Chapter LXXV: Section 3: of this statute is as follows (3)

In Wiser _v._ Lawler, 189 U. S. 260, Brown, J., said (pp. 264–65):
“Attached to these prospectuses was a map entitled ‘Map of the group
of mines belonging to the Seven Stars Gold Mining Company.’ It is true
that there is neither in the prospectuses nor in the map a distinct
assertion that the legal title to the properties mentioned was vested
in the Seven Stars Company; but we think that no one can read them
without inferring and believing that the Seven Stars was the owner of
these properties, and that the net proceeds of their operation would
be distributed in dividends to stockholders. As they were circulated
as an inducement to take stock in the enterprises, we are bound to
interpret them by the effect they would produce upon an ordinary mind.
Andrews _v._ Mockford, (1896) 1 Q. B. D. 372. They were, however, even
more damaging in their omissions than in their statements. No mention
was made of the fact that the title to these properties stood in the
names of Lawler and Wells; no allusion to the Cowland agreement, with
its provisions for forfeiture, nor to the fact that the only interest
of the company was an equitable right to the properties after the sum
of $450,000 had been realized from the profits and paid to defendants.
In estimating the probability of subscribers being misled by these
prospectuses we may take into consideration not only the facts stated,
but the facts suppressed. New Brunswick Co. _v._ Muggeridge, 1 Drewey
& Smale, 363. They are entitled to know the _cons_ as well as the
_pros_. Gluckstein _v._ Barnes, (1900) App. Cas. 240; Hubbard _v._
Weare, 79 Iowa, 678; Hayward _v._ Leeson, 175 Mass. 310; In re Leeds
and Hanley Theatres, (1902) 2 Ch. Div. 809.”

In Peek _v._ Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377, Lord Cairns said (p. 403):
“Mere non-disclosure of material facts, however morally censurable,
however that non-disclosure might be a ground in a proper proceeding
at a proper time for setting aside an allotment or a purchase of
shares, would in my opinion form no ground for an action in the nature
of an action for misrepresentation. There must, in my opinion, be some
active misstatement of fact, or, at all events, such a partial and
fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withholding of that which
is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false.”

Compare Mitchell, J., in Newell _v._ Randall, 32 Minn. 171, 172–73:
“It is doubtless the general rule that a purchaser, when buying on
credit, is not bound to disclose the facts of his financial condition.
If he makes no actual misrepresentations, if he is not asked any
questions, and does not give any untrue, evasive, or partial answers,
his mere silence as to his general bad pecuniary condition, or his
indebtedness, will not constitute a fraudulent concealment. 2 Pom. Eq.
Jur. §906; Bigelow on Fraud, 36, 37. But this was not a case of mere
passive non-disclosure. The object of De Laittre’s inquiry clearly was
to ascertain Bauman’s financial condition and ability to pay. Bauman’s
statement was in response to that inquiry, and, when he undertook to
answer, he was bound to tell the whole truth, and was not at liberty
to give an evasive or misleading answer, which, although literally
true, was partial, containing only half the truth, and calculated to
convey a false impression. The natural construction which would, under
the circumstances, be put on this statement is that he had $3,300
capital in his business. It was couched in language calculated to
negative the idea that this was merely the gross amount of his assets,
and that he owed debts to the extent of two-thirds or the whole of
that amount. Such a statement, made under the circumstances it was,
might fairly and reasonably be understood as amounting to a
representation that he had that amount of capital which was and would
remain available, out of which to collect any debt which he might
contract with plaintiff. We think this is the way in which men would
ordinarily have understood it. It is immaterial that more explicit
inquiries by plaintiff would have disclosed the fact of his
indebtedness. It does not lie in Bauman’s mouth to say that plaintiff
relied too implicitly on this general statement. To tell half a truth
only is to conceal the other half. Concealment of this kind, under the
circumstances, amounts to a false representation.”

Footnote 337:

The statement is taken from 37 Ch. D. 541, omitting the last part.
Arguments are omitted. None of the opinions are given except portions
of LORD HERSCHELL’S.

Footnote 338:

The opinion of STIRLING, J., is reported in 37 Ch. D. 550. See
especially 556–558.

Footnote 339:

“Want of honest belief in the truth of what one asserts, not positive
knowledge that it is false, is the essence of the wrong. A man who
knows that he is making a reckless assertion about things of which he
really knows nothing may not be speaking against his own belief, but
he is not speaking according to it, and therefore his conduct is
dishonest, and is esteemed fraud by the law.” Pollock, Law of Fraud in
British India, 43.

Footnote 340:

For a criticism of the view that the directors all believed the
statement, see 6 Law Quarterly Rev. 73; 5 Law Quarterly Rev. 420–422.

Footnote 341:

Schuchardt _v._ Allens, 1 Wall. 359; Union R. Co. _v._ Barnes, (C. C.
A.) 64 Fed. 80; Pittsburgh Life & Trust Co. _v._ Northern Life Ins.
Co., (C. C. A.) 148 Fed. 674; Foster _v._ Kennedy, 38 Ala. 359; Morton
_v._ Scull, 23 Ark. 289; Hutchinson _v._ Gorman, 71 Ark. 305; Davidson
_v._ Jordan, 47 Cal. 351; Bartholomew _v._ Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271;
Fooks _v._ Waples, 1 Har. (Del.) 131; Manes _v._ Kenyon, 18 Ga. 291;
Cooley _v._ King, 113 Ga. 1163; Wheeler _v._ Randall, 48 Ill. 182;
Holdom _v._ Ayer, 110 Ill. 448; Herman _v._ Foster, 185 Ill. App. 97;
Holmes _v._ Clark, 10 Ia. 423; Scroggin _v._ Wood, 87 Ia. 497; Boddy
_v._ Henry, 113 Ia. 462; Farmers’ Stock Breeding Ass’n _v._ Scott, 53
Kan. 534; Campbell _v._ Hillman, 15 B. Mon. 508; Haynes _v._ Gould, 83
Me. 344; Cahill _v._ Applegarth, 98 Md. 493; Emerson _v._ Brigham, 10
Mass. 197; Pike _v._ Fay, 101 Mass. 134; Cole _v._ Cassidy, 138 Mass.
437; Holst _v._ Stewart, 154 Mass. 445; Lillegren _v._ Burns, 135
Minn. 60; Taylor _v._ Frost, 39 Miss. 328; Utley _v._ Hill, 155 Mo.
232; Allen _v._ Wanamaker, 31 N. J. Law, 370; Williams _v._ Wood, 14
Wend. 126; Marsh _v._ Folker, 40 N. Y. 562; Wakeman _v._ Dalley, 51 N.
Y. 27; Kountze _v._ Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124; Hamrick _v._ Hogg, 1 Dev.
350; Taylor _v._ Leith, 26 Ohio St. 428; Staines _v._ Shore, 16 Pa.
St. 200; Erie Iron Works _v._ Barber, 106 Pa. St. 125; Lamberton _v._
Dunham, 165 Pa. St. 129; Deppen _v._ Light, 228 Pa. St. 79; Gibbs _v._
Odell, 2 Cold. 132; Weeks _v._ Burton, 7 Vt. 67 _Accord_.

