Chapter VIII: Interference with Advantageous Relations (13)

MALICIOUS USE OF ONE’S OWN LAND,
general discussion of doctrine of, 923, 939, 952 n.
by erecting fence to annoy neighbors, 927 n., 928.
by erecting building annoying to neighbor, 926.
by diverting percolating water, 928 n.
malice must be dominant motive, 935 n.
by frightening wild fowl from resorting to plaintiff’s land, 935,
937.
by cutting trees causing evaporation from stream to injury of
plaintiff’s water right, 938.

MALICIOUS WORDS (see DEFAMATION; MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY
INFLUENCING CONDUCT OF ANOTHER; SLANDER OF TITLE).

MANUFACTURER,
liability of, for defects, 228, 233, 235, 251.

MARRIAGE,
loss of, is special damage, 807.
loss of performance of promise to marry, is special damage, 884 n.
fraudulent, of plaintiff’s daughter, 869.

MASTER AND SERVANT,
seduction of servant of another, 866.
enticing servant of another, 864.
threat of physical injury to servant of another, 863.
inducing servant at will to leave master, 873 n.

MENTAL OR NERVOUS SHOCK,
action for causing, 45, 49 n., 50, 57 n., 58, 61.

MISFEASANCE (see NEGLIGENCE).

MISTAKE,
in addressing a privileged communication, 761 n.
defamation by, 761 n.

MORAL DUTY,
assumption of performance of, 129, 141.
in absence of relation between parties, 131.
where relation between parties, 134, 137 n.

MOTIVE (see MALICE),
aspersion of, of public man, not fair comment, 769, 775.

NEGLIGENCE (see CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; OCCUPIER OF PREMISES;
TRESPASSERS; PUBLIC WRONG),
without damage, no liability, 41.
must be proximate cause of injury, 42.
standard of care, 63, 66 n., 67, 76.
ordinary care, definition of, 70.
standard in case of physical disability, 71, 73.
degrees of, 77, 79, 79 n., 82 n., 83, 85 n.
statutory degrees of, 86.
of infant, 88, 88 n., 90, 92 n., 93.
proof of, 98, 102, 106, 111, 113, 115.
duty of care, 120, 125.
definition of, 156.
requirement of duty of care toward person injured, 156.
in performance of gratuitous undertaking, 184 n.
liability for, of maker or vendor of chattel, 228, 233, 235, 246,
251.
comparative negligence, 267, 268 n., 269.
difference between gross negligence and wanton or reckless conduct,
340, 342 n., 343.
as ground of recovery for injury by vicious animal, 434.
breach of rules of a private corporation, whether, 508 n.
violation of ordinance, whether, 508 n.
breach of statutory duty, whether, 391, 400 n., 504, 506, 506 n.
liability for negligent language, 573 n.

NERVOUS SHOCK (see MENTAL OR NERVOUS SHOCK).

NEWSPAPER,
has no peculiar privilege in defamation, 732.

NOLLE PROSEQUI (see MALICIOUS PROSECUTION).

NONFEASANCE, 127, 129, 131, 134, 137, 142 n.

NUISANCE (see DANGEROUS USE OF LAND),
“attractive” 165, 170 n., 170, 173, 176 n.; age to which doctrine
applicable, 171 n.
allowing land to go to weeds not, 493.
trees shading another’s land not, 495.
stored explosives, 498, 502.

OCCUPIER OF PREMISES (see TRESPASS; NUISANCE “attractive”; LANDLORD AND
TENANT),
liability to trespassers, 147, 149 n.
liability to known trespassers, 149.
liability to anticipated trespassers, 150, 154, 156 n.
liability to trespassers prohibited by statute, 153 n.
duty to look out for trespassers, 156 n.
liability to licensee, 177, 179, 183, 183 n., 186, 191.
injury to licensee by “trap,” 179.
liability to children licensees, 183 n.
liability where known permissive use by public, 183 n.
liability in case of gratuitous carriage, 183 n.
liability to licensee for negligent operation of active force, 186,
190 n.
duty to notify of withdrawal of license, 191.
liability to invitee, 194, 199 n.
duty to child accompanying invitee, 200 n.
liability to children invitees, 200 n.
duty to invitee of licensee, 200 n.
liability where plaintiff exceeds invitation, 200 n.
liability where notice habitually disregarded, 201.
not an insurer of safety of invitees, 203.
duty toward invitees to ascertain condition of premises, 202.
liability for injury to invitees by third persons, 204.
who are invitees, 207, 214, 220 n.
liability to social guest, 222, 225 n.
liability in case of license conferred by law, 225, 227 n.
liability to trespasser or licensee in case of breach of statutory
duty, 520.

PARTY,
statements by, privileged, 709 n.

PEACE,
malicious exhibition of articles of, 626.

PHYSICAL IMPACT,
necessity of, 45, 50, 58, 62 n.

PHYSICIAN,
slander of, 691.

PICKETING, 897, 968, 978 n., 1005, 1010.

POSTAL CARD,
whether mailing is publication, 660 n.
sending privileged communication by, 754.

PRIVACY,
interference with, 797.

PRIVILEGE (see DEFAMATION).

PRIZE FIGHT,
each party to, liable to other, 18.

PROBABLE CAUSE (see MALICIOUS PROSECUTION).

PROFESSION (see DEFAMATION).

PROMISE,
loss of performance of gratuitous, is special damage, 811.

PUBLIC MEETINGS,
reports of, whether privileged, 727, 728 n.

PUBLIC WRONG,
plaintiff’s participation in, no bar where wilful injury, 377.
violation of Sunday law, whether bar to action for negligence, 379,
381, 388 n.
violation of ordinance, whether bar to action for negligence, 388,
391.
violation of licensing or registration law, whether bar to action for
negligence, 398, 400 n.
unlicensed automobile, status of, in highway, 398, 401 n., 402 n.
injury by dog unmuzzled in violation of ordinance, 434 n.
injuries by animals running at large contrary to statute, 441 n.
breach of statutory duty, whether negligence, 391, 400 n., 504, 506,
506 n.
violation of ordinance, whether negligence, 508 n.

PUBLICATION (see DEFAMATION).

REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE (see MALICIOUS PROSECUTION).

REPETITION,
of slander, actionable, 677.

REPORTS,
of legislative and judicial proceedings, privileged (see DEFAMATION).

RES IPSA LOQUITUR,
inference of negligence, 98, 102, 102 n., 105 n., 106.
necessary allegation, 105 n.
doctrine applies only in absence of explanation, 105 n.
in actions by servant against master, 107, 107 n.
elements of the doctrine, 110 n.
burden of proof not shifted, merely burden of going forward, 111 n.
other inferences must be excluded, 113 n.
simply a rule of evidence, 115 n.

SCIENTER (see ANIMALS).

SEARCH WARRANT,
malicious procurement of execution of, 648 n.

SEDUCTION,
of daughter, 866.
of plaintiff’s fiancée, 884 n.
action by woman for, 16.
statutory action for, 17 n.
by guardian, 17 n.

SERVICE, LOSS OF,
by enticing servant, 864.
by seducing daughter or female servant, 866.

SLANDER (see DEFAMATION).

SLANDER OF TITLE (see DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY),
differs from slander of person, 813.
what is, 815 n.
action for, survives as injury to property, 813.
special damage essential, 816.
whether malice required, 816 n.
what is special damage, 819 n., 847 n., 855, 859 n., 883 n., 884 n.

SMASHING RATES,
is fair competition, 906, 913.

SPECIAL DAMAGE (see DAMAGE).

SUBORNATION OF WITNESS,
action for, 710.

SUNDAY LAWS (see PUBLIC WRONG).

TELEGRAM,
sending privileged communication by, 753.

THREATS (see MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLAINTIFF BY INFLUENCING CONDUCT OF
ANOTHER).

