Chapter LXXX: Section 3: of the Trade Disputes Act, 6 Edward 7, Chap. 47, enacted

Dec. 21, 1906, is as follows:—

“Sect. 3. An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it
induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it
is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some
other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his
capital or his labor as he wills.”

See Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev.
253, 345, 429.

Footnote 580:

Only the opinion of Bowen, L. J., is given. Fry, L. J., concurred, but
Lord Esher, M. R., dissented. The decision was afterwards affirmed in
the House of Lords, [1892] A. C. 25.

Footnote 581:

Payne _v._ Railroad Co., 13 Lea, 507 (Freeman and Turney, JJ.,
dissenting); South Royalton Bank _v._ Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505; Delz
_v._ Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405 (_semble_) _Accord_. See Lough _v._
Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271.

Footnote 582:

Statement rewritten.

Footnote 583:

See Boggs _v._ Duncan Furniture Co., 163 Ia. 106; Rogers, Predatory
Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 Harvard Law Rev. 139.

Footnote 584:

The arguments are omitted.

Footnote 585:

In Holbrook _v._ Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, a land owner put a sign on
her land reading, “For Sale. Best Offer From Colored Family.”
Defendant wished to sell but was also moved by ill will toward
plaintiffs, whose real estate business was seriously interfered with
by the threatened sale. See Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because
of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 420;
Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 429,
453, 455.

Footnote 586:

In this case, however, the means used by defendant involved trespasses
and fraud. See American Waltham Watch Co. _v._ United States Watch
Co., 173 Mass. 85.

Footnote 587:

See Faloon _v._ Schilling, 29 Kan. 292.

“_Spite fence._” Malicious use of property to the injury of a neighbor
was held not actionable in Capital Bank _v._ Henty, 7 A. C. 741, 766
(_semble_); Giller _v._ West, 162 Ind. 17; Brostrom _v._ Lauppe, 179
Mass. 315; Bordeaux _v._ Greene, 22 Mont. 254; Mahan _v._ Brown, 13
Wend. 261; Auburn Co. _v._ Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444 (_semble_); Pickard
_v._ Collins, 23 Barb. 444; Levy _v._ Brothers, 4 Misc. 48; Letts _v._
Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73; Koblegard _v._ Hale, 60 W. Va. 37; Metzger
_v._ Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267.

_Contra_ Norton _v._ Randolph, 176 Ala. 381; Burke _v._ Smith, 69
Mich. 380; Flaherty _v._ Moran, 81 Mich. 52; Kirkwood _v._ Finegan, 95
Mich. 543; Peek _v._ Roe, 110 Mich. 52; Barger _v._ Barringer, 151 N.
C. 433. See Wilson _v._ Irwin, 144 Ky. 311; Metz _v._ Tierney, 13 N.
M. 363; Smith _v._ Speed, 11 Okl. 95; Haverstick _v._ Sipe, 33 Pa. St.
368; Shell _v._ Kemmerer, 13 Phila. 502; McCorkle _v._ Driskell,
(Tenn.) 60 S. W. 172.

_Malicious diversion of percolating water_ was held to give no right
of action in Corporation of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587;
Meeker _v._ East Orange, 76 N. J. Law, 435; Phelps _v._ Nowlen, 72 N.
Y. 39; Chatfield _v._ Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Huber _v._ Merkel, 117 Wis.
355.

_Contra_ Chasemore _v._ Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 388 (_semble_);
Roath _v._ Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 540–44 (semble); Chesley _v._ King,
74 Me. 164 (_semble_); Stevens _v._ Kelley, 78 Me. 445, 452; Greenleaf
_v._ Francis, 18 Pick. 119 (_semble_); Swett _v._ Cutts, 50 N. H. 439,
447 (_semble_); Wyandot Club Co. _v._ Sells, 3 Ohio N. P. 210;
Wheatley _v._ Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528, 533 (_semble_); Haldeman _v._
Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514 (_semble_); Lybe’s Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 626
(_semble_); Williams _v._ Laden, 161 Pa. St. 283 (_semble_); Miller
_v._ Black Rock Co., 99 Va. 747 (_semble_).