In Heilbut _v._ Buckleton, [1913] A. C. 30, Lord Moulton said (p. 48):
“In the history of English law we find many attempts to make persons
responsible in damages by reason of innocent misrepresentations, and
at times it has seemed as though the attempts would succeed. On the
Chancery side of the Court the decisions favoring this view usually
took the form of extending the scope of the action for deceit. There
was a tendency to recognize the existence of what was sometimes called
‘legal fraud,’ i. e., that the making of an incorrect statement of
fact without reasonable grounds, or of one which was inconsistent with
information which the person had received or had the means of
obtaining, entailed the same legal consequences as making it
fraudulently. Such a doctrine would make a man liable for
forgetfulness or mistake or even for honestly interpreting the facts
known to him or drawing conclusions from them in a way which the Court
did not think to be legally warranted. The high-water mark of these
decisions is to be found in the judgment pronounced by the Court of
Appeal in the case of Peek _v._ Derry, (1887) 37 Ch. D. 541; (1889) 14
App. Cas. 337, when they laid down that where a defendant has made a
misstatement of fact and the Court is of opinion that he had no
reasonable grounds for believing that it was true he may be made
liable in an action of deceit if it has materially tended to induce
the plaintiff to do an act by which he has incurred damage. But on
appeal to your Lordships’ House this decision was unanimously
reversed, and it was definitely laid down that, in order to establish
a cause of action sounding in damages for misrepresentation, the
statement must be fraudulent or, what is equivalent thereto, must be
made recklessly, not caring whether it be true or not. The opinions
pronounced in your Lordships’ House in that case show that both in
substance and in form the decision was, and was intended to be, a
reaffirmation of the old common law doctrine that actual fraud was
essential to an action for deceit, and it finally settled the law that
an innocent misrepresentation gives no right of action sounding in
damages.

“On the Common Law side of the Court the attempts to make a person
liable for an innocent misrepresentation have usually taken the form
of attempts to extend the doctrine of warranty beyond its just limits
and to find that a warranty existed in cases where there was nothing
more than an innocent misrepresentation. The present case is, in my
opinion, an instance of this. But in respect of the question of the
existence of a warranty the Courts have had the advantage of an
admirable enunciation of the true principle of law which was made in
very early days by Holt, C. J., with respect to the contract of sale.
He says: ‘An affirmation at the time of the sale is a warranty,
provided it appear on evidence to be so intended.’ So far as decisions
are concerned, this has, on the whole, been consistently followed in
the Courts of Common Law. But from time to time there have been dicta
inconsistent with it which have, unfortunately, found their way into
text-books and have given rise to confusion and uncertainty in this
branch of the law. For example, one often sees quoted the dictum of
Bayley, J., in Cave _v._ Coleman, 3 Man. & Ry. 2, where, in respect of
a representation made verbally during the sale of a horse, he says
that ‘being made in the course of a dealing, and before the bargain
was complete, it amounted to a warranty’—a proposition that is far too
sweeping and cannot be supported. A still more serious deviation from
the correct principle is to be found in a passage in the judgment of
the Court of Appeal in DeLassalle _v._ Guildford, [1901] 2 K. B. 215,
at p. 221, which was cited to us in the argument in the present case.
In discussing the question whether a representation amounts to a
warranty or not the judgment says: ‘In determining whether it was so
intended, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a
fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or
judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge,
and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to
exercise his judgment.’

“With all deference to the authority of the Court that decided that
case, the proposition which it thus formulates cannot be supported. It
is clear that the Court did not intend to depart from the law laid
down by Holt, C. J., and cited above, for in the same judgment that
dictum is referred to and accepted as a correct statement of the law.
It is, therefore, evident that the use of the phrase ‘decisive test’
cannot be defended. Otherwise it would be the duty of a judge to
direct a jury that if a vendor states a fact of which the buyer is
ignorant, they must, as a matter of law, find the existence of a
warranty, whether or not the totality of the evidence shows that the
parties intended the affirmation to form part of the contract; and
this would be inconsistent with the law as laid down by Holt, C. J. It
may well be that the features thus referred to in the judgment of the
Court of Appeal in that case may be criteria of value in guiding a
jury in coming to a decision whether or not a warranty was intended;
but they cannot be said to furnish decisive tests, because it cannot
be said as a matter of law that the presence or absence of those
features is conclusive of the intention of the parties. The intention
of the parties can only be deduced from the totality of the evidence,
and no secondary principles of such a kind can be universally true.

“It is, my Lords, of the greatest importance, in my opinion, that this
House should maintain in its full integrity the principle that a
person is not liable in damages for an innocent misrepresentation, no
matter in what way or under what form the attack is made. In the
present case the statement was made in answer to an inquiry for
information. There is nothing which can by any possibility be taken as
evidence of an intention on the part of either or both of the parties
that there should be a contractual liability in respect of the
accuracy of the statement. It is a representation as to a specific
thing and nothing more. The judge, therefore, ought not to have left
the question of warranty to the jury, and if, as a matter of prudence,
he did so in order to obtain their opinion in case of appeal he ought
then to have entered judgment for the defendants notwithstanding the
verdict.”

But compare Kirkpatrick _v._ Reeves, 121 Ind. 280; Mendenhall _v._
Stewart, 18 Ind. App. 262; McLeod _v._ Tutt, 2 Miss. 288; Searing _v._
Lum, 2 South, 683; Indianapolis R. Co. _v._ Tyng, 63 N. Y. 653; Cobb
_v._ Fogalman, 1 Ired. 440; Mason _v._ Moore, 73 Ohio St. 275; Loper
_v._ Robinson, 54 Tex. 510; Magill _v._ Coffmann, (Tex. Civ. App.) 129
S. W. 1146; Smith _v._ Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah, 580; Ogden Resort
Co. _v._ Lewis, 41 Utah, 183; Cameron _v._ Mount, 86 Wis. 477; Palmer
_v._ Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103; Knudson _v._ George, 157 Wis. 520.

As to whether an action ought not to be allowed for negligence in the
use of language, see Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14
Harvard Law Rev. 184; Cunningham _v._ Pease, 74 N. H. 435; Conway
National Bank _v._ Pease, 76 N. H. 319. The English Directors’
Liability Act (1890), 53 & 54 Vict. c. 64, makes directors and others
who issue prospectuses liable in certain cases to compensate persons
sustaining loss by reason of any untrue statement in the prospectus,
unless it is proved that the persons issuing the prospectus had
reasonable ground to believe and did believe that the prospectus was
true. See also the statute of Oklahoma, Howe _v._ Martin, 23 Okl. 561,
567.

_Liability for statement made recklessly not knowing whether true or
not_, see: Cooper _v._ Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148; Hindman _v._ First
National Bank, (C. C. A.) 112 Fed. 931; Mueller Furnace Co. _v._
Cascade Foundry Co., 145 Fed. 596; Einstein _v._ Marshall, 58 Ala.
153; McCoy _v._ Prince, 11 Ala. App. 388; Stimson _v._ Helps, 9 Col.
33; Scholfield Gear Co. _v._ Scholfield, 71 Conn. 1; Upchurch _v._
Mizell, 50 Fla. 456; Corbett _v._ Gilbert, 24 Ga. 454; Miller _v._
John, 208 Ill. 173; Snively _v._ Meixsell, 97 Ill. App. 365; West _v._
Wright, 98 Ind. 335; Graves _v._ Lebanon Bank, 10 Bush, 23; Stone _v._
Denny, 4 Met. 151; Fisher _v._ Mellen, 103 Mass. 503; Beebe _v._
Knapp, 28 Mich. 53; Stone _v._ Covell, 29 Mich. 359; Bullitt _v._
Farrar, 42 Minn. 8; Hamlin _v._ Abell, 120 Mo. 188; Chase _v._ Rusk,
90 Mo. App. 25; Ruddy _v._ Gunby, (Mo.) 180 S. W. 1043; Rowell _v._
Chase, 61 N. H. 135; Shackett _v._ Bickford, 74 N. H. 57; Zabriskie
_v._ Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; Bennett _v._ Judson, 21 N. Y. 238; Taylor
_v._ Commercial Bank, 174 N. Y. 181; Bell _v._ James, 128 App. Div.
241; Whitehurst _v._ Life Ins. Co., 149 N. C. 273; Cawston _v._
Sturgis, 29 Or. 331; Robertson _v._ Frey, 72 Or. 599; Thompson _v._
Chambers, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 213; Mitchell _v._ Zimmerman, 4 Tex. 75;
Katzenstein _v._ Reid, Murdock & Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 106; Benton
_v._ Kuykendall, (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 438; Wheeler _v._
Wheelock, 34 Vt. 553; Agnew _v._ Hackett, 80 Wash. 236; Cotzhausen
_v._ Simon, 47 Wis. 103.