TRADE,
competition in (see COMPETITION).
slander of one in (see DEFAMATION).

TRADE DISPUTES ACT (English), 897 n., 967 n.

TRADE-MARK,
fraudulent imitation of, 827.

TRESPASSER (see NUISANCE “attractive”),
takes risk of condition of premises, 157.
negligent injury of, 147, 149, 150.
wilful, negligent injury to, 149 n.
child, duty to, 150 n., 160.
occupier may assume, will look out for himself, 156 n.
child, takes risk of condition of premises, 160.
setting traps for, 160 n., 176 n.

TRUTH,
justification in action for defamation, 695.

TURN TABLE CASES (see NUISANCE “attractive”).

TYPEWRITER,
communication to, a publication, 758.
communication to, not privileged, 758.
communication to, privileged, 761 n.

VENDOR OF CHATTEL,
liability of, to third persons for defects, 228, 233, 235, 251.

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA (see LEAVE AND LICENSE).

WATER COMPANY,
liability in tort for failure to provide water, 262 n.

WEEDS (see DANGEROUS USE OF LAND).

WITNESS,
no action against, for perjury, 712.
action for subornation of, 710.
statements of, privileged (see DEFAMATION)

WORDS,
insulting, no assault, 11, 11 n., 12 n.
malicious (see MALICIOUS WORDS).
construction of, in defamation, 661.

-----

Footnote 1:

Smith _v._ Newsam, 1 Vent. 256; Tombs _v._ Painter, 13 East, 1; Lewis
_v._ Hoover, 3 Blackf. 407; Handy _v._ Johnson, 5 Md. 450; People _v._
Carlson, 160 Mich. 426; Saunders _v._ Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463; Leach
_v._ Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 699 _Accord_.

Footnote 2:

The report of the same case in 2 Keble, 545, adds: “The defendant
pleaded the plaintiff began first, and the stroke he received, whereby
he lost his eye, was on his own assault, and in defense of the
defendant.”

Footnote 3:

Blake _v._ Barnard, 9 Car. & P. 626; State _v._ Crow, 1 Ired. 375;
Commonwealth _v._ Eyre, 1 S. & R. 347; Biggins _v._ Gulf R. Co., 102
Tex. 417 _Accord_. Compare Handy _v._ Johnson, 5 Md. 450.

Similarly, a mere preparation for a possible assault, but without any
act indicating a present intention to do personal violence to another,
is not an assault. Lawson _v._ State, 30 Ala. 14; Godwin _v._ Collins,
67 Fla. 197; Penny _v._ State, 114 Ga. 77; Gober _v._ State, 7 Ga.
App. 206; Haupt _v._ Swenson, 125 Ia. 694; State _v._ Painter, 67 Mo.
84; State _v._ Milsaps, 82 N. C. 549. But compare State _v._ Hampton,
63 N. C. 13.

Footnote 4:

Townsdin _v._ Nutt, 19 Kan. 282; Handy _v._ Johnson, 5 Md. 450;
Fairme’s Case, 5 City Hall Rec. 95; Brister _v._ State, 40 Tex. Cr.
505; Western T. Co. _v._ Bowdoin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 1
_Accord_. Jones _v._ State, 89 Ark. 213 (_semble_) _Contra_.

Compare Cobbett _v._ Grey, 4 Ex. 744, _per_ Pollock, C. B.; Burton
_v._ State, 8 Ala. App. 295; Wells _v._ State, 108 Ark. 312; People
_v._ Lilley, 43 Mich. 521; Grimes _v._ State, 99 Miss. 232;
Commonwealth _v._ Roman, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 64; Trimble _v._ State, 57
Tex. Cr. 439.

In Mortin _v._ Shoppee, 3 Car. & P. 373, defendant rode up to
plaintiff’s gate, plaintiff being in his garden about three yards off,
and, shaking his whip, said, “Come out, and I will lick you before
your own servants.” Compare People _v._ Yslas, 27 Cal. 630; State _v._
Shipman, 81 N. C. 513.

Footnote 5:

Only so much of the case is given as relates to the question of
assault.

Footnote 6:

United States _v._ Kiernan, 3 Cranch, C. C. 435; Plonty _v._ Murphy,
82 Minn. 268; People _v._ Lee, 1 Wheeler, Crim. Cas. 364; State _v._
Davis, 1 Ired. 125; Alexander _v._ Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476; Newell _v._
Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589; Bishop _v._ Ranney, 59 Vt. 316; Barnes _v._
Martin, 15 Wis. 240; Keep _v._ Quallman, 68 Wis. 451 _Accord_.

Footnote 7:

United States _v._ Myers, 1 Cranch, C. C. 310; Keefe _v._ State, 19
Ark. 190; Hixson _v._ Slocum, 156 Ky. 487; State _v._ Dooley, 121 Mo.
591; State _v._ Herron, 12 Mont. 230; State _v._ Morgan, 3 Ired. 186;
State _v._ Cherry, 11 Ired. 475; State _v._ Church, 63 N. C. 15;
Bishop _v._ Ranney, 59 Vt. 316; French _v._ Ware, 65 Vt. 338 _Accord_.

Footnote 8:

State _v._ Church, 63 N. C. 15 _Accord_.

Firing a revolver in plaintiff’s presence but not at him, intending to
frighten him but not to do him any bodily harm, was held not to be an
assault. Degenhardt _v._ Heller, 93 Wis. 662. Compare Nelson _v._
Crawford, 122 Mich. 466.

Footnote 9:

The argument for the plaintiff is omitted.

Footnote 10:

In Chapman _v._ State, 78 Ala. 463; State _v._ Yturaspe, 22 Idaho,
360; State _v._ Sears, 86 Mo. 169; State _v._ Godfrey, 17 Or. 300;
McKay _v._ State, 44 Tex. 43, it was decided that a defendant who
aimed an unloaded pistol at another, although perhaps liable for a
civil assault, was not guilty of a criminal assault. See also 2 Green,
Cr. Cas. 271 n.; Territory _v._ Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139; People _v._
Sylva, 143 Cal. 62. Such conduct was held to be a criminal assault in
State _v._ Shepard, 10 Ia. 126; Commonwealth _v._ White, 110 Mass.
407; State _v._ Barry, 45 Mont. 598; Clark _v._ State, (Okl. Cr.) 106
Pac. 803; State _v._ Smith, 2 Humph. 457; Richels _v._ State, 1 Sneed,
606 (_semble_); Morison’s Case, 1 Brown, Just. R. (Scotch) 394. In
Commonwealth _v._ White, _supra_, Wells, J., said: “It is not the
secret intent of the assaulting party, nor the undisclosed fact of his
ability or inability to commit a battery, that is material, but what
his conduct and the attending circumstances denote at the time to the
party assaulted.” Cf. Howell _v._ Winters, 58 Wash. 436.

Footnote 11:

Only so much of the case is printed as relates to this count.

Footnote 12:

State _v._ Daniel, 136 N. C. 571; Degenhardt _v._ Heller, 93 Wis. 662
_Accord_. Wood _v._ Young, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1931 _Contra_. It is not an
assault to make the kissing sign to another. Fuller _v._ State, 44
Tex. Cr. 463.

Mere words, looks, or gestures, however violent or insulting, do not
amount to an assault. State _v._ Borrelli, 24 Del. 349;
Reimenschneider _v._ Neusis, 175 Ill. App. 172; Harvey _v._ Harvey,
124 La. 595; Bouillon _v._ La Clede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo. App. 462;
State _v._ Daniel, 136 N. C. 571; Lewis _v._ Fountain, 168 N. C. 277.
A _fortiori_ violent language over the telephone is no assault. Kramer
_v._ Ricksmeier, 159 Ia. 48.

