Chapter LXXVI: Section 3: of this statute is as follows (4)

In a few jurisdictions the conviction, although set aside, is treated
as conclusive evidence of probable cause, proof of fraud in its
procurement being inadmissible. Hartshorn _v._ Smith, 104 Ga. 235;
Clements _v._ Odorless Co., 67 Md. 461, 605 (Bryan, J., diss.); Parker
_v._ Huntington, 7 Gray, 36; Griffis _v._ Sellars, 4 Dev. & B. 176.

In Virginia, on the contrary, a count alleging a conviction and its
reversal is sufficient without any allegation in regard to fraud.
Jones _v._ Finch, 84 Va. 204 (_semble_); Blanks _v._ Robinson, 1 Va.
Dec. 600; Va. L. J. (1886) 398 (overruling Womack _v._ Circle, 32
Grat. 324). See Hale _v._ Boylen, 22 W. Va. 234.

_Commitment for grand jury._—The holding of the defendant for the
grand jury is _prima facie_ evidence of probable cause. Miller _v._
Chicago Co., 41 Fed. 898; Ewing _v._ Sanford, 19 Ala. 605; Price
Mercantile Co. _v._ Cuilla, 100 Ark. 316; Ganea _v._ Southern Co., 51
Cal. 140; Diemer _v._ Herber, 75 Cal. 287; Ritchey _v._ Davis, 11 Ia.
124; Ross _v._ Hixon, 46 Kan. 550; Danzer _v._ Nathan, 145 App. Div.
448; Giesener _v._ Healy, 86 Misc. 16; Ricord _v._ Central Co., 15
Nev. 167; Ash _v._ Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119; Raleigh _v._ Cook, 60 Tex.
438; Hale _v._ Boylen, 22 W. Va. 234.

_Finding of indictment._—The finding of an indictment is _prima facie_
evidence of probable cause. Garrard _v._ Willet, 4 J. J. Marsh. 628;
Sharpe _v._ Johnston, 76 Mo. 660; Peck _v._ Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138;
Wilkerson _v._ McGhee, 153 Mo. App. 343, 163 Mo. App. 356.

_Failure of the prosecution._—The failure of the original prosecution
is in some jurisdictions regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of want of
probable cause. Miller _v._ Chicago R. Co., 41 Fed. 898; Hanchey _v._
Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Tucker _v._ Bartlett, 97 Kan. 163; Straus _v._
Young, 36 Md. 246; Whitfield _v._ Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311; Bostick
_v._ Rutherford, 4 Hawks, 83; Downing _v._ Stone, 152 N. C. 525;
Barhigh _v._ Tammany, 158 Pa. St. 545; McKenzie _v._ Canning, 42 Utah,
529 (but compare Smith _v._ Clark, 37 Utah, 116); Jones _v._ Finch, 84
Va. 204; Waring _v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534; Saunders _v._ First Nat.
Bank, 85 Wash. 125; Brady _v._ Stiltner, 40 W. Va. 289; Fetty _v._
Huntington Loan Co., 70 W. Va. 688; Winn _v._ Peckham, 42 Wis. 493;
Lawrence _v._ Cleary, 88 Wis. 473; Manz _v._ Klippel, 158 Wis. 557. In
others there is no such presumption. Incledon _v._ Berry, 1 Camp. 203
n; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 195; Thompson _v._ Beacon
Co., 56 Conn. 493; Plummer _v._ Collins, 1 Boyce, 281; Skidmore _v._
Bricker, 77 Ill. 164; Bitting _v._ Ten Eyck, 82 Ind. 421; Prine _v._
Singer Machine Co., 176 Mich. 300; Williams _v._ Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339;
Boeger _v._ Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390; Eckerle _v._ Higgins, 159 Mo. App.
177 (distinguishing nol. pros. and discharge on preliminary
examination—see also Smith _v._ Glynn, (Mo.) 144 S. W. 149); Harris
_v._ Quincy R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 261; Scott _v._ Simpson, 1 Sandf.
601; Central Light Co. _v._ Tyron, 42 Okl. 86; Eastman _v._ Monastes,
32 Or. 291; Bekkeland _v._ Lyons, 96 Tex. 255; McIntosh _v._ Wales, 21
Wyo. 397. See also Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274.

Order vacating attachment as _prima facie_ evidence of want of
probable cause in action for malicious attachment, see Petruschke _v._
Kamerer, 131 Minn. 320.

Footnote 386:

The statement of the evidence, the argument for the defendant, and the
concurring opinion of HOLROYD, J., are omitted.

Footnote 387:

Snow _v._ Allen, 1 Stark. 502; Abrath _v._ North Eastern Co., 11 Q. B.
Div. 440, 11 App. Cas. 247; Scougall _v._ Stapleton, 12 Ont. 206;
Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Blunt _v._ Little, 3 Mason, 102;
Cuthbert _v._ Galloway, 35 Fed. 466 (_semble_); Miller _v._ Chicago
Co., 41 Fed. 898; Coggswell _v._ Bohn, 43 Fed. 411; Staunton _v._
Goshorn, 94 Fed. 52; McLeod _v._ McLeod, 73 Ala. 42; Jordan _v._
Alabama Co., 81 Ala. 220; Lemay _v._ Williams, 32 Ark. 166; Bliss _v._
Wyman, 7 Cal. 257; Jones _v._ Jones, 71 Cal. 89; Brooks _v._ Bradford,
4 Col. App. 410; Mark _v._ Rich, 43 App. D. C. 182; Joiner _v._ Ocean
Co., 86 Ga. 238; Baker _v._ Langley, 3 Ga. App. 751; Ross _v._ Innis,
26 Ill. 259; Ames _v._ Snider, 69 Ill. 376; Barrett _v._ Spaids, 70
Ill. 408; Brown _v._ Smith, 83 Ill. 291; Roy _v._ Goings, 112 Ill.
656; Aldridge _v._ Churchill, 28 Ind. 62; Paddock _v._ Watts, 116 Ind.
146; Adams _v._ Bicknell, 126 Ind. 210; Mesher _v._ Iddings, 72 Ia.
553; Schippel _v._ Norton, 38 Kan. 567; Dyer _v._ Singer Machine Co.,
164 Ky. 538; Carrigan _v._ Graham, 166 Ky. 333; Stevens _v._ Fassett,
27 Me. 266; Soule _v._ Winslow, 66 Me. 447; Cooper _v._ Utterbach, 37
Md. 282; Hyde _v._ Greuch, 62 Md. 577; Torsch _v._ Dell, 88 Md. 459;
Stone _v._ Swift, 4 Pick. 389; Monaghan _v._ Cox, 155 Mass. 487;
Stanton _v._ Hart, 27 Mich. 539; Perry _v._ Sulier, 92 Mich. 72; Moore
_v._ Northern Co., 37 Minn. 147; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274;
Alexander _v._ Harrison, 38 Mo. 258; Burris _v._ North, 64 Mo. 426;
Whitfield _v._ Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311; Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont.
274; Jonasen _v._ Kennedy, 39 Neb. 313; Magowan _v._ Rickey, 64 N. J.
Law, 402; Hall _v._ Suydam, 6 Barb. 83; Richardson _v._ Virtue, 2 Hun,
208; Turner _v._ Dinnegar, 20 Hun, 465; Beal _v._ Robeson, 8 Ired.
276; Ash _v._ Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119; El Reno Gas Co. _v._ Spurgeon, 30
Okl. 88; Sims _v._ Jay, 53 Okl. 183; Walter _v._ Sample, 25 Pa. St.
275; Smith _v._ Walter, 125 Pa. St. 453; Bartlett _v._ Brown, 6 R. I.
37; Jackson _v._ Bell, 5 S. D. 257; Kendrick _v._ Cypert, 10 Humph.
291; St. Johnsbury Co. _v._ Hunt, 59 Vt. 294; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75
Va. 168; Saunders _v._ Baldwin, 112 Va. 431; Hightower _v._ Union
Trust Co., 88 Wash. 179; Sutton _v._ McConnell, 46 Wis. 269; Manz _v._
Klippel, 158 Wis. 557 _Accord_.

