Chapter IV: Conflicting Jurisdictions (1)

The principal source of strife between the Inquisition and the other authorities arose from its claim to exclusive competence in all cases involving those connected with it and their dependents. This gave rise to perpetual conflicts, conducted with the utmost tenacity, which filled the land with confusion and, in many cases, rendered the administration of justice a mockery. For two centuries the monarchs vainly endeavored to keep the peace by repeated efforts to define the boundaries between the rival jurisdictions and the methods of settling their differences. The tireless efforts, on the one side, of the Holy Office to extend its authority and increase its emoluments caused it constantly to violate compacts, while the jealousy of the civil magistracy on the other and its natural desire to repel intrusion rendered it prompt to use whatever means lay in its power. The struggle was unequal against the superior weapons furnished by papal faculties and against the royal favor which was with the Inquisition, but the conflict was maintained with marvellous constancy, supported by popular sympathy, and the time of the king and his advisers was frittered away in deciding a continuous stream of petty quarrels, growing out of trivial incidents, but assuming portentous proportions through the violent methods which had aggravated them.

To understand the claim of the Inquisition to exclusive cognizance of the cases of its subordinates it is necessary to bear in mind the benefit of clergy, through which, from the early middle ages, all clerics were exempted from the jurisdiction of the laity and were subjected wholly to the spiritual courts. This amounted virtually to immunity for crime, both because those courts were debarred from rendering judgements of blood and because of the inevitable favoritism manifested to those of their own cloth.[1047] As civilization advanced the disorders caused by a class, thus emboldened in wrong-doing by impunity, were the source of constant solicitude to rulers and were deplored by right-thinking churchmen. In this, Spain was no exception. In a project of instructions drawn up by a Spanish bishop for the delegates to the Lateran Council in 1512, the crimes and scandals perpetrated by married clerks and those in the lower orders, through expectation of immunity, are dwelt upon as reasons for a change; there were daily conflicts between the spiritual and secular courts, leading to interdicts cast on cities and some universal legislation by the Church was desirable.[1048] No such remedy was adopted, and when the Council of Trent gave promise of reform, the Spanish prelates, in contrast with the Inquisition, which made every effort to extend its jurisdiction over offenders, proposed in 1562 to the council that married clerks wearing secular habits should not enjoy protection from secular justice.[1049] In 1544, Fernando de Aragon, when Viceroy of Valencia, declared that his principal trouble lay with the Church, of which the chief object was to protect evil-doers and liberate them from his justice, an opinion in which he was heartily seconded by the saintly Tomás de Vilanova, then recently appointed archbishop.[1050]

[Sidenote: _LATITUDE IN SECULAR AFFAIRS_]

Yet the marked aversion in Spain to ecclesiastical encroachment led to repeated enactments restraining spiritual jurisdiction within strict limits. In a series of laws, dating from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, Henry II, Juan II, Henry IV, Ferdinand and Isabella and Charles V endeavored by the severest penalties to repress its inevitable tendency to extend itself, whether by seizure of the persons or property of the laity or by entertaining cases between laymen. Ferdinand and Isabella, in 1493, even threatened half confiscation and perpetual exile from Spain for all who, under any pretext, aided ecclesiastical judges in taking prisoners from secular officials or who assisted them in any way.[1051] In addition to this was the _recurso de fuerza_ through which appeal lay to the royal courts or to the _Sala de Gobierno_ whenever the spiritual courts refused an appeal or heard secular cases or those in which laymen were concerned.[1052] It is necessary to bear in mind this tendency and these restrictions on ecclesiastical jurisdiction to estimate properly the latitude obtained by the Inquisition in purely secular affairs.

Whether, at its inception, the Inquisition enjoyed the prerogative of exclusive cognizance of cases involving its officials it would be impossible now to say. They were mostly laymen and as such were subject to the secular courts, while, in the popular opposition elicited by their proceedings, especially in the Aragonese kingdoms, there might be anticipated danger that they would be terrorized or prosecuted unless protected by being reserved for judgement by their own tribunals. The earliest mandate to this effect that I have met is a cédula of Ferdinand, March 26, 1488, addressed to all the officers of justice in Catalonia ordering them, under penalty of two thousand florins and the royal wrath, to take no cognizance of anything concerning the ministers and familiars of the Inquisition; all their acts in such cases are declared invalid, and any one whom they may have arrested is at once to be transferred to the tribunal, showing that, at least in Catalonia, no such exemption from secular justice had previously been recognized.[1053]

Yet in this unlimited decree Ferdinand had overlooked details which necessarily presented themselves in practice. Was this exemption from secular jurisdiction confined to the _titulados y asalariados_ or did it extend to the unsalaried commissioners and familiars, receiving no pay, pursuing their customary avocations and only called upon for occasional service? There was also a question about the servants of officials, for an abuse of the spiritual courts had included those of clerics. Then it might be asked whether the protection accorded to the person of the official extended to his property in civil suits, with the wide avenue thus opened to abuses of many kinds. There was, moreover, a well-settled principle of law that the accuser or plaintiff must seek the court of the defendant; if, in violation of this, the official could enjoy what was known as the active _fuero_ as well as the passive--that is, if he as plaintiff could bring suit or prosecution before his own tribunal--his power of offence would be vastly increased, together with his opportunities for tyrannizing over all around him.