No action lies for the shame and insult to a woman from inviting her
to illicit intercourse. Davis _v._ Richardson, 76 Ark. 348; Reed _v._
Maley, 115 Ky. 816; State _v._ White, 52 Mo. App. 285. _Aliter_ where
accompanied by acts that put her in fear. Johnson _v._ Hohn, 168 Ia.
147; Jeppsen _v._ Jensen, 47 Utah, 536; Newell _v._ Whitcher, 53 Vt.
589. And a common carrier is liable, as a public service company, for
insults to a passenger by its employees. Knoxville Co. _v._ Lane, 103
Tenn. 376.

“Injury is committed not only when a man is struck with the fist or
beaten with a stick or lashed, but also when abusive language is
publicly addressed to any one, or when ... some one ... has followed
about a married woman or a young boy or girl, or when some person’s
modesty may be said to have been assailed.” Institutes of Justinian,
iv, 4, 1.

“Likewise it is an injury of this kind when one person, without
actually striking another, keeps raising his hand menacingly and
creates in the other the fear that he will be struck.... Likewise if
he mocks another with indecent or indecorous gestures; or if by means
of gesticulations he indicates things of such a kind that if they were
expressed in spoken words or in writing they would convey an injury.”
Voet, Commentary on the Pandects, xlvii, 10, § 7.

“Ignominious treatment is an injury only when it is an infringement of
one of the absolute rights of personality: a right that is recognized
by the law of the State as included amongst the natural rights of
every freeman. Such an infringement of another’s right may be regarded
as offensive to good morals (_contra bonos mores_); hence the
definition of _injuria_ as ‘an insult offered to any person against
good morals’ (_contumelia contra bonos mores alicui illata_).” De
Villiers, Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries, 22.

Footnote 13:

Meader _v._ Stone, 7 Met. (Mass.) 147 _Accord_.

See Rex _v._ Smith, 2 Car. & P. 449; Preiser _v._ Wielandt, 48 App.
Div. 569.

Footnote 14:

Hostile touching or in anger. Singer Co. _v._ Methvin, 184 Ala. 554;
McGlone _v._ Hanger, 56 Ind. App. 243; Booher _v._ Trainer, 172 Mo.
App. 376; Hough _v._ Iderhoff, 69 Or. 568; Raefeldt _v._ Koenig, 152
Wis. 459 _Accord_.

Touching _contra bonos mores_ but with no hostile intent. Richmond
_v._ Fisk, 160 Mass. 34. Taking liberties with a woman. Hatchett _v._
Blacketer, 162 Ky. 266; Timmons _v._ Kenrick, 53 Ind. App. 490.
Unauthorized surgical operation. Pratt _v._ Davis, 224 Ill. 300; Mohr
_v._ Williams, 95 Minn. 261; Schloendorff _v._ Society, 211 N. Y. 125;
Rolater _v._ Strain, 39 Okl. 572. But see Bennan _v._ Parsonnet, 83 N.
J. Law, 20. _Aliter_ where authorized by a minor. Bakker _v._ Welsh,
144 Mich. 632.

Footnote 15:

Kerifford’s Case, Clayt. 22 pl. 38 _Accord_. See, also, Steinman _v._
Baltimore Laundry Co., 109 Md. 62; Courtney _v._ Kneib, 131 Mo. App.
204.

Footnote 16:

The statement of the case has been abridged.

Footnote 17:

Courtney _v._ Kneib, 131 Mo. App. 204 _Accord_. Compare Reynolds _v._
Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273.

Footnote 18:

A part of the case, relating to a point of practice, is omitted.

Footnote 19:

Dodwell _v._ Burford, 1 Mod. 24; Hopper _v._ Reeve, 7 Taunt. 698;
Spear _v._ Chapman, 8 Ir. L. R. 461; Reynolds _v._ Pierson, 29 Ind.
App. 273; Burdick _v._ Worrall, 4 Barb. 596 (_semble_); Bull _v._
Colton, 22 Barb. 94; Clark _v._ Downing, 55 Vt. 259 _Accord_. But see
Kirland _v._ State, 43 Ind. 146.

An injury to the clothes on one’s back is a trespass on the person,
Regina _v._ Day, 1 Cox, C. C. 207. So is the removal of an ulster from
the plaintiff, Geraty _v._ Stern, 30 Hun, 426; or seizing anything in
the plaintiff’s hand, Scott _v._ State, 118 Ala. 115; Dyk _v._ De
Young, 35 Ill. App. 138; Steinman _v._ Baltimore Laundry Co., 109 Md.
62 (_semble_); Respublica _v._ De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111; or cutting
a rope connecting the plaintiff with his slave, State _v._ Davis, 1
Hill (S. C.) 46.

Footnote 20:

The statement of the pleadings and the arguments of counsel are
omitted.

Footnote 21:

Berry _v._ Da Costa, L. R. 1 C. P. 331; Collins _v._ Mack, 31 Ark.
684; Hattin _v._ Chapman, 46 Conn. 607; Graves _v._ Rivers, 123 Ga.
224; Tubbs _v._ Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446; Tyler _v._ Salley, 82 Me. 128;
Sauer _v._ Schulenberg, 33 Md. 288; Sherman _v._ Rawson, 102 Mass.
395; Kelley _v._ Riley, 106 Mass. 339; Bennett _v._ Beam, 42 Mich.
346; Schmidt _v._ Durnham, 46 Minn. 227; Green _v._ Spencer, 3 Mo.
318; Musselman _v._ Barker, 26 Neb. 737; Coil _v._ Wallace, 24 N. J.
Law, 291; Kniffen _v._ McConnell, 30 N. Y. 285; Spellings _v._ Parks,
104 Tenn. 351; Daggett _v._ Wallace, 75 Tex. 352; Giese _v._ Schultz,
69 Wis. 521 _Accord_.

Weaver _v._ Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; Wrynn _v._ Downey, 27 R. I. 454
_Contra_.

Footnote 22:

But see 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 65; 1 Bishop, New Criminal Law, §
38.

Footnote 23:

Beseler _v._ Stephani, 71 Ill. 400; Woodward _v._ Anderson, 9 Bush,
624; Paul _v._ Frazier, 3 Mass. 71; Welsund _v._ Schueller, 98 Minn.
475; Robinson _v._ Musser, 78 Mo. 153; Hamilton _v._ Lomax, 26 Barb.
615; Weaver _v._ Bachert, 2 Pa. St. 80; Conn _v._ Wilson, 2 Overt. 233
_Accord_. See Desborough _v._ Homes, 1 F. & F. 6.

An action is allowed by statute in some jurisdictions. Marshall _v._
Taylor, 98 Cal. 55; Swett _v._ Gray, 141 Cal. 83; McIlvain _v._ Emery,
88 Ind. 298; Verwers _v._ Carpenter, 166 Ia. 273; Watson _v._ Watson,
49 Mich. 540; Hood _v._ Sudderth, 111 N. C. 215; Breon _v._ Henkle, 14
Or. 494. The Scotch law is to the same effect. Smith, Law of Damages
in Scotland, 128. Under these statutes it has been held that there
must be a real seduction: “Consent must be procured by some trick or
artifice other than mere solicitation.” Brown _v._ Kingsley, 38 Ia.
220. Compare Breon _v._ Henkle, 14 Or. 494.

Even without a statute a guardian is liable in damages for the
seduction of his ward. Graham _v._ Wallace, 50 App. Div. 101. See also
Smith _v._ Richards, 29 Conn. 232.