Compare Ray County Bank _v._ Hutton, 224 Mo. 42; Ramsey _v._ Wallace,
100 N. C. 75.

Footnote 342:

“The doctrine seems to be well established by authority that the
conduct and admissions of a party operate against him in the nature of
an estoppel, wherever, in good conscience and honest dealing, he ought
not to be permitted to gainsay them. Thus, negligence becomes
constructive fraud,—although, strictly speaking, the actual intention
to mislead or deceive may be wanting, and the party may be innocent,
if innocence and gross negligence may be deemed compatible; and in
such cases the maxim is justly applied to him, that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer who by his own acts
occasioned the confidence and loss. The application of the maxim to
the case before us is obvious. The principle involved in it is kindred
to that of an equitable estoppel, the difference being that the
application of the estoppel, instead of the maxim, avoids the loss to
the innocent party who has been misled by the conduct of another. See
1 Story’s Eq. Jur., secs. 387, 389; Lucas _v._ Hart, 5 Iowa, 415;
Commonwealth _v._ Moltz, 10 Pa. St. 527, 531; Smith _v._ McNeal, 68
Pa. St. 164.” Foster, J., in Stevens _v._ Dennett, 51 N. H. 324, 335.

“The usual form of expressing the situation which founds an estoppel
_in pais_ has been that followed in the rulings given, in which, as in
many of the older decisions, it is said that an intent to deceive is a
necessary element. But under this formula the jury were not prohibited
from finding the intention and the estoppel, if, without more, the
plaintiff spoke or acted falsely, knowing or having cause to believe
that his words or conduct reasonably might influence the defendant’s
action. The more modern statement, that one is responsible for the
word or act which he knows, or ought to know, will be acted upon by
another, includes the older statement that the estoppel comes from an
intention to mislead. White _v._ Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 20. Tracy _v._
Lincoln, 145 Mass. 357, 359. O’Donnell _v._ Clinton, 145 Mass. 461,
463. Washburn _v._ Hammond, 151 Mass. 132, 141.” Barker. J., in Stiff
_v._ Ashton, 155 Mass. 130, 133.

Footnote 343:

Milson _v._ Gerstenberg, 43 App. D. C. 165; Ballard _v._ Thibodeau,
109 Me. 559; Kiefer _v._ Rogers, 19 Minn. 32; Hedin _v._ Minneapolis
Medical Institute, 62 Minn. 146; Flaherty _v._ Till, 119 Minn. 191;
Devero _v._ Sparks, 189 Mo. App. 500; Craig _v._ Ward, 1 Abb. Dec.
454; Garvin _v._ Harrell, 27 Okl. 373; Wells _v._ Driskell, (Tex. Civ.
App.) 149 S. W. 205 _Accord_.

See Water Com’rs _v._ Robbins, 82 Conn. 623; Auman _v._ McKibben, 179
Ill. App. 425; Huntress _v._ Blodgett, 206 Mass. 318; Bank _v._ Wood,
189 Mo. App. 62.

_As to the fiction of “presumption of knowledge,”_ see: Hicks _v._
Stevens, 121 Ill. 186; Ward _v._ Trimble, 103 Ky. 153; Reynolds _v._
Evans, 123 Md. 365; Unitype Co. _v._ Ashcraft, 155 N. C. 63; Collins
_v._ Chipman, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 563. Compare Brooks _v._ Hamilton, 15
Minn. 26.

Footnote 344:

O’Neill _v._ Conway, 88 Conn. 651; Bethell _v._ Bethell, 92 Ind. 318;
Riley _v._ Bell, 120 Ia. 618; Gund Brewing Co. _v._ Peterson, 130 Ia.
301; Davis _v._ Central Land Co., 162 Ia. 269; Altoona State Bank _v._
Hart, 82 Kan. 398; Braley _v._ Powers, 92 Me. 203; Litchfield _v._
Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195; Savage _v._ Stevens, 126 Mass. 207; Teague
_v._ Irwin, 127 Mass. 217; Adams _v._ Collins, 196 Mass. 422; Huntress
_v._ Blodgett, 206 Mass. 318; Chatham Furnace Co. _v._ Moffatt, 147
Mass. 403; Riggs _v._ Thorpe, 67 Minn. 217; Vincent _v._ Corbitt, 94
Miss. 46; Western Cattle Co. _v._ Gates, 190 Mo. 391; Paretti _v._
Rebenack, 81 Mo. App. 494; Leicher _v._ Keeney, 98 Mo. App. 394, 110
Mo. App. 292; Leach _v._ Bond, 129 Mo. App. 315; Crosby _v._ Wells, 73
N. J. Law, 790; Thompson _v._ Koewing, 79 N. J. Law, 246; Hadcock _v._
Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604; Modlin _v._ Roanoke Navigation Co., 145 N. C.
218; Pate _v._ Blades, 163 N. C. 267; Joines _v._ Combs, 38 Okl. 380;
Gibbens _v._ Bourland, (Tex. Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 274; Grant _v._
Huschke, 74 Wash. 257; Tolly _v._ Poteet, 62 W. Va. 231; Rogers _v._
Rosenfeld, 158 Wis. 285 _Accord_. See Roberts _v._ Anheuser Busch
Ass’n, 211 Mass. 449.

In Brownlie _v._ Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925, Lord Blackburn said (pp.
952—53): “The Courts of Law had to refer fraud, in which knowledge was
an essential ingredient, to a jury. A Court of Equity had to find it
for itself, and consequently the judges in Courts of Equity were not
driven to be so precisely accurate in stating exactly whether they
were going upon the ground that there was a contract or warranty that
the thing was so, or whether they were going upon the ground that the
party, knowing it was not, and representing that it was, had committed
a fraud in doing that. Most of the cases (the leading one is Burrowes
_v._ Loch, 10 Ves. 470, and it is sufficient to mention that, though
there were others) when looked at, if they do not absolutely amount to
contract, come uncommonly near it. In Burrowes _v._ Loch a man
proposing to lend money on the security of an equitable assignment of
a share of what remained due on account of the residue of a testator’s
estate, went to the trustee who held the fund and asked him, telling
him the facts, ‘I am going to lend money upon the security of this
share, has any prior loan upon this been communicated to you so as to
make you have prior notice, so as to make that other loan come in
before me and cut me out, tell me that, in order that I may know
whether I will lend the money or not.’ The party on the other side
answered, ‘There has been none such.’ To say that that is not warranty
or contract that he has received no such notice is, I think, going
very near the wind; if it was not that it was so uncommonly like it,
that I cannot make the distinction myself. That would have been
sufficient for the Master of the Rolls to say, ‘You have warranted
this.’ He also had considerable ground for doubting whether the man
had really _bona fide_ forgotten. The man, he seems to have thought,
had thought this, ‘I will not take the trouble of a search,’ the fact
being that he really knew nothing about this and would not take the
trouble of looking, but he boldly made the assertion, ‘I know there is
none,’ saying as a fact, ‘I know there is none,’ when the real truth
could not be more than ‘I am pretty sure there is none.’ If, when a
man thinks it is highly probable that a thing exists, he chooses to
say he knows the thing exists, that is really asserting what is
false—it is positive fraud. That has been repeatedly laid down, and I
think the more it is considered the more clear it becomes. If you
choose to say, and say without inquiry, ‘I warrant that,’ that is a
contract. If you say, ‘I know it,’ and if you say that in order to
save the trouble of inquiring, that is a false representation—you are
saying what is false to induce them to act upon it. I think all the
cases which have been cited come round to pointing to that, but none
of them, as far as I am aware, are in contradiction with that which I
have cited from Chief Justice Tindal, and I think there are a good
many other authorities to the same effect.”