These were questions which had to be decided. It would seem that the inquisitors construed their powers in the most liberal fashion, giving rise to abuses which called for repression and a limitation of their jurisdiction. The reformatory Instructions of 1498, accordingly, order them not to defend officials and their servants in civil cases and only officials in criminal actions, a rule repeated in a carta acordada of May 4th of the same year.[1054] This excluded servants wholly and deprived officials of the _fuero_ in civil matters, but it was soon modified by Ferdinand, in a letter of January 12, 1500, to the Catalonia tribunal, ordering it not to interfere with the royal court in a certain suit, and expressing the rule that the plaintiff must seek the court of the defendant.[1055] It was impossible however to restrain inquisitors from exceeding their jurisdiction and he was obliged, August 20 1502, to repeat his injunctions to the same tribunal, in consequence of complaints from the Diputados. The inquisitors were roundly taken to task for lending themselves to the schemes of the receiver in buying up debts and claims and then collecting them through the tribunal; they were told that they must defend none but salaried officials actually in service; if they are plaintiffs in civil suits they must apply to the court of the defendants, while if they are defendants the plaintiffs must seek the tribunal. To evoke other cases, he says, causes great scandal and will lead to troubles which must be prevented. A fortnight later he emphasized this about a civil case which they had evoked from the royal court; they must remit it back and not have to be written to again as he would not tolerate such proceedings.[1056] Thus familiars and servants were not entitled to the _fuero_, or inquisitorial jurisdiction, while salaried officials enjoyed it, active and passive, in criminal actions and only passive in civil suits.

[Sidenote: _INTERFERENCE WITH COURSE OF JUSTICE_]

Unduly favorable as was this to the Inquisition, the tribunals paid no attention to its limitations; they welcomed all who sought their judgement seat, and the desire for it of those who had no claim on it shows that they had a reputation of selling justice. One or two cases will exemplify this and show how good were the grounds of complaint by the people. There was a certain Juan de Sant Feliu of Murviedro, whose father and mother-in-law had been condemned for heresy, and to whom Ferdinand had kindly granted their confiscations, including the dowry of his wife. In 1505 the town of Murviedro farmed out to him and his wife the impost on meat for 11,100 sueldos a year; he died and, in the settlement of his account, he was found to owe the town a hundred and fifty libras, which it proceeded to collect from his sons in the court of the governor. Under pretext that his property had been confiscated and restored, they appealed in 1511 to the tribunal of Valencia, which promptly evoked the case and inhibited the court from further action, whereupon the town complained to Ferdinand who ordered the case remitted to the governor. Unabashed by this, in 1513, Sant Feliu's heirs on the same pretext obtained the intervention of the tribunal in another case, in which Doña Violante de Borja had sued them for 7500 sueldos which she had entrusted to him to invest in a censo of the town of Murviedro; the censo had been paid off and he had concealed the fact and kept the money. Judgement was given against them, when the inquisitors interposed and prohibited the royal court from further action. Ferdinand expressed much indignation at their interference with justice in a matter wholly foreign to their jurisdiction and ordered the prohibition to be withdrawn. Even more arbitrary was the action, in 1511, of the Majorca tribunal, when Pedro Tornamirandez sued the heirs of Francisco Ballester for some cattle and obtained judgement in the court of the royal lieutenant, whereupon the heirs appealed to the inquisitor who evoked the case and forbade further proceedings in the secular court. None of the parties had any connection with the Inquisition and there was not even the pretext of confiscation; it was a mere wanton interference with the course of justice, only explicable by some illicit gain, and when Ferdinand's attention was called to it he ordered the inquisitor to revoke his action.[1057] If, under Ferdinand's incessant vigilance the Inquisition thus boldly prostituted its powers, we can appreciate how well-founded, under his careless successors, were the complaints of those who suffered under wrongs perpetrated under the pretence of serving God.

In the Catalan Concordia of 1512 there was an attempt to do away with some of these abuses and the bull _Pastoralis officii_ of Leo X, confirming the Concordia, marks another stage in the development of the _fuero_. No one, he said, could be cited save in his own ordinary court at the instance of an official or familiar; if it were attempted, all acts concerning it were invalid and the inquisitors must condemn the plaintiff in double the expenses and damage; if any official bought property in suit, or on which a suit was expected, he could be cited before a court not his own and if he claimed property under seizure by a secular judge, the latter could disregard all inhibitions issued by inquisitors; moreover inquisitors should have no cognizance in matters concerning the private property of officials. While thus striking at some of the more flagrant abuses of the _fuero_, Leo opened the door to worse ones by admitting familiars and the commensals or servants of officials to participation in the immunities of the Inquisition.[1058] The bull, in fact, is in accordance with the Instructions of 1514, as issued by Inquisitor-general Mercader, and we shall see how completely the restrictive clauses were ignored while those admitting familiars and servants were developed.[1059]

[Sidenote: _IMMUNITY OF SERVANTS_]