Footnote 24:

Boulter _v._ Clarke, Bull. N. P. 16; Reg. _v._ Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534,
538, 546, 549, 567; Logan _v._ Austin, 1 Stewart (Ala.) 476; Cadwell
_v._ Farrell, 28 Ill. 438; Adams _v._ Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531; Lund _v._
Tyler, 115 Ia. 236; McNeil _v._ Mullin, 70 Kan. 634; Galbraith _v._
Fleming, 60 Mich. 403; Grotton _v._ Glidden, 84 Me. 589; Commonwealth
_v._ Colburg, 119 Mass. 350 (_semble_); Lizana _v._ Lang. 90 Miss.
469; Jones _v._ Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637; Morris _v._ Miller, 83 Neb.
218; Stout _v._ Wren, 1 Hawks (N. C.), 420; Barholt _v._ Wright, 45
Ohio St. 177 (explaining Champer _v._ State, 14 Ohio St. 437); McCue
_v._ Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (_semble_); Willey _v._ Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212;
Shay _v._ Thompson, 59 Wis. 540; Miller _v._ Bayer, 94 Wis. 124
(procuring an abortion with plaintiff’s consent) _Accord_.

Reg. _v._ Coney, 15 Cox, C. C. 46 (_semble_), _per_ HAWKINS J.;
Hegarty _v._ Shine, L. R. 4 Ir. 288, 294 (_semble_); Goldnamer _v._
O’Brien, 98 Ky. 569 (procuring an abortion with plaintiff’s consent);
Lykins _v._ Hamrick, 144 Ky. 80, _Contra_. If the plaintiff is injured
by the defendant, both being engaged in an illegal charivari party, he
cannot recover damages from the defendant. Gilmore _v._ Fuller, 198
Ill. 130.

As to injury in the course of a “friendly scuffle,” see Gibeline _v._
Smith, 106 Mo. App. 545.

Footnote 25:

McNay _v._ Stratton, 9 Ill. App. 215; Price _v._ Bailey, 66 Ill. 48;
Hildebrand _v._ McCrum, 101 Ind. 61; Smith _v._ State, 7 Humph. 43;
Sorenson _v._ Dundas, 50 Wis. 335 _Accord_.

Compare Marshall _v._ Heller, 55 Wis. 392. For recent definitions see
Westberry _v._ Clanton, 136 Ga. 795; Coolahan _v._ Marshall Field &
Co., 159 Ill. App. 466; Efroymson _v._ Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451; Comer
_v._ Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; New York R. Co. _v._ Waldron, 116 Md. 441;
Smith _v._ Clark, 37 Utah, 116, 126.

Footnote 26:

Anon. 1 Vent. 306; Anon. 7 Mod. 8; Whithead _v._ Keyes, 3 All. 495
_Accord_.

Footnote 27:

If the bailiff, who has a process against one, says to him when he is
on horseback or in a coach, “You are my prisoner; I have a writ
against you,” upon which he submits, turns back, or goes with him,
though the bailiff never touched him, yet it is an arrest, because he
submitted to the process; but if, instead of going with the bailiff,
he had gone or fled from him, it could be no arrest, unless the
bailiff laid hold of him. Horner _v._ Battyn, Bull. N. P. 62.

Footnote 28:

Chinn _v._ Morris, 2 Car. & P. 361; Pocock _v._ Moore, Ry. & M. 321;
Peters _v._ Stanway, 6 Car. & P. 737; Granger _v._ Hill, 4 Bing. N.C.
212; Warner _v._ Riddiford, 4 C. B. N. S. 180 (criticizing Arrowsmith
_v._ Le Mesurier, 2 B. & P. N. R. 211); Singleton _v._ Kansas City
Base Ball Co., 172 Mo. App. 299 _Accord_.

To hold a man by the sleeve without professing to arrest him or
leading him to believe he is not free to get away is not an
imprisonment. Macintosh _v._ Cohen, 24 N. Zeal. L. R. 625.

Footnote 29:

Part of the case, not relating to imprisonment, has been omitted.

Footnote 30:

Johnson _v._ Tompkins, Baldw. C. C. 571, 601; Collins _v._ Fowler, 10
Ala. 858; Courtoy _v._ Dozier, 20 Ga. 369; Hawk _v._ Ridgway, 33 Ill.
473; Brushaber _v._ Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266; Josselyn _v._ McAllister,
25 Mich. 45; Moore _v._ Thompson, 92 Mich. 498; Ahern _v._ Collins, 39
Mo. 145; Strout _v._ Gooch, 8 Greenl. 126; Mowry _v._ Chase, 100 Mass.
79; Emery _v._ Chesley, 18 N. H. 198; Browning _v._ Rittenhouse, 40 N.
J. Law, 230; Hebrew _v._ Pulis, 73 N. J. Law, 621; Gold _v._ Bissell,
1 Wend. 210; Van Voorhees _v._ Leonard, 1 Thomp. & C. 148; Searls _v._
Viets, 2 Thomp. & C. 224; Limbeck _v._ Gerry, 15 Misc. 663; Martin
_v._ Houck, 141 N. C. 317; Huntington _v._ Shultz, Harp. 452; Mead
_v._ Young, 2 Dev. & Batt. 521; Haskins _v._ Young, 2 Dev. & Batt.
527; Jones _v._ Jones, 13 Ired. 448; McCracken _v._ Ansley, 4 Strob.
1; Gunderson _v._ Struebing, 125 Wis. 173 _Accord_.

Submission to wrongful detention by conductor of a train in
consequence of his representation of authority to detain plaintiff was
held an imprisonment in Whitman _v._ Atchison R. Co., 85 Kan. 150.

There must be reasonable ground for fear that defendant will use
force. Powell _v._ Champion Fibre Co., 150 N. C. 12.

But compare Cottam _v._ Oregon City, 98 Fed. 570, deciding that a
submission to arrest rather than pay an illegal license fee is not an
imprisonment.

Footnote 31:

A portion of the case, relating to damages, is omitted.

Footnote 32:

As to “shadowing” by detectives, see Chappell _v._ Stewart, 82 Md.
323; People _v._ Weiler, 179 N. Y. 46; Schultz _v._ Ins. Co., 151 Wis.
537.

Footnote 33:

Stat. 13 Ed. I. c. 48.

Footnote 34:

The concurring opinions of Williams and Patteson, JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 35:

Wright _v._ Wilson, 1 Ld. Raym. 739; Crossett _v._ Campbell, 122 La.
659; Balmain Ferry Co. _v._ Robertson, 4 C. L. R. (Australia) 379,
aff’d [1910] A. C. 295; Queen _v._ Macquarie, 13 N. S. W. Sup. Ct. R.
(Law) 264 (_semble_) _Accord_.

See Hawk _v._ Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473; Cullen _v._ Dickenson, 33 S. D.
27.

To order one to leave a boat which was moored to a wharf and, upon his
refusal, to set the boat adrift is an imprisonment. Queen _v._
Macquarie, 13 N. S. W. Sup. Ct. R. (Law) 264.

Compare Herd _v._ Weardale Steel Co. [1913] 3 K. B. 771; Robinson _v._
Ferry Co. [1910] A. C. 295; Whittaker _v._ Sanford, 110 Me. 77;
Talcott _v._ National Exhibition Co., 144 App. Div. 337.

Footnote 36:

Gates _v._ Miles, 3 Conn. 64, 70; McIntyre _v._ Sholty, 121 Ill. 660;
Amick _v._ O’Hara, 6 Blackf. 258, 259; Cross _v._ Kent, 32 Md. 581;
Feld _v._ Borodófski, 87 Miss. 727; Bullock _v._ Babcock, 3 Wend. 391;
Krom _v._ Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647. (imprisonment); Ward _v._
Conatser, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 64; Brennan _v._ Donaghey, 19 N. Zeal. Gaz.
L. R. 289, affirming s. c. 2 New Zeal. Gaz. L. R. 410 _Accord_.

The rule is the same as to torts in general. Behrens _v._ McKenzie, 23
Ia. 333, 343; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Francisco, 149 Ky. 307; Morain
_v._ Devlin, 132 Mass. 87 (nuisance); Gibson _v._ Pollock, 179 Mo.
App. 188; Jewell _v._ Colby, 66 N. H. 399; Re Heller, 3 Paige, 199;
Williams _v._ Hays, 143 N. Y. 442 (compare Williams _v._ Hays, 157 N.
Y. 541); Williams _v._ Cameron, 26 Barb. 172; Lancaster Bank _v._
Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407, 412; Morse _v._ Crawford, 17 Vt. 499
(conversion).