_As to liability where defendant had no reasonable ground to believe
what he stated_, see Mayer _v._ Salazar, 84 Cal. 646; McCabe _v._
Desnoyers, 20 S. D. 581.

_Statement as to matter of which obviously defendant could not have
personal knowledge_, see: Krause _v._ Cook, 144 Mich. 365; Spead _v._
Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46.

Footnote 345:

Part of the statement is an abridgment of the report in 6 Bingham,
396.

Footnote 346:

Hindman _v._ First Nat. Bank, (C. C. A.) 112 Fed. 931; Hart _v._
Tallmadge, 2 Day, 381; Young _v._ Hall, 4 Ga. 95; Endsley _v._ Johns,
120 Ill. 469; Leonard _v._ Springer, 197 Ill. 532; Skeels _v._ Porter,
165 Ia. 255; Carpenter _v._ Wright, 52 Kan. 221; Bean _v._ Herrick, 12
Me. 262; Page _v._ Bent, 2 Met. 371; Stoney Creek Woolen Co. _v._
Smalley, 111 Mich. 321; Busterud _v._ Farrington, 36 Minn. 320;
Brownlee _v._ Hewitt, 1 Mo. App. 360; Bingham _v._ Fish, 86 N. J. Law,
316; White _v._ Merritt, 7 N. Y. 352; Hubbard _v._ Briggs, 31 N. Y.
518; Carpenter _v._ Lee, 5 Yerg. 265; Paddock _v._ Fletcher, 42 Vt.
389 _Accord_.

Footnote 347:

Statement of facts and arguments of counsel omitted.

Footnote 348:

See West London Bank _v._ Kitson, 13 Q. B. D. 360; National Bank _v._
Kershaw Oil Mill, (C. C. A.) 202 Fed. 90. Compare Tackey _v._ McBain,
[1912] A. C. 186.

Footnote 349:

Iasigi _v._ Brown, 17 How. 183; Bank of Montreal _v._ Thayer, 7 Fed.
622; Merchants Nat. Bank _v._ Armstrong, 65 Fed. 932; Hindman _v._
First Nat. Bank, (C. C. A.) 98 Fed. 562, 112 Fed. 931; Western Tel.
Co. _v._ Schriver, 141 Fed. 538; Harrison _v._ Savage, 19 Ga. 310;
Slade _v._ Little, 20 Ga. 371; Hunnewell _v._ Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286;
Nash _v._ Minnesota Title & Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437; Rawlings _v._
Bean, 80 Mo. 614; Lembeck _v._ Gerken, 88 N. J. Law, 329; McCracken
_v._ West, 17 Ohio, 16; Wells _v._ Cook, 16 Ohio St. 67 _Accord_. But
see Merchants Nat. Bank _v._ Robison, 8 Utah, 256.

_Person or member of a class to whom defendant expected the
representation to be passed on_, see Shrewsbury _v._ Blount, 2 Man. &
Gr. 475; Gerhard _v._ Bates, 2 E. & B. 476; Bedford _v._ Bagshaw, 4 H.
& N. 538; Scott _v._ Brown, [1892] 2 Q. B. 724; Andrews _v._ Mockford,
[1896] 1 Q. B. 372; Warfield _v._ Clark, 118 Ia. 69; Wells _v._
Western Tel. Co., 144 Ia. 605; Henry _v._ Dennis, 95 Me. 24; Chubbuck
_v._ Cleveland, 37 Minn. 466; Baker _v._ Crandall, 78 Mo. 584; Stuart
_v._ Bank of Staplehurst, 57 Neb. 569; Addington _v._ Allen, 11 Wend.
374; Hadcock _v._ Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604; Cazeaux _v._ Mali, 25 Barb.
578; Converse _v._ Sickles, 16 App. Div. 49.

Footnote 350:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 351:

In Allaire _v._ Whitney, 1 Hill, 484, 487, Cowen, J., says that actual
damage is not necessary to an action for fraud; and see also Ingraham,
J., in Isman _v._ Loring, 130 App. Div. 845. The same doctrine is
stated in Northrop _v._ Hill, 57 N. Y. 351; and in Van Velsor _v._
Seaberger, 35 Ill. App. 598; but neither case was one of merely
nominal damages. Leadbetter _v._ Morris, 3 Jones, Law, 543, sustains
the view of Cowen, J. The doctrine of Cowen, J., in Allaire _v._
Whitney is also cited approvingly in 1 Sedgwick on Damages, 8th ed., §
101, and in 1 Sutherland on Damages, 3d ed., § 10.

But the great weight of authority is against this doctrine, and
accords with the view taken by the Minnesota court in the above case
of Alden _v._ Wright: viz., that an action of deceit cannot be
maintained in the absence of actual damage. See Pollock, Torts, 9 ed.,
190, 291; Pollock, Law of Fraud in British India, 22, 23; 1 Jaggard,
Torts, 600, 601; Pigott, Torts, 270, 271; McCarrel _v._ Hayes, 186
Ala. 323; Winkler _v._ Jerrue, 20 Cal. App. 555; Morrison _v._ Martin,
84 Conn. 628; Wesselhoeft _v._ Schanze, 153 Ill. App. 443; Bailey _v._
Oatis, 85 Kan. 339; Barnard _v._ Napier, 167 Ky. 824; Reynolds _v._
Evans, 123 Md. 365; Brackett _v._ Perry, 201 Mass. 502; Tregner _v._
Hazen, 116 App. Div. 829; Badger _v._ Pond, 120 App. Div. 619.

Compare Skowhegan Bank _v._ Maxfield, 83 Me. 576 (fraudulently
inducing plaintiff to pay debts); Garry _v._ Garry, 187 Mass. 62
(inducing release of inchoate right of dower); Urtz _v._ New York R.
Co., 202 N. Y. 170 (release of disputed claim).

Footnote 352:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 353:

In re Pennewell, 119 Fed. 139; Kimmans _v._ Chandler, 13 Ia. 327; Dunn
_v._ Bishop, (R. I.) 90 Atl. 1073 _Accord_. Compare Van Vliet
Automobile Co. _v._ Crowell, (Ia.) 149 N. W. 861.

Footnote 354:

A new statement has been made covering but one point and only the
portion of the opinion relating to that point is given.

Footnote 355:

Ely _v._ Stannard, 46 Conn. 124; Goring _v._ Fitzgerald, 105 Ia. 507;
Briggs _v._ Brushaber, 43 Mich. 330; Currier _v._ Poor, 155 N. Y. 344;
Hoffman _v._ Toft, 70 Or. 488 _Accord_.

See Conway Bank _v._ Pease, 76 N. H. 319.

Footnote 356:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 357:

See Graham _v._ Peale, (C. C. A.) 173 Fed. 9 (delay in asserting
claim); Spreckels _v._ Gorrill, 152 Cal. 383; Barron Estate Co. _v._
Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561 (preparations for building); Williams
Crusher & Pulverizer Co. _v._ Lyth Tile Co., 150 N. Y. Suppl. 6
(expensive investigation preliminary to contract not made).