The question as to familiars and servants was not absolutely settled for some years. It is true that, in 1515 at Logroño, when the corregidor arrested Martin de Viana, a servant of the secretary Lezana, and refused to surrender him to the tribunal, he and his deputy and alguazil were excommunicated and the Suprema on appeal subjected them all to fines and humiliating penance.[1060] On the other hand, in 1516 at Valladolid, when Alonso de Torres, servant of Inquisitor Frias, was thrown into the royal prison, the inquisitor did not reclaim him but procured the interposition of the Suprema, which ordered him to be released on bail and then, after nine months had passed without a charge being brought against him, he procured a royal cédula for the release of his bondsmen.[1061] Whatever doubts may have existed on the subject were removed, in 1518, by a cédula of Charles V, reciting that in Jaen the secular courts assumed cognizance of criminal cases concerning officials and familiars and their servants, which was contrary to the privileges of the Holy Office, wherefore he forbade it strictly for the future.[1062] After this the Inquisition had no hesitation in insisting on its rights. When, in 1532, the corregidor and officials of Toledo were excommunicated for punishing the servant of an inquisitor and the Empress-regent Isabel wrote to the tribunal to absolve them, the Suprema instructed it not to obey her.[1063] She learned the lesson and, in 1535, when ordering some servants of inquisitors and familiars to be remitted to the Inquisition, she said it was accustomed to have their cases, both civil and criminal, and it was her pleasure that this should be observed.[1064]

The civil authorities were somewhat dilatory in recognizing the immunity of servants, and cases continued to occur in which the tribunals vindicated their jurisdiction energetically. About 1565 two officers of the royal justice in Barcelona arrested a servant of Inquisitor Mexia in a brothel where he was quarrelling with a woman, for which they were thrown into the secret prison as though they were heretics and were banished for three months, while the judge of the royal criminal court, who had something to do with the matter, was compelled to appear in the audience-chamber and undergo a reprimand in the presence of the assembled officials of the tribunal. The virtual immunity for offenders resulting from the privilege is illustrated by the case, in the same tribunal, of Pedro Juncar, servant of the receiver, who murdered the janitor of the Governor of Catalonia; the governor arrested him but was forced to surrender him to the tribunal, which discharged him with a sentence of exile for a year or two and costs.[1065] The influence on social order of conferring immunity on such a class can readily be conceived.

The privilege of the fuero was not confined to servants but was extended in whatever direction the ingenuity and perseverance of the tribunal could enforce it. Penitents who were fulfilling their terms of penance were claimed and the claim was confirmed, in 1547, by Prince Philip. In Valencia and Barcelona the workmen employed on the buildings of the Inquisition were given nominal appointments under which they claimed immunity. In Lima the tribunal complained to the viceroy of the arrest of a bricklayer who was working for it, but it got no satisfaction. In Barcelona the tribunal granted inhibition with censures on the civil court, in which the brother of a familiar was suing a merchant on a protested bill of exchange.[1066]

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _IMMUNITY OF FAMILIARS_]

We have seen the limitations imposed by Ferdinand and the bull _Pastoralis officii_ and the reiteration of the principle that the plaintiff must seek justice in the court of the defendant. As far as regards Castile, Charles V had overthrown this in criminal matters for both officials and familiars. Civil cases remained in a somewhat undetermined state, especially concerning familiars, the inquisitors endeavoring to grasp as far as they could both the active and passive fuero. When, in 1551, complaints came from Valencia that the tribunal was collecting debts for familiars, Inquisitor-general Valdés wrote that he did not know how this had come to pass and called for precise information as to when it had commenced and generally as to the method observed in the civil cases, active and passive, of familiars, so that he could answer Prince Philip.[1067] There was a good deal of uncertainty about the whole subject; the courts were restive and the situation was becoming strained. In the endeavor to settle it, Charles, in 1542, reissued his edict of 1518 with a _sobre carta_ emphatically commanding its strict observance and forbidding the secular courts from any cognizance of the criminal cases of officials or familiars.[1068] This did not mend matters. The courts persisted in exercising jurisdiction over familiars, the _recurso de fuerza_ was freely invoked and competencias multiplied. Both sides appealed to Charles, who was in Germany, and this time the opponents of the Inquisition gained the advantage. Prince Philip, as regent, issued a cédula, May 15, 1545, in which he described how laymen, subject to the secular courts, obtained immunity for their crimes on pretext of being familiars; how the tribunals, in defending them, cast excommunications on the officers of justice, through which scandals and disquiet were daily increasing, and the course of justice was impeded. The familiars were in no way entitled to immunity from the secular courts, as they were not officials, although a different custom existed in Aragon and the inquisitors pretended to it in Castile, under the cédula of 1518 and the sobrecédula of 1542, but these were both irregular, not having been despatched by the Council and Secretariat of Castile as is customary and necessary. Therefore in order that delinquent familiars may not remain unpunished and be induced to commit crimes by the prospect of immunity, the emperor ordered the matter to be thoroughly discussed and meanwhile the cédulas of 1518 and 1542 to be suspended, in conformity with which they are declared to be suspended, inquisitors are ordered no longer to take cognizance of the cases of familiars and the secular courts are instructed to prosecute them in accordance with the laws.[1069]

The Inquisition did not acquiesce tamely in this defeat, which was aggravated by the secular courts interpreting it as giving them jurisdiction over officials as well as familiars. It protested and resisted and showed so little obedience that the Córtes of Valladolid, in 1548, asked that it should be compelled to confine itself to its proper functions in matters of faith.[1070] Quarrels and recursos de fuerza continued and finally the whole question was referred to a junta consisting of two members each from the Suprema and Council of Castile. The representatives of the Inquisition conceded that it had been in fault in appointing too many familiars and in claiming for them all the exemptions of salaried officials; those of the Council admitted that the courts had erred in interfering with civil and criminal cases properly appertaining to the Holy Office. Mutual concessions were made, resulting in what was known as the Concordia of Castile, March 10, 1553--an agreement which the Inquisition admitted, a century later, that neither side had observed.[1071]

[Sidenote: _THE LAW IN CASTILE_]