But see Brewer _v._ Jacobs, 22 Fed. 217; Stewart _v._ Mulligan, 11 Ga.
App. 660; Smith _v._ Glynn, (Mo.) 144 S. W. 149; Downing _v._ Stone,
152 N. C. 525; Ramsey _v._ Arrott, 64 Tex. 320; Glasgow _v._ Owen, 69
Tex. 167; Shannon _v._ Jones, 76 Tex. 141; Tiedeman’s Note, 21 Am. L.
Reg. N. S. 582.

The advice must be that of a lawyer, and not a layman. Murphy _v._
Larson, 77 Ill. 172; McCullough _v._ Rice, 59 Ind. 580; Olmstead _v._
Partridge, 16 Gray, 381; Beal _v._ Robeson, 8 Ired. 276. Even though
the layman be a justice of the peace. Stephens _v._ Gravit, 136 Ky.
479; Coleman _v._ Heurich, 2 Mack. 189; Straus _v._ Young, 36 Md. 246;
Monaghan _v._ Cox, 155 Mass. 487 (_semble_); Gee _v._ Culver, 12 Or.
228; Brobst _v._ Ruff, 100 Pa. St. 91; Sutton _v._ McConnell, 46 Wis.
269. But see Ball _v._ Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; Sisk _v._ Hurst, 1 W. Va.
53. Compare Marks _v._ Hastings, 101 Ala. 165.

The lawyer must have no personal interest in the controversy. Smith
_v._ King, 62 Conn. 515; White _v._ Carr, 71 Me. 555.

In Hazzard _v._ Flury, 120 N. Y. 223, the Court of Appeals held that
mistaken advice of counsel upon a point of law would not justify the
client, since every one is presumed to know the law. Surely that
much-abused fiction has seldom been so glaringly perverted in behalf
of injustice. See Singer Machine Co. _v._ Dyer, 156 Ky. 156.

Footnote 388:

Vann _v._ McCreary, 77 Cal. 434; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274;
Acton _v._ Coffman, 74 Ia. 17; Johnson _v._ Miller, 82 Ia. 693; Sharpe
_v._ Johnston, 76 Mo. 660; Ames _v._ Rathbun, 37 How. Pr. 289; Laird
_v._ Taylor, 66 Barb. 139; Davenport _v._ Lynch, 6 Jones, (N. C.) 545;
Powell _v._ Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504 _Accord_.

_Withholding facts from or unfairstatement to counsel._ Fowlkes _v._
Lewis, 10 Ala. App. 543; Rothschach _v._ Diven, 97 Kan. 38;
Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind. 239; Lammers _v._
Mason, 123 Minn. 204; Bowers _v._ Walker, 192 Mo. App. 230; Lathrop
_v._ Mathers, 143 App. Div. 376; Baer _v._ Chambers, 67 Wash. 357;
Rogers _v._ Van Eps, 143 Wis. 396; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463.

_Must state facts which might have been ascertained with reasonable
diligence._ Weddington _v._ White, 148 Ky. 671; Virtue _v._ Creamery
Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17; Duffy _v._ Scheerger, 91 Neb. 511.
_Contra_—enough to make full and fair disclosure of known facts, Roby
_v._ Smith, 40 Okl. 280.

Footnote 389:

The statement of facts is taken from 3 L. J. K. B. N. S. 35. The
arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Patteson and
Taunton, JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 390:

Willans _v._ Taylor, 6 Bing. 183; Busst _v._ Gibbons, 30 L. J. Ex. N.
S. 75; Brown _v._ Hawkes, [1891] 2 Q. B. 718; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn,
98 U. S. 187; Brown _v._ Selfridge, 224 U. S. 189; Sanders _v._
Palmer, 55 Fed. 217; Staunton _v._ Goshorn, 94 Fed. 52; Gulsby _v._
Louisville R. Co., 167 Ala. 122; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Stephenson, 6
Ala. App. 578; Ball _v._ Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; Johnson _v._ Southern R.
Co., 157 Cal. 333; Smith _v._ King, 62 Conn. 515; Carroll _v._ Perry,
43 App. D. C. 363; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274; Helwig _v._
Beckner, 149 Ind. 131; Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind.
239; Lawrence _v._ Leathers, 31 Ind. App. 414; Henderson _v._
McGruder, 49 Ind. App. 682; Atchison Co. _v._ Allen, 70 Kan. 743;
Michael _v._ Matson, 81 Kan. 360; Metrop. Co. _v._ Miller, 114 Ky.
754; Moser _v._ Fable, 164 Ky. 517; Medcalfe _v._ Brooklyn Co., 45 Md.
198; Thelin _v._ Dorsey, 59 Md. 539; Campbell _v._ Baltimore R. Co.,
97 Md. 341; Bishop _v._ Frantz, 125 Md. 183; Good _v._ French, 115
Mass. 201; Bartlett _v._ Hawley, 38 Minn. 308; Shafer _v._ Hertzig, 92
Minn. 171; Williams _v._ Pullman Co., 129 Minn. 97; Harris _v._ Quincy
R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 261; McNulty _v._ Walker, 64 Miss. 198; Cohn _v._
Saidel, 71 N. H. 558; Magowan _v._ Rickey, 64 N. J. Law, 402; Hartdorn
_v._ Webb Mfg. Co., (N. J.) 75 Atl. 893; Heyne _v._ Blair, 62 N. Y.
19; Fagnan _v._ Knox, 66 N. Y. 525; Anderson _v._ How, 116 N. Y. 336;
L. I. Union _v._ Seitz, 180 N. Y. 243; Viele _v._ Gray, 10 Abb. Pr. 1;
McCarthy _v._ Barrett, 144 App. Div. 727; Galley _v._ Brennan, 156
App. Div. 443; Stanford _v._ Grocery Co., 143 N. C. 419; Humphries
_v._ Edwards, 164 N. C. 154; Dunnington _v._ Loeser, (Okl.) 149 Pac.
1161; Leahey _v._ March, 155 Pa. St. 458; Roessing _v._ Pittsburgh R.
Co., 226 Pa. St. 523; McCoy _v._ Kalbach, 242 Pa. St. 123; Cooper _v._
Flemming, 114 Tenn. 40; Landa _v._ Obert, 45 Tex. 539; Finigan _v._
Sullivan, 65 Wash. 625; Bailey _v._ Gollehon, 76 W. Va. 322 _Accord_.
But see Wilson _v._ Thurlow, 156 Ia. 656; Griffin _v._ Dearborn, 210
Mass. 308.

Footnote 391:

Abrath _v._ North Eastern Co., 11 Q. B. Div. 440, 448, 455; Wiggin
_v._ Coffin, 3 Story, 1; Johnson _v._ Ebberts, 11 Fed. 129, 6 Sawy.
538, S. C.; Brewer _v._ Jacobs, 22 Fed. 217; Gulsby _v._ Louisville R.
Co., 167 Ala. 122; Hammond _v._ Rowley, 86 Conn. 6; Coleman _v._
Allen, 79 Ga. 637; South Western Co. _v._ Mitchell, 80 Ga. 438;
Stewart _v._ Mulligan, 11 Ga. App. 660; McElroy _v._ Catholic Press
Co., 254 Ill. 290; White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia.
210; Foltz _v._ Buck, 89 Kan. 381; Metrop. Co. _v._ Miller, 114 Ky.
754; Pullen _v._ Glidden, 66 Me. 202; Wills _v._ Noyes, 12 Pick. 324;
Mitchell _v._ Wall, 111 Mass. 492; Ross _v._ Langworthy, 13 Neb. 492;
Callahan _v._ Kelso, 170 Mo. App. 338; Gee _v._ Culver, 13 Or. 598;
Squires _v._ Job, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 289; Culberston _v._ Cabeen, 29
Tex. 247, 256; Sebastian _v._ Cheney, (Texas) 24 S. W. 970; Barron
_v._ Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 198; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168; Spear
_v._ Hiles, 67 Wis. 350; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463 _Accord_.

