Chapter LXXVIII: Section 3: of this statute is as follows (6)

But see, _contra_, Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, where the
distinction between fair comment and qualified privilege was
overlooked. See also Estelle _v._ Daily News Pub. Co., 99 Neb. 397;
Arnold _v._ Ingram, 151 Wis. 438; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524.

Footnote 499:

The court found that the defendant acted in good faith.

Footnote 500:

Ashford _v._ Evening Star Co., 41 App. D. C. 395; Addington _v._ Times
Pub. Co., 138 La. 731; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404
(_semble_); Express Co. _v._ Copeland, 64 Tex. 354 _Accord_. Compare
Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 141 App. Div. 301; Ivie _v._ Minton, 75 Or. 483.

_Statement at a meeting to oppose a candidate for public office._
Baker _v._ Warner, 231 U. S. 588.

_Criticism of minister in a church convention._ Dickson _v._ Lights,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 17 S. W. 834.

_Criticism of member of association_ at a meeting to discuss the
affairs of the association. Caldwell _v._ Hayden, 42 App. D. C. 166.

_Reply to defamatory statements._ Adam _v._ Ward [1917] A. C. 309;
Preston _v._ Hobbs, 161 App. Div. 363; Smith _v._ Kemp, 132 La. 943.

Footnote 501:

Only part of the opinion is given.

Footnote 502:

_Criticism of member of congregation in a sermon._ Hassett _v._
Carroll, 85 Conn. 23.

_Statement by clergyman to congregation as to conduct of a trustee._
Everett _v._ DeLong, 144 Ill. App. 496.

Footnote 503:

The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Lopes and Kay,
L.JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 504:

Bohlinger _v._ Germania Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477; Gambrill _v._
Schooley, 93 Md. 48 _Accord_. See Central R. Co. _v._ Jones, 18 Ga.
App. 414. But the dictation of a defamatory letter by a lawyer to his
clerk and the copying of it by another clerk in the regular course of
serving his clients, although a publication, is, nevertheless,
privileged. Boxsius _v._ Goblet, [1894] 1 Q. B. 842. And the authority
of Pullman _v._ Hill is greatly weakened by Edmonson _v._ Birch,
[1907] 1 K. B. 371, which treats as privileged the dictation of a
defamatory letter by a company through one of its officers to a
stenographer, and Roff _v._ British Chemical Co., [1918] 2 K. B. 277
(letter passed through the hands of two clerks of addressee). See to
the same effect Owen _v._ Ogilvie Co., 32 App. Div. 465.

_Exchange of letters by mistake whereby privileged letter goes to
wrong person._ See Tompson _v._ Dashwood, 11 Q. B. D. 43; Hebditch
_v._ McIlwaine, [1894] 2 Q. B. 54, 61.

A defamatory statement true of A. but published concerning B., by
mistake, will support an action by B. Shepheard _v._ Whitaker, L. R.
10 C. P. 502; Taylor _v._ Hearst, 107 Cal. 262; Griebel _v._ Rochester
Co., 60 Hun, 319. But see, _contra_, Hanson _v._ Globe Co., _supra_,
665 (Holmes, Morton, and Barker, JJ., dissenting).

Compare Brett _v._ Watson, 20 W. R. 723; Fox _v._ Broderick, 14 Ir. C.
L. R. 453, 459; Loibl _v._ Breidenbach, 78 Wis. 49.

Footnote 505:

The concurring opinions of Bramwell and Brett, L.JJ., and the argument
for defendant are omitted.

Footnote 506:

Salmon _v._ Isaac, 20 L. T. Rep. 885; Lawyers Pub. Co. _v._ West Pub.
Co., 32 App. Div. 585; Saunders _v._ Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369 _Accord_.

Footnote 507:

3 Q. B. Div. 237, S. C.

Footnote 508:

The charge of the learned baron is abridged; the arguments of counsel
and the concurring opinions of Bramwell and Cotton, L.JJ., are
omitted.

Footnote 509:

Barry _v._ McCollom, 81 Conn. 293; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251, 255–6;
Hemmens _v._ Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Haft _v._ First Bank, 19 App. Div.
423 _Accord_.

Footnote 510:

The case is materially abridged.

Footnote 511:

Ranson _v._ West, 125 Ky. 457 (_semble_); Toothaker _v._ Conant, 91
Me. 438; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404; Conroy _v._ Pittsburgh
Times, 139 Pa. St. 334; Mulderig _v._ Wilkes Barre Times, 215 Pa. St.
470; Egan _v._ Dotson, 36 S. D. 459 _Accord_.

See also, Douglass _v._ Daisley, 114 Fed. 628.

Compare Glisson _v._ Biggio, 139 La. 23; Estelle _v._ Daily News Pub.
Co., 99 Neb. 397; Wiese _v._ Riley, 146 Wis. 640.

_Petition or memorial for removal of public officer privileged._ Blake
_v._ Pilfold, 1 M. & Rob. 198; Woodward _v._ Lander, 6 Car. & P. 548;
James _v._ Boston, 2 Car. & K. 4; Spackman _v._ Gibney, Odgers, Lib. &
Sl. (5th ed.) 278; Beatson _v._ Skene, 5 H. & N. 838; Harrison _v._
Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; Hart _v._ Von Gumpach, L. R. 4 P. C. 439; Stanton
_v._ Andrews, 5 Up. Can. Q. B. O. S. 211; Corbett _v._ Jackson, 1 Up.
Can. Q. B. 128; Rogers _v._ Spalding, 1 Up. Can. Q. B. 258; McIntire
_v._ McBean, 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 534; Bell _v._ Parke, 10 Ir. C. L. R.
279 (_semble_); White _v._ Nichols, 3 How. 266; Vogel _v._ Gruaz, 110
U. S. 311; Pearce _v._ Brower, 72 Ga. 243; Young _v._ Richardson, 4
Ill. App. 364; Rainbow _v._ Benson, 71 Ia. 301; Rabb _v._ Trevelyan,
122 La. 174; Bodwell _v._ Osgood, 3 Pick. 379; Wieman _v._ Mabee, 45
Mich. 484; Greenwood _v._ Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449; State _v._ Burnham, 9
N. H. 34; Thorn _v._ Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508; Vanderzee _v._ McGregor,
12 Wend. 545; Howard _v._ Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; Halstead _v._
Nelson, 24 Hun, 395; Decker _v._ Gaylord, 35 Hun, 584; Woods _v._
Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445, 47 Hun, 362; Cook _v._ Hill, 3 Sandf. 341; Van
Wyck _v._ Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190; Harwood _v._ Keech, 6 Th. & C. 665;
Logan _v._ Hodges, 146 N. C. 38; Gray _v._ Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23;
Kent _v._ Bongartz, 15 R. I. 72; Reid _v._ Delorme, 2 Brev. 76; Harris
_v._ Huntington, 2 Tyler, 129 _Accord_.

But not absolutely privileged, where the proceeding is not judicial.
Dickson _v._ Wilton, 1 F. & F. 419; Proctor _v._ Webster, 16 Q. B. D.
112; Woods _v._ Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445; Morah _v._ Steele, 157 App. Div.
109; Fulton _v._ Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323.

Compare McKee _v._ Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455 (petition to revoke
merchant’s license).