The Concordia was silent as to the salaried officials, thus leaving them in possession of the active and passive fuero in both civil and criminal cases. It devoted itself wholly to the familiars who, in this as in so much else, were the leading source of trouble. After regulating, as we shall see hereafter, their number and character, it defined that in civil cases they should be subject wholly to the secular courts. For the greater crimes, moreover, cognizance was also reserved exclusively to the courts, the list comprising treason, unnatural crime, sedition, violating royal safe-conducts, disobedience to royal mandates, treachery, rape, carrying off women, highway robbery, arson, house-breaking and crimes of greater magnitude than these, as well as resistance or formal disrespect to the royal courts. Those who held office were also amenable to the courts for official malfeasance. This left only petty offences subject to inquisitorial jurisdiction and for these familiars were liable to arrest by secular magistrates, subject to being immediately transferred to the Inquisition. For doubtful cases it was provided that, when the lay judge and inquisitor could not agree, there should be no contention, but the evidence was to be sent to the court of the king, where two members each of the Suprema and Council of Castile should decide as to the jurisdiction; for this a majority was required and, in case of equal division of votes, the matter went to the king for final decision. No appeal from this was allowed and meanwhile the accused was retained in the prison to which he had been consigned at arrest.[1072] This process of adjudicating disputes became known as _competencia_, the details of which will be considered hereafter.

Whatever concession the Inquisition made in thus surrendering a portion of its jurisdiction over familiars was more than compensated by what was evidently part of the agreement, the issue on the same day of Philip's cédula addressed to all judicial bodies forbidding them to entertain appeals of any kind from the acts of the Holy Office (p. 341). It thus secured complete autonomy; it was rendered self-judging, responsible to the king alone, and the populations were surrendered wholly to its discretion.

As far as regards Castile, the Concordia of 1553 was final. It is true that the royal cédula of Aranjuez, April 28, 1583, extended its principles to the salaried officials, but there is no trace of the observance of this.[1073] Another point was subjected to a temporary modification. The absolute denial of justice in allowing inquisitors to have their civil suits decided by their own tribunals attracted attention, after nearly a century, and the Suprema, February 18, 1641, ordered that these cases should be referred to it, when, if it deemed proper, it would commission the tribunal to hear them, but this slender restriction seems to have elicited so active an opposition that it was withdrawn within three months by a counter order of May 14th, restoring to the inquisitors the power of sitting in judgement on their own cases.[1074] It is easy to conceive the amount of oppression and wrong which they could thus inflict.

With these trivial exceptions the Concordia remained the law in Castile. In 1568 Philip II issued a cédula stating that it had not been observed, wherefore he ordered strict compliance with it and, as late as 1775 Carlos III treats it as being still in force and to be respected by all parties.[1075] If Philip, however, expected peace between the rival and jealous jurisdictions, as the result of the Concordia, he deceived himself. Both were eager for quarrel and opportunities to gratify combative instincts were not lacking. The secular courts resented the intrusion of the Inquisition, which was careful to keep antagonism active by the insulting arrogance of its methods, whenever a question arose between them. There was ample field for contention, for not only were the excepted crimes loosely defined, giving rise to many nice questions, but the Inquisition acutely argued that before the royal courts could assume possession of a case the crime must be fully proved, for the familiar was entitled to the fuero until his guilt was ascertained, thus keeping in its own hands all the vital parts of the process and excluding the secular justices.[1076] Then the circle of excepted cases was enlarged, not only for familiars but for salaried officials, by various edicts from time to time, as we have seen with regard to pistols and discharging fire-arms. Another instance was a cédula of Philip II, in 1566, including among exceptions the violation of royal pragmáticas, which was put to the test, in 1594, when the Chancellery of Granada prosecuted a notary of the tribunal for wearing a larger ruff than was allowed by a sumptuary pragmática; the tribunal excommunicated the judges but, when the case was carried up to the Suprema and Council of Castile, the Chancellery was justified.[1077] In the frenzied efforts to maintain the value of the worthless vellon coinage, Philip IV, by repeated edicts between 1631 and 1660, deprived familiars and salaried officials of the fuero in cases of demanding more than the legal premium for the precious metals or of counterfeiting or importing base money.[1078] Frauds on the revenue from tobacco also deprived all offenders of exemptions, by a pragmática of 1719, but it was difficult to enforce and had to be repeated in 1743, after which at last Inquisitor-general Prado y Cuesta, in 1747, ordered the tribunals to obey it.[1079]

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[Sidenote: _VALENCIA_]

Although Navarre was under the crown of Castile, the Concordia of 1553 was not extended to it until 1665, by a royal cédula of May 9th. The questions which agitated the rest of Spain seem to have rarely presented themselves there, for we hear little of them in that quarter, although, in 1564, the tribunal of Logroño complained of the intrusion of the secular courts on its jurisdiction and there were, as we shall see hereafter, occasional collisions on the subject of witchcraft, which was _mixti fori_.[1080]

* * * * *

The kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon were the scenes of much greater trouble than those of Castile, in delimiting the boundaries of the rival jurisdictions, for they still had institutions which could remonstrate against abuses and struggle for their removal. We have seen how recalcitrant they were when the Inquisition was introduced and how vigorously they struggled against the abuses which followed. In the Concordias of 1512 and 1520 they secured certain paper guarantees, but these were brushed aside by the Inquisition with customary ill-faith. Irritation and hostility became chronic, with the result that they were denied some of the slender alleviations vouchsafed to Castile, on the ground that the character of the population and the neighborhood of the heretics of France rendered it necessary that the Holy Office should be fortified with greater privileges than in the rest of Spain.