In Abrath _v._ North Eastern Co., _supra_, malice was defined by
Brett, M. R., p. 448, as “a malicious intention in the mind of the
defendant, that is, not with the mere intention of carrying the law
into effect,” and by Bowen, L. J., as “a malicious spirit, that is, an
indirect and improper motive, and not in furtherance of justice.” See
also especially Pullen _v._ Glidden, and Johnson _v._ Ebberts, cited
_supra_ in this note; Magowan _v._ Rickey, 64 N. J. Law, 402; Peterson
_v._ Reisdorph, 49 Neb. 529; Nobb _v._ White, 103 Ia. 352; Brooks _v._
Bradford, 4 Col. App. 410; Jackson _v._ Bell, 5 S. D. 257.

_Definitions of “malice”_ in this connection, see Fowlkes _v._ Lewis,
10 Ala. App. 543; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573;
Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Cecil, 164 Ky. 377; Lammers _v._ Mason, 123
Minn. 204; Downing _v._ Stone, 152 N. C. 525; Wright _v._ Harris, 160
N. C. 542.

Footnote 392:

Farmer _v._ Darling, 4 Burr. 1971; Busst _v._ Gibbons, 30 L. J. Ex. N.
S. 75; Coulter _v._ Dublin Co., 60 L. T. 180; Hicks _v._ Faulkner, 46
L. T. Rep. 127 (affirming S. C. 8 Q. B. D. 167); Wheeler _v._ Nesbitt,
24 How. 544; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 191; Wiggin _v._ Coffin,
3 Story, 1; Burnap _v._ Albert, Taney, 244; Benson v. McCoy, 36 Ala.
710; Lunsford _v._ Dietrich, 93 Ala. 565; Bozeman _v._ Shaw, 37 Ark.
160; Levy _v._ Brannan, 39 Cal. 485; Harkrader _v._ Moore, 44 Cal.
144; Porter v. White, 5 Mackey, 180; Harpham _v._ Whitney, 77 Ill. 32;
Krug _v._ Ward, 77 Ill. 603; Boyd _v._ Mendenhall, 53 Minn. 274;
Frankfurter _v._ Bryan, 12 Ill. App. 549; Gardiner _v._ Mays, 24 Ill.
App. 286; Newell _v._ Downs, 8 Blackf. 523; Oliver _v._ Pate, 43 Ind.
132; Ritchey _v._ Davis, 11 Ia. 124; Atchison Co. _v._ Watson, 37 Kan.
773; Gourgues _v._ Howard, 27 La. Ann. 339; Humphries _v._ Parker, 52
Me. 502; Medcalfe _v._ Brooklyn Co., 45 Md. 198; Mitchell _v._ Wall,
111 Mass. 492; Bartlett _v._ Hawley, 38 Minn. 308; Greenwade _v._
Mills, 31 Miss. 464; Sharpe _v._ Johnston, 59 Mo. 557; Finley _v._ St.
Louis Co., 99 Mo. 559; March _v._ Vandiver, 181 Mo. App. 281; McKown
_v._ Hunter, 30 N. Y. 625; Farnam _v._ Feeley, 56 N. Y. 451; Heyne
_v._ Blair, 62 N. Y. 19; Thompson _v._ Lumley, 50 How. Pr. 105;
Voorhes _v._ Leonard, 1 Th. & C. 148; Johnson _v._ Chambers, 10 Ired.
287; Gee _v._ Culver, 12 Or. 228, 13 Or. 598; Schofield _v._ Ferrers,
47 Pa. St. 194; Dietz _v._ Langfitt, 63 Pa. St. 234; Gilliford _v._
Windel, 108 Pa. St. 142; Bell _v._ Graham, 1 N. & M’C. 278; Campbell
_v._ O’Bryan, 9 Rich. 204; Willis _v._ Knox, 5 S. C. 474; Caldwell
_v._ Bennett, 22 S. C. 1; Evans _v._ Thompson, 12 Heisk. 534; Stansell
_v._ Cleveland, 64 Tex. 660; Shannon _v._ Jones, 76 Tex. 141; Barron
_v._ Mason, 31 Vt. 189; Carleton _v._ Taylor, 50 Vt. 220; Scott _v._
Shelor, 28 Grat. 891; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168 _Accord_.

But see, _contra_, Wilson _v._ Bowen, 64 Mich. 133.

Footnote 393:

The statement of facts and the argument for the defendant are
abridged; the concurring opinions of Coleridge, Wightman, and Erie,
JJ., are omitted.

Footnote 394:

In Exch. Ch. 1 T. R. 510, reversing the judgment of the Court of
Exchequer in Sutton _v._ Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493. Judgment of Exch. Ch.
affirmed on error, in Dom. Proc. 1 T. R. 784. S. C. 1 Bro. P. C. 76
(2d ed.).

Footnote 395:

1 T. R. 545.

Footnote 396:

The case alluded to is perhaps Broad _v._ Ham, 5 B. N. C. 722. By the
report of S. C. in 8 Scott, 40, the cause appears to have been tried
before Maule, B. (Reporter’s note.)

Footnote 397:

Broad _v._ Ham, 5 B. N. C. 722; Turner _v._ Ambler, 10 Q. B. 252;
Roret _v._ Lewis, 5 D. & L. 371; Hinton _v._ Heather, 14 M. & W. 131;
Williams _v._ Banks, 1 F. & F. 557; Chatfield _v._ Comerford, 4 F. &
F. 1008; Shrosbery _v._ Osmaston, 37 L. T. Rep. 792; Steed _v._
Knowles, 79 Ala. 446; Harkrader _v._ Moore, 44 Cal. 144; Ball _v._
Rawles, 93 Cal. 222; Galloway _v._ Stewart, 49 Ind. 156; Donnelly _v._
Burkett, 75 Ia. 613; Humphries _v._ Parker, 52 Me. 502, 505; Mitchell
_v._ Wall, 111 Mass. 492; Bartlett _v._ Hawley, 38 Minn. 308; Peck
_v._ Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138; Chicago Co. _v._ Kriski, 30 Neb. 215;
Howard _v._ Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; Burlingame _v._ Burlingame, 8 Cow.
141; Fagnan _v._ Knox, 66 N. Y. 525; Anderson _v._ How, 116 N. Y. 336;
Wass _v._ Stephens, 128 N. Y. 123; Wilson _v._ King, 39 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 384; Linitzky _v._ Gorman, 146 N. Y. Supp. 313; Thienes _v._
Francis, 69 Or. 165; King _v._ Colvin, 11 R. I. 582; Scott _v._
Shelor, 28 Grat. 891; Forbes _v._ Hagman, 75 Va. 168; Spear _v._
Hiles, 67 Wis. 350; Baker _v._ Kilpatrick, 7 Br. Col. L. R. 150;
Harcourt _v._ Aiken, 22 N. Zeal. L. R. 389; Clift _v._ Birmingham, 4
W. Aust. L. R. 20 _Accord_.

Footnote 398:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 399:

Brown _v._ Hawkes, [1891] 2 Q. B. 718; Grant _v._ Book, 25 Nova
Scotia, 266 _Accord_.

_Malice may be inferred from want of probable cause._ Hanchey _v._
Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Hawkins _v._ Collins, 5 Ala. App. 522; Fowlkes
_v._ Lewis, 10 Ala. App. 543; Price _v._ Morris, 122 Ark. 382; Redgate
_v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573; Stewart _v._ Mulligan, 11 Ga.
App. 660; Holliday _v._ Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779; McElroy _v._
Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290; Pontius _v._ Kimball, 56 Ind. App.
144; Singer Machine Co. _v._ Dyer, 156 Ky. 156; Mertens _v._ Mueller,
119 Md. 525; Griffin _v._ Dearborn, 210 Mass. 308; Moscob _v._ Frank
Ridlon Co., 216 Mass. 193; Krzyszke _v._ Kamin, 163 Mich. 290; Bowers
_v._ Walker, 192 Mo. App. 230; Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274; Galley
_v._ Brennan, 156 App. Div. 443; Kellogg _v._ Ford, 70 Or. 213; Cole
_v._ Reece, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 212; Keener _v._ Jeffries, 54 Pa. Super.
Ct. 553; Tufshinsky _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 121;
Fetty _v._ Huntington Loan Co., 70 W. Va. 688.

