Chapter LXXIX: Section 3: of this statute is as follows (7)

See note (4) to Skinner _v._ Gunton, 1 Wms. Saund. 230.—Reporter’s
note.

Footnote 572:

Only the opinion of Coleridge, J., on this point is given. It is now
generally admitted that this learned judge, although wrong on this
point, was right in maintaining that the actress was not a servant.

Footnote 573:

William Hankford, Justice of the Common Pleas in 1398, afterwards, in
1414 (1 H. 5), Chief Justice of England.—Reporter’s note.

Footnote 574:

Cattle _v._ Stockton Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 453, 458 (_semble_); Angle
_v._ Chicago R. Co., 151 U. S. 1; Bitterman _v._ Louisville R. Co.,
207 U. S. 205, 222–23; Dr. Miles Medical Co. _v._ Park & Sons Co., 220
U. S. 373, 394 (_semble_); Heaton Co. _v._ Dick, 55 Fed. 23, 52 Fed.
667; Heath _v._ American Book Co., 97 Fed. 533; Tubular Co. _v._
Exeter Co., 159 Fed. 824; Motley _v._ Detroit Co., 161 Fed. 389;
Chipley _v._ Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; Doremus _v._ Hennessy, 176 Ill.
608; Heywood _v._ Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 236 (_semble_); Knickerbocker
Ice Co. _v._ Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556; Walker _v._ Cronin, 107
Mass. 555; Beekman _v._ Marsters, 195 Mass. 205; Joyce _v._ Great
Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 225; Mealey _v._ Bemidji Lumber Co., 118
Minn. 427; Lally _v._ Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. 524; Van Horn _v._ Van
Horn, 52 N. J. Law, 284; Haskins _v._ Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Jones
_v._ Stanly, 76 N. C. 355; Flaccus _v._ Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128; Delz
_v._ Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405; Raymond _v._ Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443;
Brown Co. _v._ Indiana Stove Works, 96 Tex. 453; Duffies _v._ Duffies,
76 Wis. 374, 377 (_semble_); Martens _v._ Reilly, 109 Wis. 464; Hewitt
_v._ Ontario Co., 44 Up. Can. Q. B. 287 _Accord_.

Boyson _v._ Thorn, 98 Cal. 578; Barron _v._ Collins, 49 Ga. 580
(_semble_); Chambers _v._ Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121; Bourlier _v._ Macauley,
91 Ky. 135; Kline _v._ Eubanks, 109 La. 241 (_semble_); Ashley _v._
Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430; De Jong _v._ Behrman, 148 App. Div. 37; Laskey
Feature Play Co. _v._ Fox, 93 Misc. 364; Swain _v._ Johnson, 151 N. C.
93; Sleeper _v._ Baker, 22 N. D. 386 _Contra_.

It was decided before the case of Lumley _v._ Gye that an action for
slander of title was maintainable where the only special damage laid
was the breach by a third person of his contract with the plaintiff.
Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. But see, _contra_, Kendall _v._
Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Brentman _v._ Note, 3 N. Y. Sup. 420 (N. Y. City
Court).

So an action would doubtless lie for defamatory words, not actionable
_per se_, which induced a third person to break his contract to marry
the plaintiff. But compare Davis _v._ Condit, 124 Minn. 365 (seduction
of plaintiff’s fiancée).

As to justification, see Leonard _v._ Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383.

On the general subject, see also Sweeney _v._ Smith, 167 Fed. 385;
Mahoney _v._ Roberts, 86 Ark. 130; Citizens’ Light, &c. Co. _v._
Montgomery Light, &c. Co., 171 Fed. 553, 560, 561; McGurk _v._
Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457; Globe Ins. Co. _v._ Fireman’s Ins. Co., 97
Miss. 148; Biggers _v._ Matthews, 147 N. C. 299; Thacker Coal Co. _v._
Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; Huffcutt, Interference with Contracts and
Business in New York, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 423.

Footnote 575:

The statement of facts and the dissenting opinion of Lord Coleridge,
C. J., are omitted.

Footnote 576:

“That this was a wrongful interference on the part of the Omaha
Company, and that it resulted directly in loss to the contractor and
to the Portage Company, is apparent. It is not an answer to say that
there was no certainty that the contractor would have completed his
contract, and so earned these lands for the Portage Company. If such a
defence were tolerated, it would always be an answer in case of any
wrongful interference with the performance of a contract, for there is
always that lack of certainty. It is enough that there should be, as
there was here, a reasonable assurance, considering all the
surroundings, that the contract would be performed in the manner and
within the time stipulated, and so performed as to secure the land to
the company.

“It certainly does not lie in the mouth of a wrong-doer, in the face
of such probabilities as attend this case, to say that perhaps the
contract would not have been completed even if no interference had
been had, and that, therefore, there being no certainty of the loss,
there is no liability.” Brewer, J., in Angle _v._ Chicago R. Co., 151
U. S. 1, 12.

Footnote 577:

Statement abridged. Arguments omitted; also part of opinions.

Footnote 578:

As to the distinction between intent and motive, see Smith, Crucial
Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 253, 256–259.

Footnote 579:

Compare Tunstall _v._ Sterns Coal Co., (C. C. A.) 192 Fed. 808.