Footnote 512:

The statement of the case, the arguments of counsel, the judgment of
Mellor, J., and portions of the judgments of Crompton and Blackburn,
JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 513:

Hibbs _v._ Wilkinson, 1 F. & F. 608; Turnbull _v._ Bird, 2 F. & F.
508; Hunter _v._ Sharpe, 4 F. & F. 983; Hunt _v._ Star Co., [1908] 2
K. B. 309; Walker _v._ Hodgson, [1909] 1 K. B. 239, 253; De Mestre
_v._ Syme, 9 Vict. L. R. (L) 10; Davis _v._ Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396;
Queen _v._ Carden, 5 Q. B. D. 1, 8; Crane _v._ Waters, 10 Fed. 619;
Kinyon _v._ Palmer, 18 Ia. 377; Bradford _v._ Clark, 90 Me. 298;
People _v._ Glassman, 12 Utah, 238 _Accord_.

Footnote 514:

Stuart _v._ Lovell, 2 Stark. 93; Macleod _v._ Wakley, 3 Car. & P. 311;
Green _v._ Chapman, 4 Bing. N. C. 92; Parmiter _v._ Coupland, 6 M. &
W. 105; Whistler _v._ Ruskin, Odgers, Lib. & Sl., (5th ed.) 196;
Wilson _v._ Reed, 2 F. & F. 149; Morrison _v._ Belcher, 3 F. & F. 614;
Hedley _v._ Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224; Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18
L. T. Rep. 615; Joynt _v._ Cycle Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 292; Massie _v._
Toronto Co., 11 Ont. 362; Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238;
Cooper _v._ Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Reade _v._ Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S.
9, n.; Ullrich _v._ N. Y. Co., 23 Misc. 168 _Accord_.

Footnote 515:

See _contra_, Williams _v._ Spowers, 8 Vict. L. R. (Law) 82.

Footnote 516:

Honest belief is no defense apart from privilege. Van Wiginton _v._
Pulitzer Pub. Co., (C. C. A.) 218 Fed. 483; Brandt _v._ Story, 161 Ia.
451; Tanner _v._ Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Reid _v._ Nichols, 166 Ky.
423; Sweet _v._ Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450; Clair _v._ Battle Creek
Journal Co., 168 Mich. 467; Ivie _v._ King, 167 N. C. 174; Spencer
_v._ Minnick, 41 Okl. 613; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis.
90.

_Fair comment on public affairs and public officers._ See Gandia _v._
Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452; Lowe _v._ News Pub. Co., 9 Ga. App. 103;
Diener _v._ Star Chronicle Pub. Co., 230 Mo. 613; Cook _v._ Globe
Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471; Merrey _v._ Guardian Pub. Co., 79 N. J.
Law, 177; Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27.

_Fair comment on candidates._ Walsh _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 250 Mo.
142; Schull _v._ Hopkins, 26 S. D. 21; Ingalls _v._ Morrissey, 154
Wis. 632.

_Fair comment on persons seeking public patronage._ Ott _v._ Murphy,
160 Ia. 730.

Footnote 517:

Dibdin _v._ Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Heriot _v._ Stuart, 1 Esp. 437; Stuart
_v._ Lovell, 2 Stark. 93 (_semble_); Tabart _v._ Tipper, 1 Camp. 350
(_semble_); Dunne _v._ Anderson, Ry. & M. 287, 3 Bing. 88; Soane _v._
Knight, M. & M. 74; Thompson _v._ Shackell, M. & M. 187; Macleod _v._
Wakley, 3 Car. & P. 311; Fraser _v._ Berkeley, 7 Car. & P. 621; Evans
_v._ Harlow, Dav. & M. 507; Paris _v._ Levy, 9 C. B. N. S. 342;
Eastwood _v._ Holmes, 1 F. & F. 347; Hibbs _v._ Wilkinson, 1 F. & F.
608; Turnbull _v._ Bird, 2 F. & F. 508; Strauss _v._ Francis, 4 F. &
F. 939, 1107, 15 L. T. Rep. 674; Henwood _v._ Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P.
606; Jenner _v._ A’Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; Mulkern _v._ Ward, 13
Eq. 619, 622; Whistler _v._ Ruskin, Odgers, Lib. & Sl., (5 ed.) 196;
Duplany _v._ Davis, 3 T. L. R. 184; McQuire _v._ Western Co., [1903] 2
K. B. 100; Crane _v._ Waters, 10 Fed. 619; Snyder _v._ Fulton, 34 Md.
128, 137; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; O’Connor _v._ Sill, 60
Mich. 175; Dowling _v._ Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321; Cooper _v._ Stone,
24 Wend. 434 (_semble_); Reade _v._ Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, _n._
(_semble_); Adolf Philipp Co. _v._ New Yorker Staatszeitung, 165 App.
Div. 377; Press Co. _v._ Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584 _Accord_.

“The defendant was, in my opinion, entitled to have the jury’s
decision, as to the plea of fair comment, whether or not, in all the
circumstances proved, the libel went beyond a fair comment on the
plaintiff and on the system of medical enterprise with which he
associated himself, as a matter of public interest treated by the
defendant honestly and without malice. The plea of fair comment does
not arise if the plea of justification is made good, nor can it arise
unless there is an imputation on a plaintiff. It is precisely where
the criticism would otherwise be actionable as a libel that the
defence of fair comment comes in. But the learned judge put aside that
defence, and told the jury that unless a justification was proved they
were bound to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and that, unless
justified, the libel is not fair comment and cannot come within the
region of fair comment.” Lord Loreburn, L. C., in Dakhyl _v._
Labouchere, [1908] 2 K. B. 325, 326–27.

Footnote 518:

The arguments are omitted.

Footnote 519:

The statement has been abridged, and the arguments of counsel together
with a small portion of the judgment are omitted.

Footnote 520:

Merivale _v._ Carson, _supra_, 775; McQuire _v._ Western Co., [1903] 2
K. B. 100, 110; Joynt _v._ Cycle Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 292; Digby _v._
Financial News, [1907] 1 K. B. 502; Hunt _v._ Star Co., [1908] 2 K. B.
309, 317; Walker _v._ Hodgson, [1909] 1 K. B. 239; Starks _v._ Comer,
190 Ala. 245; Com. _v._ Pratt, 208 Mass. 553; Williams _v._ Hicks
Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524 _Accord_.

In Walker _v._ Hodgson, Kennedy, L. J., said, p. 256: “Now it is true
that there may be comment of an injurious nature in which there is no
statement of facts, or which refers to facts which are admitted or are
indisputable. In such a case the fairness of the comment depends upon
the character of the criticisms, or the inferences of which it is
composed, that is, whether it is a comment made honestly and _bona
fide_, or a comment made _mala fide_ and maliciously.... But where the
words which are alleged to be defamatory allege, or assume as true,
facts concerning the plaintiff which the plaintiff denies, and which
either involve a slanderous imputation in themselves, or upon which
the comment bases imputations or inferences injurious to the
plaintiff, it is, I think, settled law that the defence of fair
comment fails, unless the comment is truthful in regard to its
allegation or assumption of such facts.” See also the remarks of
Buckley, L. J., in the same case, p. 253.