Of the three kingdoms Valencia was the one which gave the least trouble in this matter. Yet a case occurring in 1540 is highly significant of the terrorism under which the royal judges discharged their duties. Dr. Ferrer of Tortosa, one of the judges, appealed to Inquisitor-general Tavera, representing that in the previous year he had condemned to death a murderer, who had fully deserved it. Now that the inquisitor had come his enemies represent that the culprit was a familiar, although he had never claimed to be one, and it is currently reported that the inquisitor is about to prosecute him (Ferrer). If he is in fault in the matter he will cheerfully submit to punishment, but he begs not to be subjected to the infamy of a trial. To this appeal the Suprema responded by ordering the inquisitor to send it such evidence as he may gather and to await a reply before taking action.[1081] It is evident that all criminal judges lived in an atmosphere of dread lest at any moment the honest discharge of their functions might precipitate them into a disastrous conflict with the tribunal. It justifies the complaints of the Córtes of 1547 and 1553, the latter of which declared that the inquisitors exceeded their jurisdiction, intervening in many affairs, both civil and criminal, that had no connection with heresy. This caused great disturbance of justice and contentions between the jurisdictions, in which the tribunal assumed to be supreme and to define the limits of its own power. Great as were these evils they were daily increasing and were becoming intolerable, wherefore the Córtes prayed that the subject be investigated and a clear definition be made between the royal jurisdiction and that of the Inquisition.[1082]

[Sidenote: _VALENCIA_]

This resulted in a junta of the members of the Suprema and of the Council of Aragon, who agreed upon a Concordia, published by Prince Philip, May 11, 1554. In this he recited that, in consequence of the great numbers of familiars and their endeavoring to have all their cases, civil and criminal, tried by the tribunal, which sought to protect them in this against the claims of the royal judges, there had arisen many contentions in which the whole of the Audiencia had been excommunicated. To put an end to this unseemly strife he had caused the junta to be held, with the result of the following articles, which he ordered both sides to observe, the royal officials under pain of a thousand florins, and the inquisitors as they desired to please him and the emperor. In this the first point was the reduction of the excessive number of familiars; in the city of Valencia they were not to exceed one hundred and eighty; in towns of more than a thousand hearths there might be eight, in those of over five hundred six, in smaller places four, except that in the coast towns there might be two more. Lists of all appointees were to be furnished to the magistrates, both to check excess and to identify individuals. In civil suits they were to enjoy the passive fuero but not the active; if in contracts they renounced this privilege the condition held good, while, if the other party agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, he could not be cited before it. In criminal cases, the Inquisition had sole cognizance with respect to officials, their servants and families and to familiars but not to their wives, children and servants. When contests arose with secular courts, mild measures were to be used and excommunication be avoided as far as possible. When a familiar entered into a treaty of peace and truce, it was to be executed before an inquisitor and, if it contained a condition of death for violation, the inquisitor, in case of such violation, was to relax the culprit to the secular arm to be put to death. Familiars who were in trade were not to enjoy the fuero for frauds or violations of municipal laws and officials holding public office were liable to the secular courts for malfeasance therein.[1083]

This would appear to grant to the Inquisition all that it had any excuse for asking, but it was impossible to bind the inquisitors to any compact, or to observe any rules. A letter to them from the Suprema, in September, 1560, reminds them that it had already ordered them, in the case of Juan Sánchez, to deprive him of his familiarship, to withdraw their inhibitions and censures, and to remit the affair to the secular judge, in spite of which they had gone forward and rendered sentence; now, as Sánchez is not a familiar, they must positively send the case back to the ordinary courts.[1084] When such persistence in injustice existed, it is not surprising that, at the Córtes of Monzon, in 1564, the deputies of Valencia, like those of Aragon and Catalonia, presented a series of complaints, bearing chiefly on abuses of jurisdiction. We happen to have a view of the situation by an impartial observer, the Venetian envoy, Giovanni Soranzo, in his relation of 1565, which is worth repeating, although we must bear in mind that it was impossible for a Venetian statesman to give Philip II credit for the honest fanaticism which underlay his character. After alluding to the privileges of the Aragonese kingdoms, he proceeds "The king uses every opportunity to deprive them of these great privileges and, knowing that there is no easier or more certain method than through the Inquisition, he is continually increasing its authority. In these last Córtes the Aragonese prayed that the Inquisition should take cognizance of no cases save those of religion and said that they grieved greatly that it embraced infinite things as distant as possible from its jurisdiction and they presented many cases not pertaining in any way to its duties. In truth at present the Inquisition interposes in everything, without respect to any one of whatever rank or position, and we may say positively that this tribunal is the real master which rules and dominates all Spain. The king replied that the Inquisition was not to be discussed in the Córtes, when they all arose and threatened to depart without finishing any other business, if the king did not wish them to discuss a matter of so much importance to them. The king quieted them by promising that, when he returned to Castile, he would listen to their complaints and would not fail to grant the appropriate relief. But undoubtedly he did this so that the Córtes should end without a revolt, his intention being to increase rather than to diminish the importance of the Inquisition, clearly recognizing it as the means of maintaining his reputation and of keeping the people in obedience and terror."[1085]

[Sidenote: _VALENCIA_]