But cases of this type are now coming to be treated on a different
principle of waste or unreasonable use of water underlying neighboring
tracts. Gagnon _v._ French Lick Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687; Barclay _v._
Abraham, 121 Ia. 619; Stillwater Water Co. _v._ Farmer, 89 Minn. 58;
Springfield Waterworks Co. _v._ Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74.

(1) Has the owner of land the same ownership and control of
percolating water (water passing, or filtering, through the ground
beneath the surface of the earth, without flowing in definite
channels), that he has of the soil, _e. g._, the sand and the rocks?

Or (2) has he only a limited and qualified right in the percolating
water; a right of reasonable user limited by the correlative rights of
his neighbors?

On those questions there is, in recent cases, a conflict of authority.
For illustrative cases endorsing the first theory, see Acton _v._
Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324; Mayor of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C.
587; Meeker _v._ East Orange, 76 N. J. Law, 435. For illustrative
cases favoring the second theory, see Bassett _v._ Salisbury Mfg. Co.,
43 N. H. 569 (where the question related to the right of the defendant
to prevent water percolating under the surface of plaintiff’s land
from passing off through defendant’s land); Katz _v._ Walkinshaw, 141
Cal. 116, 140, 141.

We are concerned here only to point out how the adoption of one or the
other of the above conflicting views may affect the materiality of the
landowner’s motive in the use of percolating water.

If the first theory is adopted, then, in some jurisdictions, the
landowner would not be held liable, even though actuated by bad motive
(Mayor of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587); and, in all other
jurisdictions, he would be liable only when, and because, he was
actuated by bad motive.

But if the second theory is adopted, the landowner might frequently be
held liable, irrespective of motive. On the second theory percolating
water might be regarded as, in a certain sense, the common property of
the adjoining owners (bearing some analogy to an underground lake);
and it would be held that each owner is entitled to only a reasonable
share, and is entitled to use that share only for certain purposes.
See 3 Farnham, Waters, § 935. Upon this view an owner who uses more
than his share, or who uses it for purposes outside those legally
allowable, would be liable entirely irrespective of motive. “Later
American cases,” says Professor Huffcut, “transfer the emphasis from
the showing of ‘malice’ to a showing of ‘unreasonable user,’ which may
or may not be accompanied by malice.” 13 Yale Law Journal, 222.

We may add that if bad motive should not be held, in itself, a
substantive ground of liability, yet the existence of bad motive might
be a piece of evidence bearing upon the question of reasonable user.
User for the sole purpose of gratifying ill will might not be deemed
reasonable.

On the general question of liability for malevolent acts in reference
to percolating water, see, Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because
of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 414–415;
Huffcut, Percolating Waters: the Rule of Reasonable User, 13 Yale Law
Journ. 222.

Footnote 588:

Statements abridged. Portions of opinion omitted.

Footnote 589:

In Rideout _v._ Knox, 148 Mass. 368, where a similar statute was held
constitutional, it was held error to charge that defendant could not
justify building the fence unless his sole motive was a legitimate
use; malice must be the dominant motive. See also Ingwerson _v._
Barry, 118 Cal. 342; Gallagher _v._ Dodge, 48 Conn. 387; Holmes _v._
Fuller, 68 Vt. 207; Karasek _v._ Peier, 22 Wash. 419; Jones _v._
Williams, 56 Wash. 588; Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of
the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 414–415.

Footnote 590:

The rest of the opinion is omitted. This case was followed in
Carrington _v._ Taylor, 11 East, 571. See Lamprey _v._ Danz, 86 Minn.
317; Whittaker _v._ Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386; Meredith _v._ Triple
Island Gun Club, 113 Va. 80.

Footnote 591:

Only the opinion of Bramwell, B., is given. Pollock, C. B., Martin and
Pigott, BB., concurred.

Footnote 592:

Statement rewritten. Only so much of the case is given as relates to a
single point.

Footnote 593:

Statement rewritten. Arguments omitted. Some of the opinions are
entirely omitted, and none are given in full.

Footnote 594:

... “The litigants are members of two rival associations of
workingmen, registered under the Trade Unions Act of 1871.”... Lord
Watson, [1898] A. C., p. 90. “It is not a dispute between employers
and employed,—between capital and labor,—but rather one between the
members of one trade union and of another trade union.”... Lord
Ashbourne, _ibid._ p. 109. “Each party had the financial support of
their union.” Lord Macnaghten, p. 147.