In Hubbard _v._ Allyn, 200 Mass. 167, Rugg, J., said (p. 170): “The
right of the defendant was not to make false statements of fact
because the subject matter was of public interest, but only to
criticise, discuss and comment upon the real acts of the plaintiff and
the consequences likely to follow from them, or upon any other aspect
of the case in a reasonable way. This may be done with severity.
Ridicule, sarcasm and invective may be employed. But the basis must be
a fact, and not a falsehood.”

Nor does it cover violent attacks and insulting statements. Press Pub.
Co. _v._ Gillette, (C. C. A.) 229 Fed. 108; Jozsa _v._ Moroney, 125
La. 813; Hines _v._ Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669; Patten _v._ Harpers Weekly
Corp., 158 N. Y. Supp. 70; Hayden _v._ Hasbrouck, 34 R. I. 556;
Spencer _v._ Looney, 116 Va. 767; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co.,
159 Wis. 90; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524; Compare Dickson _v._
Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W. 834. And see Phillips _v._
Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199.

Footnote 521:

Robinson _v._ Coulter, 215 Mass. 566; Tawney _v._ Simonson, 109 Minn.
341 _Accord_.

The burden is on the plaintiff to show malice, not on the defendant to
show good faith. Jenoure _v._ Delmege, [1891] A. C. 73; Davis _v._
Hearst, 160 Cal. 143; Locke _v._ Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Hemmens
_v._ Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Haft _v._ Newcastle Bank, 19 App. Div.
423; Strode _v._ Clement, 90 Va. 553.

_Definitions of “malice.”_ Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171; Peake _v._
Taubman, 251 Mo. 390. See Marney _v._ Joseph, 94 Kan. 18.

“If proof of a malevolent motive would rebut the privilege, which we
do not decide, nothing less than that would do, so far as malice is
concerned. It is true, as is said in the very careful brief for the
plaintiff, that in most connections malice means only knowledge of
facts sufficient to show that the contemplated act is very likely to
have injurious consequences. Apart from statute it generally means no
more when the question is what is sufficient _prima facie_ to charge a
defendant. Burt _v._ Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245. But
sometimes the defence is not that the damage was not to be foreseen,
but rests on what in substance is a privilege, whether of a kind
usually pleaded as such or not, that is to say, on a right to inflict
the damage even knowingly. In such cases, if malice in any sense makes
a difference, as distinguished from excess over what was reasonable or
needful to do or say under the circumstances, which often is included
under the same word, Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 239, it means
that the defendant is not within the privilege because he was not
acting in _bona fide_ answer to the needs of the occasion, but outside
of it from a wish to do harm. See Wren _v._ Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730,
735, 736; Clark _v._ Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237, 246, 247.” Holmes, C.
J., in Squires _v._ Wason Mfg. Co., 182 Mass. 137, 141.

See Advertiser Co. _v._ Jones, 169 Ala. 196, 670; Davis _v._ Hearst,
160 Cal. 143.

_Reckless republication without inquiry._ Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.
_v._ Wegner, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 45.

_“Malice” on the face of publication._ Ashford _v._ Evening Star Co.,
41 App. D. C. 395; Dickson _v._ Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W.
834.

Footnote 522:

16 C. B. N. S. 829, S. C.

Footnote 523:

Nevill _v._ Fine Arts Co., [1895] 2 Q. B. 156; Hollenbeck _v._
Ristine, 105 Ia. 488; Children _v._ Shinn, 168 Ia. 531; Atwill _v._
Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177; Wagner _v._ Scott, 164 Mo. 289; McGaw _v._
Hamilton, 184 Pa. St. 108; Hellstern _v._ Katzer, 103 Wis. 391
_Accord_. Compare Davis _v._ New England Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470;
Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171.

Footnote 524:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 525:

Parmiter _v._ Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105; Odger _v._ Mortimer, 28 L. T.
Rep. 472; Queen _v._ Carden, 5 Q. B. Div. 1, 8; Bryce _v._ Rusden, 2
T. L. R. 435; Duplany _v._ Davis, 3 T. L. R. 184; R. _v._ Flowers, 44
J. P. 377, _per_ Field, J.; LeFroy _v._ Burnside, L. R. 4 Ir. 556,
565, 566; Stewart _v._ McKinley, 11 Vict. L. R. 802; Browne _v._
McKinley, 12 Vict. L. R. 240; Smith _v._ Tribune Co., 4 Biss. 477;
McDonald _v._ Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244; Hallam _v._ Post Co., 55 Fed.
456, 59 Fed. 530; Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439;
Jarman _v._ Rea, 137 Cal. 339; Dauphiny _v._ Buhne, 153 Cal. 757; Star
Co. _v._ Donahoe, (Del.) 58 Atl. 513; Jones _v._ Townsend, 21 Fla.
431; Rearick _v._ Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77; Klos _v._ Zahorik, 113 Ia. 161;
Ott _v._ Murphy, 160 Ia. 730; Bearce _v._ Bass, 88 Me. 521; Negley
_v._ Farrow, 60 Md. 158; Commonwealth _v._ Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 169
(_semble_); Curtis _v._ Mussey, 6 Gray, 261; Burt _v._ Advertiser Co.,
154 Mass. 238 (compare Sillars _v._ Collier, 151 Mass. 50); Hubbard
_v._ Allyn, 200 Mass. 166; Foster _v._ Scripps, 39 Mich. 376; Bronson
_v._ Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; Bourreseau _v._ Detroit Co., 63 Mich. 425;
Wheaton _v._ Beecher, 66 Mich. 307; Belknap _v._ Ball, 83 Mich. 583;
Hay _v._ Reid, 85 Mich. 296; Smurthwaite _v._ News Co., 124 Mich. 377;
Aldrich _v._ Press Co., 9 Minn. 133 (but see, _contra_, Marks _v._
Baker, 28 Minn. 162); Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94; State _v._
Schmitt, 49 N. J. Law, 579; Lewis _v._ Few, 5 Johns. 1; Root _v._
King, 7 Cow. 613; Littlejohn _v._ Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. 41; Hamilton
_v._ Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Mattice _v._ Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 624; Hoey _v._
New York Times Co., 138 App. Div. 149; Ullrich _v._ N. Y. Co., 23
Misc. 168; Seely _v._ Blair, Wright, (Ohio) 358, 683; Post Co. _v._
Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71; Upton _v._ Hume, 24 Or. 420; Barr _v._ Moore,
87 Pa. St. 385; Brewer _v._ Weakley, 2 Overt. 99; Banner Co. _v._
State, 16 Lea, 176; Democrat Co. _v._ Jones, 83 Tex. 302; Sweeney _v._
Baker, 13 W. Va. 158; Spiering _v._ Andrae, 45 Wis. 330; Eviston _v._
Cramer, 57 Wis. 570; Gagen _v._ Dawley, 162 Wis. 152; D. Ward _v._
Derrington, 14 S. Aust. L. R. 35; Haselgrove _v._ King, 14 S. Aust. L.
R. 192 _Accord_.

Mott _v._ Dawson, 46 Ia. 533; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251 (but see
State _v._ Haskins, 109 Ia. 656, 658, and Morse _v._ Printing Co., 124
Ia. 707, 723); State _v._ Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Coleman _v._ McLennan,
78 Kan. 711; Marks _v._ Baker, 28 Minn. 162; State _v._ Burnham, 9 N.
H. 34; Neeb _v._ Hope, 111 Pa. St. 145; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa.
St. 404; Press Co. _v._ Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584; Jackson _v._
Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. St. 406; Ross _v._ Ward, 14 S. D. 240;
Boucher _v._ Clark Co., 14 S. D. 72 _Contra_.