It is not a necessary inference. Hanowitz _v._ Great Northern R. Co.,
122 Minn. 241; Smith _v._ Glynn, (Mo.) 144 S. W. 149; Chicago R. Co.
_v._ Holliday, 30 Okl. 680; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463.

It is not inferred from failure to prosecute, Malloy _v._ Chicago R.
Co., 34 S. D. 330, nor from discharge or acquittal. Waring _v._
Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534.

_Want of probable cause is not to be inferred from malice._ Runo _v._
Williams, 162 Cal. 444; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App.
573; Plummer _v._ Collins, 1 Boyce, 281; McElroy _v._ Catholic Press
Co., 254 Ill. 290; Shadden _v._ Butler, 164 Ia. 1; Hudson _v._ Nolen,
142 Ky. 824; Chapman _v._ Nash, 121 Md. 608; Griffin _v._ Dearborn,
210 Mass. 308; Callahan _v._ Kelso, 170 Mo. App. 338; Motsinger _v._
Sink, 168 N. C. 548; Kellogg _v._ Ford, 70 Or. 213; McCoy _v._
Kalbach, 242 Pa. St. 123; Boyer _v._ Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463; McIntosh
_v._ Wales, 21 Wyo. 397. But see Squires _v._ Job, 50 Pa. Super. Ct.
289.

Footnote 400:

Only a portion of the opinion is given.

Footnote 401:

Whitehurst _v._ Ward, 12 Ala. 264; Shannon _v._ Simms, 146 Ala. 673;
Whipple _v._ Gorsuch, 82 Ark. 252; Adams _v._ Lisher, 3 Blackf. 241;
Bruley _v._ Rose, 57 Ia. 651; Parkhurst _v._ Masteller, 57 Ia. 474;
White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 210; Lancaster _v._
McKay, 103 Ky. 616, 624; Bacon _v._ Towne, 4 Cush. 217, 241; Threefoot
_v._ Nuckols, 68 Miss. 116; Morris _v._ Corson, 7 Cow. 281; Turner
_v._ Dinnegar, 20 Hun, 465; Bell _v._ Pearcy, 5 Ired. 83; Johnson _v._
Chambers, 10 Ired. 287; Thurber _v._ Eastern Ass’n, 118 N. C. 129
_Accord_. See Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._ Henby, 178 Ind. 239.

Footnote 402:

Watson _v._ Norbury, Sty. 3, 201; Brown _v._ Chapman, 1 W. Bl. 427;
Cotton _v._ James, 1 B. & Ad. 128; Whitworth _v._ Hall, 2 B. & Ad.
695; Hay _v._ Weakley, 5 Car. & P. 361; Farley _v._ Danks, 4 E. & B.
493; Johnson _v._ Emerson, L. R. 6 Ex. 329; Metropolitan Bank _v._
Pooley, 10 App. Cas. 210; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187;
Wilkinson _v._ Goodfellow Co., 141 Fed. 218; McDonald _v._ Goddard
Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432; Lawton _v._ Green, 5 Hun, 157; Cohen
_v._ Nathaniel Fisher & Co., 135 App. Div. 238; King _v._ Sullivan,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 92 S. W. 51; Carleton _v._ Taylor, 50 Vt. 220
(_semble_) _Accord_.

Similarly an action will lie without proof of special damage for a
malicious and unfounded presentation of a petition to wind up a
trading company. Quartz Co. _v._ Eyre, 11 Q. B. Div. 674; Wyatt _v._
Palmer, [1899] 2 Q. B. 106 (_semble_).

_Malicious inquisition of lunacy_, see Lockenour _v._ Sides, 57 Ind.
360; Dordoni _v._ Smith, 82 N. J. Law, 525.

_Malicious proceeding for suspension or removal of an officer._ Fulton
_v._ Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323.

_Malicious prosecution of unfounded claim for a patent._ Strelitzer
_v._ Schnaier, 135 App. Div. 384.

Footnote 403:

The arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 404:

_Malicious arrest on civil process._ Stribler _v._ Jones, 1 Lev. 276;
Daw _v._ Swain, 1 Sid. 424; Parker _v._ Langley, Gilb. 163, 10 Mod.
209, S. C.; Goslin _v._ Wilcock, 2 Wils. 302; Sinclair _v._ Eldred, 4
Taunt. 7; Pierce _v._ Street, 3 B. & Ad. 397; Cozer _v._ Pilling, 4 B.
& C. 26; Saxon _v._ Castle, 6 A. & E. 652; Roret _v._ Lewis, 5 D. & L.
371; Medina _v._ Grove, 10 Q. B. 152; Daniels _v._ Fielding, 16 M. &
W. 200 (_semble_, see Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, 5 ed. 683); Moore _v._
Guardner, 16 M. & W. 595 (_semble_); Ross _v._ Norman, 5 Ex. 359;
Ventress _v._ Rosser, 73 Ga. 534; Joiner _v._ Ocean Co., 86 Ga. 238;
Cardival _v._ Smith, 109 Mass. 158; Hamilburgh _v._ Shepard, 119 Mass.
30; Cotter _v._ Nathan & Hurst Co., 218 Mass. 315; Stanfield _v._
Phillips, 78 Pa. St. 73; Emerson _v._ Cochran, 111 Pa. St. 619; Ward
_v._ Sutor, 70 Tex. 343.

_Malicious holding to bail._ Steer _v._ Scoble, Cro. Jac. 667; Berry
_v._ Adamson, 6 B. & C. 528; Small _v._ Gray, 2 Car. & P. 605.

_Malicious seizure of property on civil process._ Sanders _v._ Powell,
1 Lev. 129, 1 Sid. 183, 1 Keb. 603, S. C.; Craig _v._ Hasell, 4 Q. B.
481; Medina _v._ Grove, 10 Q. B. 152; Redway _v._ McAndrew, L. R. 9 Q.
B. 74; Kirksey _v._ Jones, 7 Ala. 622; Vesper _v._ Crane Co., 165 Cal.
36; Juchter _v._ Boehm, 67 Ga. 534; Wilcox _v._ McKenzie, 75 Ga. 73;
Lawrence _v._ Hagerman, 56 Ill. 68; Spaids _v._ Barrett, 57 Ill. 289;
Western Co. _v._ Wilmarth, 33 Kan. 510; Wills _v._ Noyes, 12 Pick.
324; Savage _v._ Brewer, 16 Pick. 453; O’Brien _v._ Barry, 106 Mass.
300; Bobsin _v._ Kingsbury, 138 Mass. 538; Grant _v._ Reinhart, 33 Mo.
App. 74; Smith _v._ Smith, 56 How. Pr. 316; Jaksich _v._ Guisti, 36
Nev. 104; Tyler _v._ Mahoney, 166 N. C. 509; Fortman _v._ Rottier, 8
Ohio St. 548; Sommer _v._ Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64
Pa. St. 283.

_Malicious replevin._ O’Brien _v._ Barry, 106 Mass. 300; McPherson
_v._ Runyon, 41 Minn. 524; Martin _v._ Rexford, 170 N. C. 540.

_Malicious issue of an injunction._ Munce _v._ Black, 7 Ir. C. L. R.
475; McFarlane _v._ Garrett, 3 Pennewill, 36; Landis _v._ Wolf, 206
Ill. 392; Krzyszke _v._ Kamin, 163 Mich. 290; Manlove _v._ Vick, 55
Miss. 567; Burt _v._ Smith, 84 App. Div. 47; Coal Co. _v._ Upson, 40
Ohio St. 17; Hess _v._ German Co., 37 Or. 297; Batson _v._ Paris Co.,
73 S. C. 368; Powell _v._ Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504; Williams _v._
Ainsworth, 121 Wis. 600 (_semble_).