Footnote 358:

“But there is one thing which intervenes between the _injuria_ and the
_damnum_ and that is the plaintiff’s _action_ which results in damage.
It is clear that a misrepresentation cannot of itself directly produce
damage. It requires a means of conveyance, and that is the action
which it produces, and which results in damage.”

“... It is the action of the plaintiff, and not the damage, which must
be materially induced by the misrepresentation.”

“The fallacy is in regarding the damage, and the action resulting in
damage, as the same thing.” Moncrieff, Law of Fraud and
Misrepresentation, 187.

Footnote 359:

Statement abridged and arguments omitted.

Footnote 360:

Reaffirmed in Sigafus _v._ Porter, 179 U. S. 116. The authorities on
each side of this controverted question are collected in a note to
George _v._ Hesse, (100 Tex. 44) 8 L. R. A. N. S. 804. For later
cases, see: Harris _v._ Neil, 144 Ga. 519 (_accord_); Trayne _v._
Boardman, 207 Mass. 581; Crawford _v._ Armacost, 85 Wash. 622
(_contra_).

Footnote 361:

Statement abridged; arguments omitted; also part of opinion.

Footnote 362:

Henderson _v._ Henshall, (C. C. A.) 54 Fed. 320; Tooker _v._ Alston,
159 Fed. 599; Jordan _v._ Pickett, 78 Ala. 331; Dingle _v._ Trask, 7
Col. App. 16; Carondelet Iron Works _v._ Moore, 78 Ill. 65; Jones _v._
Foster, 175 Ill. 459; Press _v._ Hair, 133 Ill. App. 528; Anderson
Foundry _v._ Myers, 15 Ind. App. 385; Moore _v._ Turbeville, 2 Bibb,
602; Weaver _v._ Shriver, 79 Md. 530; Silver _v._ Frazier, 3 All. 382;
Parker _v._ Moulton, 114 Mass. 99; Poland _v._ Brownell, 131 Mass.
138; Thompson _v._ Pentecost, 206 Mass. 505; Anderson _v._ McPike, 86
Mo. 293; Brown _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 187 Mo. App. 104; Morrill _v._
Madden, 35 Minn. 493; Grindrod _v._ Anglo-American Bond Co., 34 Mont.
169; Power _v._ Turner, 37 Mont. 521; Osborne _v._ Missouri R. Co., 71
Neb. 180; Saunders _v._ Hatterman, 2 Ired. 32; Mulholland _v._
Washington Match Co., 35 Wash. 315; Mosher _v._ Post, 89 Wis. 602;
Farr _v._ Peterson, 91 Wis. 182; Kaiser _v._ Nummerdor, 120 Wis. 234;
Jacobsen _v._ Whitely, 138 Wis. 434 _Accord_.

But see Wilson _v._ Higbee, 62 Fed. 723; King _v._ Livingston Mfg.
Co., 180 Ala. 118; Mason _v._ Thornton, 74 Ark. 46; Linington _v._
Strong, 107 Ill. 295; Robinson _v._ Reinhart, 137 Ind. 674; Hanks _v._
McKee, 2 Litt. 227; Bowen _v._ Carter, 124 Mass. 426; Arnold _v._
Teele, 182 Mass. 1; Light _v._ Jacobs, 183 Mass. 206; Bachman _v._
Travelers Ins. Co., (N. H.) 97 Atl. 223; Fox _v._ Duffy, 95 App. Div.
202.

“The doctrine ... is not to be extended. It relates merely to seller’s
talk.” Sheldon, J., in Townsend _v._ Niles, 210 Mass. 524, 531.

_Equal means of knowledge_, see Hill _v._ Bush, 19 Ark. 522; Strong
_v._ Peters, 2 Root, 93; McDaniell _v._ Strohecker, 19 Ga. 432; Knight
_v._ Gaultney, 23 Ill. App. 376; Foley _v._ Cowgill, 5 Blackf. 18;
Boddy _v._ Henry, 113 Ia. 462; Hinchman _v._ Weeks, 85 Mich. 535;
Bradford _v._ Wright, 145 Mo. App. 623; Conway Nat. Bank _v._ Pease,
76 N. H. 319; Long _v._ Warren, 68 N. Y. 426; Crislip _v._ Cain, 19 W.
Va. 438.

_Execution of instrument without reading it_, see Dunham Lumber Co.
_v._ Holt, 123 Ala. 336; Robinson _v._ Glass, 94 Ind. 211; Porter _v._
United Railways, 165 Mo. App. 619; Muller _v._ Rosenblath, 157 App.
Div. 513; Griffin _v._ Roanoke Lumber Co., 140 N. C. 514.

_Reliance on friendship_, see Gray _v._ Reeves, 69 Wash. 374.

Footnote 363:

Arguments omitted; also part of opinion.

Footnote 364:

Martin _v._ Burford, (C. C. A.) 181 Fed. 922; Hutchinson _v._ Gorman,
71 Ark. 305; Scott _v._ Moore, 89 Ark. 321; Montgomery _v._ McLaury,
143 Cal. 83; Teague _v._ Hall, 171 Cal. 668; Eames _v._ Morgan, 37
Ill. 260; Ladd _v._ Pigott, 114 Ill. 647; Kehl _v._ Abram, 210 Ill.
218 (public records); Backer _v._ Pyne, 130 Ind. 288 (records);
McGibbons _v._ Wilder, 78 Ia. 531; Faust _v._ Hosford, 119 Ia. 97
(records); Scott _v._ Burnight, 131 Ia. 507; McKee _v._ Eaton, 26 Kan.
226 (records of patent office); Davis _v._ Jenkins, 46 Kan. 19
(records of land office); Carpenter _v._ Wright, 52 Kan. 221 (deed
records); Trimble _v._ Ward, 97 Ky. 748; Martin _v._ Jordan, 60 Me.
531; Braley _v._ Powers, 92 Me. 203; Harlow _v._ Perry, 113 Me. 239;
David _v._ Park, 103 Mass. 501 (records of patent office); Holst _v._
Stewart, 161 Mass. 516; Rollins _v._ Quimby, 200 Mass. 162 (mortgage
records); Jackson _v._ Armstrong, 50 Mich. 65; Smith _v._ Werkheiser,
152 Mich. 177; Faribault _v._ Sater, 13 Minn. 223; Redding _v._
Wright, 49 Minn. 322; Union Bank _v._ Hunt, 76 Mo. 439; Cottrill _v._
Krum, 100 Mo. 397; Stonemets _v._ Head, 248 Mo. 243; Shearer _v._
Hill, 125 Mo. App. 375; Gerner _v._ Mosher, 58 Neb. 135 (books of
corporation); Perry _v._ Rogers, 62 Neb. 898; Martin _v._ Hutton, 90
Neb. 34; Bradbury _v._ Haines, 60 N. H. 123; Blossom _v._ Barrett, 37
N. Y. 434 (records of court); Gage _v._ Peetsch, 16 Misc. 291
(mortgage records); Blumenfield _v._ Stine, 42 Misc. 411 (records);
Blacknall _v._ Rowland, 108 N. C. 554; Bank of North America _v._
Sturdy, 7 R. I. 109; Handy _v._ Waldron, 19 R. I. 618 (failure to
inquire of references); Hunt _v._ Barker, 22 R. I. 18 (deed records);
Wright _v._ United States Mfg. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 42 S. W. 789 (tax
records); Chamberlain _v._ Rankin, 49 Vt. 133; Morrill _v._ Palmer, 68
Vt. 1; Jordan _v._ Walker, 115 Va. 109; City _v._ Tacoma Light Co., 17
Wash. 458; Simons _v._ Cissna, 52 Wash. 115; Borde _v._ Kingsley, 76
Wash. 613; Hall _v._ Bank, 143 Wis. 303 (records); Woteshek _v._
Neuman, 151 Wis. 365; Rogers _v._ Rosenfeld, 158 Wis. 285 _Accord_.