See Palmer _v._ Concord, 48 N. H. 211.

In Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238, Holmes, J., said: “But
there is an important distinction to be noticed between the so-called
privilege of fair criticism upon matters of public interest, and the
privilege existing in the case, for instance, of answers to inquiries
about the character of a servant. In the latter case, a _bona fide_
statement not in excess of the occasion is privileged, although it
turns out to be false. In the former, what is privileged, if that is
the proper term, is criticism, not statement, and however it might be
if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made by
others, and gave it no new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his
own person to allege facts otherwise libellous, he will not be
privileged if those facts are not true. The reason for the distinction
lies in the different nature and degree of the exigency and of the
damage in the two cases. In these, as in many other instances, the law
has to draw a line between conflicting interests, both intrinsically
meritorious. When private inquiries are made about a private person, a
servant, for example, it is often impossible to answer them properly
without stating facts, and those who settled the law thought it more
important to preserve a reasonable freedom in giving necessary
information than to insure people against occasional unintended
injustice, confined as it generally is to one or two persons. But what
the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom
of discussion rather than of statement. Moreover, the statements about
such matters which come before the courts are generally public
statements, where the harm done by a falsehood is much greater than in
the other case. If one private citizen wrote to another that a high
official had taken a bribe, no one would think good faith a sufficient
answer to an action. He stands no better, certainly, when he publishes
his writing to the world through a newspaper, and the newspaper itself
stands no better than the writer. Sheckell _v._ Jackson, 10 Cush. 25,
26.”

_Participants in legal proceedings_ are legitimate subjects for
comment if restricted to their conduct therein. Rex _v._ White, 1
Camp. 359; Seymour _v._ Butterworth, 3 F. & F. 372; Hedley _v._
Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224; Woodgate _v._ Ridout, 4 F. & F. 202; Hibbins
_v._ Lee, 4 F. & F. 243; Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18 L. T. Rep.
615; Reg. _v._ Sullivan, 11 Cox C. C. 44, 57; Kane _v._ Mulvany, Ir.
R. 2 C. L. 402; Miner _v._ Detroit Co., 49 Mich. 358. See also Kelly
_v._ Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699 (churchwarden); Harle _v._ Catherall,
14 L. T. Rep. 801 (waywarden).

_Matters not of public interest._ The right of comment was denied in
Latimer _v._ Western Co., 25 L. T. Rep. 44; Hogan _v._ Sutton, 16 W.
R. 127; Wilson _v._ Fitch, 41 Cal. 363.

See also Hearne _v._ Stowell, 12 A. & E. 719; Gathercole _v._ Miall,
15 M. & W. 319; Walker _v._ Brogden, 19 C. B. N. S. 65; Booth _v._
Briscoe, 2 Q. B. Div. 496.

Footnote 526:

Arguments omitted.

Footnote 527:

The decision of the Appellate Division, overruling demurrer to
complaint, is reported in 64 App. Div. 30.

Footnote 528:

Corelli _v._ Wall, 22 Times L. R. 532 (post cards depicting imaginary
incidents of an author’s life); Atkinson _v._ Doherty, 121 Mich. 372
(picture of plaintiff’s dead husband on cigar label); Henry _v._
Cherry, 30 R. I. 13 (picture as advertisement); Hillman _v._ Star Pub.
Co., 64 Wash. 691 (picture of plaintiff in connection with report of
arrest of her father for crime) _Accord_. Compare Chappell _v._
Stewart, 82 Md. 323 (shadowing).

Corliss _v._ Walker, 57 Fed. 434 (_semble_); Von Theodorovich _v._
Josef Beneficiary Ass’n, 154 Fed. 911 (_semble_); Pavesich _v._ New
England Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (picture as advertisement);
Foster-Milburn Co. _v._ Chinn, 134 Ky. 424 (picture as advertisement);
Douglas _v._ Stokes, 149 Ky. 506 (publishing photograph of deceased
deformed child of plaintiff); Itzkovitch _v._ Whitaker, 115 La. 479,
117 La. 708 (photograph in rogues’ gallery); Schulman _v._ Whitaker,
117 La. 704; Munden _v._ Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652 (picture as
advertisement); Edison _v._ Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq.
136 (picture—but here there was chiefly an interest of substance)
_Contra_.

See also Dill, J. in Vanderbilt _v._ Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 919.

As to photographing persons arrested on charges of crime, see Hodgman
_v._ Olsen, 86 Wash. 615.

NEW YORK, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51 (Laws of 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1,
2).

§ 50. A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait, or picture
of any living person without having first obtained the written consent
of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.

§ 51. Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within this
state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an
equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the
person, firm, or corporation so using his name, portrait, or picture,
to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries maintained by reason of such use, and if the
defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s name, portrait, or
picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by
this act, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.

See Binns _v._ Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51.

On the whole subject, see Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harvard Law Rev. 193; Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harvard Law
Rev. 343, 362–364.

Footnote 529:

4 Rep. 16 _b_, S. C.

Footnote 530:

Dame Morrison’s Case, Jenk. 316; Matthew _v._ Crasse, 2 Bulst. 89;
Sell _v._ Facy, 2 Bulst. 276, 3 Bulst. 48; Nelson _v._ Staff, Cro.
Jac. 422; Thomson’s Case, Bendl. 148; Countess of Salop’s Case, Bendl.
155; Taylor _v._ Tolwin, Latch, 218; Wicks _v._ Shepherd, Cro. Car.
155; Southold _v._ Daunston, Cro. Car. 269 _Accord_.

See Bridge _v._ Langton, Litt. 193; Norman _v._ Simons, 1 Vin. Abr.
Act. Words, D, _a_, 12.

In Felty _v._ Felty, 164 Ky. 355, plaintiff’s husband left her as a
result of the defamatory words.

Footnote 531:

The arguments of counsel are omitted, together with the concurring
opinions of Martin, Bramwell, and Wilde, BB.

Footnote 532:

Guy _v._ Gregory, 9 Car. & P. 584; Adams _v._ Smith, 58 Ill. 417;
Woodbury _v._ Thompson, 3 N. H. 194; Butler _v._ Hoboken Co., 73 N. J.
Law, 45; Beach _v._ Ranney, 2 Hill, 309; Terwilliger _v._ Wands, 17 N.
Y. 54 (overruling Bradt _v._ Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Olmsted _v._
Brown, 12 Barb. 657; Fuller _v._ Fenner, 16 Barb. 333); Wilson _v._
Goit, 17 N. Y. 442; Bassell _v._ Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561; Shepherd _v._
Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498; Clark _v._ Morrison, 80 Or. 240 _Accord_. But
see Garrison _v._ Sun Publishing Ass’n, 207 N. Y. 1 (defendant
published a libel on plaintiff’s wife resulting in illness and loss of
her services).

McQueen _v._ Fulgham, 27 Tex. 463; Underhill _v._ Welton, 32 Vt. 40
_Contra_.