_Malicious procurement of the execution of a search warrant._ Cooper
_v._ Booth, 3 Esp. 135, S. C. 1 T. R. 535 (_cited_); Elsee _v._ Smith,
2 Chit. R. 304, 1 D. & R. 97, S. C.; Wyatt _v._ White, 29 L. J. Ex.
193; Carey _v._ Sheets, 60 Ind. 17, 67 Ind. 375; Whitson _v._ May, 71
Ind. 269; Olson _v._ Tvete, 46 Minn. 225; Miller _v._ Brown, 3 Mo. 94;
Boeger _v._ Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390.

_Malicious garnishment._ King _v._ Yarbray, 136 Ga. 212; Lopes _v._
Connolly, 210 Mass. 487.

_Levy of execution under fraudulent judgment._ Atlanta Ice Co. _v._
Reeves, 136 Ga. 294.

See also Hope _v._ Evered, 17 Q. B. Div. 338; Lea _v._ Charrington, 23
Q. B. Div. 45; Utting _v._ Berney, 5 T. L. Rep. 39.

Footnote 405:

Only the opinion of the court on this point is given.

Footnote 406:

Savile _v._ Roberts, 1 Ld. Ray. 374; Purton _v._ Honnor, 1 B. & P.
205; Cotterell _v._ Jones, 11 C. B. 713; Quartz Co. _v._ Eyre, 11 Q.
B. Div. 674; Ray _v._ Law, Pet. C. C. 207; Tamblyn _v._ Johnston, 126
Fed. 267, 270; Mitchell _v._ South Western Co., 75 Ga. 398 (but see
Slater _v._ Kimbro, 91 Ga. 217); Smith _v._ Mich. Co., 175 Ill. 619;
Bonney _v._ King, 201 Ill. 47; McCormick _v._ Weber, 187 Ill. App.
290; Smith _v._ Hintrager, 67 Ia. 109; Cattle Co. _v._ Nat. Bank, 127
Ia. 153, 158; White _v._ International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 310;
Cade _v._ Yocum, 8 La. Ann. 477; McNamee _v._ Mink, 49 Md. 122; Sup.
Lodge _v._ Unverzagt, 76 Md. 104 (see Clements _v._ Odorless Co., 67
Md. 461); Woodmansie _v._ Logan, 1 Penningt. 93; Potts _v._ Imlay, 1
South. 330; State _v._ Meyer, 40 N. J. Law, 252; Ely _v._ Davis, 111
N. C. 24 (_semble_); Terry _v._ Davis, 114 N. C. 31; Carpenter _v._
Hanes, 167 N. C. 551; Cincinnati Co. _v._ Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489
(explaining Pope _v._ Pollock, 46 Ohio St. 367); Kramer _v._ Stock, 10
Watts, 115; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283; Muldoon _v._ Rickey,
103 Pa. St. 110; Emerson _v._ Cochran, 111 Pa. St. 619, 622; Michell
_v._ Donanski, 28 R. I. 94, 97 (_semble_); Smith _v._ Adams, 27 Tex.
28; Johnson _v._ King, 64 Tex. 226; Nowotny _v._ Grona, 44 Tex. Civ.
App. 325; J. Calisher Co. _v._ Bloch, (Tex. Civ. App.) 147 S. W. 683;
Abbott _v._ Thorne, 34 Wash. 692; Luby _v._ Bennett, 111 Wis. 613
(_semble_); Cross _v._ Comm. Agency, 18 N. Zeal. L. R. 153 _Accord_.

Burnap _v._ Albert, Taney, 244; Cooper _v._ Armour, 42 Fed 215, 217;
Wade _v._ Nat. Bank, 114 Fed. 377; Eastin _v._ Stockton Bank, 66 Cal.
123; Berson _v._ Ewing, 84 Cal. 89; Hoyt _v._ Macon, 2 Col. 113
(_semble_); Whipple _v._ Fuller, 11 Conn. 582; Wall _v._ Toomey, 52
Conn. 35; Payne _v._ Donegan, 9 Ill. App. 566 (_semble_); Lockenour
_v._ Sides, 57 Ind. 360; McCardle _v._ McGinley, 86 Ind. 538;
Whitesell _v._ Study, 37 Ind. App. 429; Marbourg _v._ Smith, 11 Kan.
554; Cox _v._ Taylor, 10 B. Mon. 17; Woods _v._ Finnell, 13 Bush. 628;
Johnson _v._ Meyer, 36 La. Ann. 333 (_semble_); Allen _v._ Codman, 139
Mass. 136 (_semble_); Wilson _v._ Hale, 178 Mass. 111; Brand _v._
Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590; Antcliff _v._ June, 81 Mich. 477; McPherson
_v._ Runyon, 41 Minn. 524; O’Neill _v._ Johnson, 53 Minn. 439;
Eickhoff _v._ Fidelity Co., 74 Minn. 139; Virtue _v._ Creamery Mfg.
Co., 123 Minn. 17; Brown _v._ City, 90 Mo. 377 (_semble_); Smith _v._
Burrus, 106 Mo. 94; McCormick Co. _v._ Willan, 63 Neb. 391; Pangburn
_v._ Bull, 1 Wend. 345; Dempsey _v._ Lepp, 52 How. Pr. 11; Smith _v._
Smith, 20 Hun, 555 (_semble_); Willard _v._ Holmes, 21 N. Y. Supp. 998
(_semble_); (but see Willard _v._ Holmes, 142 N. Y. 492; Paul _v._
Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9); Kolka _v._ Jones, 6 N. D. 461; Sawyer _v._
Shick, 30 Okl. 353; Lipscomb _v._ Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112; Swepson _v._
Davis, 109 Tenn. 99; Closson _v._ Staples, 42 Vt. 209 _Contra_.

In Eastin _v._ Stockton Bank, _supra_, the court said: “The English
cases which deny the right to maintain the action, stand upon the
ground that the successful defendant is adequately compensated for the
damages he sustains by the costs allowed him by the statute. Those
costs, it seems, include the attorney’s charges for preparing the case
for trial in all its parts, the fees of the witnesses and the court
officials, and even the _honorarium_ of the barrister who conducted
the case in court. The reason upon which the English rule rests would
not, therefore, seem to apply here, where the costs recoverable under
the statute are confined to much narrower limits....

“Two other objections made to the maintenance of the action,—first,
the claim that if such suits are allowed, litigation will become
interminable, because every successful action will be followed by
another, alleging malice in the prosecution of the former; and second,
that if the defendant may sue for damages sustained by an unfounded
prosecution, the plaintiff may equally bring an action when the
defendant makes a groundless defence,—are well answered in the article
already alluded to [Mr. Lawson’s note, 21 A. L. Reg. N. S. 281, 353]:
‘To the first objection, it is enough to say that the action will
never lie for an unsuccessful prosecution, unless begun and carried on
with malice and without probable cause. With the burden of this
difficult proof upon him, the litigant will need a very clear case
before he will be willing to begin a suit of this character. The
second argument fails to distinguish between the position of the
parties, plaintiff and defendant, in an action at law. The plaintiff
sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and maliciously he
is the cause of the defendant’s damage. But the defendant stands only
on his legal rights—the plaintiff having taken his case to court, the
defendant has the privilege of calling upon him to prove it to the
satisfaction of the judge or jury, and he is guilty of no wrong in
exercising this privilege.’”

In Doane _v._ Hescock, 155 N. Y. Supp. 210, the court (Appellate Term,
First Department) says: “It clearly appears that the complaint does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for abuse
of process, nor are the allegations sufficient to support an action
for malicious prosecution of a civil action in this state. There is no
allegation that the action resulted in damages to the business or
reputation of the defendant or that in any way his personal or
property rights were interfered with. The sole allegation as to damage
is the trouble, inconvenience, and expense of defending the action.
This is not sufficient. Paul _v._ Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9, 11, 13
(dissenting opinion, 21), 82 N. Y. Supp. 369; Fulton _v._ Ingalls, 165
App. Div. 323, 326, 151 N. Y. Supp. 130.”