A lunatic has been held liable under a statute giving an action to the
widow and children of one killed by the “careless, wanton, or
malicious” use of firearms. Young _v._ Young, 141 Ky. 76.

In McIntyre _v._ Sholty, _supra_, Magruder, J., said, p. 664: “It is
well settled that, though a lunatic is not punishable criminally, he
is liable in a civil action for any tort he may commit. However justly
this doctrine may have been originally subject to criticism on the
grounds of reason and principle, it is now too firmly supported by the
weight of authority to be disturbed. It is the outcome of the
principle, that, in trespass, the intent is not conclusive. Mr.
Sedgwick, in his work on Damages (margin, p. 456), says that, on
principle, a lunatic should not be held liable for his tortious acts.
Opposed to this view, however, is a majority of the decisions and text
writers.”

“So long as the primitive notion prevailed that the doer of harm was
absolutely responsible therefor, the insanity of the doer could afford
no defence, either to a criminal prosecution or a civil action. 7
Harv. L. Rev. 446. When this notion was so far modified that
misadventure or accident on the part of the doer became a defence, it
would have been entirely logical for the courts to treat the acts or
the omissions of lunatics as involuntary, and consequently not
tortious but accidental.” Burdick, Torts (2d ed.), 60. See also Ames,
Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 99–100; Hornblower, Insanity and
the Law of Negligence, 5 Col. L. Rev. 278.

“827. A person who causes damage to another while in a condition of
unconsciousness or in a condition of morbid disturbance of mental
activity incompatible with the free determination of the will is not
responsible for the damage....”

“829. A person who ... is by virtue of 827 ... not responsible for any
damage caused by him shall nevertheless where compensation cannot be
obtained from a third party charged with the duty of supervision make
compensation for damage in so far as according to the circumstances
(e. g. according to the relative positions of the parties) equity
requires compensation and he is not deprived of the means which he
needs for his own maintenance suitable to his station in life and for
the fulfilment of his statutory duties to furnish maintenance to
others.”—German Civil Code, §§ 827, 829.

Footnote 37:

Underwood v. Hewson, 1 Stra. 596; Welch _v._ Durand, 36 Conn. 182;
Atchison _v._ Dullam, 16 Ill. App. 42; Hodges _v._ Weltberger, 6 Monr.
(Ky.) 337; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620; Chataigne _v._
Bergeron, 10 La. An. 699; Sullivan _v._ Murphy, 2 Miles (Pa.) 298;
Castle _v._ Duryee, 2 Keyes, 169; Taylor _v._ Rainbow, 2 Hen. & Mun.
423 _Accord_.

See to the same effect Morgan _v._ Cox, 22 Mo. 373; Dygert _v._
Bradley, 8 Wend. 469; Jennings _v._ Fundeburg, 4 McC. 161; Tally _v._
Ayres, 3 Sneed, 677 (the injury to chattels); Wetzel _v._ Satterwhite,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 93 (injury to property); Wright _v._ Clark,
50 Vt. 130. Compare Osborne _v._ Van Dyke, 113 Ia. 557.

Footnote 38:

Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 538 (_semble_); Morris _v._ Platt,
32 Conn. 75, 84–90 (defendant in defending himself lawfully against A.
fired a pistol at A., but accidentally hit the plaintiff); Paxton _v._
Boyer, 67 Ill. 132 (facts similar to those in Morris _v._ Platt,
_supra_); Crabtree _v._ Dawson, 119 Ky. 148 _Accord_.

Footnote 39:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 40:

Alderson _v._ Waistell, 1 Car. & K. 358; The Virgo, 25 W. R. 397;
Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524 (_semble_); Strouse _v._
Whittlesey, 41 Conn. 559; Sutton _v._ Bonnett, 114 Ind. 243; Holland
_v._ Bartch, 120 Ind. 46 (see also Bennett _v._ Ford, 47 Ind. 264);
Harvey _v._ Dunlop, Hill & D. 193; Center _v._ Finney, 17 Barb. 94,
Seld. Notes, 80 _Accord_.

But one who by blasting throws rocks upon the plaintiff’s land is
liable in trespass _quare clausum fregit_, irrespective of negligence.
Central Co. _v._ Vandenheuk, 147 Ala. 546; Bessemer Co. _v._ Doak, 152
Ala. 166; Sloss Co. _v._ Salser, 158 Ala. 511; Birmingham Co. _v._
Grover, 159 Ala. 276; Hay _v._ Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain _v._
Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163; St. Peter _v._ Denison, 58 N. Y. 416;
Sullivan _v._ Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Holland House _v._ Baird, 169 N.
Y. 136, 140. And the same rule has been applied to trespass to the
person by blasting. Sullivan _v._ Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Turner _v._
Degnon Co., 99 App. Div. 135.

Footnote 41:

Only so much of the report is given as relates to the first count.

Footnote 42:

See The Mediana, [1900] A. C. 113, 116–118; Columbus Co. _v._ Clowes,
[1903] 1 K. B. 244.

Footnote 43:

Brunsden _v._ Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141, 150 (_semble_); Vogrin _v._
American Steel Co., 179 Ill. App. 245; Muncie Pulp Co. _v._ Davis, 162
Ind. 558; Foster _v._ County, 63 Kan. 43; Stepp _v._ Chicago R. Co.,
85 Mo. 229; Commercial Bank _v._ Ten Eyck, 48 N. Y. 305; McCaffrey
_v._ Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 47 Hun, 404; Washington _v._ Baltimore
R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 _Accord_.

Compare Clifton _v._ Hooper, 6 Q. B. 468.

Footnote 44:

Statement condensed. Only part of opinion is given.

Footnote 45:

Carlisle Banking Co. _v._ Bragg, [1911] 1 K. B. 489; Jackson _v._
Metropolitan R. Co., 2 C. P. D. 125; Steel Car Co. _v._ Chec, 184 Fed.
868; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Pearce, 142 Ala. 680; Florida R. Co. _v._
Williams, 37 Fla. 406; Perry _v._ Central R., 66 Ga. 746; Cleveland R.
Co. _v._ Lindsay, 109 Ill. App. 533; City _v._ Martin, 74 Ind. 449;
Hart _v._ Brick Co., 154 Ia. 741; Goins _v._ North Coal Co., 140 Ky.
323; County _v._ Collison, 122 Md. 91; Tutein _v._ Hurley, 98 Mass.
211; McNally _v._ Colwell, 91 Mich. 527; Harlan _v._ St. Louis R. Co.,
65 Mo. 22; Wallace _v._ Chicago R. Co., 48 Mont. 427; Brotherton _v._
Manhattan Beach Co., 48 Neb. 563; Koch _v._ Fox, 71 App. Div. 288;
Alexander _v._ City, 165 N. C. 527; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Hess, 34
Okl. 615; Thubron _v._ Dravo Co., 238 Pa. St. 443; Anderson _v._
Southern R. Co., 70 S. C. 490; Newton _v._ Oregon R. Co., 43 Utah,
219; Sowles _v._ Moore, 65 Vt. 322; Schwartz _v._ Shull, 45 W. Va.
405; Klatt _v._ Foster, 92 Wis. 622 _Accord_.

Footnote 46:

Only so much of the case as relates to this count is given. The
arguments are omitted. The statement was compiled, by Professor
Jeremiah Smith, from the bill of exceptions filed in the Social Law
Library of Boston.