Soranzo's account of the Córtes is not wholly complete. When Philip promised relief after his return to Castile, the deputies replied that they did not choose to be convoked in Castile and that they would go no further with the subsidio which he wanted until they were satisfied. The sessions were prolonged; the patience of the deputies outwore his own and he promised that he would have a visitation made of the tribunals of the three kingdoms and then, in concert with their Diputados, issue a new series of regulations.[1086] The promise was kept. Francisco de Soto Salazar, a member of the Suprema, was sent, in 1566, with full powers and instructions to investigate all abuses, but especially those connected with jurisdiction in matters not of faith. In Valencia his attention was particularly called to a practice of appointing deputy inquisitors and officials and investing them with the privilege of the fuero as well as mechanics employed on the palace of the Inquisition and houses of the officials and also to the overgrown number of familiars and their character.[1087] In Catalonia, especially, he found much to criticize, as we shall have occasion to see hereafter, for he performed his mission thoroughly and conscientiously; he listened to all complaints, investigated them and bore back to the Suprema full reports which bore hardly on the methods of all the tribunals. Prolonged debates ensued between the Suprema, the Council of Aragon and the Diputados and finally, in 1568, a new Concordia was issued. It is significant that it no longer was a royal decree but bore the shape of instructions from Inquisitor-general Espinosa and the Suprema to the tribunals, and the king only appeared in it as communicating it to his representatives and ordering its observance under pain of a thousand florins, coupled with commands to favor and reverence the Inquisition and its officials, to give them all necessary aid and to protect and defend their privileges.

The Concordia thus granted to Valencia confirmed that of 1554 and ordered its observance, adding a number of special provisions, highly suggestive of the abuses which had flourished. As affording a view in some detail of the causes of popular irritation and of the remedies sought, I subjoin an abstract of the articles bearing on the subject.

Outside of the city the local magistrates are to have cognizance of
civil cases of familiars involving less than twelve libras.

Familiars of other districts settling in Valencia lose the fuero,
but retain it if the residence is temporary.

The number of familiars is to be reduced to that provided in 1554,
weeding out the least desirable.

They must present themselves with their commissions to the local
magistrates in order to be entered on the lists, without which they
forfeit their exemption.

The provision depriving those in trade of the fuero, for frauds and
offences committed in their business, which has not been observed,
is to be enforced.

Crimes committed prior to appointment are not entitled to the
fuero.

No cleric or religious or powerful noble or baron is to be
appointed.

Consultors are not to be considered as officials, but only persons
holding commissions from the inquisitor-general, to whom may be
added a steward of the prison and two advocates of prisoners.

In future the servants of officials must really be servants living
with them and receiving regular wages in order to be protected by
the inquisitors.

Inquisitors are not to interfere, at the petition of an official or
familiar, with the regulations of the college of surgeons.

Any familiar who is a carpenter and who brings lumber from the
sierra of Cuenca shall not be protected by the inquisitors, but
shall be left for judgement to the secular court.

Outside of cases of heresy inquisitors must not interfere with the
execution of justice by the royal judges under pretext that
culprits have committed offences pertaining to them, but in such
cases the judges shall be notified and allowed to execute justice,
after which the inquisitors can inflict punishment. In case of
heresy, however, a prisoner can be demanded, to be returned after
trial, provided he is not sentenced to relaxation.

Familiars are not to be protected in the violation of municipal
regulations, nor, during pestilence, in the refusal to observe the
regulations for the avoidance of contagion; they must submit for
inspection the goods which they bring in and the royal judges
shall not be prevented from imposing the penalties provided in the
royal pragmática.

Commissioners shall not form competencias with secular or
ecclesiastical judges, nor shall their assistants enjoy greater
privileges than familiars.

Persons temporarily employed to make arrests, or to read the
edicts, or as procurators, etc., shall not be defended by the
inquisitors.

As the inquisitorial district of Valencia comprehends Teruel in
Aragon and Tortosa in Catalonia, those places are not to be
exempted from the Concordia under the pretext that the Concordia of
1554 spoke of the kingdom of Valencia.

The widows of officials, while remaining unmarried, enjoy both
civil and criminal fuero, but not their children and families as
has been the case, but widows of familiars are deprived of it and
are not to be defended by the inquisitors.

The judge employed by the inquisitors to hear the cases of
officials and familiars is to be dismissed; such cases are to be
heard by the inquisitors outside of the regular hours of service
and for this they are to charge no fees.

Servants and families of salaried officials are only to have the
passive fuero in civil cases, like familiars.

Inquisitors are no longer to defend familiars in matters of the
apportionment of irrigating waters, injuries to harvests,
vineyards, pastures, forests, furnishing of lights, licences for
building, street-cleaning, road-mending and furnishing provisions.

Inquisitors are not to publish edicts with excommunication for the
discovery of debts, thefts or other hidden offences committed
against officials and familiars, nor such edicts against any
delinquents save in cases of heresy.

Persons arrested, except for heresy, are not to be confined in the
secret prison but in the public one, where they can confer with
their counsel and procurators, and they are to be allowed to hear
mass and receive the sacraments.

Familiars holding office are not to be defended for official frauds
or malfeasance, but the secular authorities are to be freely
allowed to administer justice.

Inquisitors shall not give safe-conducts to persons outlawed or
banished by the royal judges, except in cases of faith and then
only for the time necessary to appear before them.