See Henry _v._ Allen, 93 Ala. 197; Hanger _v._ Evins, 38 Ark. 334;
Wheeler _v._ Baars, 33 Fla. 696 (records); Forbes _v._ Thorpe, 209
Mass. 570. Compare Campbell _v._ Frankem, 65 Ind. 591.

_Assertion of title_, see: Crandall _v._ Parks, 152 Cal. 772; Hale
_v._ Philbrick, 42 Ia. 81; Young _v._ Hopkins, 6 T. B. Mon. 18; Cobb
_v._ Wright, 43 Minn. 83; Manley _v._ Johnson, 85 Vt. 262.

_Statements as to boundaries_, see: Roberts _v._ Plaisted, 63 Me. 335;
Olson _v._ Orton, 28 Minn. 36; Clark _v._ Baird, Seld. Notes, 187;
Schwenk _v._ Naylor, 102 N. Y. 683; Roberts _v._ Holliday, 10 S. D.
576.

_Plaintiff informed of truth by third person_, see: Moncrief _v._
Wilkinson, 93 Ala. 373; Haight _v._ Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464; Grosjean _v._
Galloway, 82 App. Div. 380.

_Refusal of defendant to put representation in writing_, Ettlinger
_v._ Weil, 184 N. Y. 179.

Footnote 365:

O’Neill _v._ Conway, 88 Conn. 651; Antle _v._ Sexton, 137 Ill. 410;
Ledbetter _v._ Davis, 121 Ind. 119; Speed _v._ Hollingsworth, 54 Kan.
436; Judd _v._ Walker, 215 Mo. 312; Miller _v._ Wissert, 38 Okl. 808;
Farris _v._ Gilder, (Tex. Civ. App.) 115 S. W. 645 _Accord_.

Compare Cawston _v._ Sturgis, 29 Or. 331. And see Disney _v._ Lang, 90
Kan. 309.

Footnote 366:

Credle _v._ Swindell, 63 N. C. 305; Wamsley _v._ Currence, 25 W. Va.
543 _Accord_.

See Cagney _v._ Cuson, 77 Ind. 494. Compare Lewis _v._ Jewell, 151
Mass. 345.

_Representations as to matter of law_, see Eaglesfield _v._
Londonderry, 4 Ch. D. 693, 702–703; Mutual Life Ins. Co. _v._ Phinney,
178 U. S. 327; Martin _v._ Wharton, 38 Ala. 637; Lehman _v._
Shackleford, 50 Ala. 437; McDonald _v._ Smith, 95 Ark. 523; Kehl _v._
Abram, 210 Ill. 218; Hill _v._ Coates, 127 Ill. App. 196; Clodfelter
_v._ Hulett, 72 Ind. 137; Kinney _v._ Dodge, 101 Ind. 573; Whitman
_v._ Atchison R. Co., 85 Kan. 150; Thompson _v._ Phoenix Ins. Co., 75
Me. 55; Stevens _v._ Odlin, 109 Me. 417; Bilafsky _v._ Conveyancers
Ins. Co., 192 Mass. 504; Kerr _v._ Shurtleff, 218 Mass. 167; Rose _v._
Saunders, 38 Hun, 575; Unckles _v._ Hentz, 18 Misc. 644; Moreland _v._
Atchison, 19 Tex. 303; Texas Cotton Co. _v._ Denny, (Tex. Civ. App.)
78 S. W. 557; Gormely _v._ Gymnastic Ass’n, 55 Wis. 350.

_Law of another state_, see Travelers Protective Ass’n _v._ Smith, 183
Ind. 59; Schneider _v._ Schneider, 125 Ia. 1; Anderson _v._ Heasley,
95 Kan. 572; Wood _v._ Roeder, 50 Neb. 476.

Footnote 367:

“This contention assumes that the defrauded party owes to the party
who defrauded him a duty to use diligence to discover the fraud. There
is no such obligation. One who perpetrates a fraud cannot complain
because his victim continues to have a confidence which a more
vigilant person could not have.” Carpenter, J., in Smith _v._
McDonald, 139 Mich. 225, 229. See Barley _v._ Walford, 9 Q. B. 197,
209. Compare Thaler _v._ Neidermeyer, 185 Mo. App. 257.

Footnote 368:

The statement has been redrawn and only parts of the opinion are
printed.

Footnote 369:

See Hicks _v._ Stevens, 121 Ill. 186.

Footnote 370:

The statement of the case has been abridged and only a part of the
opinion is given.

Footnote 371:

The court decided that the answer was good.

Footnote 372:

In accordance with the opinion of the majority of the court see Clarke
_v._ Postan, 6 Car. & P. 423; Stapp _v._ Partlow, Dudley, (Ga.) 176;
Feazle _v._ Simpson, 2 Ill. 30 (_semble_); Holmes _v._ Johnson,
Busbee, 44; Britton _v._ Granger, 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 281, 291.

In accordance with the opinion of the minority see Gregory _v._ Derby,
8 Car. & P. 749, 750 (_semble_); Cooper _v._ Armour, 42 Fed. 215, 217;
Sheppard _v._ Furniss, 19 Ala. 760 (_semble_); Davis _v._ Sanders, 133
Ala. 275, 278 (_semble_); Newfield _v._ Copperman, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S.
360 (_semble_); Lawyer _v._ Loomis, 3 Th. & C. 393, 395; Mitchell _v._
Donanski, 28 R. I. 94; O’Driscoll _v._ McBurney, 2 N. & McC. 54
(_semble_); Heyward _v._ Cuthbert, 4 McC. 354 (_semble_).

Compare Swift _v._ Witchard, 103 Ga. 193.

_Arrest without warrant, not followed by prosecution_, see Auerbach
_v._ Freeman, 43 App. D. C. 176; McDonald _v._ National Art Co., 69
Misc. 325.

_Search warrant issued but no arrest or seizure of property_, see
Gulsby _v._ Louisville R. Co., 167 Ala. 122; Hardin _v._ Hight, 106
Ark. 190; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Holliday, 30 Okl. 680; Olson _v._
Haggerty, 69 Wash. 48.

_Application for a warrant, none issued_, see Schneider _v._ Schlang,
159 App. Div. 385. But see Kashare _v._ Robbins, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1041.

Some jurisdictions, however, require legal process of at least _prima
facie_ validity. See Strain _v._ Irwin, 195 Ala. 414; Smith _v._
Brown, 119 Md. 236; Tiede _v._ Fuhr, 264 Mo. 622; Segusky _v._
Williams, 89 S. C. 414.

Cf. Grissom _v._ Lawler, 10 Ala. App. 540 (plaintiff gave bond after
complaint, so no process issued).

Footnote 373:

Pippet _v._ Hearn, 5 B. & Al. 634; Rutherford _v._ Dyer, 146 Ala. 665;
Peterson _v._ Hoyt, 4 Alaska, 713; Harrington _v._ Tibbet, 143 Cal.
78; Streight _v._ Bell, 37 Ind. 550; Shaul _v._ Brown, 28 Ia. 37; Bell
_v._ Keepers, 37 Kan. 64; Potter _v._ Gjertsen, 37 Minn. 386; Stocking
_v._ Howard, 73 Mo. 25; Hackler _v._ Miller, 79 Neb. 209; Dennis _v._
Ryan, 65 N. Y. 385; Kline _v._ Shuler, 8 Ired. 484; Chicago R. Co.
_v._ Holliday, 30 Okl. 680; Ward _v._ Sutor, 70 Tex. 343; Strehlow
_v._ Pettit, 96 Wis. 22; McIntosh _v._ Wales, 21 Wyo. 397 _Accord_.

