’s activities through the latter’s reports which were sent to him for information and comments by the chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, through official channels. These, however, either contained simple information about the fact that Professor Haagen had asked for and received a commission for research, or else they were scientific publications containing nothing to which objections could be made.

The prosecution concluded from the letter of the Luftwaffe Medical Academy, dated 7 July 1944 to the Luftlottenarzt Reich [Air Fleet Physician Reich] that Haagen must have infected human beings with virulent typhus bacilli which were pathogenic to human beings because “control persons” were mentioned in this letter. (_NO-128, Pros._ _Ex. 307._) This letter approves the publication of Professor Haagen’s work and that of his assistant Crodel: “Experiments with a New Dried Typhus Vaccine.” This work which had been submitted to the defendant Rose prior to publication actually shows clearly that these controls were meant to be a comparison of the results of serological examinations on patients from the camp epidemic with the serological examinations on persons protectively vaccinated. Haagen, whose main interest was in serological examinations, as already mentioned, had no reason whatsoever to perform artificial infections since the epidemic in the concentration camp at Natzweiler offered an abundance of persons for the purposes of comparison.

Finally it must be stated, in addition, that the experimental plans discussed in Haagen’s letter of 27 June 1944 to Professor Hirt never became known to the Luftwaffe Medical Inspectorate nor to Rose. (_NO-127, Pros. Ex. 306._) Moreover, the general development of the situation (Haagen’s absence from Strasbourg, evacuation of the camp at Natzweiler, etc.,) shows that this planned experiment could never have been performed. The truth of this statement is further clearly proved by the testimonies of the witnesses Broers and Nales, according to which no more typhus vaccinations took place after April 1944.

* * * * *

_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
MRUGOWSKY_[59]

The prosecution stated in its plea: If Grawitz were still alive, he would sit here as one of the principal defendants on the defendants’ bench. This is certainly true. But Grawitz passed sentenced on himself. And what does the prosecution do? It indicts Mrugowsky instead of Grawitz. It does not consider in its arguments that Mrugowsky was not a private person but a medical officer in the Waffen SS, that is a soldier, and that Grawitz and Himmler were his military superiors. It speaks of conspiracy but it does not examine thereby to what extent a conspiracy may be conceived when military subordination plays its part. In its summing-up, both written and oral, the prosecution merely submitted the original allegations of the indictment. It completely ignored the evidence produced by the defendants, and merely pointed out a little scornfully that this evidence was mostly composed of affidavits. But this is no fault of the defendants. They would have preferred to be able to produce counter-proof taken from their own records. But all the documents belonging to the defendants and to other offices, from which the prosecution evidence emanates, are in the hands of the prosecution. It merely submitted those parts of the documents which, torn from their context, seem to incriminate the defendants. On the other hand, the prosecution made it impossible for the defendants to find the records connected with the prosecution evidence which would ensure a complete elucidation of the true facts.

I would ask the Tribunal to consider in particular this difficult position of the defendants with regard to evidence. It places particular emphasis on the old legal principle that the defendant is considered not guilty until his guilt has been proved, and in doubtful cases the Court is to decide in favor of the defendant.

The charges against Mrugowsky are composed of three groups:

(1) The typhus experiments and the aconitine execution which did not concern volunteers. In these cases the Tribunal will have to consider whether state emergency contended by Mrugowsky really existed, and if so, if the typhus experiments and the aconitine execution were justified. If the answer is in the affirmative, then neither the typhus experiments nor the aconitine execution is criminal, since there is no objection raised as to the manner in which they were performed. If the question is answered in the negative, then the next consideration is, if and to what extent Mrugowsky participated in them and if he is responsible under criminal law.

(2) The second group consists of the actions of Ding which he performed on his own initiative, e. g., his participation in a killing by phenol and the poison experiment on 6 persons.

(3) The third group consists of the protective vaccinations for which volunteers were available, according to the evidence produced by the prosecution.

The defendant Mrugowsky is indicted first of all for his alleged participation in the typhus experiments at Buchenwald and in other medical experiments. In its submission of evidence, the prosecution treated these experiments as criminal and as experiments performed by doctors. During the examination of the experts, Professor Leibbrandt and Professor Ivy, the prosecution also treated these medical experiments as experiments performed by doctors and asked the experts if these experiments were to be considered as admissible from the point of view of medical ethics.

I am convinced that the experiments on which the prosecution bases its indictment were in no way experiments which originated from the initiative of the executive physicians themselves. The experiments were a form of research work necessitated by an extraordinarily pressing state emergency, and ordered by the highest competent governmental authorities.

Professor Ivy also admitted that there is a fundamental difference between the physician as a therapeutist and the physician as a scientific research worker. When asked by Dr. Tipp: “So you admit that to the physician as a therapeutist, the physician who cures, other rules and, therefore, other paragraphs of the oath of Hippocrates apply,” he gave the answer: “Yes, I do, very definitely.”