Footnote 595:

As to the terms of the ironworkers’ employment, see Lord Watson, pp.
90, 99, and Lord Herschell, p. 130.

Footnote 596:

See Lord Macnaghten, p. 146.

Footnote 597:

It was _held_, both by Kennedy, J., and by the Court of Appeal, that
Jackson and Knight were not liable. Upon this branch of the case there
was no appeal to the House of Lords.

Footnote 598:

See Lord Macnaghten, p. 148.

Footnote 599:

The statement here given is compiled from extracts recited in the
opinions of Lord Shand, p. 162, Lord Halsbury, p. 82, and Lord
Macnaghten, p. 149.

Footnote 600:

See Veeder, Advisory Opinions of the Judges in England, 13 Harv. Law
Rev. 358.

Footnote 601:

... “There is no ground for even a suggestion that the defendant’s
acts were due to competition in trade or employment. There could be no
competition between the two sets of men in the circumstances under
which they were then working, the one at wood, the other at iron only;
and even if they were competing, the plaintiffs were working well
within their right.” Hawkins, J., p. 23. “Now, although according to
the principles of the Mogul Case the action of Allen might have been
justified on the principles of trade competition, if it had been
confined to the time when the respondents were doing ironwork, and
were therefore acting in competition with the boilermakers, it appears
to me that as soon as he overstepped those limits, and induced their
employers to dismiss them by way of punishment, his action was without
just cause or excuse, and, consequently, malicious within the legal
meaning of that word.” Cave, J., p. 37. “This action was not an
effort, by competition, to enable the boilermakers to get the work
instead, but to punish the plaintiffs by causing the employment of
other shipwrights in their room.” Lord Ashbourne, p. 111.

Footnote 602:

GERMAN CIVIL CODE, §§ 226, 826.

226. The exercise of a right is not permitted, when its sole object is
to injure another.

826. Whoever intentionally inflicts damage upon another in a morally
reprehensible manner is bound to compensate the other for the damage.

See also Digest, xxxix, 3, 1, § 12, xxxix, 3, 2, § 9; L. 17, 55;
Domat, Civil Law (Cushing’s ed.) § 158; Erskine, Institutes of the Law
of Scotland, Bk. II, tit. 1, § 2; Bell, Principles of the Law of
Scotland, § 966; Planiol, Traité Elémentaire de droit civil, (4 ed.),
II, §§ 870–72; Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, I, § 121;
Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of
the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411; Walton, Motive as an Element in
Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law, 22 Harvard Law Rev. 349.

Footnote 603:

Some opinions are omitted. None are given in full. Arguments omitted.

Footnote 604:

Read by Lord Davey in Lord Lindley’s absence.

Footnote 605:

[1895] 2 Q. B. 22, 23; [1898] A. C. 3.

Footnote 606:

[1898] A. C. p. 19, Lord Watson; p. 115, Lord Herschell; pp. 147–150,
Lord Macnaghten; pp. 161, 165, Lord Shand; p. 175, Lord Davey; p. 178,
Lord James.

Footnote 607:

ENGLAND, TRADE DISPUTES ACT, 1906, 6 Ed. 7, c. 47.

1.—The following paragraph shall be added as a new paragraph after the
first paragraph of section three of the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875:—

“An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or
more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute, not be actionable unless the act, if done without any such
agreement or combination, would be actionable.”

2.—(1) It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own
behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or
firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at
or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on
business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of
peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from working.

(2) Section seven of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875, is hereby repealed from “attending at or near” to the end of the
section.

3.—An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces
some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is an
interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other
person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his
capital or his labor as he wills.

4.—(1) An action against a trade union, whether of workmen or masters,
or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves
and all other members of the trade union in respect of any tortious
act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union,
shall not be entertained by any court.

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the trustees
of a trade union to be sued in the events provided for by the Trades
Union Act, 1871, section nine, except in respect of any tortious act
committed by or on behalf of the union in contemplation or in
furtherance of a trade dispute.