When any official or familiar, in criminal or civil cases not of
faith, has consented tacitly or explicitly to the secular
jurisdiction or has pleaded clergy, the inquisitors shall not
protect him nor inhibit the secular judges. And if any official or
familiar inherits property in litigation the case shall remain in
the court where it is pending.

As familiars in civil cases have only the passive and not the
active fuero there shall no longer, as heretofore, be artifices
employed, such as pretended criminal prosecutions and interdicts,
to obtain cognizance of such cases, but they shall be conducted in
the court of the defendant.

When a suit between outsiders has been decided, if any official or
familiar intervenes to prevent the execution of the decision, on
the pretext that he is in possession of the property at issue or a
part of it, the inquisitors shall not support him in it.

[Sidenote: _VALENCIA_]

If an outsider commits a crime while in company with an official or
familiar, or is an accomplice in a crime committed by an official
or familiar, the inquisitors shall not have cognizance of his case
but only of that of the official or familiar.

When a grave crime has been committed by or against a familiar the
inquisitors shall not send a judge to take testimony or punish,
with salary by the day, but shall avoid expense by making a
commissioner gather the evidence.

Inquisitors shall no longer enforce contracts of peace and truce
unless they have been entered into before them or by their order.

Inquisitors shall not have cognizance of contracts between
outsiders because of a clause submitting them to the fuero, nor of
cases of donations or cession to officials or familiars.

Inquisitors shall not protect widows of officials and familiars in
refusing to pay imposts and contributions.

When inquisitors have to summon secular judges before them it must
be only in cases where it is unavoidable and then only with great
consideration.

If a bankrupt is a familiar the inquisitors have cognizance, but
not in the case of an outsider under pretext that an official or
familiar is a creditor.

Familiars shall not make arrests or other execution of justice
without orders from inquisitors.

Inquisitors shall not proceed against the priors and officials of
guilds and confraternities who levy upon a familiar, who is a
member, for dues under the rules of the association, or when a
familiar has had the administration of a church or hermitage or
hospital and is sued for debts or contributions due.[1088]

The other prayers and demands of the Córtes were rejected, but those which were granted sufficiently indicate the abusive manner in which the tribunal had extended its jurisdiction, how that jurisdiction was admittedly used to protect officials and familiars in violations of law, and how intolerable was the influence on municipal and commercial life of letting loose on the community a class who were beyond the reach of justice. We can readily understand the eagerness of the lawless and unscrupulous to obtain positions which secured for them such privileges and why it was impossible to restrain inquisitors within the prescribed limits of their appointing power.

After protracted effort the Valencians had thus obtained promise of substantial relief, but as usual it was a promise only made to be broken. How little intention there was of enforcing the reform was promptly revealed for, when the authorities naturally ordered the new Concordia to be printed so that the courts and rural magistrates could be guided by it in their dealings with the officials and familiars, the inquisitors at once ordered the printers to suspend work and appealed to the king, who commanded that all copies should be surrendered.[1089] Although the settlement was permanent and remained in force until the end, it apparently never was published for general information. At the moment it was regarded as greatly limiting the secular jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the worthy Valencian inquisitor, Juan de Rojas, says that he is ashamed to allude to its depressed and weakened condition, which has worked great injury to the faith.[1090] His grief was superfluous; the tribunal was not accustomed to be bound by law and its methods of enforcing its assumed prerogatives were difficult to resist. In 1585 the Córtes had a fresh accumulation of grievances which, by order of the king, the Suprema sent to the inquisitors with orders to report the method of meeting them most advantageous to the Holy Office.[1091]

[Sidenote: _VALENCIA_]

If space permitted abundant cases could be cited to show the justice of these complaints. In fact, the correspondence between the Suprema and the tribunal, during the last fifteen years of the sixteenth century, is largely devoted to cases of competencias arising from crimes of all descriptions committed by familiars and to the punishments inflicted by the tribunal, the heaviest of which is the galleys, in two or three cases. Sometimes the charges are dismissed and as a whole the criminals seem to have escaped so lightly that prosecution only served to encourage their lawlessness.[1092] There was no improvement as time went on and a case occurring in 1632 is worth alluding to as illustrating the results of the _fuero_ and the spirit in which it was administered by the tribunal. Don Martin Santis was murdered by pistol shots, while returning with some Dominican frailes in a coach from the Grao of Valencia to the city. Four notorious familiars, Pedro Rebert, Joan Ciurana, Jaime Blau and Calixto Tafalla, were suspected and were arrested by the Audiencia. The tribunal claimed them, a competencia was formed and the case came up before the Suprema and the Council of Aragon. The Marquis of los Velez, the viceroy, took advantage of it to represent to Philip IV the disorders and scandals caused by the criminal familiars who were protected by the Inquisition. This paper was referred to the Council of Aragon which, on July 21st, presented a consulta on the subject. There is, it says, no peace or safety to be hoped for in Valencia unless there is reform in the selection of familiars, for there is no crime committed there in which they are not principals or accomplices, in the confidence of escape through the intervention of the tribunal, since there is no one, however guilty he may be of atrocious crime, who is not speedily seen walking the streets in freedom. In all disturbances, familiars are recognized as ringleaders and their object in gaining appointment is only to enjoy immunity for their crimes. In Valencia, Pedro Revert, Joan Ciurana and Sebastian Adell, all familiars, are the chief disturbers of the peace. So in Villareal, a place notorious for murders, Jaime Blau has been the moving spirit. In Benignamin, where there are constant outbreaks, the leaders of the factions are Gracian España, Martin Barcela and others, likewise familiars. It is the same in Orihuela with Juan García de Espejo and others. Scarce anywhere is there trouble in which familiars are not concerned and they daily become more insolent through impunity, for the inquisitors never punish with the requisite severity. One result is that it is almost impossible to procure evidence against these malefactors, in consequence of witnesses knowing that they will shortly be released and will avenge themselves. Justice cannot be administered and still greater evils are to be anticipated if the king does not provide a remedy. If it is difficult to revise the Concordia and introduce the necessary provisions, at least the king can order that these familiars be dismissed and greater care be exercised in new appointments. All the viceroys have recognized these impediments to justice, for these people only seek exemption from the secular courts in order to be free to commit crimes.