Footnote 47:

Western Co. _v._ Wood, 57 Fed. 471; Kyle _v._ Chicago R. Co., 182 Fed.
613; McCray _v._ Sharpe, 188 Ala. 375; Bachelder _v._ Morgan, 179 Ala.
339; St. Louis Co. _v._ Taylor, 84 Ark. 42; Chicago Co. _v._ Moss, 89
Ark. 187; Green _v._ Southern R. Co., 9 Ga. App. 751; Haas _v._ Metz,
78 Ill. App. 46; Kalen _v._ Terre Haute Co., 18 Ind. App. 202; Zabron
_v._ Cunard Co., 151 Ia. 345; Kentucky Traction Co. _v._ Bain, 161 Ky.
44; Wyman _v._ Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Wilson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 160
Mo. App. 649; Arthur _v._ Henry, 157 N. C. 438; Samarra _v._ Allegheny
Co., 238 Pa. St. 469; Folk _v._ Seaboard Co., 99 S. C. 284; Chesapeake
R. Co. _v._ Tinsley, 116 Va. 600; Gulf Co. _v._ Trott, 86 Tex. 412
_Accord_.

Footnote 48:

“Ordinary street cars must be run with reference to ordinary
susceptibilities, and the liability of their proprietors cannot be
increased simply by a passenger’s notifying the conductor that he has
unstable nerves.” Holmes J., in Spade _v._ Lynn R. Co., 172 Mass. 488,
491. But compare Webber _v._ Old Colony R. Co., 210 Mass. 432.

Footnote 49:

Victorian Commissioners _v._ Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Haile _v._
Tex. Co., 60 Fed. 557; St. Louis Co. _v._ Bragg, 69 Ark. 402; Braun
_v._ Craven, 175 Ill. 401 (_semble_); Kansas Co. _v._ Dalton, 65 Kan.
661; Morse _v._ Chesapeake Co., 117 Ky. 11; Reed _v._ Ford, 129 Ky.
471; White _v._ Sander, 168 Mass. 296; Smith _v._ Postal Co., 174
Mass. 576; Homans _v._ Boston Co., 180 Mass. 456 (_semble_); Cameron
_v._ N. E. Co., 182 Mass. 310 (_semble_); Nelson _v._ Crawford, 122
Mich. 466; Crutcher _v._ Cleveland Co., 132 Mo. App. 311; Deming _v._
Chicago Co., 80 Mo. App. 152; Rawlings _v._ Wabash Co., 97 Mo. App.
515; Ward _v._ West Co., 65 N. J. Law, 383; Porter _v._ Del. Co., 73
N. J. Law, 405 (_semble_); Mitchell _v._ Rochester Co., 151 N. Y. 107;
Newton _v._ N. Y. Co., 106 App. Div. 415 (_semble_); Prince _v._
Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 667 (_semble_); Hutchinson _v._ Stern, 115 App.
Div. 791; Miller _v._ Belt Co., 78 Ohio St. 309; Ewing _v._ Pittsburgh
Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; Linn _v._ Duquesne Co., 204 Pa. St. 551; Huston
_v._ Freemansburg, 212 Pa. St. 548; Hess _v._ American Pipe Co., 221
Pa. St. 67; Morris _v._ Lackawana R. Co., 228 Pa. St. 198; Taylor _v._
Atlantic Co., 78 S. C. 552; Ford _v._ Schliessman, 107 Wis. 479, 483
(_semble_) Accord.

The damages for an admitted tort to the person may be enhanced by
proof of nervous shock caused by fright induced by the defendant’s
misconduct. Eagan _v._ Middlesex R. Co., 212 Fed. 562, 214 Fed. 747;
Birmingham Co. _v._ Martini, 2 Ala. App. 653; Melone _v._ Sierra Co.,
151 Cal. 113; Seger _v._ Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290; Masters _v._
Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Garvey _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 155 Ill. App.
601; Pittsburgh Co. _v._ Sponier, 85 Ind. 165; McClintic _v._ Eckman,
153 Ky. 704; Newport Co. _v._ Gholson, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 938; City Co.
_v._ Robinson, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 555; Green _v._ Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69;
Warren _v._ Boston Co., 163 Mass. 484; Homans _v._ Boston Co., 180
Mass. 456; Cameron _v._ N. E. Co., 182 Mass. 310; Driscoll _v._
Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102; Conley _v._ United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238;
Smith _v._ St. Paul Co., 30 Minn. 169; Hollingshed _v._ Yazoo R. Co.,
99 Miss. 464; Butts _v._ Nat. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168; Breen _v._ St.
Louis Co., 102 Mo. App. 479; Heiberger _v._ Missouri Tel. Co., 133 Mo.
App. 452; Lowe _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 145 Mo. App. 248; Buchanan
_v._ West Co., 52 N. J. Law, 265; Consol. Co. _v._ Lambertson, 59 N.
J. Law, 297; Stokes _v._ Schlacter, 66 N. J. Law, 334; Porter _v._
Del. Co., 73 N. J. Law, 405; Kennell _v._ Gershonovitz, 84 N. J. Law,
577; O’Flaherty _v._ Nassau Co., 34 App. Div. 74 (affirmed 165 N. Y.
624); Cohn _v._ Ansonia Co., 162 App. Div. 791; Pa. Co. _v._ Graham,
63 Pa. St. 290; Scott _v._ Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Ewing _v._
Pittsburgh Co., 147 Pa. St. 40 (_semble_); Linn _v._ Duquesne Co., 204
Pa. St. 551 (_semble_); Samarra _v._ Allegheny R. Co., 238 Pa. St.
469; Folk _v._ Seaboard Co., 99 S. C. 284; Godeau _v._ Blood, 52 Vt.
251; Nordgren _v._ Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305; Shutz _v._ Chicago Co., 73
Wis. 147; and even though the admitted tort is only an assault as
distinguished from a battery. Kline _v._ Kline, 158 Ind. 602; Williams
_v._ Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223; Leach _v._ Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App.
699. It must be shown that there was causal connection between the
fright and the shock. Hack _v._ Dady, 142 App. Div. 510.

In Homans _v._ Boston Co., _supra_, the court said, through Holmes, C.
J.: “As has been explained repeatedly, it is an arbitrary exception,
based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery
for visible illness resulting from nervous shock alone. Spade _v._
Lynn Co.; Smith _v._ Postal Co., 174 Mass. 576. But when there has
been a battery and the nervous shock results from the same wrongful
management as the battery, it is at least equally impracticable to go
further and to inquire whether the shock comes through the battery or
along with it. Even were it otherwise, recognizing as we must the
logic in favor of the plaintiff when a remedy is denied because the
only immediate wrong was a shock to the nerves, we think that when the
reality of the cause is guaranteed by proof of a substantial battery
of the person there is no occasion to press further the exception to
general rules.” See also Spade _v._ Lynn Co., 172 Mass. 690, per
Holmes, C. J.

_Liability for frightening an Animal to Death._ The doctrine of the
principal case was carried so far in Lee _v._ Burlington, 113 Ia.,
356, that no recovery was allowed for the death of a horse from fright
caused by the careless conduct of the defendant. But the opposite view
prevailed in Louisville R. Co. _v._ Melton, 158 Ala. 509, and Conklin
_v._ Thompson, 29 Barb. 218.

Footnote 50:

Portions of the statement of facts have been omitted.

Footnote 51:

See to the same effect Phillips _v._ Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; Cleveland
Co. _v._ Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374; Gaskins _v._ Runkle, 25 Ind. App.
584; Mahoney _v._ Dankwart, 108 Ia. 321; McGee _v._ Vanover, 148 Ky.
737; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Robinett, 151 Ky. 778; Sperier _v._ Ott,
116 La. 1087; Renner _v._ Canfield, 36 Minn. 90; Bucknam _v._ Great
Northern R. Co., 76 Minn. 373; Sanderson _v._ Great Northern R. Co.,
88 Minn. 162; Hutchinson _v._ Stern, 115 App. Div. 791; Gosa _v._
Southern Ry., 67 S. C. 347; Gulf R. Co. _v._ Overton, 101 Tex. 583
(but compare Gulf R. Co. _v._ Coopwood, 16 Tex. Ct. Rep. 354); Taylor
_v._ Spokane R. Co., 72 Wash. 378, rev’g 67 Wash. 96.