Consequently, experiments on human beings, performed for urgent reasons of a public character and ordered by the competent authorities of the state, cannot simply be considered as criminal merely because the experimental persons chosen by the state for the research work were not volunteers.

The prosecution ought to have brought additional evidence with regard to the individual experiments to prove why they were criminal, apart from the fact that the experimental persons were not volunteers.

The largest space in the indictment against Mrugowsky is taken up by the typhus experiments at Buchenwald. The prosecution does not contend that Mrugowsky participated in them personally, but I further think I have proved in my written arguments that he neither suggested nor ordered nor controlled these experiments; that he did not further them nor even approve of them.

Nevertheless for precaution’s sake, I also must prove that the experiments in question were not illegal and that under no aspect can they be considered as criminal since they were caused by an urgent state emergency. This proof can be produced in a particularly impressive manner in the case of the typhus experiments.

In the Flick trial,[60] the prosecution submitted Document NI-5222 which I have offered to the Tribunal. (_Mrugowsky, Ex. 99._) This document, which comes from the Labor Office Westphalia and is dated 3 February 1942, states that according to information from military quarters, until recently the number of Soviet prisoners of war dying of typhus was still 15,000 _daily_.

I think I need no longer emphasize that a most pressing state emergency is considered to exist if from one single epidemic there are, I repeat, 15,000 deaths daily in the camps for Russian prisoners alone.

On the other hand, the prosecution stated that from the beginning of 1942 until the beginning of 1945, a total of 142 persons died as a result of the typhus experiments at Buchenwald. I place these two figures intentionally at the beginning of my argument. They show that during the entire period of the experiments in Buchenwald, the number of fatalities amounted to one percent of the toll taken _every day_ by typhus in the _Russian prisoner camps alone_ in winter 1941-42. In addition to these victims in the Russian P. W. camps, one has to consider the enormous number of people who died of typhus among the civil population of the occupied eastern territories and the German Armed Forces.

It is clear that under these conditions drastic measures had to be taken. When judging the typhus experiments carried out in the concentration camp Buchenwald one must not forget that Germany was engaged in war at the time. Millions of soldiers had to give up their lives because they were called upon to fight by the state. The state employed the civil population for work according to state requirements. In doing so it made no distinction between men and women. The state ordered employment in chemical factories which was detrimental to health. It ordered work on the construction of new projectiles which involved considerable danger. When unexploded enemy shells of a new type were found at the front, or unexploded bombs of new construction were found after an air raid at home, it ordered gunnery officers to dismount such new shells or bombs with the aid of assistants in order to learn their construction. This implied great danger. Then the fillings of the new shells and bombs had to be examined by analytical chemists to determine their composition. In certain cases this work was detrimental to the health of the chemists and their assistants and always considerably dangerous.

In the same way the state ordered the medical men to make experiments with new weapons against dangerous diseases. These weapons were the vaccines. The fact that during these experiments not only the experimental persons but also the medical men were exposed to great danger was proved when Dr. Ding infected himself unintentionally at the beginning of his typhus experiments and became seriously ill with typhus.

With regard to such medical experiments, one has to agree on principle with the opinion of Professor Ivy and Professor Leibbrandt that such experiments may only be performed on volunteers. But even Professor Ivy admitted that there is a difference between those cases in which a scientific research worker starts such experiments on his own initiative and the cases in which the competent organs of the state authorize him to do so. He answered the question of whether the organ of the state is responsible in the affirmative; but he added that this has nothing to do with the moral responsibility of the experimenter towards the experimental subject.

If the experiment is ordered by the state, this moral responsibility of experimenter towards the experimental subject relates to the way in which the experiment is performed, not to the experiment itself.

The prosecution did not contest that the experiments at Buchenwald were carried out correctly. By way of precaution, I offered evidence for the correct execution in my closing brief.

In answer to a question by Dr. Sauter, Professor Ivy observed that he did not think the state could take the responsibility of ordering a scientist to kill a man in order to obtain knowledge.

The case with the typhus experiments is different. No order was given to kill a man in order to obtain knowledge. But the typhus experiments were dangerous experiments. Out of 724 experimental persons, 154 died. But these 154 deaths from the typhus experiments have to be compared with the 15,000 who died of typhus _every day_ in the camps for Soviet prisoners of war, and the innumerable deaths from typhus among the civilian population of the occupied eastern territories and the German troops. This enormous number of deaths led to the absolute necessity of having effective vaccines against typhus in sufficient quantity. The newly developed vaccines had been tested in the animal experiments as to their compatibility.

I explained this in detail in writing.

The Tribunal will have to decide whether, in view of the enormous extent of epidemic typhus, in view of the 15,000 deaths it was causing daily in the camps for Russian prisoners of war alone, the order given by the government authorities to test the typhus vaccines was justified or not. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the typhus experiments at Buchenwald were not criminal, since the prosecution did not contest that they were carried out according to the rules of medical science. In this case, any responsibility of Mrugowsky for these experiments is excluded. If, on the other hand, the Tribunal answered the question in the negative and declared the typhus experiments at Buchenwald to be criminal, then examination would have to be made as to whether Mrugowsky was responsible for them in any way.