We might imagine much of this to be exaggeration were not its truth tacitly admitted by the Suprema, when transmitting it to Valencia with instructions for information on which to base a reply. There is no rebuke or exhortation to amendment, but the inquisitors are told to act with the utmost caution and secrecy; to report the number of familiars in Valencia and how many are unmarried; to give details as to the cases cited by the Council of Aragon and what punishments were inflicted; what was the record of those inculpated in the murder of Don Martin Santís; covertly to obtain statistics of crime in Valencia for the last ten years, committed by those not exempt, the punishments inflicted by the royal court and whether these were subsequently remitted; whether, when familiars were tried by the tribunal, accomplices were prosecuted in the royal courts, and if so what sentences were pronounced; also to make secret investigation as to promises made to familiars by the judges to let them off easily if they would not claim the fuero, and finally to furnish a list of cases in which the tribunal has punished its officials for trifling offences. Altogether the effort was evidently much less to offer a justification than to make a _tu quoque_ rejoinder. Apparently the statistics asked of the tribunal were unsatisfactory, for there was no use made of them in the answer presented October 6th, in which, after seeking to explain away the assertions of the viceroy and Council of Aragon, the Suprema accused the secular courts and their officials of perpetual prosecution of familiars, who were arrested on the slightest suspicion, assumed to be guilty and then forced by cruel treatment to renounce the fuero. The suggestions for reform were airily brushed aside. To dismiss delinquent familiars would be almost impossible, in view of its effect upon their families and kindred. To enquire of the royal officials as to the character of aspirants for appointment was inadmissible, as it would admit them to participation in a matter with which they had nothing to do. The true cure for the troubles would be to secure the Inquisition in its rights by forbidding the secular courts from assuming any jurisdiction over familiars. In short it was a passionate outburst, precluding all hope of amendment, to which the king replied by telling the Suprema to see that the tribunal did not employ violent measures against the royal officials, but report to him any excess for his action. Evidently nothing was to be hoped for from him and indeed he had written on August 6th to the viceroy that the case must take its regular course as a competencia and the inquisitors must not use inhibitory censures or summon the judges to appear before them. The result was the usual one that the tribunal obtained cognizance of the case; one, at least, of the accused, Jaime Blau, was found guilty, for we have his insufficient sentence, condemning him to exile and a fine of three hundred ducats--a sentence which goes far to explain the eagerness of the inquisitors to extend their jurisdiction, for they rarely inflicted corporal punishments on their delinquent officials, when pecuniary ones were so much more profitable.[1093]

[Sidenote: _VALENCIA_]

The same spirit was shown when, in 1649, disturbances between armed bands led Philip IV to order the Suprema to instruct the inquisitors that familiars and officials participating in these brawls, or lending aid to peacebreakers, should not enjoy the fuero and that the tribunal should not defend them or interfere with the course of justice. Instead of obeying, the Suprema replied that it suspended the order until the king should be better informed. It then proceeded with a long argument to show that the faith would be imperilled by such abridgement of the privileges of the Holy Office. Besides, these factional contests had always been customary in Valencia and it was impossible to avoid favoring one side or the other, for these armed bands demanded whatever they wanted--money, or food or clothes--and people were forced to give it at the risk of having their harvests burnt or their throats cut. The consulta ended with the impudent suggestion that in future it would be much better for the king, before issuing such decrees, to communicate to the Suprema the consultas of the other councils on which they were based so that a junta could be formed and the matter be debated.[1094]

Evidently the Suprema held that this semi-savage state of society should be encouraged by favoring the factionists and, under such conditions, amelioration was impossible. Rivalry of jurisdiction paralyzed the law and there was perpetual friction over the veriest trifles, for the tribunal was always on the watch to resist the minutest infraction of its prerogatives or disregard of its dignity. When, in 1702, Jacinto Nadal, a familiar of Onteniente, received a summons to appear before Don Pedro Domenech, a criminal judge of the Audiencia, he at once appealed to the tribunal which sent word, on May 29th, that he had been under arrest since March 25th and the papers in any charge against him must be surrendered to it. It turned out that Domenech only wanted him to enter security for his son and, when this was done, the inquisitors complained that Nadal had done wrong in going to the judge after appealing to them, and that Domenech had not treated them with proper respect, so that some months were required to arrange a truce between them.[1095]

* * * * *

Aragon was a source of greater trouble than Valencia. The popular spirit was more independent, it had resisted the introduction of the Inquisition until the murder of San Pedro Arbués had rendered further opposition impossible, it had been cheated of the fruits of the tenacity of Juan Prat and it possessed an institution peculiar to itself, designed to limit the encroachments of the sovereign power and well adapted to restrain the arrogance of anything less formidable than the mingled spiritual and temporal jurisdiction of the Holy Office.

[Sidenote: _ARAGON_]