Footnote 52:

Pullman Co. _v._ Lutz, 154 Ala. 517; Spearman _v._ McCrary, 4 Ala.
App. 473; Sloane _v._ So. Co., 111 Cal. 668; Watson _v._ Dilts, 116
Ia. 249; Cowan _v._ Tel. Co., 122 Ia. 379, 382 (_semble_); Purcell
_v._ St. Paul Co., 48 Minn. 134, 138; Lesch _v._ Great Northern R.
Co., 97 Minn. 503; Watkins _v._ Kaolin Co., 131 N. C. 536; Taber _v._
Seaboard Co., 81 S. C. 317; Simone _v._ R. I. Co., 28 R. I. 186; Mack
_v._ South Co., 52 S. C. 323; Hill _v._ Kimball, 76 Tex. 210; Gulf Co.
_v._ Hayter, 93 Tex. 239; Yoakum _v._ Kroeger, (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.
W. 953; St. Louis Co. _v._ Murdock, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 249; Pankopf
_v._ Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146; Fitzpatrick _v._ Gr. W. Co., 12 Up. Can.
Q. B. 645; Bell _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 26 L. R. Ir. 428; Cooper
_v._ Caledonia Co. (Court of Sess., June 14, 1902), 4. F. 880
_Accord_.

See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence
without Impact, 41 Am. L. Reg. & Rev. 141.

_Mental Anguish caused by Negligence in Transmission of Telegrams._ In
a few states the addressee is allowed to recover damages for mental
anguish resulting from the negligent failure of a telegraph company to
make seasonable delivery of a message. Mentzer _v._ Western Co., 93
Ia. 752; Cowan _v._ Western Co., 122 Ia. 379; Hurlburt _v._ Western
Co., 123 Ia. 295; Chapman _v._ Western Co., 90 Ky. 265; Western Co.
_v._ Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464; Western Co. _v._ Fisher, 107 Ky. 513;
Graham _v._ Western Co., 109 La. 1069; Barnes _v._ Western Co., 27
Nev. 438 (_semble_); Thompson _v._ Western Co., 106 N. C. 549; Young
_v._ Western Co., 107 N. C. 370; Bryan _v._ Western Co., 133 N. C.
603; Woods _v._ Western Co., 148 N. C. 1; Hellams _v._ Western Co., 70
S. C. 83 (_statutory_); Capers _v._ Western Co., 71 S. C. 29;
Wadsworth _v._ Western Co., 86 Tenn. 695; Railroad _v._ Griffin, 92
Tenn. 694; So Relle _v._ Western Co., 55 Tex. 308; Stuart _v._ Western
Co., 66 Tex. 580; Western Co. _v._ Beringer, 84 Tex. 38.

But the weight of authority is against such recovery. Chase _v._
Western Co., 44 Fed. 554; Crawson _v._ Western Co., 47 Fed. 544; Tyler
_v._ Western Co., 54 Fed. 634; Western Co. _v._ Wood, 57 Fed. 471;
Gahan _v._ Western Co., 59 Fed. 433; Stansell _v._ Western Co., 107
Fed. 668; Western Co. _v._ Sklar, 126 Fed. 295; Rowan _v._ Western
Co., 149 Fed. 550; Blount _v._ Western Co., 126 Ala. 105; Western Co.
_v._ Krichbaum, 132 Ala. 535; Western Co. _v._ Blocker, 138 Ala. 484;
Western Co. _v._ Waters, 139 Ala. 652; Peay _v._ Western Co., 64 Ark.
538 (but changed by statute, Western Co. _v._ McMullin, 98 Ark. 346);
Russell _v._ Western Co., 3 Dak. 315; Internat. Co. _v._ Saunders, 32
Fla. 434; Chapman _v._ Western Co., 88 Ga. 763; Giddens _v._ Western
Co., 111 Ga. 824; Western Co. _v._ Haltom, 71 Ill. App. 63; Western
Co. _v._ Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64 (overruling Reese _v._ Western Co., 123
Ind. 294); West _v._ Western Co., 39 Kan. 93 (_semble_); Cole _v._
Gray, 70 Kan. 705; Francis _v._ Western Co., 58 Minn. 252; Western Co.
_v._ Rogers, 68 Miss. 748; Duncan _v._ Western Co., 93 Miss. 500;
Connell _v._ Western Co., 116 Mo. 34; Newman _v._ Western Co., 54 Mo.
App. 434; Curtin _v._ Western Co., 13 App. Div. 253; Morton _v._
Western Co., 53 Ohio St. 431; Butner _v._ Western Co., 2 Okl. 234;
Western Co. _v._ Chouteau, 28 Okl. 664; Lewis _v._ Western Co., 57 S.
C. 325 (law changed by statute in 1900, Capers _v._ Western Co., 71 S.
C. 29); Connelly _v._ Western Co., 100 Va. 51; Corcoran _v._ Postal
Co., 80 Wash. 570; Davis _v._ Western Co., 46 W. Va. 48; Summerfield
_v._ Western Co., 87 Wis. 1; Koerber _v._ Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 464
(_semble_).

Footnote 53:

Only the judgment of the court is printed.

Footnote 54:

Hall _v._ Jackson, 24 Col. App. 225; Dunn _v._ Western Co., 2 Ga. App.
845; Goddard _v._ Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722 (_semble_); Watson _v._
Dilts, 116 Ia. 249, 124 Ia. 249; Lonergan _v._ Small, 81 Kan. 48;
Nelson _v._ Crawford, 122 Mich. 466 (_semble_); Preiser _v._ Wielandt,
48 App. Div. 569; Buchanan _v._ Stout, 123 App. Div. 648 (_semble_);
Miller _v._ R. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 324 (_semble_); Butler _v._
Western Co., 62 S. C. 222 (_semble_); Western Co. _v._ Watson, 82
Miss. 101 (_semble_); Shellabarger _v._ Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566;
Wilson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649; Hill _v._ Kimball, 76
Tex. 210; Davidson _v._ Lee, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 904; Jeppsen
_v._ Jensen, 47 Utah 536 _Accord_.

_Threats not amounting to an Assault._ Threats of bodily harm sent by
letter and causing illness by reason of apprehension of bodily harm
are grounds for an action. Houston _v._ Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15;
Grimes _v._ Gates, 47 Vt. 594. Compare Stevens _v._ Steadman, 140 Ga.
680; Degenhardt _v._ Heller, 93 Wis. 662.

Footnote 55:

The opinion of Cozens-Hardy, M.R., sustaining the award is omitted.

Footnote 56:

“On principle, the distinction between cases of physical impact or
lesion being necessary as a ground of liability for damage caused
seems to have nothing in its favour—always on the footing that the
causal connection between the injury and the occurrence is
established. If compensation is to be recovered under the statute or
at common law in respect of an occurrence which has caused dislocation
of a limb, on what principle can it be denied if the same occurrence
has caused unhinging of the mind? The personal injury in the latter
case may be infinitely graver than in the former, and to what avail—in
the incidence of justice, or the principle of law—is it to say that
there is a distinction between things physical and mental? This is the
broadest difference of all, and it carries with it no principle of
legal distinction. Indeed it may be suggested that the proposition
that injury so produced to the mind is unaccompanied by physical
affection or change might itself be met by modern physiology or
pathology with instant challenge.” Lord Shaw in Coyle _v._ Watson,
[1915] A. C. 1, 14.