Alexander _v._ West, 6 Ga. App. 72 _Contra_.

_Prosecution under unconstitutional statute_: Murten _v._ Garbe, 91
Neb. 439.

_Court without jurisdiction_: Calhoun _v._ Bell, 136 La. 149. Compare
Grorud _v._ Lossl, 48 Mont. 274.

Footnote 374:

1 Marsh. 12, S. C.

Footnote 375:

The statement of the case has been taken from 1 Marsh. 12; the
arguments of counsel are omitted.

Footnote 376:

See Saville _v._ Roberts, 1 Ld. Ray. 374; 12 Mod. 208, S. C.

“It is difficult to see on what grounds it can be maintained that a
charge of breaking the peace conveys no imputation on the character of
the person charged, and it may be doubted whether the authority of the
cases above mentioned (Byne _v._ Moore and Saville _v._ Roberts) would
now be recognized on this point.” Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, (5 ed.)
663.

Footnote 377:

Only the opinion of ERLE, C. J., is given.

Footnote 378:

Hyde _v._ Greuch, 62 Md. 577; Pixley _v._ Reed, 26 Minn. 80
(_semble_); Apgar _v._ Woolston, 43 N. J. Law, 57. 65 (_semble_); Bump
_v._ Betts, 19 Wend. 421; Fortman _v._ Rottier, 8 Ohio St. 548
_Accord_.

See Brinkley _v._ Knight, 163 N. C. 194 (release by constable without
a hearing).

Footnote 379:

Parker _v._ Langley, 10 Mod. 209; Whitworth _v._ Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695;
Mellor _v._ Baddeley, 2 Cr. & M. 675; Watkins _v._ Lee, 5 M. & W. 270;
McCann _v._ Preneveau, 10 Ont. 573; Poitras _v._ LeBeau, 14 Can. S. C.
742; Stewart _v._ Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Steel _v._ Williams, 18
Ind. 161; West _v._ Hayes, 104 Ind. 251; Olson _v._ Neal, 63 Ia. 214;
Wood _v._ Laycock, 3 Met. (Ky.) 192; Smith _v._ Brown, 119 Md. 236;
Hamilburgh _v._ Shepard, 119 Mass. 30; Wilson _v._ Hale, 178 Mass.
111; Pixley _v._ Reed, 26 Minn. 80; Lowe _v._ Wartman, 47 N. J. Law,
413; Clark _v._ Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344; Searll _v._ McCracken, 16 How.
Pr. 262; Swartwout _v._ Dickelman, 12 Hun, 358; Johnson _v._ Finch, 93
N. C. 205; Forster _v._ Orr. 17 Or. 447; Scheibler _v._ Steinburg, 129
Tenn. 614; Luby _v._ Bennett, 111 Wis. 613 _Accord_.

Consequently, the Statute of Limitations does not run until the
prosecution is terminated. Mayor _v._ Hall, 12 Can. S. C. 74; Printup
_v._ Smith, 74 Ga. 157; Rider _v._ Kite, 61 N. J. Law, 8.

Also although discharged by a magistrate, plaintiff can not sue if the
grand jury afterwards indict. Hartshorn _v._ Smith, 104 Ga. 235;
Weglein _v._ Trow Directory Co., 152 App. Div. 705. See Schippel _v._
Norton, 38 Kan. 567; Knott _v._ Sargent, 125 Mass. 95. Compare Simmons
_v._ Sullivan, 42 App. D. C. 523 (amended or substitute information,
altering the charge); Mistich _v._ Collette, 136 La. 294 (second
prosecution instituted after termination of first and still pending).

Footnote 380:

Everything is omitted, except the opinion of the court on the question
of the termination of the prosecution.

Footnote 381:

Cotton _v._ Wilson, Minor, 203; Hurgren _v._ Union Co., 141 Cal. 585;
Chapman _v._ Woods, 6 Blackf. 504; Richter _v._ Koster, 45 Ind. 440;
Coffey _v._ Myers, 84 Ind. 105; Kelley _v._ Sage, 12 Kan. 109; Bell
_v._ Matthews, 37 Kan. 686; Yocum _v._ Polly, 1 B. Mon. 358; Stanton
_v._ Hart, 27 Mich. 539; Swensgaard _v._ Davis, 33 Minn. 368
(_semble_); Kennedy _v._ Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503; Casebeer _v._
Drahoble, 13 Neb. 465; Casebeer _v._ Rice, 18 Neb. 203; Apgar _v._
Woolston, 43 N. J. Law, 57; Lowe _v._ Wartman, 47 N. J. Law, 413;
Clark _v._ Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344 (_semble_); Moulton _v._ Beecher, 8
Hun, 100; Fay _v._ O’Neill, 36 N. Y. 11 (_semble_); Murray _v._
Lackey, 2 Murph. 368; Rice _v._ Ponder, 7 Ired. 390; Hatch _v._ Cohen,
84 N. C. 602; Marcus _v._ Bernstein, 117 N. C. 31; Douglas _v._ Allen,
56 Ohio St. 156; Murphy _v._ Moore, (Pa.) 11 Atl. 665; Driggs _v._
Burton, 44 Vt. 124; Woodworth _v._ Mills, 61 Wis. 44; Manz _v._
Klippel, 158 Wis. 557; McCrosson _v._ Cummings, 5 Hawn, 391 _Accord_.

Massachusetts formerly held to the contrary. Parker _v._ Farley, 10
Cush. 279. But see Graves _v._ Dawson, 130 Mass. 78, 133 Mass. 419;
Langford _v._ Boston R. Co., 144 Mass. 431; Briggs _v._ Shepard Mfg.
Co., 217 Mass. 446.

_Indictment quashed_, see Simmons _v._ Sullivan, 42 App. D. C. 523;
Wilkerson _v._ McGee, 265 Mo. 574; Reit _v._ Meyer, 160 App. Div. 752.

Case stricken from docket because sent to wrong court, Sandlin _v._
Anders, 187 Ala. 473.

_Termination of a previous civil action._—If a party sues for a
malicious arrest or seizure of property in a civil action, a voluntary
abandonment of the latter action by the plaintiff therein is
equivalent to its termination in favor of his adversary. Arundell _v._
White, 14 East, 216; Nicholson _v._ Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21; Pierce _v._
Street, 3 B. & Ad. 397; Watkins _v._ Lee, 5 M. & W. 270; Ross _v._
Norman, 5 Ex. 359; Emery _v._ Ginnan, 24 Ill. App. 65; Cardival _v._
Smith, 109 Mass. 158; Ludwick _v._ Penny, 158 N. C. 104; Mayer _v._
Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283. Compare Hales _v._ Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46
(action recommenced after voluntary nonsuit).

The rule is the same as to malicious prosecutions of civil actions
without arrest or attachment in jurisdictions where one is allowed to
sue for malicious prosecution of a civil action, without more. Wall
_v._ Toomey, 52 Conn. 35; Marbourg _v._ Smith, 11 Kan. 554; Mitchell
_v._ Sullivan, 30 Kan. 231. See also Wilson _v._ Hale, 178 Mass. 111;
Luby _v._ Bennett, 111 Wis. 613.