In my written statement I explained in detail that Block 46 at Buchenwald, where the experiments were carried out, was not subordinate to Mrugowsky, but that Dr. Ding worked under the immediate orders of Grawitz. Out of the extensive evidence I offered to prove this fact, I only want to stress, one, the letter addressed by Grawitz to Mrugowsky in which Grawitz declared explicitly on 24 August 1944 that he gave his _consent_ for the series of experiments he mentioned in the letter to be performed in Block 46 at Buchenwald, and two, the letter addressed by Mrugowsky to Grawitz on 29 January 1945 in which he suggests the testing of a jaundice virus and writes: “Please obtain permission from the Reich Leader SS to perform the infection experiments _in the typhus experimental station of the concentration camp Buchenwald_.”

These two letters demonstrate that even in autumn 1944 and early in 1945 Mrugowsky could still only have performed a series of experiments in Block 46 with special permission. This refutes the assumption of the prosecution that Block 46 was subordinate to Mrugowsky.

But above all, I want to stress again the affidavit given by Dr. Morgen on 23 May 1947 in which he stated that when he investigated the occurrences in Block 46 at Buchenwald, Dr. Ding showed him an order signed by Grawitz in which Ding was commissioned explicitly to carry out the experiments.

Dr. Morgen has further stated that he had to report to Grawitz personally about the result of his investigations as an examining magistrate at Buchenwald. The results here, too, according to the affidavit given by Dr. Morgen showed that Grawitz ordered the experiments. On this occasion he called Dr. Ding “his man,” and said he would be very sorry if the investigation caused any charges to be brought against Dr. Ding, since he had employed him for the experiments. Morgen emphasized that the name of Mrugowsky was not mentioned in the course of his conversations with Ding and Grawitz. This clearly shows, I think, that Mrugowsky had nothing to do with Block 46 at Buchenwald. As further evidence that Ding was actually subordinate to Mrugowsky in Block 46, the prosecution referred to the sketches designed by Mrugowsky. (_NO-416, Pros. Ex. 22 and NO-417, Pros. Ex. 23._) These pictures show that the Division for Typhus and Virus Research in Buchenwald was subordinate to Mrugowsky; Mrugowsky does not deny this. Division for Typhus and Virus Research was only Block 50. Block 46 was called as formerly “Experimental Station of the Concentration Camp Buchenwald.” Mrugowsky’s letter just quoted shows this. Block 46 was merely attached to the Division for Typhus and Virus Research without establishing thereby any relationship of subordination to Mrugowsky. This is described and proved in detail in my closing brief.

From the two sketches designed by Mrugowsky, showing that the Division for Typhus and Virus Research was under his control from its establishment to the end of the war, nothing can be deduced, therefore, about whether he was Ding’s superior in Block 46.

This fact and the further evidence brought in my closing brief demonstrate that Block 46 at Buchenwald was not subordinate to Mrugowsky. Therefore, Mrugowsky bears no responsibility for the typhus experiments in Block 46.

In this connection, I want to emphasize that Mrugowsky never denied that he knew the typhus experiments at Buchenwald were ordered by Grawitz and carried out by Dr. Ding. He never denied that he saw, for instance, the report about the series I of the experiments, which he rewrote in his letter of May 5, 1942, and that he saw Ding’s essay about acridine which Ding sent to Grawitz for approval to publish 18 months after the experiments were completed, and which Grawitz then gave to Mrugowsky to return to Ding. But from this knowledge, no responsibility on the part of Mrugowsky can be deduced for the typhus experiments. The experiments were ordered by Himmler and Grawitz as his highest military superiors. As a medical officer of the Waffen SS, Mrugowsky had no possibility at all of opposing these experiments ordered by his superiors. When Grawitz first suggested the experiments, he resisted at once, and induced him to ask for a decision from Himmler as the highest superior. Himmler decided against Mrugowsky. Under these conditions Mrugowsky could do no more. His opposition, however, resulted in the fact that he was not commissioned with the experiments, but that Ding received the order for execution.

Nor has the prosecution brought any evidence to show that Mrugowsky subsequently intervened in any way in the typhus experiments at Buchenwald; that he furthered them, or participated in them in any way. On account of the fact that Mrugowsky knew about the typhus experiments, no charge can be made against him under criminal law, because neither in law nor in fact had he any possibility of preventing the experiments or enforcing their cessation later on.