5.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and the
Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and this Act may be cited together as
the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906.

(2) In this Act the expression “trade union” has the same meaning as
in the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and shall include any
combination as therein defined, notwithstanding that such combination
may be the branch of a trade union.

(3) In this Act and in the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875, the expression “trade dispute” means any dispute between
employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is
connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of the
employment, or with the conditions of labor, of any person, and the
expression “workmen” means all persons employed in trade or industry,
whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a trade
dispute arises; and, in section three of the last-mentioned Act, the
words “between employers and workmen” shall be repealed.

See Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev.
345, 351, note 3.

Footnote 608:

The statement has been abridged.

Footnote 609:

“The defendant associations had the absolute right to threaten to do
that which they had the right to do.” Parker, C. J., in National
Protective Association _v._ Cumming, 170 New York, 315, p. 329.

“It will be said that a man has the absolute right to threaten to do
that which he has a right to do. Granted that what you may absolutely
do you may absolutely threaten to do (give unqualified notice of your
intention to do). But it does not follow that you may conditionally
threaten to do it. The right to absolutely refuse to work and the
right to conditionally refuse do not, as against third persons, _i.
e._, persons other than the employer, stand to each other in the
relation of the greater to the less. The former does not necessarily
include the latter. They are distinct from each other; and the latter
may sometimes be the more important and the more dangerous right of
the two.” 20 Harvard Law Rev., p. 273.

“The right to quit an employment which is terminable at will may
include a right to give absolute and unqualified notice of intention
to leave.”

“It may also include, _as against an employer_, a right to annex any
possible condition to an offer to work or to a threat to refrain from
working. By ‘right as against an employer’ we mean that an employer
could not maintain an action against a laborer for annexing such
conditions. The employer is not legally damaged by such an offer. He
is not bound to accept it. As between B and C, the person with whom B
is directly dealing, it may be true that ‘the right to refuse to deal
involves the right to name any terms which one pleases, and to refuse
to deal except on these terms.’ C cannot maintain an action against B
for insisting on unreasonable terms. But the terms or conditions
annexed to an offer may relate to the offeree’s relations to a third
person, and [if the offeree accepts and performs the conditions] that
may raise a question whether such third person has any ground of
complaint.”

“We think that the right to work or not to work does not include, _as
against third persons_, the right to annex any possible condition to
an offer to work or to a notice of intention to refrain from work.
Suppose that B offers to work for C on condition that C commits a
battery on A. Could B effectively deny that he instigated the
commission of the battery? Could B escape liability to A on the ground
that he was merely stating to C the conditions on which he was willing
to exercise his right to labor or not to labor?” 20 Harvard Law Rev.
270–271.

The contrary view is open to several objections:—

“1. It assumes that, if certain conduct of B does not violate any
legal right of C, it cannot infringe a legal right of A.

“2. It overlooks the distinction between unconditionally exercising a
right, and offering to exercise it (or to refrain from exercising it)
on condition that the offeree shall take action which is intended to
produce (and does produce) damage to a third person.

“3. It assumes that one who intentionally instigates a second person
to inflict damage on a third person can escape responsibility by
putting the instigation in the form of a conditional offer to
exercise, or to refrain from exercising, a right which he had against
the second person.” 20 Harvard Law Rev. 269.

Footnote 610:

“In many of the cases the element of combination or conspiracy is
found. If the act be lawful, the combination or conspiracy to commit
it does not make the act unlawful; if it be unlawful, the combination
to commit it may render its commission easier and may aggravate the
injury; but it does not change the character of the act. The fact of
combination is treated by the courts as of great evidentiary value in
deciding the question of coercion or duress.” Burke, J., in Sumwalt
Ice Co. _v._ Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 Md. 403, 414.

“The gist of a civil action of this sort is not the conspiracy but the
deceit or fraud causing damage to the plaintiff, the combination being
charged merely for the purpose of fixing joint liability on the
defendants.” Rugg, J., in New England Foundation Co. _v._ Reed, 209
Mass. 556.