_Malicious excessive attachment._ Tamblyn _v._ Johnston, (C. C. A.)
126 Fed. 267; Mills _v._ Larrance, 217 Ill. 446; Savage _v._ Brewer,
16 Pick. 453; Paul _v._ Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9; Sommer _v._ Wilt, 4 S.
& R. 19.

Footnote 407:

The averments of the count are abridged and the arguments of counsel
are omitted.

Footnote 408:

Fivaz _v._ Nicholls, 2 C. B. 501, 514 (_semble_); Grove _v._
Brandenburg, 7 Blackf. 234 _Accord_.

“Pechell _v._ Watson came to be considered in Flight _v._ Leman. Its
authority was recognized, but the latter case was decided against the
plaintiff, who sued for maintenance, on the ground, I own I should
have thought the narrow ground, that to instigate a suit was not
maintenance, though to support one already instituted was.” _Per_
Coleridge, C. J., in Bradlaugh _v._ Newdegate, 11 Q. B. Div. 1, 8.

See also Alabaster _v._ Harness, [1894] 2 Q. B. 897, [1895] 1 Q. B.
339; Grieg _v._ National Union, 22 T. L. Rep. 274; Goodyear Co. _v._
White, 2 N. J. Law Journ. 150, 10 Fed. Cas. 752, no. 5602; Breeden
_v._ Frankford Ins. Co., 220 Mo. 327, 373, 378–420, 424–443. Compare
Metropolitan Bank _v._ Pooley, 10 App. Cas. 210, 217–218.

Footnote 409:

Only the opinion of the Chief Justice upon the point of abuse of legal
process is given.

Footnote 410:

Heywood _v._ Collinge, 9 A. & E. 268; King _v._ Yarbray, 136 Ga. 212;
Wicker _v._ Hotchkiss, 62 Ill. 107 (_semble_); Emery _v._ Ginnan, 24
Ill. App. 65 (_semble_); Whitesell _v._ Study, 37 Ind. App. 429
(_semble_); Page _v._ Cushing, 38 Me. 523; Wood _v._ Graves, 144 Mass.
365; White _v._ Apsley Co., 181 Mass. 339; White _v._ Apsley Co., 194
Mass. 97; Malone _v._ Belcher, 216 Mass. 209; Pixley _v._ Reed, 26
Minn. 80 (_semble_); Rossiter _v._ Minn. Co., 37 Minn. 296; Bebinger
_v._ Sweet, 6 Hun, 478; Buffalo Co. _v._ Everest, 30 Hun, 586
(_semble_); Hazard _v._ Harding, 63 How. Pr. 326; Prough _v._
Entriken, 11 Pa. St. 81; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283; Lauzon
_v._ Charroux, 18 R. I. 467 _Accord_.

As to the distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse of
process, see Waters _v._ Winn, 142 Ga. 138; Wright _v._ Harris, 160 N.
C. 542; Cooper _v._ Southern R. Co., 165 N. C. 578.

In Wood _v._ Graves, 144 Mass. 365, Allen, J., said, p. 366: “There is
no doubt that an action lies for the malicious abuse of lawful
process, civil or criminal. It is to be assumed, in such a case, that
the process was lawfully issued for a just cause, and is valid in
form, and that the arrest or other proceeding upon the process was
justifiable and proper in its inception. Perhaps the most frequent
form of such abuse is by working upon the fears of the person under
arrest for the purpose of extorting money or other property, or of
compelling him to sign some paper, to give up some claim, or to do
some other act, in accordance with the wishes of those who have
control of the prosecution. The leading case upon this subject is
Grainger _v._ Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212, where the owner of a vessel was
arrested on civil process, and the officer, acting under the
directions of the plaintiffs in the suit, used the process to compel
the defendant therein to give up his ship’s register, to which they
had no right. He was held entitled to recover damages, not for
maliciously putting the process in force, but for maliciously abusing
it, to effect an object not within its proper scope.”

In Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283, Sharswood, J., said: “There is a
distinction between a malicious use and a malicious abuse of legal
process. An abuse is where the party employs it for some unlawful
object, not the purpose which it is intended by the law to effect; in
other words, a perversion of it. Thus, if a man is arrested, or his
goods seized in order to extort money from him, even though it be to
pay a just claim other than that in suit, or to compel him to give up
possession of a deed or other thing of value, not the legal object of
the process, it is settled that in an action for such malicious abuse
it is not necessary to prove that the action in which the process
issued has been determined, or to aver that it was sued out without
reasonable or probable cause: Grainger _v._ Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212.
It is evident that when such a wrong has been perpetrated, it is
entirely immaterial whether the proceeding itself was baseless or
otherwise. We know that the law is good, but only if a man use it
lawfully.

“On the other hand, legal process, civil or criminal, may be
maliciously used so as to give rise to a cause of action where no
object is contemplated to be gained by it other than its proper effect
and execution. As every man has a legal power to prosecute his claims
in a court of law and justice, no matter by what motives of malice he
may be actuated in doing so, it is necessary in this class of cases to
aver and prove that he has acted not only maliciously, but without
reasonable or probable cause. It is clearly settled also, that the
proceeding must be determined finally before any action lies for the
injury; because, as it is said in Arundell _v._ Tregono, Yelv. 117,
the plaintiff will clear himself too soon, viz., before the fact
tried, which will be inconvenient; besides, the two determinations
might be contrary and inconsistent.”

To proceed unfairly and oppressively but without seeking to compel
another to do what he is not obliged to do, e. g., to enter up
judgment on a note after 10 P. M. and to bring immediate execution, is
not a ground of action according to Docter _v._ Riedel, 96 Wis. 158.
But see dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.

Footnote 411:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 412:

Y. B. 7 Hen. VI. 43; 1 Roll. Ab. 101, pl. 1, S. C.; Holliday _v._
Sterling, 62 Mo. 321 _Accord_.

Footnote 413:

Edwards _v._ Wooton, 12 Rep. 35; Peacock _v._ Raynell, 2 Brownl. 151;
Barrow _v._ Lewellin, Hob. 152; Hick’s Case, Hob. 375; Rex _v._
Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95 _Accord_.

Footnote 414:

Phillips _v._ Jansen, 2 Esp. 624; Ward _v._ Smith, 4 Car. & P. 302;
Sharp _v._ Skues, (C. A.) 25 T. L. Rep. 336; Warnock _v._ Mitchell, 43
Fed. 428; Western Co. _v._ Cashman, 149 Fed. 367; Spaits _v._
Poundstone, 87 Ind. 522; Yousling _v._ Dare, 122 Ia. 539; Lyon _v._
Lash, 74 Kan. 745; Buckwalter _v._ Gossow, 75 Kan. 147; McIntosh _v._
Matherly, 9 B. Mon. 119; Roberts _v._ English Co., 155 Ala. 414;
Dickinson _v._ Hathaway, 122 La. 644; Gambrill _v._ Schooley, 93 Md.
48; Rumney _v._ Worthley, 186 Mass. 144, 145; Youmans _v._ Smith, 153
N. Y. 214, 218; Lyle _v._ Clason, 1 Caines, 581; Waistel _v._ Holman,
2 Hall, 172; Prescott _v._ Tousey, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 12; Shepard
_v._ Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498; Fonville _v._ McNease, Dudley, 303; State
_v._ Syphrett, 27 S. C. 29; Fry _v._ McCord, 95 Tenn. 678; Sylvis _v._
Miller, 96 Tenn. 94; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 63 Vt. 481; Wilcox _v._ Moon,
64 Vt. 450 _Accord_.

See Ahern _v._ Maguire, A. M. & O. 39.

If two persons combine in sending a libel to the plaintiff, each is
guilty of a publication to the other. Spaits _v._ Poundstone, 87 Ind.
522, 524, 525.

In Virginia, by statute, an action lies for insulting words written or
spoken, although not read or heard by a third person. Rolland _v._
Batchelder, 84 Va. 664; Strode _v._ Clement, 90 Va. 553.

Footnote 415:

Part of the case, not relating to publication, is omitted.