The prosecution further based its charge against Mrugowsky on the depositions of several witnesses to the effect that he had been Ding’s chief in Block 46, also insofar as the experiments carried out by Ding in Block 46 were concerned. I have energetically contested this. All the statements produced by the prosecution in this respect originate from Ding. None of these statements comes from anybody who worked in Block 46 himself. It is significant that the prosecution has not been able to submit one single order given by Mrugowsky to Ding for the execution of typhus experiments, although its witness, Balachowsky, stated that Kogon had managed to collect and secure extensive evidence which he had handed over to the American Army. If there had been any written orders from Mrugowsky to Ding, the latter would certainly not have destroyed them for the sake of his own protection, and Kogon would have given them to the American Army with his other documents. It is true that the witness Kogon (whose unreliability I shall prove later) maintains that Mrugowsky gave mostly only oral orders to Ding. But he further testified that from the year 1943 onwards, Ding was no longer satisfied with oral orders from Mrugowsky but asked for them to be given in writing. In spite of this, not a single written order from Mrugowsky to Ding concerning the execution of a series of typhus experiments was produced.

The only witness who might be able to state from his own knowledge anything about the order given to Ding in respect of the typhus experiments is the witness Dr. Morgen. I just indicated that Morgen saw the order given by Grawitz to Ding for the execution of the typhus experiments, and that Grawitz personally told Dr. Morgen that Ding was his man at Buchenwald and said he employed him there.

The error of the witnesses, who stated that Mrugowsky had been Ding’s chief, results from the fact that Ding was dependent on Mrugowsky in respect of the production of vaccine in Block 50 and also concerning his activity as a hygienist. I proved in my closing brief that from 1942 to 1945 Ding was only working on the typhus vaccine experiments for about 2½ months, if one adds up all the hours he worked on them. All the rest of his activity in approximately 3 years was devoted to the vaccine production and the work of a hygienist, that is, work in which he was Mrugowsky’s subordinate. It is comprehensible that during the approximate period of 33 months when he worked for Mrugowsky, he received many more orders from him than from Grawitz for the execution of the 13 typhus vaccine experiments. It is, therefore, comprehensible that the main part of his correspondence under these circumstances was carried on with Mrugowsky.

In consequence of the description of the prosecution which hardly spoke of anything except the typhus vaccine experiments, and only produced documents thereon, the impression was certainly given that the typhus vaccine experiments were Ding’s main activity at Buchenwald. That is not so. In his main activity at Buchenwald, Ding was Mrugowsky’s subordinate. Therefore, because his main correspondence was with Mrugowsky and he called Mrugowsky his superior, one cannot assume that also in respect of the typhus vaccine experiments there was some connection between Mrugowsky and Ding, and that Mrugowsky participated in these experiments in any way or was responsible for them. The prosecution did not deny that such double subordination, as it existed between Ding on the one hand and Grawitz and Mrugowsky on the other, is possible in a military organization and happened frequently. I can refer also in this respect to the statement in my closing brief.

The testimony of the witness Kogon and Ding’s diary (_NO-265, Pros. Ex. 287_) are the chief items of evidence submitted by the prosecution against Mrugowsky. This is why, in my closing brief, I explained in detail that neither Kogon’s statement nor the Ding diary furnish any substantial proof. As to Kogon’s testimony, I want to emphasize once more the principal points:

Kogon described on the witness stand the dramatic circumstances under which he pretends to have saved the so-called Ding diary. I needn’t point out that the particular occurrences which happened when he saved the diary would have impressed him so much that he would not forget them if his statement were true. Therefore, he couldn’t possibly give a different description of this event on several different occasions. In fact, in the doctors’ trial and in the Pohl trial,[61] he gave two reports about the way he allegedly saved the diary. These reports differ so fundamentally and in a manner which could only be possible if his contention that he saved the diary is untrue, and the descriptions he gives of this event are pure invention.

Kogon stated in the doctors’ trial that Ding sorted the secret documents to be burned in Block 46. While Ding and Dietzsch went into the adjoining room for a moment, he threw the diary and a heap of papers into a box to save them from destruction. Two days later he had told Ding that he had saved the diary and a heap of other papers from being destroyed and received permission to fetch them from Block 46; otherwise, he wouldn’t have been able to get them out. He fetched them and kept them ever since. This description is quite plausible and would be hard to refute if there was not Kogon’s own testimony in the Pohl trial.

In the Pohl trial, the same Kogon testified about three months later that he was standing with Ding and Dietzsch at the same table when the secret documents were sorted for destruction. Suddenly Ding pushed the diary and other papers towards him. He took them and carried them to Block 50, together with Ding. Ding did not know at this time that Kogon had the diary and the other documents with him, but he told Ding this on the same day.