_Damage caused by another person’s repetition of the defendant’s
words_ is too remote. Holwood _v._ Hopkins, Cro. El. 787; Ward _v._
Weeks, 7 Bing. 211 (but see Riding _v._ Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91);
Rutherford _v._ Evans, 4 Car. & P. 74; Tunnicliff _v._ Moss, 3 Car. &
K. 83; Kendillon _v._ Maltby, 1 Car. & M. 402; Parkins _v._ Scott, 1
H. & C. 153; Dixon _v._ Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; Clarke _v._ Morgan, 38
L. T. Rep. 354; Bree _v._ Marescaux, 7 Q. B. Div. 434; Cates _v._
Kellogg, 9 Ind. 506; Stevens _v._ Hartwell, 11 Met. 542; Hastings _v._
Stetson, 126 Mass. 329; Hastings _v._ Palmer, 20 Wend. 225; Hallock
_v._ Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Olmsted _v._ Brown, 12 Barb. 657;
Terwilliger _v._ Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20;
Bassell _v._ Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561 (but see Sewell _v._ Catlin, 3 Wend.
295; Keenholts _v._ Becker, 3 Den. 346).

See also Whitney _v._ Moignard, 24 Q. B. Div. 630; Speight _v._
Gosnay, 60 L. J. Q. B. 231; Adams _v._ Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625;
Mills _v._ Flynn, 157 Ia. 477; Fitzgerald _v._ Young, 89 Neb. 693.

The rule is otherwise where the repetition is made as a privileged
communication. Gillett _v._ Bullivant, 7 L. T. 490; Derry _v._
Handley, 16 L. T. Rep. 263; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20.

Footnote 533:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 534:

The case is materially abridged.

Footnote 535:

The statement of the counts is abridged, and the arguments of counsel
are omitted.

Footnote 536:

But see now Paterson _v._ Welch, (Court of Sess. May 31, 1893) 20 R.
744. See also Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (1st ed.) 87, 91; Odgers, Outlines of
Law of Libel, 17, 18; Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, (1st ed.) 497–98;
Salmond, Torts, 426–27; Bower’s Code of Actionable Defamation, 338–39,
443–45.

Footnote 537:

“It may be reasonable to allow St. Peter a primacy of order, such a
one as the ringleader hath in a dance.”—Barrow’s Treatise of the
Pope’s Supremacy, Oxford edition of Works, 1830, vol. vii. p. 70. In
Fox’s Preface to Tyndall’s Works, “these three learned fathers of
blessed memory, William Tyndall, John Frith, and Robert Barons,” are
styled “chief ringleaders in these latter tymes of thys Church of
England.”—Reporter’s Note.

Footnote 538:

Only the opinion of Day, J., is given. Wills, J., concurred.

Footnote 539:

_Slander of title._ Mildmay’s Case, 1 Rep. 175; Marvin _v._ Maynard,
Cro. El. 419; Pennyman _v._ Rabanks, Cro. Eliz. 427; Newman _v._
Zachary, Al. 3; Rowe _v._ Roach, 1 M. & S. 304; Bignell _v._ Buzzard,
3 H. & N. 217; Webb _v._ Cecil, 9 B. Mon. 198; Ross _v._ Pynes, Wythe,
71, 3 Call, 490.

In Rowe _v._ Roach, _supra_, Lord Ellenborough said, p. 310: “The law
makes no allowance for the slander of strangers, whatever it may do in
behalf of those who have a real title, or a claim of title. _Rei
immiscet se alienæ_ is the good sense which must govern this case.
Here the defendant is a stranger himself, and shows no authority from
those who are parties in interest.”

Where defendant has some interest, it is enough if he actually
believes what he says against plaintiff’s title.

Gerard _v._ Dickenson, 4 Rep. 18 a, Cro. El. 196; Lovett _v._ Weller,
1 Rolle R. 409; Anon., Sty. 414; Pitt _v._ Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639;
Smith _v._ Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246; Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707;
Pater _v._ Baker, 3 C. B. 831; Watson _v._ Reynolds, M. & M. 1; Carr
_v._ Duckett, 5 H. & N. 783; Atkins _v._ Perrin, 3 F. & F. 179; Brook
_v._ Rawl, 4 Ex. 521; Burnett _v._ Tak, 45 L. T. Rep. 743; Steward
_v._ Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; Wren _v._ Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730;
Hart _v._ Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146 (_semble_); Baker _v._ Piper, 2 T. L.
R. 733; Dicks _v._ Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22; Halsey _v._ Brotherhood, 19
Ch. D. 386; Royal Co. _v._ Wright, 18 Pat. Cas. Rep. 95; Dunlop Co.
_v._ Talbot, 20 T. L. R. 579; Boulton _v._ Shields, 3 Up. Can. Q. B.
21; Hill _v._ Ward, 13 Ala. 310; McDaniel _v._ Baca, 2 Cal. 326;
Thompson _v._ White, 70 Cal. 135; Reid _v._ McLendon, 44 Ga. 156; Van
Tuyl _v._ Riner, 3 Ill. App. 556; Stark _v._ Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141;
Gent _v._ Lynch, 23 Md. 58; Swan _v._ Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Walkley
_v._ Bostwick, 49 Mich. 374; Chesebro _v._ Powers, 78 Mich. 472;
Meyrose _v._ Adams, 12 Mo. App. 329; Butts _v._ Long, 106 Mo. App.
313; Andrew _v._ Deshler, 45 N. J. Law, 167; Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N.
Y. 14; Like _v._ McKinstry, 4 Keyes, 397, 3 Abb. App. 62, 41 Barb.
186; Hovey _v._ Rubber Co., 57 N. Y. 119; Dodge _v._ Colby, 37 Hun,
515, 108 N. Y. 445; Lovell Co. _v._ Houghton, 116 N. Y. 520; Hastings
_v._ Giles Co., 51 Hun, 364, 121 N. Y. 674; Cornwell _v._ Parke, 52
Hun, 596, 123 N. Y. 657; McElwee _v._ Blackwell, 94 N. C. 261; Harriss
_v._ Sneeden, 101 N. C. 273.

Compare Virtue _v._ Creamery Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17.

As to the requirement of “malice,” see Coffman _v._ Henderson, 9 Ala.
App. 553; Fearon _v._ Fodera, 169 Cal. 370; Long _v._ Rucker, 166 Mo.
App. 572; Potosi Zinc Co. _v._ Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390; Fant _v._
Sullivan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 515.

See Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 Columbia Law Rev. 13, 121.

Footnote 540:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 541:

Tasburgh _v._ Day, Cro. Jac. 484; Gresham _v._ Grinsley, Yelv. 88;
Sneade _v._ Badley, 3 Bulst. 74, 1 Roll. 244; Law _v._ Harwood, Cro.
Car. 140, W. Jones, 196; Cane _v._ Golding, Sty. 169, 176; Manning
_v._ Avery, 3 Keb. 153; Haddan _v._ Lott, 15 C. B. 411; Evans _v._
Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; Ashford _v._ Choate, 20 Up. Can; C. P. 471;
Collins _v._ Whitehead, 34 Fed. 121; Ebersole _v._ Fields, 181 Ala.
421; Stark _v._ Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141; Continental Co. _v._ Little, 135
Ky. 618; Swan _v._ Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass.
235; Dooling _v._ Budget Co., 144 Mass. 258; Boynton _v._ Shaw Co.,
146 Mass. 219; Wilson _v._ Dubois, 35 Minn. 471; Tobias _v._ Harland,
4 Wend. 537; Madison Church _v._ Madison Church, 26 How. Pr. 72;
Linden _v._ Graham, 1 Duer, 670; Bailey _v._ Dean, 5 Barb. 297;
Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Kennedy _v._ Press Co., 41 Hun, 422;
Childs _v._ Tuttle, 48 Hun, 228; Maglio _v._ N. Y. Co., 93 App. Div.
546; Felt _v._ Germania Life Ins. Co., 149 App. Div. 14; Witteman
Bros. _v._ Witteman Co., 88 Misc. 266; McGuinness _v._ Hargiss, 56
Wash. 162 _Accord_.