Footnote 416:

Wenman _v._ Ash, 13 C. B. 836; Jones _v._ Williams, 1 T. L. Rep. 572;
Sesler _v._ Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486, 489 (_semble_); Luick _v._
Driscoll, 13 Ind. App. 279; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 63 Vt. 481; Wilcox _v._
Moon, 64 Vt. 450 _Accord_.

But a communication by the libeller to his own wife is said not to be
a publication. Wennhak _v._ Morgan, 20 Q. B. D. 635; Sesler _v._
Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486; Trumbull _v._ Gibbons, 3 City H. Rec. 97. But
see State _v._ Shoemaker, 101 N. C. 690. See also Central R. Co. _v._
Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414 (dictation by officer of corporation to
co-employee); Kirschenbaum _v._ Kaufman (N. Y. City Ct.), 50 N. Y. Law
Journ. 406 (defamatory matter uttered to business partner in course of
business). It would be more accurate to say that the communication in
such cases is privileged. In Powell _v._ Gelston, [1916] 2 K. B. 615,
a libellous letter, privileged as a communication to A, was sent to B,
who asked for the information in his own name at A’s request. The
letter was opened and read by A only.

Footnote 417:

M’Coombs _v._ Tuttle, 5 Blackf. 431; Van Cleef _v._ Lawrence, 2 City
H. Rec. 41 _Accord_.

Footnote 418:

Wyatt _v._ Gore, Holt, 299; Wenman _v._ Ash, 13 C. B. 836; Kiene _v._
Ruff, 1 Ia. 482; Allen _v._ Wortham, 89 Ky. 485; Rumney _v._ Worthley,
186 Mass. 144; Schenck _v._ Schenck, Spencer, 208; State _v._
McIntire, 115 N. C. 769; Wilcox _v._ Moon, 64 Vt. 540; Adams _v._
Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250 _Accord_.

See Fox _v._ Broderick, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 453; Callan _v._ Gaylord, 3
Watts, 321.

_Slanderous statements to plaintiff in presence of his counsel_,
Massee _v._ Williams, 207 Fed. 222.

_Sending libellous letter to plaintiff’s attorney_, Brown _v._ Elm
City Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9.

Footnote 419:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 420:

Jones _v._ Davers, Cro. Eliz. 496; Price _v._ Jenkings, Cro. Eliz.
865; Amann _v._ Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; Kiene _v._ Ruff, 1 Ia. 42;
Hurtert _v._ Weines, 27 Ia. 134; Mielenz _v._ Quasdorf, 68 Ia. 726;
Economopoulos _v._ A. G. Pollard Co., 218 Mass. 294; Wormouth _v._
Cramer, 3 Wend. 394 _Accord_.

See Bechtell _v._ Shatter, Wright, (Ohio) 107. Conf. Anon., Moore,
182; Gibs _v._ Jenkins, Hob. 335; Zenobio _v._ Axtell, 6 T. R. 162;
Jenkins _v._ Phillips, 9 Car. & P. 766; Hickley _v._ Grosjean, 6
Blackf. 351; Keenholts _v._ Becker, 3 Den. 346; Rahauser _v._ Barth, 3
Watts, 28; Zeig _v._ Ort, 3 Chandl. 26; K. _v._ H., 20 Wis. 239;
Filber _v._ Dautermann, 26 Wis. 518; Simonsen _v._ Herald Co., 61 Wis.
626; Pelzer _v._ Benishy, 67 Wis. 291.

Footnote 421:

Anon., Sty. 70; Force _v._ Warren, 15 C. B. N. S. 806; Desmond _v._
Brown, 33 Ia. 13; Marble _v._ Chapin, 132 Mass. 225, 226; Cameron _v._
Cameron, 162 Mo. App. 110; Traylor _v._ White, 185 Mo. App. 325;
Broderick _v._ James, 3 Daly, 481 Accord.

_Mailing of post card_. Three views have been expressed as to whether
the mailing of a post card is a publication.

(1) The mailing is a publication. Sadgrove _v._ Hole, [1901] 2 K. B.
1, 4, 5 (_semble_); Logan _v._ Hodges, 146 N. C. 38; Spence _v._ Burt,
18 Lanc. L. Rev. 251; Robinson v. Jones, L. R. 4 Ir. 391 (_semble_);
McCann _v._ Edinburgh Co., L. R. 28 Ir. 24, 28 per Palles, C. B.

(2) The mailing is _prima facie_ a publication. Odgers, Libel and
Slander (4 ed.), 153, 281.

(3) The mailing is _prima facie_ not a publication, i. e., is not a
publication unless evidence is given that the post card was read _in
transitu_. Steele _v._ Edwards, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 52, 58.

_Publication in ignorance of the libel_. The dissemination of a libel
by a carrier or newsvender or a public library, who neither knew nor
ought to have known of the libel and who had no reason to suppose that
the newspaper was likely to contain libellous matters, gives no cause
of action. Emmens _v._ Pottle, 16 Q. B. D. 354; Martin _v._ Trustees
of British Museum, 10 T. L. Rep. 338. But the proprietor of a
circulating library was held liable for giving out a book containing
defamatory statements, because his freedom from negligence did not
appear. Vizetelly _v._ Mudie’s Library, [1900] 2 Q. B. 170. See also
Morris _v._ Ritchie, Court of Sess., March 12, 1902, 4 F. 645.

Footnote 422:

The case has been much abridged.

Footnote 423:

Phillips _v._ Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199; Allen _v._ Fincher, 187 Ala.
599; Pouchan _v._ Godeau, 167 Cal. 692; United Mine Workers _v._
Cromer, 159 Ky. 605; Tawney _v._ Simonson, 109 Minn. 341; Sweaas _v._
Evenson, 110 Minn. 304; Vanloon _v._ Vanloon, 159 Mo. App. 255; Jones
_v._ Banner, 172 Mo. App. 132; Bigley _v._ National Fidelity Co., 94
Neb. 813; Phillips _v._ Barber, 7 Wend. 439; Church _v._ New York
Tribune Ass’n, 135 App. Div. 30; Rossiter _v._ New York Press Co., 141
App. Div. 339; Spencer _v._ Minnick, 41 Okl. 613; McGeary _v._ Leader
Pub. Co., 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 35; Lehmann _v._ Medack, (Tex. Civ. App.)
152 S. W. 438 _Accord_. Compare Marshall _v._ Chicago Herald Co., 185
Ill. App. 224; Willfred Coal Co. _v._ Sapp, 193 Ill. App. 400; Sweet
_v._ Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450; Corr _v._ Sun Printing & Pub.
Ass’n, 177 N. Y. 131. But see M. _v._ J., 164 Wis. 39.

A lunatic is liable for torts generally and also for a libel. Mordaunt
_v._ Mordaunt, 39 L. J. Pr. & M. 57, 59. But it is another
illustration of the rule of the principal case that defamatory words
spoken by a lunatic whose insanity was obvious or known to all the
hearers, are not actionable. Yeates _v._ Reed, 4 Blackf. 463; Irvine
_v._ Gibson, 117 Ky. 306; Dickinson _v._ Barber, 9 Mass. 225, 227;
Bryant _v._ Jackson, 6 Humph. 199. So also of words spoken and
understood as a jest. Donoghue _v._ Hayes, Hayes, 265. Drunkenness is
no defence. Kendrick _v._ Hopkins, Cary, 133; Gates _v._ Meredith, 7
Ind. 440.

The old rule of construing defamatory statements _in mitiori sensu_
was long ago exploded. See Odgers, Libel & Slander (5 ed.), 111–113.

_Explanation of words by context_, see Deitchman _v._ Bowles, 166 Ky.
285; McCurda _v._ Lewiston Journal Co., 109 Me. 53; Wing _v._ Wing, 66
Me. 62; Larsen _v._ Brooklyn Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4; Guenther _v._
Ridgway Co., 170 App. Div. 725; Eddy _v._ Cunningham, 69 Wash. 544;
Leuch _v._ Berger, 161 Wis. 564.

Footnote 424:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 425:

Massee _v._ Williams, (C. C. A.) 207 Fed. 222; Ivie _v._ King, 167 N.
C. 174; Olympia Waterworks _v._ Mottman, 88 Wash. 694 _Accord_. See
_Ex parte_ Nelson, 251 Mo. 63.