See also Romer, L. J., in Giblan _v._ National Amalgamated Union,
[1903] 2 K. B. 600, 619–620. But compare Henshaw, J., in Vallejo Ferry
Co. _v._ Solano Club, 165 Cal. 255.

Footnote 611:

_Intimidation._ See Springhead Co. _v._ Riley, 6 Eq. 551 (intimidating
placards); Southern R. Co. _v._ Machinists Union, 111 Fed. 49; Knudsen
_v._ Benn, 123 Fed. 636; Atchison R. Co. _v._ Gee, 139 Fed. 582; Pope
Motor Co. _v._ Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (collection of large crowd); Allis
Chalmers Co. _v._ Iron Molders’ Union, 150 Fed. 155 (crowds);
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. _v._ Goldfield Miners’ Union, 159
Fed. 500; Kolley _v._ Robinson, (C. C. A.) 187 Fed. 415; Fortney _v._
Carter, (C. C. A.) 203 Fed. 454; Bittner _v._ West Virginia Coal Co.,
(C. C. A.) 214 Fed. 716; Goldberg _v._ Stablemen’s Union, 149 Cal.
429; Underhill _v._ Murphy, 117 Ky. 640; Sherry _v._ Perkins, 147
Mass. 212 (intimidating banner); Ideal Mfg. Co. _v._ Ludwig, 149 Mich.
133 (crowd); Baltic Mining Co. _v._ Judge, 177 Mich. 632; Minnesota
Stove Co. _v._ Cavanaugh, 131 Minn. 458; Jones _v._ Maher, 62 Misc.
388; O’Neil _v._ Behanna, 182 Pa. St. 236; Jensen _v._ Cooks’ Union,
39 Wash. 531; Commercial Printing Co. _v._ Tacoma Typographical Union,
85 Wash. 234.

_Picketing_, see American Steel Co. _v._ Wire Drawers’ Union, 90 Fed.
608; Iron Molders’ Union _v._ Allis Chalmers Co., (C. C. A.) 166 Fed.
45; Sona _v._ Aluminum Castings Co., (C. C. A.) 214 Fed. 936; Karges
Furniture Co. _v._ Woodworkers’ Union, 165 Ind. 421; Beck _v._
Teamsters’ Union, 118 Mich. 497.

_Annoyance of workers resorting to plaintiff._ Union P. R. Co. _v._
Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; Frank _v._ Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443; Jonas Glass
Co. _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219.

_Inducing employer to break contracts._ Read _v._ Friendly Society,
[1902] 2 K. B. 732; Jonas _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219;
Flaccus _v._ Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128.

_Inducing employees to break contract._ Hardie Tynes Mfg. Co. _v._
Cruse, 189 Ala. 66; Folsom _v._ Lewis, 208 Mass. 336; Jonas Glass Co.
_v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219; Grassi Contracting Co.
_v._ Bennett, 160 N. Y. Suppl. 279.

Footnote 612:

This section is as follows: “No person shall, by intimidation or
force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or
continuing in the employment of any person or corporation.”

Footnote 613:

In accord with the prevailing opinion, see Tunstall _v._ Stearns Coal
Co., 192 Fed. 808; Folsom _v._ Lewis, 208 Mass. 336; Burnham _v._
Dowd, 217 Mass. 351; Fairbanks _v._ McDonald, 219 Mass. 291;
Cornellier _v._ Haverhill Mfr’s Assn, 221 Mass. 554; Blanchard _v._
Newark District Council, 77 N. J. Law, 389; Ruddy _v._ United
Journeyman Plumbers, 79 N. J. Law, 467, 81 N. J. Law, 574. Compare
Giblan _v._ National Amalgamated Union, [1903] 2 K. B. 600; National
Fire Proofing Co. _v._ Mason Builders’ Ass’n, 169 Fed. 259; Gill
Engraving Co. _v._ Doerr, 214 Fed. 111.

_Contra_, Kemp _v._ Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213.

_Purpose of gaining control of the labor market._ New England Cement
Co. _v._ McGivern, 218 Mass. 198; Jacobs _v._ Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207;
McCord _v._ Thompson Starrett Co., 129 App. Div. 130; Schwarcz _v._
International Union, 68 Misc. 528; Newton _v._ Erickson, 70 Misc. 291.