A more striking contradiction than these two statements about the saving of the diary is hardly possible. If Kogon had really saved the diary in the way he described in the doctors’ trial, then the moment when he threw the diary into the box and his reflections during the two days before he told Ding that the diary had not been burned would have remained indelibly in his memory. He would have remembered the way from Block 46 to Block 50 to fetch the diary and the way back with the diary so well, that a different description would be impossible. Also, if the preservation of the diary had occurred in the way described by Kogon in the Pohl trial, it certainly would have been recollected by him so clearly that a different description would also be impossible. So the two descriptions about the preservation of the diary, differing so fundamentally from each other, can only be explained in two ways. Either Kogon’s statement is untrue and he didn’t save the diary at all—in this case, if he told the Tribunal a falsehood about such an important point, then his whole testimony is unreliable—or Kogon must have such a bad memory that his contradictions in his testimony can be explained therefrom. In this case, too, his entire testimony would have no probative value on account of his bad memory.

The Dietzsch testimony submitted by me speaks against the correctness of Kogon’s statement on the saving of the diary. Dietzsch states that during the destruction of the secret documents in Block 46 Ding tore up the diary in his presence and threw it into the lighted stove where it was burned. Dietzsch declared explicitly that Ding made sure that all the documents were entirely burned after the destruction of the papers was finished.

I should say that Dietzsch’s statement combined with the contradiction between the two statements of Kogon’s proves that what Kogon said about the saving of the diary is a falsehood.

In my closing brief I dealt in detail with still further points on which the statements made by Kogon in the doctors’ trial and in the Pohl trial contradict each other in a similarly marked manner concerning the preservation of the diary. It will not be necessary to repeat all these arguments here. I should like to refer the Tribunal to them.

The second main evidence of the prosecution against Mrugowsky is the diary which is said to have been saved. The two fantastic descriptions of the saving of the diary given by Kogon are unreliable. Therefore, Dietzsch must be believed. He said that Ding burned the original diary of Block 46 in his presence. This statement is supported by the opinion given by the handwriting experts, Zettner and Nastvogel, treated in detail in my closing brief.

In the meantime the prosecution declared while discussing the Beiglboeck evidence that it could have handwriting examined to determine the date of its origin at an institute in Frankfurt and also documents investigated in every way. The prosecution thereupon stressed explicitly that I also had the Ding diary examined by experts.

The Ding diary is of importance for the prosecution for the charges against several defendants. Therefore, the prosecution ought to have found it more important to have the genuineness of the Ding diary examined rather than the Beiglboeck documents. Ding signed in ink. So the institute at Frankfurt would have been able to ascertain without any difficulty whether the signature on the first page is several years older than the signature on the last page. Furthermore, the institute could have ascertained without any difficulty whether the whole diary from the end of the year 1941 till spring 1945 was written on exactly the same paper or not. But the prosecution did not hand the diary to this institute for examination. This fact shows that it was itself convinced that such examination would not have given a result favorable to the prosecution.

In my opinion, this is a particularly strong argument for the assumption that the diary was really composed and written subsequently. I also want to refer the Tribunal to my closing brief with reference to this point. The probative value of a diary lies in the fact that the man who kept it cannot foresee the future development when making his entries. Therefore it is to be presumed that the entries portray the events objectively and in their entirety. If a document which is subsequently composed is given the external form of a diary, one can deduce therefrom the intention to influence the reader in a certain direction and also to deceive him for this purpose. That is the reason why any record written subsequently and made up in the form of a diary has no probative value.

The prosecution tried to show that the Ding diary is of probative value by comparing its contents with a number of documents having the same contents as the entries in the diary. In my closing brief I dealt with these documents in detail and proved that they all, without exception, came from Ding. All documents which the prosecution compared with the diary, Ding still had at hand when he made the belated compilation after the original diary had been burned. They are vouchers he used for the entries he made in the diary we have now. Therefore, it cannot be deduced from the conformity of these documents and the diary that the latter is good evidence.

One of the documents the prosecution compared with the diary is the so-called work report of Ding. This work report is really only a draft which was not signed and was not sent to Mrugowsky. I explained this in detail in my closing brief and offered evidence for it. According to Kogon’s statement, this draft of the report was written in Block 50 by the second compound clerk. Such draft has no probative value unless it is signed by the person who should sign it. In this instance, it would have been Ding. Mr. Hardy admitted that this work report was only prepared for signature by Ding. He thereby admitted that it was not signed. Therefore, the draft has no probative value. If these three main elements of evidence fail, Kogon’s statement, the work report, and the Ding dairy, the chief part of the evidence brought forward against Mrugowsky fails.

The prosecution contended in its summing-up that the experimental subjects volunteered neither for the typhus experiments nor for the other experiments at Buchenwald. In respect of the other experiments, this is not correct. I shall deal with this later. In respect to the typhus experiments, it may be correct that most of the experimental subjects did not volunteer.

On the other hand, the closing brief of the prosecution shows no allegation for the period up to the fall of 1943 that Mrugowsky had anything to do with the selection of the prisoners for the experiments. This is correct and was also put in in my closing brief. In autumn 1943 according to the contentions of the prosecution, again relying on Kogon’s testimony, Ding is said to have asked Mrugowsky for the experimental subjects to be chosen by the Reich Leader SS. This statement of Kogon’s is also untrue. I have pointed this out in detail in my written statement.