Footnote 426:

A portion of the opinion is omitted.

Footnote 427:

The article was as follows: “He Waxed Eloquent. H. P. Hanson fined ten
dollars for refusing payment of car fare.... H. P. Hanson, a real
estate and insurance broker of South Boston, emerged from the seething
mass of humanity that filled the dock and indulged in a wordy bout
with policeman Hogan, who claimed to have arrested Hanson on the
charge of evading car fare and being drunk at the same time. The judge
agreed that the prisoner was sober, but on the charge of evasion of
car fare the evidence warranted the fining of the eloquent occupant of
the dock ten dollars without costs, which he paid.”

Footnote 428:

The opinion of the dissenting judges is supported by the decisions and
_dicta_ in other jurisdictions. Butler _v._ Barret, 130 Fed. 944
(_semble_); Every Evening Co. _v._ Butler, 144 Fed. 916; Taylor _v._
Hearst, 107 Cal. 262; Hulbert _v._ New Co., 111 Ia. 490; Davis _v._
Marxhausen, 86 Mich. 281, 103 Mich. 315 (_semble_); Clark _v._ North
American Co., 203 Pa. St. 346 (_semble_); Hutchinson _v._ Robinson, 21
N. S. W. L. R. (Law) 130 (_semble_). Compare Newton _v._ Grubbs, 155
Ky. 479; Ellis _v._ Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538; Dunlop _v._
Sundberg, 55 Wash. 609.

Footnote 429:

Compare Gandia _v._ Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452; Van Wiginton _v._
Pulitzer Pub. Co., (C. C. A.) 218 Fed. 795; Jones _v._ R. L. Polk &
Co., 190 Ala. 243 (publishing of white woman that she is colored);
Ball _v._ Evening American Co., 237 Ill. 592; MacIntyre _v._ Fruchter,
148 N. Y. Suppl. 786 (“fit only for negroes to associate with”);
Spencer _v._ Looney, 116 Va. 767 (assertion of white person that he
was colored); Galveston Tribune _v._ Guisti, (Tex. Civ. App.) 134 S.
W. 239.

Footnote 430:

This abridged statement has been substituted. The arguments and all
but one of the opinions have been omitted.

Footnote 431:

Compare Northrop _v._ Tibbles, (C. C. A.) 215 Fed. 99. See Smith,
Jones _v._ Hulton, Three Conflicting Views as to a Question of
Defamation, 60 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 365, 461.

Footnote 432:

The statement of the pleadings is abridged, and only the opinion of
Littledale, J., is given. Bayley and Parke, JJ., concurred.

Footnote 433:

That the defendant repeated a defamation, giving the name of the
author, seems originally to have been a justification. Northampton’s
Case, 12 Rep. 134 (Fourth Resolution). But the name of the author was
to be given at the time of repetition, and not for the first time in
the plea. Davis _v._ Lewis, 7 T. R. 17. The words, furthermore, had to
be given with sufficient exactness to ground an action against the
author. Maitland _v._ Goldney, 2 East, 426. Doubts were thrown upon
the validity of this justification in Lewis _v._ Walter, 4 B. & Al.
605. The whole doctrine was repudiated, as to libel, in De Crespigny
_v._ Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392, and Tidman _v._ Ainslie, 10 Ex. 63; and
as to slander, in McPherson _v._ Daniels; Watkin _v._ Hall, L. R. 3 Q.
B. 396.

See to same effect Age-Herald Pub. Co. _v._ Waterman, 188 Ala. 272;
Washington Herald Co. _v._ Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322; Brewer _v._
Chase, 121 Mich. 526; Hagener _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 172 Mo. App.
436; Vallery _v._ State, 42 Neb. 123; Walling _v._ Commercial
Advertiser, 165 App. Div. 26; Galveston Tribune _v._ Johnson, (Tex.
Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 302. See also Whitney _v._ Moignard, 24 Q. B. D.
630.

In Speight _v._ Gosnay, 60 L. J. Q. B. 231, the words were not
actionable without special damage and the special damage resulted only
from unauthorized repetition by a third person.

Footnote 434:

This short statement of the case, taken from 3 Camp. 214, has been
substituted for the declaration which is set out at considerable
length in the original report.

Footnote 435:

“When our ancestors years ago drew the distinction between libel and
slander, they exercised that kind of wise discretion which they always
exercised over the whole field of the common law. It would to my mind
be very dangerous for us nowadays to relax in any way the rule of law
which confines actions for spoken words, in the absence of proof of
special damage, to a very limited number of cases.” Vaughan Williams,
L. J., in Dauncey _v._ Holloway, [1901] 2 K. B. 441, 448. See also A.
L. Smith, L. J., Id. 447. But compare Colby _v._ Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489,
493; Tillson _v._ Robbins, 68 Me. 295.

The distinction sanctioned in the principal case between oral and
written scandal still obtains in England and the United States. The
definition of a libel as a written publication calculated to bring
another into hatred, ridicule, or contempt, is also universally
recognized in English-speaking countries. As it is a pure question of
fact for the jury whether the publication in a given case comes within
this definition, it has not seemed advisable to bring together in this
book the multitudinous instances which have been passed upon. A full
collection of the cases may be found in Odgers, Libel and Slander, (5
ed.) 18–38; Townshend, Slander and Libel; (4 ed.) 203–221; 25 Cyc.
255–264.

An action for a libel made in the course of judicial proceedings
cannot be maintained until the proceedings have terminated in favor of
the person defamed, Masterson _v._ Brown, 72 Fed. 136.

Footnote 436:

There is great diversity of opinion as to what words, imputing the
commission of a crime, are actionable _per se_. The authorities may be
classified as follows:—

I. Words imputing a criminal offence punishable corporally.

In Hawes’s Case, March, 113 (speaking against common prayer); Heake
_v._ Moulton, Yelv. 90; Walden _v._ Mitchell, 2 Ventr. 265; Scoble
_v._ Lee, 2 Show. 32 (regrating); McCabe _v._ Foot, 15 L. T. Rep. 115;
Elliott _v._ Ailsberry, 2 Bibb, 473 (fornication); M’Gee _v._ Wilson,
Litt. S. C. 187 (unchastity); Mills _v._ Wimp, 10 B. Mon. 417
(_semble_); Buck _v._ Hersey, 31 Me. 558 (drunkenness); Wagaman _v._
Byers, 17 Md. 183 (adultery); Birch _v._ Benton, 26 Mo. 153 (whipping
one’s wife); Speaker _v._ McKenzie, 26 Mo. 255 (whipping one’s
mother); Billings _v._ Wing, 7 Vt. 439 (“he snaked his mother out of
doors by the hair of her head; it was the day before she died”), the
words uttered were held not to give a right of action, since they
imputed crimes punishable only by fine, or by imprisonment merely as a
consequence of the non-payment of the fine.

II. Words imputing a criminal offence and involving moral turpitude.
Sipp _v._ Coleman, 179 Fed. 997; Taylor _v._ Gumpert, 96 Ark. 354;
Frisbie _v._ Fowler, 2 Conn. 707; Hoag _v._ Hatch, 23 Conn. 585; Page
_v._ Merwin, 54 Conn. 426; Kennenberg _v._ Neff, 74 Conn. 62;
Yakavicze _v._ Valentukevicious, 84 Conn. 350; Reitan _v._ Goebel, 33
Minn. 151.

III. Words imputing a criminal offence, involving moral turpitude and
punishable corporally. Redway _v._ Gray, 31 Vt. 292 (qualifying
Billings _v._ Wing, 7 Vt. 439); Murray _v._ McAllister, 38 Vt. 167.

IV. Words imputing a criminal offence involving disgrace. Miller _v._
Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Brown _v._ Nickerson, 5 Gray, 1; Kenney _v._
McLaughlin, 5 Gray, 3; Ranger _v._ Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Mayer _v._
Schleichter, 29 Wis. 646; Gibson _v._ Gibson, 43 Wis. 23; Geary _v._
Bennett, 53 Wis. 444.