But an abandonment of the previous proceeding, brought about as a
compromise, is not a termination in favor of the original defendant.
Wilkinson _v._ Howel, M. & M. 495; Kinsey _v._ Wallace, 36 Cal. 462
(_semble_); Waters _v._ Winn, 142 Ga. 138; Emery _v._ Ginnan, 24 Ill.
App. 65; Fadner _v._ Filer, 27 Ill. App. 506; Ruehl Brewing Co. _v._
Atlas Brewing Co., 187 Ill. App. 392; Singer Machine Co. _v._ Dyer,
156 Ky. 156; Marks _v._ Gray, 42 Me. 86; Sartwell _v._ Parker, 141
Mass. 405; Langford _v._ Boston R. Co., 144 Mass. 431; Rachelman _v._
Skinner, 46 Minn. 196; McCormick _v._ Sisson, 7 Cow. 715; Gallagher
_v._ Stoddard, 47 Hun, 101; Atwood _v._ Beirne, 73 Hun, 547 (but see
Reit _v._ Meyer, 160 App. Div. 752); Welch _v._ Cheek, 115 N. C. 310;
Clark _v._ Everett, 2 Grant, (Pa.) 416; Mayer _v._ Walter, 64 Pa. St.
283, 287; Rounds _v._ Humes, 7 R. I. 535; Russell _v._ Morgan, 24 R.
I. 134. Unless the settlement was obtained by duress of the person or
the goods of the original defendant. Morton _v._ Young, 55 Me. 24;
White _v._ International Textbook Co., 156 Ia. 210.

Footnote 382:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 383:

Anon., 6 Mod. 73; Turner _v._ Ambler, 10 Q. B. 252; Hailes _v._ Marks,
7 H. & N. 56; Wheeler _v._ Nesbitt, 24 How. 544, 550; Stewart _v._
Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Sanders _v._ Palmer, 55 Fed. 217; Jordan _v._
Alabama Co., 81 Ala. 220; Price _v._ Morris, 122 Ark. 382; Mark _v._
Rich, 43 App. D. C. 182; Marable _v._ Mayer, 78 Ga. 710; Joiner _v._
Ocean Co., 86 Ga. 238; Ames _v._ Snider, 69 Ill. 376; Barrett _v._
Spaids, 70 Ill. 408; Leyenberger _v._ Paul, 12 Ill. App. 635; Morrell
_v._ Martin, 17 Ill. App. 336; Adams _v._ Lisher, 3 Blackf. 241; Green
_v._ Cochran, 43 Ia. 544; Yocum _v._ Polly, 1 B. Mon. 358; Medcalfe
_v._ Brooklyn Co., 45 Md. 198; Flickinger _v._ Wagner, 46 Md. 580;
Stone _v._ Crocker, 24 Pick. 81; Coupal _v._ Ward, 106 Mass. 289;
Hamilton _v._ Smith, 39 Mich. 222; Smith _v._ Austin, 49 Mich. 286;
Webster _v._ Fowler, 89 Mich. 303; Cox _v._ Lauritsen, 126 Minn. 128;
Burris _v._ North, 64 Mo. 426; Renfro _v._ Prior, 22 Mo. App. 403;
Kennedy _v._ Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503, 519; Harris _v._ Quincy R.
Co., 172 Mo. App. 261; McDonald _v._ Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App.
432; Woodman _v._ Prescott, 65 N. H. 224; Heyne _v._ Blair, 62 N. Y.
19; Miller _v._ Milligan, 48 Barb. 30; Linitzky _v._ Gorman, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 313; Dietz _v._ Langfitt, 63 Pa. St. 234; Emerson _v._ Cochran,
111 Pa. St. 619; Bartlett _v._ Brown, 6 R. I. 37; Welch _v._ Boston R.
Corp., 14 R. I. 609; Stoddard _v._ Roland, 31 S. C. 342; Kelton _v._
Bevins, Cooke, (Tenn.) 90; Evans _v._ Thompson, 12 Heisk. 534; Johnson
_v._ State, 32 Tex. Cr. 58; South Bank _v._ Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505;
Waring _v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534; Bailey _v._ Gollehon, 76 W. Va.
322; Reicher _v._ Neacy, 158 Wis. 657 _Accord_.

_Definitions of probable cause_, see Gulsby _v._ Louisville R. Co.,
167 Ala. 122; Hanchey _v._ Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Runo _v._ Williams,
162 Cal, 444; Redgate _v._ Southern R. Co., 24 Cal. App. 573; Mark
_v._ Rich, 43 App. D. C. 182; Pianco _v._ Joseph, 188 Ill. App. 555;
Schwartz _v._ Boswell, 156 Ky. 103; Indianapolis Traction Co. _v._
Henby, 178 Ind. 239; Banken _v._ Locke, 136 La. 155; Chapman _v._
Nash, 121 Md. 608; Gilecki _v._ Dolemba, 189 Mich. 107; Cox _v._
Lauritsen, 126 Minn. 128; Lammers _v._ Mason, 123 Minn. 204; Wilkerson
_v._ McGhee, 163 Mo. App. 356, 153 Mo. App. 343; Humphries _v._
Edwards, 164 N. C. 154; Cole _v._ Reece, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 212; Waring
_v._ Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534; Bailey _v._ Gollehon, 76 W. Va. 322.

Footnote 384:

Only the opinion of the court is given.

Footnote 385:

_Conviction reversed._—It is generally agreed that a conviction of the
defendant in the criminal proceeding, although subsequently reversed,
negatives the absence of probable cause, unless it is also made to
appear that the conviction was procured by the fraud of the instigator
of the criminal proceeding. Accordingly, a declaration alleging the
conviction and its reversal, but not alleging any such fraud, is bad
on demurrer. Reynolds _v._ Kennedy, 1 Wils. 232; Crescent Co. _v._
Butcher’s Co., 120 U. S. 141; Knight _v._ Internat. R. Co., 61 Fed.
87; Blackman _v._ West Co., 126 Fed. 252; Casey _v._ Dorr, 94 Ark.
433; Carpenter _v._ Sibley, 153 Cal. 215; Goodrich _v._ Warner, 21
Conn. 432 (_semble_); McElroy _v._ Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290;
Dahlberg _v._ Grace, 178 Ill. App. 97; Adams _v._ Bicknell, 126 Ind.
210; Moffatt _v._ Fisher, 47 Ia. 473; Bowman _v._ Brown, 52 Ia. 437;
Olson _v._ Neal, 63 Ia. 214; Barber _v._ Scott, 92 Ia. 52; White _v._
International Text Book Co., 156 Ia. 210; Ross _v._ Hixon, 46 Kan.
550, 555; Spring _v._ Besore, 12 B. Mon. 551; Kaye _v._ Kean, 18 B.
Mon. 839; Duerr _v._ Ky. Co., 132 Ky. 228; Witham _v._ Gowen, 14 Me.
362; Payson _v._ Caswell, 22 Me. 212; Sidelinger _v._ Trowbridge, 113
Me. 537; Whitney _v._ Peckham, 15 Mass. 243; Dennehey _v._ Woodsum,
100 Mass. 195, 197; Phillips _v._ Kalamazoo, 53 Mich. 33 (see Spalding
_v._ Lowe, 56 Mich. 366); Boogher _v._ Hough, 99 Mo. 183; Nehr _v._
Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863; Burt _v._ Place, 4 Wend. 591; Palmer _v._ Avery,
41 Barb. 290; Francisco _v._ Schmeelk, 156 App. Div. 335; Root _v._
Rose, 6 N. D. 575; Thienes _v._ Francis, 69 Or. 165; Herman _v._
Brookerhoff, 8 Watts, 240 (_semble_); Welch _v._ Boston R. Co., 14 R.
I. 609; Hull _v._ Sprague, 23 R. I. 188; Memphis Co. _v._ Williamson,
9 Heisk. 314; Saunders _v._ Baldwin, 112 Va. 431; Topolewski _v._
Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52. Compare Carpenter _v._ Hood, 172
Mich. 533; Platt _v._ Bonsall, 136 App. Div. 397.

As to fraudulently procured plea of guilty, see Johnson _v._ Girdwood,
7 Misc. 651; Holtman _v._ Bullock, 142 Ky. 335.