In this connection, the prosecution mentions Himmler’s order of 27 February 1944 relating to the selection of the prisoners by the Reich police agency. But this order of Himmler was not given pursuant to a suggestion made by Mrugowsky. It is really due to the attempts of Dr. Morgen. He explained this accurately in his affidavit of 23 May 1947, which I offered in evidence.

So it is an established fact that until autumn 1943 Mrugowsky had nothing to do with the selection of the prisoners, and that from this time on, the prisoners for the typhus experiments were chosen by the Reich criminal police agency pursuant to Himmler’s order suggested by Dr. Morgen, so that _after_ this time Mrugowsky had _also_ nothing to do with the choice of the prisoners.

The prosecution calls the typhus experiments criminal, in particular, because control persons were used and above all because of the alleged “passage persons”.[62] As to the control persons, I explained at length in my closing brief that such vaccine experiments are impossible without the use of control subjects and lead to no practical result without them.

If one takes the Ding diary for information, it appears that in a number of test series the cultural virus used was no longer pathogenic to human beings. If no control persons had been infected, the fact that the experimental persons were not taken ill would have been explained as a consequence of the protection obtained by the vaccination. This would have led to entirely wrong deductions and to the use of inferior vaccines in practice. If one considers the typhus experiments as admissible, the use of control subjects is, therefore, indispensable. I explained this in detail in my closing brief.

On the other hand there was no justification for the use of passage persons who were infected merely in order to have live virus always on hand. I have demonstrated in my written arguments that such passage persons were never used. Until April 1943 there was no reason to use them. For until April 1943 it is stated explicitly in the Ding diary that in each series of experiments the infection was performed by means of cultural virus bred in the yolk sacs of hens’ eggs which Ding obtained from the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin. After 11 April 1943, Ding infected with fresh blood taken from persons suffering from typhus. But during this period, too, the use of passage persons was superfluous because Ding always had persons at his disposal who had contracted typhus spontaneously, and he could take the fresh infected blood from them.

If the prosecution had wanted to bring evidence to show that passage persons were used in Block 46, this could have been done best of all by Ding and Dietzsch. The prosecution produced statements from both in which the question of the passage persons is not mentioned. The prosecution knew from the examination of Mrugowsky on the witness stand that he denied the use of passage persons. When I said at the end of the presentation of my evidence that I did not call Dietzsch to the witness stand but only offered an affidavit from him, Mr. Hardy asked the Tribunal for permission to interrogate Dietzsch on certain facts.

However, he never produced a record of such an interrogation. This is further evidence that Dietzsch did not confirm the use of passage persons. All the witnesses who testified on the use of passage persons did not work in Block 46. They, therefore, know nothing from their own observation, but only through third persons. Dr. Morgen discovered nothing about passage persons during his investigations as an examining magistrate in Block 46 in Buchenwald. So there is no conclusive evidence of any kind to show that passage persons were used in Block 46. On the contrary, I proved in my closing brief that passage persons actually were _not_ used.

If the Tribunal were, nevertheless, to assume that the use of passage persons was proved, there would be no guilt of Mrugowsky involved in the use of these passage persons because I demonstrated that Ding was not his subordinate in respect of his activity in Block 46, and also there is no evidence whatever to show that he even as much as knew about the use of passage persons.

In my written statements, I then dealt in detail with the experiments with acridine preparations within the framework of the typhus experiments. I proved that Ding did not obtain these preparations from Mrugowsky but from the I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G. There is no evidence whatever to show that Mrugowsky had any knowledge of these experiments performed by Ding.

Ding’s report on the acridine experiments submitted for publication was handed to Mrugowsky by Grawitz only about 18 months after the termination of the experiments. Therefore, no charge can be made against Mrugowsky under criminal law for the experiments with acridine preparations which caused a particularly high number of deaths.

_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR
DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY_

* * * * *

_Convalescence Serum, Blood Conservation, and Blood Serum Conservation_
CONVALESCENCE SERUM

In Ding’s diary (_NO-265, Pros. Ex. 287_) two entries are found concerning the taking of blood for the purpose of extracting convalescence serum. During the period from 26 May to 12 June 1944, 6,500 cc. of blood were taken from 15 defervescent typhus patients, and between 13 October and 31 October 1944, 20,800 cc. of blood were taken from 44 defervescent typhus patients. The blood was taken between the 12th [14th] and the 21st day following the disappearance of the fever. Thus an average of 465 cc. for each patient can be calculated. The witness for the prosecution, Kogon, has testified on this question. (_Tr. pp. 1192-3._) His statement contains several serious misinterpretations. In the first place, it must be stressed that the taking of blood from a convalescent patient by no means constitutes an “experiment,” as indicated by Mr. McHaney. What would be the experiment in that case? The only thing to find out is whether the person in question is suitable or not for the taking of blood.