Footnote 57:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 58:

Metropolitan R. Co. _v._ Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193; Hyman _v._ Nye, 6
Q. B. D. 685; Simkin _v._ London R. Co., 21 Q. B. D. 453; Smith _v._
Browne, 28 L. R. Ir. 1; Bizzell _v._ Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Western R.
Co. _v._ Vaughan, 113 Ga. 354; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Scott, 42 Ill. 132;
City _v._ Cook, 99 Ind. 10; Needham _v._ Louisville R. Co., 85 Ky.
423; Merrill _v._ Bassett, 97 Me. 501; Heinz _v._ Baltimore R. Co.,
113 Md. 582; Chenery _v._ Fitchburg R. Co., 160 Mass. 211; Brick _v._
Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334; Keown _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 141 Mo. 86;
Teepan _v._ Taylor, 141 Mo. App. 282; Brown _v._ Merrimack Bank, 67 N.
H. 549; Nashville R. Co. _v._ Wade, 127 Tenn. 154; Coates _v._ Canaan,
51 Vt. 131; Fowler _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 18 W. Va. 579; Schrunk _v._
St. Joseph, 120 Wis. 223 _Accord_.

“We do not understand that an employer’s liability for the negligent
act of his superintendent can be measured by the latter’s poise of
temperament, nor that the character of a given act of the
superintendent in respect of negligence can be made to depend upon his
excitability or the reverse. It is the duty of a superintendent to do
what an ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under the same
circumstances, and the employer is liable if he fail to do this and
injury results to an employe.” Bessemer Land Co. _v._ Campbell, 121
Ala. 50, 60.

Also it is erroneous to charge the jury that failure to exercise the
care of “an ordinary man under like circumstances” or of “a person
under similar circumstances” or “just such as one of you, similarly
employed, would have exercised under like circumstances” amounts to
negligence. Austin R. Co. _v._ Beatty, 73 Tex. 592; St. Louis R. Co.
_v._ Finley, 79 Tex. 85; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Gower, 85 Tenn. 465.

Footnote 59:

“See Lambert _v._ Bessey, T. Raym. 422; Scott _v._ Shepherd, 3 Wils.
403. Probably an action of trespass might have been brought.”
[Reporter’s note.]

Footnote 60:

Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524; Thompson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 189
Fed. 723; Fort Smith Co. _v._ Slover, 58 Ark. 168; Richardson _v._
Kier, 34 Cal. 63; Nolan _v._ New York R. Co., 53 Conn. 461; Wolf Mfg.
Co. _v._ Wilson, 152 Ill. 9; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Peters, 80 Ind.
168; Galloway _v._ Chicago R. Co., 87 Ia. 458; Schneider _v._ Little,
184 Mich. 315; Lauritsen _v._ Bridge Co., 87 Minn. 518; McGraw _v._
Chicago R. Co., 59 Neb. 397; Roberts _v._ Boston R. Co., 69 N. H. 354;
Drake _v._ Mount, 33 N. J. Law, 441; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Watson, 36
Okl. 1; Ahern _v._ Oregon Co., 24 Or. 276; Houston R. Co. _v._
Alexander, 103 Tex. 594; Washington _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 17 W. Va.
190 _Accord_.

Footnote 61:

Sharp _v._ Powell, L. R. 7. C. P. 253; Pearson _v._ Cox, 2 C. P. D.
369; Gregg _v._ Illinois R. Co., 147 Ill. 550, 560; Missouri R. Co.
_v._ Columbia, 65 Kan. 390, 400; Sutphen _v._ Hedden, 67 N. J. Law,
324; Crutchfield _v._ Richmond R. Co., 76 N. C. 320; Martin _v._
Highland Park Co., 128 N. C. 264; Simpson _v._ Southern R. Co., 154 N.
C. 51; McCauley _v._ Logan, 152 Pa. St. 202; Bradley _v._ Lake Shore
R. Co., 238 Pa. St. 315 (“only an extreme visionary would have
imagined the consequences which followed or that injury could result
to person or property therefrom”); Consumers Brewing Co. _v._ Doyle,
102 Va. 399; Lippert _v._ Brewing Co., 141 Wis. 453 _Accord_.

Footnote 62:

Only that part of the opinion which relates to this instruction is
given.

Footnote 63:

“There is no absolute or intrinsic negligence; it is always relative
to some circumstances of time, place, or person.” Bramwell, B., in
Degg _v._ Midland R. Co., 1 Hurlst. & N. 773, 781. See also Bowen, L.
J., in Thomas _v._ Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, 694.

Bizzell _v._ Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Needham _v._ San Francisco R. Co.,
37 Cal. 409; Diamond Iron Co. _v._ Giles, 7 Houst. 557; Atlantic R.
Co. _v._ Moore, 8 Ga. App. 185; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Johnson, 103 Ill.
512; Parks _v._ Yost, 93 Kan. 334; Sheridan _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 101
Md. 50; Kelly _v._ Michigan R. Co., 65 Mich. 186; De Bolt _v._ Kansas
City R. Co., 123 Mo. 496; Garland _v._ Boston R. Co., 76 N. H. 556;
New Jersey Exp. Co. _v._ Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 434; McGuire _v._
Spence, 91 N. Y. 303; Connell _v._ New York R. Co., 144 App. Div. 664;
Anderson _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 161 N. C. 462; Elster _v._ Springfield,
49 Ohio St. 82; Frankford Co. _v._ Philadelphia R. Co., 54 Pa. St.
345; Virginia Power Co. _v._ Smith, 117 Va. 418; Morrison _v._ Power
Co., 75 W. Va. 608; Davis _v._ Chicago R. Co., 58 Wis. 646 _Accord_.

Hence it is incorrect to define ordinary care as “such care as the
ordinary person uses in the transaction of the ordinary affairs of
life.” Hennesey _v._ Chicago R. Co., 99 Wis. 109.

Footnote 64:

Only part of the opinion is given.

Footnote 65:

Rosenthal _v._ Chicago R. Co., 255 Ill. 552; Indianapolis Traction Co.
_v._ Crawley, 51 Ind. App. 357 (deaf man); O’Flaherty _v._ Union R.
Co., 45 Mo. 70; Simms _v._ South Carolina R. Co., 27 S. C. 268.
_Accord_.

Footnote 66:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 67:

The instruction which the court held should have been given in Winn
_v._ Lowell was: “If the plaintiff was a person of poor sight, common
prudence required of her greater care in walking upon the streets, and
avoiding obstructions, than is required of persons of good sight.”

Footnote 68:

Compare Fenneman _v._ Holden, 75 Md. 1; Karl _v._ Juniata, 206 Pa. St.
633; Thompson _v._ Salt Lake Co., 16 Utah 281.

Footnote 69:

Statement abridged. Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to
a single point.

Footnote 70:

Compare Wilson _v._ Brett, 11 M. & W. 113; Austin _v._ Manchester R.
Co., 10 C. B. 454; Grill _v._ General Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 600;
Steamboat New World _v._ King, 16 How. 469; Purple _v._ Union R. Co.,
114 Fed. 123; Oregon Co. _v._ Roe, 176 Fed. 715; Stringer _v._ Alabama
R. Co., 99 Ala. 397; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; Denny
_v._ Chicago R. Co., 150 Ia. 460; Raymond _v._ Portland R. Co., 100
Me. 529; McPheeters _v._ Hannibal R. Co., 45 Mo. 22; Reed _v._
Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 661; Village _v._ Holliday, 50 Neb. 229;
Perkins _v._ New York R. Co., 24 N. Y. 196; McAdoo _v._ Richmond R.
Co., 105 N. C. 140; Fitzgerald _v._ Grand Trunk R. Co., 4 Ont. App.
601 _Accord_.

In Wilson _v._ Brett, _supra_, Rolfe, B., said: “I could see no
difference between negligence and gross negligence—... it was the same
thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet.”

Footnote 71:

Maryland R. Co. _v._ Tucker, 115 Md. 43; Cates _v._ Hall, 171 N. C.
360; Lundy _v._ Southern Tel. Co., 90 S. C. 25 _Accord_.