Compare Reynolds _v._ Davis, 198 Mass. 294.

Footnote 614:

See majority and minority opinions in the later case of Willcut & Sons
Co. _v._ Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, also Booth _v._ Burgess, 72 N. J.
Eq. 181. Compare Rhodes _v._ Musicians’ Union, 37 R. I. 281.

Footnote 615:

The following condensed statement is taken from 20 Harvard Law Review,
445–447.

Footnote 616:

Loring, J., p. 583.

Footnote 617:

Ibid.

Footnote 618:

Only a part of the opinion is given (pp. 587–88).

Footnote 619:

Bossert _v._ Dhuy, 166 App. Div. 261, 221 N. Y. 342 _Accord_. But see
Grassi Contracting Co. _v._ Bennett, 160 N. Y. Suppl. 279.

In Bohn Mfg. Co. _v._ Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, “a large number of retail
lumber dealers formed a voluntary association, by which they mutually
agreed that they would not deal with any manufacturer or wholesale
dealer who should sell lumber directly to consumers not dealers, at
any point where a member of the association was carrying on a retail
yard; and they provided in their by-laws that, whenever any wholesale
dealer or manufacturer made any such sale, the secretary should notify
all the members of the fact. The plaintiff, a wholesaler, having made
such a sale directly to a consumer, the secretary threatened to send
notice of the fact, as provided in the by-laws, to all the members of
the association.” (This statement is copied from 17 Green Bag, 218.
See also statement by Professor Lewis, 44 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 469.) The
court refused to grant an injunction against sending out the notice.
Here the retail dealers did not threaten to cease dealing with any one
except their competitors, _i. e._, wholesale dealers who should
attempt to sell directly to consumers. They used no lever but their
own conduct. They did not threaten to induce outsiders to refrain from
working for, or selling goods to, the wholesalers. And even as to
their own conduct, they did not threaten to abstain from dealings with
wholesalers in all matters, but only in the purchase of lumber. Much
less did they threaten to abstain from dealing with persons who dealt
with the wholesalers. In a subsequent case the same court said: “It is
to be noted that the defendants in the Bohn case had similar
legitimate interests to protect which were menaced by the practice of
wholesale dealers in selling lumber to contractors and consumers; and
that the defendants’ efforts to induce parties not to deal with
offending wholesale dealers were limited to the members of the
association having similar interests to conserve, and that there was
no agreement or combination or attempt to induce other persons not
members of the association to withhold their patronage from such
wholesale dealers.” Ertz _v._ Produce Exchange Co., 79 Minn. 140, 144.
See also Jackson _v._ Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; Brown _v._ Jacobs
Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429; and other cases collected by Professor
Wyman, 17 Green Bag, 210, 222.

_Strike unless plaintiff is discharged, as a means toward better
conditions in the shop_, see Minasian _v._ Osborne, 210 Mass. 250.

_Strike to get rid of personally objectionable foreman._ De Minico
_v._ Craig, 207 Mass. 593.

Footnote 620:

Statement abridged. Portions of opinion omitted.

Footnote 621:

Gompers _v._ Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418; Baldwin _v._
Escanaba Dealers’ Ass’n, 165 Mich. 98; Fink _v._ Butchers’ Union, 84
N. J. Eq. 638; McCormick _v._ Local Unions, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 165
_Accord_.

Compare _Ex parte_ Heffron, 179 Mo. App. 639.

Footnote 622:

Bossert _v._ Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. _v._
Bricklayers’ Union, 92 Conn. 161 _Accord_. See Iron Molders’ Union
_v._ Allis Chalmers Co., (C. C. A.) 166 Fed. 45. Also Wigmore, The
Boycott as Ground for Damages, 21 American Law Rev. 509, and
Interference with Social Relations, 21 American Law Rev. 764.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 403, changed “Holden v. McGillicuddy, 213 Mass. 563” to “Holden v. McGillicuddy, 215 Mass. 563”. 2. P. 552, changed “they avoid the contract” to “they void the contract”. 3. P. 840, changed “by continued user in connection” to “by continued use in connection”. 4. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in spelling. 5. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. 6. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter. 7. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.