Compare Fleming _v._ McDonald, 230 Pa. St. 75.

The breach of a contract by a third person is special damage. Green
_v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. But see _contra_, Kendall _v._ Stone, 5
N. Y. 14; Brentman _v._ Note, 3 N. Y. Sup. 420 (N. Y. City Court).

Footnote 542:

The arguments and the concurring opinions of Lords Watson, Macnaghten,
Morris, and Shand are omitted.

Footnote 543:

_Disparagement of goods._ In the case cited it was held actionable to
say falsely that plaintiffs’ manure was inferior to defendants’ if
done without legal excuse. Young _v._ Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264; Alcott
_v._ Millar, 21 T. L. R. 30; Dooling _v._ Budget Co., 144 Mass. 258
(_semble_); Boynton _v._ Shaw Co., 146 Mass. 219; Wilson _v._ Dubois,
35 Minn. 471; Wier _v._ Allen, 51 N. H. 177; Snow _v._ Judson, 38
Barb. 210; Kennedy _v._ Press Co., 41 Hun, 422 (_semble_); Paull _v._
Halferty, 63 Pa. St. 46; Young _v._ Geiske, 209 Pa. St. 515 _Accord_.

Footnote 544:

Lyne _v._ Nicholls, 23 T. L. R. 86; Barrett _v._ Associated
Newspapers, 23 T. L. R. 666; Burkett _v._ Griffith, 90 Cal. 532
_Accord_.

Compare Marlin Fire Arms Co. _v._ Shields, 171 N. Y. 384.

Footnote 545:

Prestolite Co. _v._ Heiden, (C. C. A.) 219 Fed. 845; Zittlosen Mfg.
Co. _v._ Boss, (C. C. A.) 219 Fed. 887; Coca-Cola Co. _v._ Butler, 229
Fed. 224; Hartzler _v._ Goshen Ladder Co., 55 Ind. App. 455; National
Biscuit Co. _v._ Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 369; Sanford
Iron Works _v._ Enterprise Machine Works, 130 Tenn. 669; Pacific Coast
Milk Co. _v._ Frye, 85 Wash. 133 _Accord_. In March _v._ Billings, 7
Cush. 322, under similar circumstances, the plaintiff recovered in an
action at law.

See also Coffin, Fraud as an Element of Unfair Competition, 16 Harvard
Law Rev. 272; Wyman, Competition and the Law, 15 Harvard Law Rev. 427;
Cox, The Prevention of Unfair Competition in Business, 5 Harvard Law
Rev. 139; Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade Marks, 4
Harvard Law Rev. 321.

_Misleading similarity._ Hanover Milling Co. _v._ Metcalf, 240 U. S.
403; McDonald Mfg. Co. _v._ Mueller Mfg. Co., 183 Fed. 972; British
American Tobacco Co. _v._ British American Cigar Stores Co., (C. C.
A.) 211 Fed. 933; Hiram Walker & Sons _v._ Grubman, 224 Fed. 725;
Jenkins _v._ Kelly & Jones Co., (C. C. A.) 227 Fed. 211; Jacoway _v._
Young, (C. C. A.) 228 Fed. 630; Van Zile _v._ Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed.
829; Moline Plow Co. _v._ Omaha Stores Co., (C. C. A.) 235 Fed. 519;
Boston Shoe Shop _v._ McBroom Shoe Shop, 196 Ala. 262; Italian Swiss
Colony _v._ Italian Vineyard Co., 158 Cal. 252; Dunston _v._ Los
Angeles Van & Storage Co., 165 Cal. 89; Modesto Creamery _v._
Stanislaus Creamery Co., 168 Cal. 289; Motor Accessories Co. _v._
Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 167 Ia. 202; Bonnie & Co. _v._ Bonnie Bros.,
160 Ky. 487; Crutcher _v._ Starks, 161 Ky. 690; George G. Fox Co. _v._
Best Baking Co., 209 Mass. 251; C. A. Briggs & Co. _v._ National Wafer
Co., 215 Mass. 100; Grocers’ Supply Co. _v._ Dupuis, 219 Mass. 576;
Rodseth _v._ Northwestern Marble Works, 129 Minn. 472; Rubber &
Celluloid Co. _v._ Rubber Bound Brush Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 419, 519;
Westcott Chuck Co. _v._ Oneida Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247; World’s
Dispensary Ass’n _v._ Pierce, 203 N. Y. 419; Material Men’s Ass’n _v._
New York Material Men’s Ass’n, 169 App. Div. 843; German American
Button Co. _v._ Heymsfeld, 170 App. Div. 416; Collier _v._ Jones, 66
Misc. 97; Frohman _v._ William Morris, 68 Misc. 461; Elbs _v._
Rochester Egg Carrier Co., 134 N. Y. Supp. 979; Columbia Engineering
Works _v._ Mallory, 75 Or. 542; Rosenburg _v._ Fremont Undertaking
Co., 63 Wash. 52; J. I. Case Plow Works _v._ J. I. Case Machine Co.,
162 Wis. 185.

_Use of one’s own name_, see L. E. Waterman Co. _v._ Modern Pen Co.,
235 U. S. 88; Borden Ice Cream Co. _v._ Borden’s Consolidated Milk
Co., (C. C. A.) 201 Fed. 510; Deister Concentrator Co. _v._ Deister
Machine Co., 63 Ind. App. 412; C. H. Batchelder Co. _v._ Batchelder,
220 Mass. 42; Zagier _v._ Zagier, 167 N. C. 616.

_Where defendant passes off his product as plaintiff’s_, recovery is
allowed without proof of actual damage. Blofeld _v._ Payne, 4 B. & A.
410; Singleton _v._ Bolton, 3 Doug. 293 (_semble_); Sykes _v._ Sykes,
3 B. & C. 541; Morison _v._ Salmon, 2 M. & G. 385; Crawshay _v._
Thompson, 4 M. & G. 357 (_semble_); Rodgers _v._ Nowill, 5 C. B. 109;
Forster Co. _v._ Cutter Co., 211 Mass. 219. Compare Glendon Co. _v._
Uhler, 75 Pa. St. 467.