Even Kogon admits that the taking of blood from convalescent patients is an ordinary procedure. I have proved the same thing through Mrugowsky 14, Mrugowsky Exhibit 37. The same appears from the affidavit of the expert, Professor Dr. Siebeck. (_Mrugowsky 15, Mrugowsky Ex. 38._) There it says:

“* * * It is correct that in the case of typhus, convalescence
serum is frequently used for therapeutical purposes * * *.”

The expert, Professor Dr. Vollhardt, also confessed to the same opinion. It is then a fact that the taking of blood from former typhus patients during convalescence is, in principle, in accordance with medical usage.

It has been proved that no objections can be raised against the treatment in Block 46. Accordingly, it is very improbable that the physician in charge should have exposed particularly asthenic patients to the taking of blood. The witness Dorn has stated that the delivery of drugs to Block 46 took place through the prison hospital and that he personally discharged the deliveries twice a week. Furthermore, the examining judge, Dr. Morgen (_Mrugowsky 23, Mrugowsky Ex. 26_) demonstrated that even in 1944—

“* * * the treatment and supply of the sick persons was careful
and good in every respect. According to the impression I gained,
the sick persons were treated similar to those in a good
military hospital.”

This is also confirmed through the indictment of Morgen against Koch. (_NO-2366, Pros. Ex. 526._)

Consequently, there is no reason to doubt that they were in a condition favorable to the taking of blood and that this constituted no danger for them. Mrugowsky expressed his opinion on this question during his examination. (_Tr. p. 5166._) He pointed out that the taking of blood in a quantity not exceeding 500 cc. is in complete compliance with medical regulations and that the convalescent patients received additional food as compensation for the loss of blood. In his affidavit Dr. Ellenbeck propounded his view concerning the extraction of typhus convalescence serum. (_Mrugowsky 120, Mrugowsky Ex. 110._) From this it appears that Ellenbeck also received blood from patients belonging to the Waffen SS, consequently not exclusively from prisoners in the concentration camps. In the above-mentioned document (_Mrugowsky 15, Mrugowsky Ex. 38_) Professor Siebeck expressly points out:

“It is at least quite improbable, if not impossible, for human
beings, who are in the convalescent stage of typhus, to be so
harmed by a single bloodletting of 439 cc. that they die after a
certain period has elapsed in consequence of the loss of blood.”

The same opinion is endorsed by Professor Dr. Vollhardt.

In face of this evidence no support is to be found for the assertion of Kogon that many convalescent patients died at that time, nor for his suspicion that they died as a consequence of the taking of blood. The result of this exposition then is that:

1. The taking of blood for the purpose of extraction of convalescence serum is not an experiment but a medical measure. It is not criminal but customary throughout the world.

2. The bleedings were carried out according to the regulations of medical science.

3. The quantities taken were below the usual limit, probably even very far below.

4. It is absolutely impossible that any person whatsoever died as a consequence of the taking of blood.

On the other hand, the blood pressure of persons convalescing from typhus, in particular, is often too low. Their blood vessels are still not as elastic as before. In such cases, a withdrawal of blood within the normal limits is very often a practiced method of relieving the circulation.

PRESERVATION OF BLOOD SERUM

Furthermore, Kogon states that Dr. Ellenbeck carried out the taking of blood in the small camp to obtain a stock of blood serum. (_Tr. p. 1192._) Kogon further states that in the part of the Buchenwald concentration camp, where blood was taken, there were enough volunteers and they received additional food. He answered the question as to whether anybody died as a consequence of the taking of blood as follows:

“* * * It is impossible to establish whether anybody died
directly or indirectly as a consequence of the taking of blood *
* *.”

Dr. Ellenbeck made the following statement concerning that question:

“From the fall of 1944 onwards, as far as I know by request of
the leading physician of the concentration camps, the department
for the conservation of blood produced a conserved blood serum
to be used for the emergency treatment of prisoners since drugs
became more and more scarce. I had nothing whatsoever to do with
the drawing of blood and the supply. I had the blood sent to
Berlin. On account of reasons to be found in the aerial warfare,
the production of this conserved blood serum was only very
small.

“Kogon maintained that SS medical personnel from Berlin drew the
blood for this conserved blood serum. That is untrue. No SS
medical personnel came from Berlin to Buchenwald in order to
fetch blood, but ordinary couriers came who were not in a
position to draw the blood.” (_Mrugowsky 120, Mrugowsky Ex.
110._)

Therefore these amounts of blood, too, were only small. Ellenbeck can state positively that such stocks of serum were not made for other purposes in his laboratory. The medical officer of the concentration camp gave him the order. The stocks of serum he had prepared were made available to him again. * * *

“To the question as to whether people died after the removal of
blood, I refer to the above-quoted statements of the
specialists, Professor Dr. Vollhardt and Professor Dr. Siebeck.”

I would also like to point out that according to Kogon’s statement, Dr. Ellenbeck himself saw to it that the prisoners actually received their additional food after the removal of blood. The prisoners volunteered for the removal of blood and received additional food for it. That somebody died as a consequence of the removal of blood is a statement without any basis.