Footnote 546:

The learned judge here discussed McDonald _v._ Snelling, 14 All. 290,
and Rigby _v._ Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240, and cited 2 Pars. Cont. 456; Dixon
_v._ Fawcus, 30 L. J. Q. B. 137; Tarleton _v._ McGawley, Peake, 270;
Bell _v._ Midland Co., 10 C. B. N. S. 307 Keeble _v._ Hickeringill, 11
East, 574, _n._

Footnote 547:

Defendant put out an envelope, with the word “telegram” conspicuously
printed thereon, similar to that used by plaintiff, a telegraph
company, to be used for advertising circulars. Plaintiff claimed that
it tended to make its patrons think plaintiff was imposing on them by
allowing advertisers to use its facilities in order to gain their
attention and so injured its business. An injunction was denied.
Postal Telegraph Co. _v._ Livermore & Knight Co., 188 Fed. 696.

In Riding _v._ Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91, plaintiff sued for injury to his
business due to defendant’s charging his wife with adultery, by reason
whereof customers ceased to deal with him.

In Hamon _v._ Falle, 4 App. Cas. 247, an officer of an insurance
company notified a shipowner that the company would not insure the
ship if plaintiff was employed as master. Defendant set up that he
honestly believed plaintiff unfit. See also Bowen _v._ Matheson, 14
All. 499.

In Morasse _v._ Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, defendant in a sermon warned
his congregation against a physician who had been excommunicated for
remarrying after divorce.

Footnote 548:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 549:

The opinion of the court on this point is omitted. The defendant’s
contention was not sustained.

Footnote 550:

Only the opinion is given.

Footnote 551:

“It is contended that the amount of the plaintiff’s loss is so
entirely a matter of pure chance as to be incapable of assessment. I
cannot for this purpose draw any distinction between a chance and a
probability. In the Oxford English Dictionary one of the definitions
of ‘chance’ is ‘a possibility or probability of anything happening, as
distinct from a certainty,’ and a citation is given from Reid’s
Intellectual Powers, ‘The doctrine of chances is a branch of
mathematics little more than an hundred years old.’ The two words
‘chance’ and ‘probability’ may be treated as being practically
interchangeable, though it may be that the one is somewhat less
definite than the other.... It is obvious, of course, that the chance
or probability may in a given case be so slender that a jury could not
properly give more than nominal damages, say one shilling; if they had
done so in the present case, it would have been entirely a question
for them, and this Court could not have interfered. But in the present
competition we find chance upon chance, two of which the plaintiff had
succeeded in passing. From being one of six thousand she had become a
member of a class of fifty, and, as I understand it, was first in her
particular division by the votes of readers of the paper; out of those
fifty there were to be selected twelve prize-winners; it is obvious
that her chances were then far greater and more easily assessable than
when she was only one of the original six thousand. If the plaintiff
had never been selected at all, the case would have been very
different; but that was not the case. In my opinion the existence of a
contingency, which is dependent on the volition of a third person, is
not enough to justify us in saying that the damages are incapable of
assessment.” Farwell, L. J., in Chaplin _v._ Hicks, [1911] 2 K. B.
786, 798.

Footnote 552:

Adler _v._ Fenton, 24 How. 407; Findlay _v._ McAllister, 113 U. S. 104
(_semble_); Austin _v._ Barrows, 41 Conn. 287; Green _v._ Kimble, 6
Blackf. 552; Moody _v._ Burton, 27 Me. 427; Lamb _v._ Stone, 11 Pick.
527; Wellington _v._ Small, 3 Cush. 145; Security Bank _v._ Reger,
(Okl.) 151 Pac. 1170; LeGierse _v._ Kellum, 66 Tex. 242 _Accord_.

Penrod _v._ Mitchell, 8 S. & R. 522; Penrod _v._ Morrison, 2 Pen. & W.
126; Mott _v._ Danforth, 6 Watts, 305; Hopkins _v._ Beebe, 26 Pa. St.
85, 87; Kelsey _v._ Murphy, 26 Pa. St. 78, 84; Collins _v._ Cronin,
117 Pa. St. 35, 45 _Contra_. See note in 47 L. R. A. 433–440.

In Smith _v._ Tonstall, Carthew, 3, defendant was held liable for
conspiracy with plaintiff’s debtor on _scire facias_ to procure a
false judgment and anticipate plaintiff by execution thereon and
carrying off of all the debtor’s property. Findlay _v._ McAllister,
113 U. S. 104 (_semble_); Adams _v._ Paige, 7 Pick. 541 _Accord_. See
Pullen _v._ Headberg, 53 Col. 502.

Footnote 553:

Only the opinion is given, and it is somewhat abridged.

Footnote 554:

In Randall _v._ Hazelton, 12 All. 412, plaintiff, a mortgagor, had a
gratuitous promise from the mortgagee not to foreclose without notice.
In order to obtain the property, defendant falsely told the mortgagee
that plaintiff wished the mortgage assigned to defendant and obtained
an assignment and foreclosed without plaintiff’s knowledge.

Footnote 555:

Statement, and part of opinion, omitted.

Footnote 556:

In Rice _v._ Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, plaintiff had a contract with a
third person for a cheese. By means of a forged telegram defendant
procured the third person to sell to him instead. The contract was
within the Statute of Frauds, but it was found that the third person
would have performed but for defendant’s act.

Footnote 557:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 558:

See American Ins. Co. _v._ France, 111 Ill. App. 382; Davis _v._ New
England Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470; Haney Mfg. Co. _v._ Perkins, 78 Mich.
1; Benton _v._ Pratt, 2 Wend. 385.

“[If, from the nature of the case, the amount of damage caused to a
plaintiff by the tort of a defendant cannot be estimated with
certainty, shall the defendant therefore be exonerated from
liability?] Certainty, it is true, would thus be attained, but it
would be the certainty of injustice.” Christiancy, J., in Allison _v._
Chandler, 11 Michigan, 542, 555. See also pp. 553–556.

Footnote 559:

Standard Oil Co. _v._ Doyle, 118 Ky. 662; Dickson _v._ Dickson, 33 La.
Ann. 1261 _Accord_.

_Threats of vexatious suits against customers_: Emack _v._ Kane, 34
Fed. 46; Lewin _v._ Welsbach Light Co., 81 Fed. 904; Farquhar Co. _v._
National Harrow Co., 99 Fed. 160; Adriance _v._ National Harrow Co.,
121 Fed. 827, 98 Fed. 118; Dittgen _v._ Racine Paper Goods Co., 164
Fed. 85; Electric Renovator Co. _v._ Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754;
Atlas Underwear Co. _v._ Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347; Shoemaker
_v._ South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Pratt Food Co. _v._
Bird, 148 Mich. 631.

Footnote 560:

St. Johnsbury Co. _v._ Hunt, 55 Vt. 570 (arrest of plaintiff’s
engineer on a malicious and baseless charge, whereby the running of
plaintiff’s train was delayed) _Accord_.

Footnote 561:

Gunter _v._ Astor, 4 Moore, 12; Hartley _v._ Cummings, 5 C. B. 247;
Jones _v._ Blocker, 43 Ga. 331; Wharton _v._ Jossey, 46 Ga. 578; Lee
_v._ West, 47 Ga. 311 (_semble_); Smith _v._ Goodman, 75 Ga. 198;
Bundy _v._ Dodson, 28 Ind. 295; Jones _v._ Tevis, 4 Litt. 25; Tyson
_v._ Ewing, 3 J. J. Marsh, 185; Carew _v._ Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1;
Bixby _v._ Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; Stille _v._ Jenkins, 3 Green, (N. J.)
302; Scidmore _v._ Smith, 13 John. 322; Covert _v._ Gray, 34 How. Pr.
450; Johnston Co. _v._ Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. C. 393; Stout _v._ Woody,
63 N. C. 37; Haskins _v._ Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Robinson _v._ Culp, 3
Brev. 302; Daniel _v._ Swearengen, 6 S. C. 297; Fowler _v._ Stonum, 6
Tex. 60; Thacker Co. _v._ Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; Cowper _v._
Macfarlane, 6 Sess. Cas., 4th Series, 683 _Accord_.