I cannot imagine how a criminal character can be attached to this removal of blood. The taking of blood from volunteers is not criminal in any way.

* * * * *

d. Evidence

_Prosecution Documents_

Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
NO-429 281 Extract from the affidavit of defendant 555
Hoven, 24 October 1946, concerning
typhus and virus experiments.
NO-265 287 Diary of the division for typhus and 557
virus research at the Institute of
Hygiene of the Waffen SS, 1941 to 1945
(Ding diary).
NO-257 283 Extract from the affidavit of Dr. Erwin 572
Schuler, 20 July 1945, concerning
typhus experiments.
NO-571 285 1943 work report for department for 573
typhus and virus research.
NO-121 293 Letter from Haagen to Hirt, 15 November 578
1943, concerning prisoners to be used
as experimental subjects for tests with
typhus vaccine.
NO-122 298 Letter dictated by Rose, addressed to 579
Haagen, 13 December 1943, concerning
experimental subjects for vaccine
experiments.
NO-123 303 Letter from Haagen to Hirt, 9 March 1944, 580
concerning experiments conducted with
typhus vaccine and requesting
experimental subjects.
NO-139 317 Letter from Dr. Grunske to Haagen, 7 581
March 1944, concerning reports on
yellow fever virus experiments
requested by a Japanese medical
officer.

_Defense Documents_

Doc. No. Def. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
Rose 16 Rose 12 Extracts from the affidavit of Professor 581
Otto Lenz, director of the Robert Koch
Institute in Berlin.
Rose 46 Rose 20 Extract from a certified statement, 4 582
March 1947, of J. Oerskov, M. D.,
director of the State Serum Institute
in Copenhagen.

_Testimony_

Extracts from the testimony of prosecution witness Eugen Kogon 583 Extracts from the testimony of defendant Rose 586 Extract from the testimony of defendant Mrugowsky 595 Extracts from the testimony of defense witness Dr. Eugen Haagen 606

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-429
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 281

EXTRACT FROM THE AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT HOVEN, 24 OCTOBER 1946,
CONCERNING TYPHUS AND VIRUS EXPERIMENTS

I, Waldemar Hoven, being duly sworn, depose and state:

* * * * *

_Typhus and Virus Experiments_

4. In the latter part of 1941 an experimental station was established in the Buchenwald concentration camp in order to determine the effectiveness of various typhus vaccines. This section was called the “Typhus Experimental Station—Division for Typhus and Virus Research” and was under the direct supervision of Dr. Ding, alias Schuler. This experimental station was set up in Block 46 of the camp. The Hygiene Institute of the Waffen SS in Berlin, under the command of Dr. Joachim Mrugowsky, received all the reports of these activities and Dr. Ding took orders from Mrugowsky. In the early days, that is, between 1941 and the summer of 1943, Dr. Ding had many meetings in Berlin with Dr. Karl Genzken concerning his work at Buchenwald in connection with the typhus experiments. Dr. Ding told me that Dr. Genzken had a special interest in these matters and that he sent him reports at various times. Dr. Ding also said that Dr. Karl Genzken was one of his superiors. From my association with Dr. Ding, I understood that the chain of command in the supervision of the typhus experimental station was as follows: Reichsarzt SS Grawitz, Genzken, Mrugowsky, and Ding.

5. I can recollect that Dr. Genzken gave orders to Dr. Ding in January 1943 to enlarge the experimental station. At this time Block 60 was cleaned out and made into a station for the production of the various vaccines to be used in the experiments at Block 46. From this time on the experimental station was known as the “Division for Typhus and Virus Research of the Hygiene Institute of the Waffen SS”. Then in the summer of 1943, Dr. Genzken turned all his duties over to Dr. Mrugowsky, and from that time on Genzken no longer actively participated in these matters. I can recall meeting Dr. Mrugowsky in the home of Dr. Ding on one of his visits to Buchenwald.

6. Inasmuch as I was constantly associated with Dr. Ding at Buchenwald, we became very friendly. I frequently discussed matters with Ding and visited his experimental station from time to time. As a matter of fact, Dr. Ding had to go to Berlin for discussions with Dr. Mrugowsky and others nearly 3 days out of every two weeks, and on such occasions I was in charge of the typhus institute. However, when Ding went to Berlin the experiments were discontinued until he returned.

7. The experiments in Block 46 in the Buchenwald concentration camp were conducted as follows: One group of victims was first vaccinated with the typhus vaccine and then infected with the typhus virus. In order to contrast the effectiveness of the vaccine, another group of inmates was merely infected with the typhus virus without previous vaccination. Between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1943 about 500 inmates of the Buchenwald concentration camp were used in these experiments. During my time about 10 percent of the total number of the inmates used, died as a result. I heard that a larger number of the victims died after my time, that is, about 20 percent.