See, also, Martinez _v._ Gerber, 3 M. & G. 88.

An action will lie against one who induces a servant to violate his
duty not to communicate the trade secrets of his employer. Jones _v._
Westervelt, 7 Cow. 445; Kerr _v._ Roxburgh, 3 Murr. (Scotland) 126;
Roxburgh _v._ McArthur, 3 Sess. Cas., 2d Series, 556.

Footnote 562:

In Blake _v._ Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221, a journeyman, while his work was
unfinished, left plaintiff and hired with defendant, who then did not
know the facts. Defendant was held liable for retaining the journeyman
after notice. Fawcet _v._ Beavres, 2 Lev. 63; Pilkington _v._ Scott,
15 M. & W. 657; Kennedy _v._ McArthur, 5 Ala. 151; Dacy _v._ Gay, 16
Ga. 203; Everett _v._ Sherfey, 1 Ia. 356; Stowe _v._ Heywood, 7 All.
118; Sargent _v._ Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54; Dickson _v._ Taylor, 1 Murr.
(Scotland) 141 _Accord_. Adams _v._ Bafeald, 1 Leon. 240; Caldwell
_v._ O’Neal, 117 Ga. 775 (if contract is oral only) _Contra_.

It was said also that there was no liability for the hiring of
plaintiff’s journeyman without notice of the facts. Eades _v._
Vandeput, 5 East, 39 n. (_a_); Sherwood _v._ Hall, 3 Sumn. 127;
Ferguson _v._ Tucker, 2 Har. & G. 182; Butterfield _v._ Ashley, 6
Cush. 249; Sargent _v._ Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54; Clark _v._ Clark, 63
N. J. Law, 1; Stuart _v._ Simpson, 1 Wend. 376; Caughey _v._ Smith, 47
N. Y. 244; Bell _v._ Lakin, 1 McMull. 364; Conant _v._ Raymond, 2 Aik.
243 _Accord_.

Footnote 563:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 564:

“The rule which governs the numerous cases upon this subject is, that
where the proximate effect of the criminal connection is an incapacity
to labor, by reason of which the master loses the services of his
servant, such loss of service is deemed to be the immediate effect of
the connection, and entitles the master to his action. The same
principle which gives a master an action where the connection causes
pregnancy or sexual disease applies to all cases where the proximate
consequence of the criminal act is a loss of health resulting in a
loss of service. There may be cases in which the seduction, without
producing pregnancy or sexual disease, causes bodily injury, impairing
the health of the servant, and resulting in a loss of services to her
master. So the criminal connection may be accomplished under such
circumstances, as, for instance, of violence or fraud, that its
proximate effect is mental distress or disease, impairing her health
and destroying her capacity to labor. In either of these cases the
master may maintain an action, because the loss of services is
immediately caused by the connection, as much as in cases of pregnancy
or sexual disease. Vanhorn _v._ Freeman, 1 Halst. 322. But if the loss
of health is caused by mental suffering, which is not the consequence
of the seduction, but is produced by subsequent intervening causes,
such as abandonment by the seducer, shame resulting from exposure, or
other similar causes, the loss of services is too remote a consequence
of the criminal act, and the action cannot be maintained. Boyle _v._
Brandon, 13 M. & W. 738; Knight _v._ Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413.

“In the case at bar, as the ruling appears to have been general that
the action could not be maintained unless pregnancy or sexual disease
was proved, we think a new trial should be granted.” Morton, J., in
Abrahams _v._ Kidney, 104 Mass. 222. See to the same effect Blagge
_v._ Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191; Clark _v._ Clark, 63 N. J. Law, 1; White
_v._ Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; Ingerson _v._ Miller, 47 Barb. 47.

Footnote 565:

The father can maintain no action in such a case: Goodwin _v._
Thompson, 2 Greene, 329; Jones _v._ Tevis, 4 Litt. 25; Hervey _v._
Moseley, 7 Gray, 479; Beard _v._ Holland, 59 Miss. 161, 164; Wilkinson
_v._ Dellinger, 126 N. C. 462. Unless the daughter was induced to
marry the defendant by the latter’s fraud. Hills _v._ Hobert, 2 Root,
48; Goodwin _v._ Thompson, _supra_.

Footnote 566:

A part of the argument and the concurring opinion of Montague Smith,
J., with which Keating, J., agreed, are omitted.

Footnote 567:

Whether it is an excess of fair competition to induce a servant at
will to leave the plaintiff, and enter the service of the defendant,
cannot be said to be definitely settled. In Salter _v._ Howard, 43 Ga.
601, the plaintiff prevailed; but in Campbell _v._ Cooper, 34 N. H.
49, the defendant was successful. The other cases commonly cited for
the plaintiff are distinguishable. In Sykes _v._ Dixon, 9 A. & E. 693,
and Peters _v._ Lord, 18 Conn. 337, the servant had left the plaintiff
of his own head before entering the service of the defendant. In Keane
_v._ Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 512, the defendant, a recruiting officer,
officiously induced the servant to leave the plaintiff, in order to
enlist as a soldier. In Speight _v._ Oliviera, 2 Stark. 493; Morgan
_v._ Molony, 7 Ir. L. R. N. S. 101, 240; Ball _v._ Bruce, 21 Ill. 161;
and Noice _v._ Brown, 39 N. J. Law, 569, as in the principal case, the
enticement was for an immoral purpose. In Cox _v._ Muncey, 6 C. B. N.
S. 375, a father induced an apprentice at will to leave the master,
but the motive of the father does not appear.

“[Keane _v._ Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 512] seems contrary to the general
principle and is certainly opposed to the decision of the Court of
Appeals in DeFrancesco _v._ Barnum, 45 Ch. D. 430. The defendant there
had enticed away an apprentice of the plaintiff. But the indenture
contained unreasonable stipulations, and it was held that it might be
avoided by the apprentice, and that it was not unlawful for the
defendant to persuade the apprentice to do that which was lawful. It
is different, however, if malice, force or fraud be used to take or
decoy the servant away. In that case the master has a right of action,
even though the servant be under no binding obligation. Per _Willes_,
J., Evans _v._ Walton, L. R. 2 Com. PL., pp. 621–622.” Clerk and
Lindsell, Torts, 5 ed. 227.

To induce a servant who is under contract with the plaintiff to leave
the latter at the expiration of the term of service, and to enter the
defendant’s service, is no more than lawful competition. Nichol _v._
Martyn, 2 Esp. 732; Boston Manufactory _v._ Binney, 4 Pick. 425.

Footnote 568:

The statement of the case and the arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 569:

The learned judge here discussed and approved of Blake _v._ Lanyon, 6
T. R. 221.

Footnote 570:

The rest of the opinion on this point is omitted.

Footnote 571: