Chapter LXVIII: Section 2901: of the Georgia Civil Code is as follows (1)

“Due care in a child of tender years is such care as its capacity,
mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual
circumstances of the occasion and situation under investigation.”

In Harrington _v._ Mayor, 125 Ga. 58, 60, Lumpkin, J., said: “The
average child of its own age is not the standard by which to measure
its legal diligence with exactness. ‘Such care as the capacity of the
particular child enables it to use naturally and reasonably, is what
the law requires.’” Compare Bleckley, C. J., in Western & Atlantic R.
Co. _v._ Young, 81 Ga. 397, 416, 417.

Footnote 89:

The liability of an infant for his torts is universally recognized.

_Trespass._ Y. B. 35 Hen. VI. f. 11, pl. 18; Burnard _v._ Haggis, 14
C. B. N. S. 45; Neal _v._ Gillett, 23 Conn. 437; Wilson _v._ Garrard,
59 Ill. 51; Peterson _v._ Haffner, 59 Ind. 130; Scott _v._ Watson, 46
Me. 362; Marshall _v._ Wing, 50 Me. 62; Sikes _v._ Johnson, 16 Mass.
389; School District _v._ Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507; Campbell _v._ Stakes,
2 Wend. 137; Hartfield _v._ Roper, 21 Wend. 615, 620; Tifft _v._
Tifft, 4 Denio, 175; Conklin _v._ Thompson, 29 Barb. 218; Huchting
_v._ Engel, 17 Wis. 230; Vosburg _v._ Putney, 80 Wis. 523; Vosburg
_v._ Putney, 86 Wis. 278.

_Conversion._ Mills _v._ Graham, 1 B. & P. N. R. 140; Bristow _v._
Clark, 1 Esp. 171; Vasse _v._ Smith, 6 Cranch, 226; Oliver _v._
McClellan, 21 Ala. 675; Ashlock _v._ Vivell, 29 Ill. App. 388; Lewis
_v._ Littlefield, 15 Me. 233; Caswell _v._ Parker, 96 Me. 39
(_semble_); Homer _v._ Thwing, 3 Pick. 492; Walker _v._ Davis, 1 Gray,
506; Wheeler Co. _v._ Jacobs, 2 Misc. 236; Green _v._ Sperry, 16 Vt.
390; Baxter _v._ Bush, 29 Vt. 465.

_Deceit._ Fitts _v._ Hall, 9 N. H. 441; Word _v._ Vance, 1 N. & McC.
197.

_Defamation._ Hodsman _v._ Grissell, Noy, 129; Drane _v._ Pawley, 8
Ky. Law Rep. 530; Fears _v._ Riley, 148 Mo. 49.

_Negligence._ Jennings _v._ Rundall, 8 T. R. 335; Dixon _v._ Bell, 1
Stark. 287; Marsh _v._ Loader, 14 C. B. N. S. 535; Latt _v._ Booth, 3
Car. & K. 292; Humphrey _v._ Douglass, 10 Vt. 71 _Accord_.

In Scott _v._ Watson, _supra_, Appleton, J., said: “Nor is his infancy
any defence, for infants are liable for torts.... The parent is not
answerable for the torts of his minor child, committed in his absence
and without his authority or approval, but the minor is answerable
therefor. Tifft _v._ Tifft, 4 Denio, 177. The minor is not exempt from
liability, though the trespass was committed by the express command of
the father. Humphrey _v._ Douglass, 10 Vt. 71.

“Nor can the defendant derive any support from the scriptural
injunction to children of obedience to their parents, invoked in
defence. No such construction can be given to the command, ‘Children,
obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right,’ as to sanction or
justify the trespass of the son upon the land of another, and the
asportation of his crops, even though done by the express commands of
his father. The defence is as unsound in its theology as it is
baseless in its law.” [Smith _v._ Kron, 96 N. C. 392, 397; O’Leary
_v._ Brooks, 7 N. D. 554; Humphrey _v._ Douglass, 10 Vt. 71; Huchting
_v._ Engel, 17 Wis. 230 _Accord_.]

May, J., dissented, saying: “I am not quite satisfied with either the
law or the theology of the opinion in this case. That sins of
ignorance may be winked at, is both a dictate of reason and of
Scripture. It is true, as a general rule, that infants who have
arrived at the age of discretion are liable for their tortious acts.
But, for the protection of infants, ought not the rule to be limited
to cases where the infant acts under such circumstances that _he must
know or be presumed to know_ that the acts which he commits are
unauthorized and wrong, when it appears that in the commission of the
acts he was under the control and direction of his father? Will not an
opposite doctrine tend to encourage disobedience in the child, and
thus be subversive of the best interests of the community? Will it not
also tend to subject him to embarrassment and insolvency when he shall
arrive at full age? If all the members of a family under age are to be
held liable in trespass or trover for the food which they eat, when
that food is in fact the property of another, but, being set before
them, they partake of it, in ignorance of such fact, by the command or
direction of the parent, and under the belief that it is his, will not
such a doctrine be in conflict with the principle that the common law
is intended as a shield and protection against the improvidence of
infancy? While the decided cases upon this subject seem to be limited
to cases of contract, is there not the same reason for extending it,
and applying it to cases like the one before us? In all the cases
which I have examined in which infants have been held liable, the
proof shows acts of positive wrong committed under circumstances where
the infant must have known the nature and character of his acts. If
the doctrines of the opinion are to prevail in a case like this, then
the common law is but the revival of the old doctrine that the
parents, by eating sour grapes, have set the children’s teeth on edge.
The rule that a servant who acts in ignorance of the rights of his
principal is to be held liable for his acts, does not fall within the
principles for which I contend.”

Footnote 90:

Welch _v._ Durand, 36 Conn. 182; Flinn _v._ State, 24 Ind. 286;
Peterson _v._ Haffner, 59 Ind. 130; Mercer _v._ Corbin, 117 Ind. 450;
Commonwealth _v._ Lister, 15 Phila. 405; Vosburg _v._ Putney, 80 Wis.
523; Vosburg _v._ Putney, 86 Wis. 278 _Accord_.

Footnote 91:

The topics dealt with in this section do not concern the substantive
law of tort. They fall rather under the heads of procedure and
evidence. But, without some knowledge of these particular subjects, it
is difficult to understand the ground of decision in some of the cases
on the general subject of negligence.

Footnote 92:

Statement, arguments, and parts of opinions omitted.

Footnote 93:

This decision and Bridges _v._ North London R. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 213,
put an end in England to a conflict of authority as to the power of
the judge to withdraw the case from the jury where there was an
“invitation to alight” or “slamming the door” of a compartment car.
See the cases cited in 21 Halsbury, Laws of England, 445.

A like question, much discussed in the United States, is: A man,
without looking or listening, attempts to cross the track of a steam
railway, and is hit by a negligently managed engine. Should the judge
rule that crossing without looking and listening (or crossing without
stopping, looking, and listening) is, as matter of law, negligent
conduct? Or should the judge tell the jury that such conduct is
evidence from which negligence _may be_ inferred, and that it is for
them to say whether they _do_ infer it? As to this, there is a
conflict of authority. See discussion and collected cases in 3 Elliott
on Railroads (1st ed.) § 1167; 2 Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of
Negligence, Chap. 52, Article 2, §§ 1637–1661, especially §§ 1640,
1649, 1650, 1653; 33 Cyc. 1116 ff.; Beach on Contributory Negligence
(3d ed.) §§ 181, 182.

Other like questions arise in case of alighting from a moving car:
Puget Sound R. Co. _v._ Felt, 181 Fed. 938; Birmingham R. Co. _v._
Girod, 164 Ala. 10; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Plott, 108 Ark. 292; Carr
_v._ Eel River R. Co., 98 Cal. 366; Coursey _v._ Southern R. Co., 113
Ga. 297; Ardison _v._ Illinois R. Co., 249 Ill. 300; Louisville R. Co.
_v._ Crunk, 119 Ind. 542; Walters _v._ Missouri R. Co., 82 Kan. 739;
Hayden _v._ Chicago R. Co., 160 Ky. 836; Cumberland R. Co. _v._
Maugans, 61 Md. 53; Street _v._ Chicago R. Co., 124 Minn. 517; Johnson
_v._ St. Joseph R. Co., 143 Mo. App. 376; Willis _v._ Metropolitan R.
Co., 63 App. Div. 332; Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Lyons, 129 Pa. St.
113; Kearney _v._ Seaboard R. Co., 158 N. C. 521; San Antonio Traction
Co. _v._ Badgett, (Tex. Civ. App.) 158 S. W. 803; Gaines _v._ Ogden R.
Co., 44 Utah, 512; Breeden _v._ Seattle R. Co., 60 Wash. 522.

Boarding moving car: Central R. Co. _v._ Hingson, 186 Ala. 40; South
Chicago R. Co. _v._ Dufresne, 200 Ill. 456; Chicago Traction Co. _v._
Lundahl, 215 Ill. 289; Pence _v._ Wabash R. Co., 116 Ia. 279; Jonas
_v._ South Covington R. Co., 162 Ky. 171; Mabry _v._ Boston R. Co.,
214 Mass. 463; Foley _v._ Detroit R. Co., 179 Mich. 586; Hull _v._
Minneapolis R. Co., 116 Minn. 349; Nolan _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 250
Mo. 602.

Standing on platform or running board: Texas R. Co. _v._ Lacey, 185
Fed. 225; Central R. Co. _v._ Brown, 165 Ala. 493; Holloway _v._
Pasadena R. Co., 130 Cal. 177; Augusta R. Co. _v._ Snider, 118 Ga.
146; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Newell, 212 Ill. 332; Math _v._ Chicago R.
Co., 243 Ill. 114; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Stillwell, 142 Ky. 330;
Blair _v._ Lewiston R. Co., 110 Me. 235; Olund _v._ Worcester R. Co.,
206 Mass. 544; Heshion _v._ Boston R. Co., 208 Mass. 117; Wheeler _v._
Boston R. Co., 220 Mass. 298; Lacey _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 118 Minn.
301; Setzler _v._ Metropolitan R. Co., 227 Mo. 454; Trussell _v._
Traction Co., 79 N. J. Law, 533; Ward _v._ International R. Co., 206
N. Y. 83; Edwards _v._ New Jersey R. Co., 144 App. Div. 554;
Germantown R. Co. _v._ Walling, 97 Pa. St. 55; Brice _v._ Southern R.
Co., 85 S. C. 216.

Part of body protruding from car: Georgetown R. Co. _v._ Smith, 25
App. D. C. 259; Clerc _v._ Morgan’s R. Co., 107 La. 370; Lange _v._
Metropolitan R. Co., 151 Mo. App. 500; Kuttner _v._ Central R. Co., 80
N. J. Law, 11; Goller _v._ Fonda R. Co., 110 App. Div. 620.

Footnote 94:

But see L. R. 6 Q. B. 760–761.

Footnote 95:

Arguments omitted; also the concurring opinion of Lush, J., and the
dissenting opinion of Hannen, J.

Footnote 96:

Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 6 Q. B. 759.

Byrne _v._ Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722; Scott _v._ London Docks Co., 3 H. &
C. 596; Skinner _v._ London R. Co., 5 Ex. 787; The Joseph D. Thomas,
81 Fed. 578; Hastorf _v._ Hudson River Co., 110 Fed. 669; Cincinnati
R. Co. _v._ South Fork Coal Co., 139 Fed. 528; Kahn _v._ Cap Co., 139
Cal. 340; Armour _v._ Golkowska, 202 Ill. 144; Talge _v._ Hockett, 55
Ind. App. 303; Nicoll _v._ Sweet, 163 Ia. 683; Melvin _v._
Pennsylvania Steel Co., 180 Mass. 196; Hull _v._ Berkshire R. Co., 217
Mass. 361; Cleary _v._ Cavanaugh, 219 Mass. 281; Scharff _v._ Southern
Construction Co., 115 Mo. App. 157; Pratt _v._ Missouri R. Co., 139
Mo. App. 502; Mullen _v._ St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; Wolf _v._ American
Society, 164 N. Y. 30; Griffen _v._ Manice, 166 N. Y. 188; Kennedy
_v._ McAllaster, 31 App. Div. 453; Scheider _v._ American Bridge Co.,
78 App. Div. 163; Travers _v._ Murray, 87 App. Div. 552; Connor _v._
Koch, 89 App. Div. 33; Larkin _v._ Reid Co., 161 App. Div. 77;
Papazian _v._ Baumgartner, 49 Misc. 244; Barnes _v._ Automobile Co.,
32 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 233; Muskogee Traction Co. _v._ McIntire, 37 Okl.
684; Edwards _v._ Manufacturers’ Co., 27 R. I. 248; Patterson _v._
Brewing Co., 16 S. D. 33; Richmond R. Co. _v._ Hudgins, 100 Va. 409;
Gibson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 61 Wash. 639; Carroll _v._ Chicago R. Co.,
99 Wis. 399; Klitzke _v._ Webb, 120 Wis. 254; Schmidt _v._ Johnson
Co., 145 Wis. 49; Snyder _v._ Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661
_Accord_.

Where the declaration alleges negligence and sets forth the nature and
particulars of the accident but not the particulars of the alleged
negligence, plaintiff may rely upon this doctrine, if the accident is
of such a kind as to indicate that it would not have happened without
negligence on the part of the defendant. James _v._ Boston R. Co., 204
Mass. 158.

The doctrine applies only in the absence of explanation. Cook _v._
Newhall, 213 Mass. 392. The inference may be met by defendant’s
showing the real cause of the accident. Nawrocki _v._ Chicago R. Co.,
156 Ill. App. 563; Parsons _v._ Hecla Iron Works, 186 Mass. 221; Cohen
_v._ Farmers’ Co., 70 Misc. 548; Stearns _v._ Spinning Co., 184 Pa.
St. 519; Scarpelli _v._ Washington Power Co., 63 Wash. 18. By
plaintiff showing by his own witnesses just how the accident happened.
Buckland _v._ New York R. Co., 181 Mass. 3. Or by defendant’s showing
that reasonable care was employed to prevent all probable sources of
accident. Thompson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 243 Mo. 336, 355; Sweeney
_v._ Edison Co., 158 App. Div. 449.

“There are many cases that hold that an unexplained accident with a
machine, not liable to occur if such machine was properly constructed
and in a proper state of repair, is evidence of negligence; as in
Spaulding _v._ C. & N. W. R. Co., 30 Wis. 110, where it was held that
the escape of fire from a passing locomotive engine, sufficient to
cause damage, raised a presumption of improper construction or
insufficient repair or negligent handling of such engine. To the same
effect are Cummings _v._ Nat. Furnace Co., 60 Wis. 603; Kurz &
Huttenlocher Ice Co. _v._ M. & N. R. Co., 84 Wis. 171; Stacy _v._ M.,
L. S. & W. R. Co., 85 Wis. 225; Mullen _v._ St. John, 57 N. Y. 567;
Volkmar _v._ Manhattan R. Co., 134 N. Y. 418; McCarragher _v._ Rogers,
120 N. Y. 526, and many others that might be cited. Such cases lay
down a very well-recognized principle in the law of negligence, but do
not ... conflict in the slightest degree with numerous authorities
that go on another principle, just as well-recognized and firmly
established, to the effect that undisputed proof of freedom of the
machine from all discoverable defects, either in construction or
repair, effectually overcomes any mere inference or presumption
arising from the happening of the accident, so as to leave no question
in that regard for the jury; as in Spaulding _v._ C. & N. W. R. Co.,
33 Wis. 582, where this court held the inference that a locomotive
engine was defective, arising merely from the escape of fire therefrom
sufficient to cause damage, rebutted by conclusive proof that the
engine was free from discoverable defects, so as to leave nothing on
that point for the consideration of a jury.” Marshall, J., Vorbrich
_v._ Geuder Co., 96 Wis. 277, 284. See Green _v._ Urban Constructing
Co., 106 App. Div. 460 _Accord_.

Footnote 97:

The arguments of counsel and a part of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 98:

There is a conflict of authority upon the question whether the maxim
_res ipsa loquitur_ is applicable in an action by a servant against a
master. See cases collected in an elaborate note, 6 Lawyers’ Reports,
Annotated, New Series, 337–363. See also 2 Labatt on Master & Servant,
§§ 833, 834, 835; especially authorities cited in § 834, note 8.

Footnote 99:

“There was much discussion by counsel of the doctrine of _res ipsa
loquitur_ and its relevancy to the facts of this case. The thing
speaks for itself, is a principle applied by the law where under the
circumstances shown the accident presumably would not have occurred in
the use of a machine if due care had been exercised, or, in the case
of an elevator, when in its normal operation after due inspection. The
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement that the party who
alleges negligence must prove the fact, but relates only to the mode
of proving it. The fact of the accident furnishes merely some evidence
to go to the jury, which requires the defendant ‘to go forward with
his proof.’ The rule of _res ipsa loquitur_ does not relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of showing negligence, nor does it raise any
presumption in his favor. Whether the defendant introduces evidence or
not, the plaintiff in this case will not be entitled to a verdict
unless he satisfies the jury by the preponderance of the evidence that
his injuries were caused by a defect in the elevator attributable to
the defendant’s negligence. The law attaches no special weight, as
proof, to the fact of an accident, but simply holds it to be
sufficient for the consideration of the jury even in the absence of
any additional evidence. Womble _v._ Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474; 2
Labatt on Master & Servant, § 834; 4 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2509. In
all other respects, the parties stand before the jury just as if there
was no such rule. The judge should carefully instruct the jury as to
the application of the principle, so that they will not give to the
fact of the accident any greater artificial weight than the law
imparts to it. Wigmore, in the section just cited, says the following
considerations ought to limit the doctrine of _res ipsa loquitur_: 1.
The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious
operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction,
inspection, or user; 2. Both inspection and user must have been, at
the time of the injury, in the control of the party charged; 3. The
injurious occurrence must have happened irrespective of any voluntary
action at the time by the party injured. He says further that the
doctrine is to some extent founded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause of the injury, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to the party charged and perhaps
inaccessible to the party injured. What are the general limits of the
doctrine and what is the true reason for its adoption, we will not now
undertake to decide. It is established in the law as a rule for our
guidance and must be enforced whenever applicable, and to the extent
that it is applicable, to the facts of the particular case.” Walker,
J., in Stewart _v._ Van Deventer Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 60, 65.

The burden of proof is not shifted; merely the burden of going
forward. Sweeney _v._ Erving, 228 U. S. 233; Ferrier _v._ Chicago R.
Co., 185 Ill. App. 326; Bigwood _v._ Boston R. Co., 209 Mass. 345;
Alabama R. Co. _v._ Groome, 97 Miss. 201; Kay _v._ Metropolitan R.
Co., 163 N. Y. 447.

Footnote 100:

The arguments of counsel, concurring opinion of Vaughan-Williams, L.
J., and dissenting opinion of Buckley, L. J., and part of the opinion
of Moulton, L. J., dealing with another point, are omitted.

Footnote 101:

Bonham _v._ Winchester Arms Co., 179 Ill. App. 469; Prestolite Co.
_v._ Skeel, 182 Ind. 593; Rice _v._ Chicago R. Co., 153 Mo. App. 35;
Dalzell _v._ New York R. Co., 136 App. Div. 329 _Accord_.

The nature and circumstances of the accident itself must not only
support an inference of defendant’s negligence but must exclude all
others. Lucid _v._ Powder Co., 199 Fed. 377.

Footnote 102:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 103:

“The maxim _res ipsa loquitur_ is simply a rule of evidence.

The general rule is that negligence is never presumed from the mere
fact of injury, yet the manner of the occurrence of the injury
complained of, or the attendant circumstances, may sometimes well
warrant an inference of negligence. It is sometimes said that it
warrants a presumption of negligence, but the presumption referred to
is not one of law, but of fact. It is, however, more correct and less
confusing to refer to it as an inference, rather than a presumption,
and not an inference which the law draws from the fact, but an
inference which the jury are authorized to draw, and not an inference
which the jury are compelled to draw.” Cobb, J., in Palmer Brick Co.
_v._ Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842. See Sweeney _v._ Erving, 228 U. S.
233, 240; Harlow _v._ Standard Imp. Co., 145 Cal. 477; National
Biscuit Co. _v._ Wilson, 169 Ind. 442; O’Neil _v._ Toomey, 218 Mass.
242; Lincoln _v._ Detroit R. Co., 179 Mich. 189; Boucher _v._ Boston
R. Co., 76 N. H. 91; Ross _v._ Cotton Mills, 140 N. C. 115. But
compare Thompson _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 243 Mo. 336, 353.

Footnote 104:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 105:

59 N. J. Law, 474.

Footnote 106:

Actiesselskabet Ingrid _v._ Central R. Co., 216 Fed. 72; Huneke _v._
West Brighton Amusement Co., 80 App. Div. 268; De Glopper _v._
Nashville R. Co., 123 Tenn. 633 _Accord_.

Footnote 107:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 108:

Carpenter _v._ Walker, 170 Ala. 659; Miller _v._ Fletcher, 142 Ga.
668; Zabron _v._ Cunard Co., 151 Ia. 345; Randolph _v._ Snyder, 139
Ky. 159; Springfield Egg Co. _v._ Springfield Ice Co., 259 Mo. 664;
Hales _v._ Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 239; Robinson _v._ Threadgill, 13
Ired. Law, 39; Hobbs _v._ Smith, 27 Okl. 830 _Accord_.

Footnote 109:

The opinion of Lord Esher, M. R., is omitted.

Footnote 110:

The settled practice allows an action against a carrier either upon
contract or upon tort, as best suits the purposes of the pleader. 3
Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.), § 1325.

Footnote 111:

Sect. 2222. “There must be fixed on the line of said roads, and at the
distance of four hundred yards from the centre of each of such road
crossings, and on each side thereof, a post, and the engineer shall be
required, whenever he shall arrive at either of said posts, to blow
the whistle of the locomotive until it arrives at the public road, and
to simultaneously check and keep checking the speed thereof, so as to
stop in time should any person or thing be crossing said track on said
road.”

Sect. 2224. “If any engineer neglects to blow said whistle as
required, and to check the speed as required, he is guilty of a
misdemeanor....”—Georgia Code of 1895.

Footnote 112:

Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.
Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 113:

But see Mayer _v._ Thompson, 104 Ala. 611; Carter _v._ Atlantic R.
Co., 84 S. C. 456; Lough _v._ Davis, 30 Wash. 204.

Footnote 114:

Stiewel _v._ Borman, 63 Ark. 30; Owens _v._ Nichols, 139 Ga. 475;
Baird _v._ Shipman, 132 Ill. 16; Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. _v._
Jester, 180 Ind. 357; Ward _v._ Pullman Co., 131 Ky. 142; Consolidated
Gas Co. _v._ Connor, 114 Md. 140; Ellis _v._ McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237;
Orcutt _v._ Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424; Hagerty _v._ Montana Ore
Co., 38 Mont. 69; Horner _v._ Lawrence, 37 N. J. Law, 46; Schlosser
_v._ Great Northern R. Co., 20 N. D. 406, 411; Greenberg _v._
Whitcomb, 90 Wis. 225 _Accord_.

Footnote 115:

Northern R. Co. _v._ State, 29 Md. 420; Dyche _v._ Vicksburg R. Co.,
79 Miss. 361; Bresnahan _v._ Lonsdale Co., (R. I. 1900) 51 Atl. 624
_Accord_.

See also Willes, J., in Skelton _v._ London R. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 631,
636; Bailey _v._ Walker, 29 Mo. 407; Thorne _v._ Deas, 4 Johns. 84,
96; Hyde _v._ Moffat, 16 Vt. 271.

Footnote 116:

Allen _v._ Hixson, 111 Ga. 460; Griswold _v._ Boston R. Co., 183 Mass.
434; Stager _v._ Laundry Co., 38 Or. 480, 489; Scholl _v._ Belcher, 63
Or. 310; Ollett _v._ Pennsylvania R. Co., 201 Pa. St. 361; King _v._
Interstate R. Co., 23 R. I. 583; Riley _v._ Gulf R. Co., (Tex. Civ.
App.) 16 S. W. 595 _Accord_. See also Kenney _v._ Hannibal R. Co., 70
Mo. 252.

Whitesides _v._ Southern R. Co., 128 N. C. 229 (divided court)
_contra_. See also Dyche _v._ Vicksburg R. Co., 79 Miss. 361.

Footnote 117:

Ohio R. Co. _v._ Early, 141 Ind. 73; Raasch _v._ Elite Laundry Co., 98
Minn. 357 (_semble_); Salter _v._ Nebraska Telephone Co., 79 Neb. 373
(_semble_) _Accord_. See also Shaw _v._ Milwaukee R. Co., 103 Minn. 8.

It has been held also that such a duty is incidental to the relation
of carrier and passenger. Layne _v._ Chicago R. Co., 175 Mo. App. 35,
41. Compare Kambour _v._ Boston R. Co., 77 N. H. 33; Southern R. Co.
_v._ Sewell, 18 Ga. App. 544.

It has always been regarded as incidental to the employment of seamen.
The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240; U.S. _v._ Knowles, 4 Sawy. 517; Scarff
_v._ Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211.

Footnote 118:

See also Weymire _v._ Wolfe, 52 Ia. 533; Trout _v._ Watkins, 148 Mo.
App. 621. Compare Texas R. Co. _v._ Geraldon, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 71.

On the whole subject, see Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harvard Law Rev.
99, 111–113; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 217, 316; Bruce,
Humanity and the Law, 73 Central Law Journ. 335.

Footnote 119:

A woman’s head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a man, instead of
assisting to quench the fire, looks on and laughs at it. A drunken
man, falling with his face downwards into a puddle, is in danger of
suffocation: lifting his head a little on one side would save him:
another man sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of gunpowder lies
scattered about a room: a man is going into it with a lighted candle:
another, knowing this, lets him go in without warning. Who is there
that in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?—Author’s
Note.

Footnote 120:

This proposed code was not enacted.

Footnote 121:

A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and published
by command of the Governor-General of India in Council; Calcutta,
1837.

Footnote 122:

As to the authorship of these notes, see the preface to the English
edition (1875) of Macaulay’s Works. As to the code itself, see
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 298–323.

Footnote 123:

Statement abridged. Arguments of counsel omitted.

Footnote 124:

Grand Trunk R. Co. _v._ Barnett, [1911] A. C. 361; Louisville R. Co.
_v._ Womack, 173 Fed. 752; Chesapeake R. Co. _v._ Hawkins, 174 Fed.
597; Graysonia Lumber Co. _v._ Carroll, 102 Ark. 460; Chicago Terminal
Co. _v._ Kotoski, 199 Ill. 383; Neice _v._ Chicago R. Co., 254 Ill.
595; Jordan _v._ Grand Rapids R. Co., 162 Ind. 464; Burgess _v._
Atchison R. Co., 83 Kan. 497; Lando _v._ Chicago R. Co., 81 Minn. 279;
Ingram-Day Lumber Co. _v._ Harvey, 98 Miss. 11; Koegel _v._ Missouri
R. Co., 181 Mo. 379; Hoberg _v._ Collins, 80 N. J. Law, 425; Gulf R.
Co. _v._ Dees, 44 Okl. 118; Woodward _v._ Southern R. Co., 90 S. C.
262; Norfolk R. Co. _v._ Wood, 99 Va. 156; Huff _v._ Chesapeake R.
Co., 48 W. Va. 45 _Accord_.

So in case of persons wrongfully upon engines, cars, or trains.
Chicago R. Co. _v._ McDonough, 112 Ill. App. 315; Handley _v._
Missouri R. Co., 61 Kan. 237; Planz _v._ Boston R. Co., 157 Mass. 377;
Bjornquist _v._ Boston R. Co., 185 Mass. 130; Feeback _v._ Missouri R.
Co., 167 Mo. 206; Wickenburg _v._ Minneapolis R. Co., 94 Minn. 276
(boy of twelve); Johnson _v._ New York R. Co., 173 N. Y. 79; Morgan
_v._ Oregon R. Co., 27 Utah, 92. But see Johnson _v._ Chicago R. Co.,
123 Ia. 224; Pierce _v._ North Carolina R. Co., 124 N. C. 83. As to
who is a trespasser in such a place, see Yancey _v._ Boston R. Co.,
205 Mass. 162.

“A railway company may lawfully require a wilful trespasser upon one
of its moving trains to immediately cease his unlawful conduct, by
such means as not to indicate a willingness to deprive him of his
self-control in leaving the train, the speed of the train not being so
great that a personal injury to him should be expected to occur,
giving due consideration to the duty of the trespasser to cease his
lawlessness by all reasonable means in his power and reasonable
expectation that he will use such means in attempting to do it. It is
not sufficient to indicate an intentional injury that the party
causing it had reasonable ground to expect that such a result was
within reasonable probabilities, otherwise a violation of the duty to
exercise ordinary care would, of itself, be sufficient to indicate
such injury. The danger of inflicting a personal injury upon a person
by the conduct of another must be such as to reasonably permit of a
belief that such other either contemplated producing it, or, being
conscious of the danger that it would occur, imposed such danger upon
that person in utter disregard of the consequences, to warrant saying,
reasonably, that the circumstances indicate willingness to perpetrate
such injury.” Marshall, J., in Bolin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 108 Wis.
333, 351–352. See also Hoberg _v._ Collins, 80 N. J. Law, 425, 429.
But compare Palmer _v._ Gordon, 173 Mass. 410; Romana _v._ Boston R.
Co., 226 Mass. 533.

Footnote 125:

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

Footnote 126:

Rome Furnace Co. _v._ Patterson, 120 Ga. 521; Fields _v._ Louisville
R. Co., 163 Ky. 673 _Accord_. See also Hector Min. Co. _v._ Robertson,
22 Col. 491; Hobbs _v._ Blanchard, 74 N. H. 116; Stuck _v._ Kanawha R.
Co., 76 W. Va. 453; Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 Harvard Law
Rev. 403.

As to duty to observed child trespasser, see Little Rock R. Co. _v._
Barker, 39 Ark. 491, 500; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Lohges, 6 Ind. App.
288; Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Welch, 114 Md. 536. To observed helpless
trespasser, see Tanner _v._ Louisville R. Co., 60 Ala. 621; Pannell
_v._ Nashville R. Co., 97 Ala. 298; Martin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 194
Ill. 138; Krenzer _v._ Pittsburgh R. Co., 151 Ind. 587; Glenn _v._
Louisville R. Co., 28 Ky. Law Rep. 949. To trespasser observed in a
dangerous position, see Haley _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 113 Ala. 640;
Atkinson _v._ Kelley, 8 Ala. App. 571; St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Townsend,
69 Ark. 380, 383; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Kotoski, 199 Ill. 383;
Richardson _v._ Missouri R. Co., 90 Kan. 292; Whitehead _v._ St. Louis
R. Co., 99 Mo. 263; Mathews _v._ Chicago R. Co., 63 Mo. App. 569;
Omaha R. Co. _v._ Cook, 42 Neb. 577.

Footnote 127:

Statement rewritten; part of case omitted; argument omitted.

Footnote 128:

The above portions of the instructions are set out in the argument of
counsel, pp. 235–237.

Footnote 129:

Schmidt _v._ Michigan Coal Co., 159 Mich. 308; Myers _v._ Boston R.
Co., 72 N. H. 175; Carney _v._ Concord St. R. Co., 72 N. H. 364; Brown
_v._ Boston R. Co., 73 N. H. 568; Magar _v._ Hammond, 171 N. Y. 377;
O’Leary _v._ Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. D. 568 _Accord_. See also
Houston R. Co. _v._ Garrett, (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 111.

As to the effect of a statute prohibiting the particular trespass, see
Marra _v._ New York R. Co., 139 App. Div. 707.

As to when a horse is trespassing, see Taft _v._ New York R. Co., 157
Mass. 297.

Footnote 130:

The statement and part of the opinion are omitted.

Footnote 131:

That in general there is no duty to look out for trespassers on the
track or right of way, see also Cleveland R. Co. _v._ Tartt, 99 Fed.
369; Louisville R. Co. _v._ Jones, 191 Ala. 484; Goudreau _v._
Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 406; Atlantic R. Co. _v._ McDonald, 135 Ga.
635; Curd _v._ Cincinnati R. Co., 163 Ky. 104; Baltimore R. Co. _v._
State, 114 Md. 536; Petur _v._ Erie R. Co., 151 App. Div. 578; Carter
_v._ Erie R. Co., 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 377; Laeve _v._ Missouri R.
Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 1129.

Jeffries _v._ Seaboard R. Co., 129 N. C. 236 _contra_. See also Ark.
Kirby’s Dig. § 6607; Tenn. Shannon’s Code, § 1574(4).

As to duty of trainmen in a place where there is a known likelihood of
trespassers, see Southern R. Co. _v._ Donovan, 84 Ala. 141; Bullard
_v._ Southern R. Co., 116 Ga. 644; Cincinnati R. Co. _v._ Blankenship,
157 Ky. 699; Risbridger _v._ Michigan R. Co., 188 Mich. 672; Fearons
_v._ Kansas City R. Co., 180 Mo. 208; Eppstein _v._ Missouri R. Co.,
197 Mo. 720; Krummack _v._ Missouri R. Co., 98 Neb. 773; St. Louis R.
Co. _v._ Hodge, (Okl.) 157 Pac. 60; Whelan _v._ Baltimore R. Co., 70
W. Va. 442; Whalen _v._ Chicago R. Co., 75 Wis. 654. _Contra_:
Baltimore R. Co. _v._ Welch, 114 Md. 536; Boden _v._ Boston R. Co.,
205 Mass. 504; Haltiwanger _v._ Columbia R. Co., 64 S. C. 7. Compare
Lowery _v._ Walker, [1911] A. C. 10.

The trainmen may assume that an adult trespasser, not in obvious
peril, will look out for himself. Indianapolis R. Co. _v._ McClaren,
62 Ind. 566; Campbell _v._ Kansas City R. Co., 55 Kan. 536; St. Louis
R. Co. _v._ Herrin, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 718. As to a child, see
Pennsylvania R. Co. _v._ Morgan, 82 Pa. St. 134.

Footnote 132:

“The duty must be one owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs in
respect to the very matter or act charged as negligence.”—PARSONS, C.
J., in Pittsfield C. M. Co. _v._ Pittsfield Shoe Co., 71 N. H. 522,
531.

Footnote 133:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 134:

Hardcastle _v._ South Yorkshire R. Co., 4 H. & N. 67; Ponting _v._
Noakes, [1894] 2 Q. B. 281; Scoggin _v._ Atlantic Cement Co., 179 Ala.
213; Gordon _v._ Roberts, 162 Cal. 506; Whitney _v._ New York R. Co.,
87 Conn. 623; Garner _v._ Town, 7 Ga. App. 630; McDermott _v._ Burke,
256 Ill. 401; Northwestern El. Co. _v._ O’Malley, 107 Ill. App. 599;
Knapp _v._ Doll, 180 Ind. 526; St. Joseph I. Co. _v._ Bertch, 33 Ind.
App. 491; Upp _v._ Darner, 150 Ia. 403; Bransom _v._ Labrot, 81 Ky.
638; Mallock _v._ Derby, 190 Mass. 208; Flanagan _v._ Sanders, 138
Mich. 253; Dahl _v._ Valley Dredging Co., 125 Minn. 90; Schmidt _v._
Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284; Henry _v._ Disbrow M. Co., 144 Mo. App.
350; Butler _v._ Chicago R. Co., 155 Mo. App. 287; Burrill _v._
Alexander, 75 N. H. 554; Kleinberg _v._ Schween, 134 App. Div. 493;
Riggle _v._ Lens, 71 Or. 125; Clapp _v._ La Grill, 103 Tenn. 164;
Stamford Oil Co. _v._ Barnes, 103 Tex. 409; Denison Light Co. _v._
Patton, 105 Tex. 621; Lunsford _v._ Colonial Coal Co., 115 Va. 346;
Anderson _v._ Northern R. Co., 19 Wash. 340; West _v._ Shaw, 61 Wash.
227.

As to setting traps for trespassers, see Bird _v._ Holbrook, 4 Bing.
628; Hooker _v._ Miller, 37 Ia. 613. Compare Marble _v._ Ross, 124
Mass. 44; Loomis _v._ Terry, 17 Wend. 497; Sherfey _v._ Bartley, 4
Sneed, 58.

Footnote 135:

Latham _v._ Johnson, [1913] 1 K. B. 398; Cleveland R. Co. _v._
Ballentine, 84 Fed. 935; Riedel _v._ West Jersey Co., 177 Fed. 374;
Pastorello _v._ Stone, 89 Conn. 286; Norman _v._ Bartholomew, 104 Ill.
App. 667; Nelson _v._ Burnham Co., 114 Me. 213; Peninsular Trust Co.
_v._ City, 131 Mich. 571; Houck _v._ Chicago R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 559;
Hughes _v._ Boston R. Co., 71 N. H. 279; Leithold _v._ Philadelphia R.
Co., 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 137; Dobbins _v._ Missouri R. Co., 91 Tex. 60;
Bottum _v._ Hawks, 84 Vt. 370; Curtis _v._ Stone Quarries, 37 Wash.
355; Uthermohler _v._ Mining Co., 50 W. Va. 457; Ritz _v._ City, 45 W.
Va. 262 Accord. Compare Walsh _v._ Pittsburg R. Co., 221 Pa. St. 463;
Lyttle _v._ Harlem Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345.

Footnote 136:

This opinion, too long to be inserted here, will be found in 2 Cent.
Law Journal, 170.

Footnote 137:

Railroad Co. _v._ Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Union R. Co. _v._ McDonald, 152
U. S. 262 (slackpit); St. Louis R. Co. _v._ Underwood, (C. C. A.) 194
Fed. 363 (pile of lumber); Southern R. Co. _v._ Bunt, 131 Ala. 591;
Thompson _v._ Alexander Cotton Mills Co., 190 Ala. 184 (drain
containing hot water); Barrett _v._ Southern P. R. Co., 91 Cal. 296
(but see Peters _v._ Bowman, 115 Cal. 345—pond; George _v._ Los
Angeles R. Co., 126 Cal. 357—cars standing unattended); Ferguson _v._
Columbus R. Co., 75 Ga. 637, 77 Ga. 102 (but see Savannah R. Co. _v._
Beavers, 113 Ga. 398—excavation); City _v._ McMahon, 154 Ill. 141;
Donk Bros. _v._ Leavitt, 109 Ill. App. 385; Belt R. Co. _v._ Charters,
123 Ill. App. 322 (but see American Advertising Co. _v._ Flannigan,
100 Ill. App. 452); Chicago R. Co. _v._ Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268; Lewis
_v._ Cleveland R. Co., 42 Ind. App. 337; Edgington _v._ Burlington R.
Co., 116 Ia. 410 (but see Anderson _v._ Ft. Dodge R. Co., 150 Ia.
465); Price _v._ Atchison Water Co., 58 Kan. 551 (reservoir); Kansas
City R. Co. _v._ Matson, 68 Kan. 815 (wood pile); Osborn _v._ Atchison
R. Co., 86 Kan. 440 (abandoned round house—but see Somerfield _v._
Land and Power Co., 93 Kan. 762—unguarded canal); Bransom _v._ Labrot,
81 Ky. 638 (pile of timber); Palermo _v._ Orleans Ice Co., 130 La. 833
(gutter containing hot water); Koons _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 65 Mo.
592; Schmidt _v._ Kansas City Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284 (hole made by
escaping steam); Berry _v._ St. Louis R. Co., 214 Mo. 593 (but see
Overholt _v._ Vieths, 93 Mo. 422—abandoned quarry; Barney _v._
Hannibal R. Co., 126 Mo. 372—unfenced freight yard; Kelly _v._ Benas,
217 Mo. 1—pile of lumber); Chicago R. Co. _v._ Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb.
889; Evansich _v._ Gulf R. Co., 57 Tex. 126 (but see Missouri R. Co.
_v._ Edwards, 90 Tex. 65; Johnson _v._ Atlas Supply Co., (Tex. Civ.
App.) 183 S. W. 31, 33); Smalley _v._ Rio Grande R. Co., 34 Utah, 423
(but see Palmer _v._ Oregon S. L. Co., 34 Utah, 466); Haynes _v._
City, 69 Wash. 419 (but see Barnhart _v._ Chicago R. Co., 89 Wash.
304); Kelley _v._ Southern R. Co., 152 Wis. 328 (but see Emond _v._
Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83—pond) _Accord_.

Compare McCabe _v._ American Woolen Co., (C. C. A.) 132 Fed. 1006
(unguarded canal); Valley Planing Mill _v._ McDaniel, 119 Ark. 139;
Brinkley _v._ Cooper, 70 Ark. 331; Prickett _v._ Pardridge, 189 Ill.
App. 307; Stendal _v._ Boyd, 73 Minn. 53; Dahl _v._ Valley Dredging
Co., 125 Minn. 90; Cooper _v._ Overton, 102 Tenn. 211.

See also Smith, Landowner’s Liability to Children, 11 Harv. Law Rev.
349, 434; 7 Thompson, Negligence, § 1031; Burdick, Torts (3d. ed.), §§
558–569.

As to the age to which the doctrine is applicable, see Belt R. Co.
_v._ Charters, 123 Ill. App. 322; State Bank _v._ Mandel, 176 Ill.
App. 278; Wilmes _v._ Chicago R. Co. 175 Ia. 101; Shaw _v._ Chicago R.
Co., (Mo.) 184 S. W. 1151.

Footnote 138:

Wilmot _v._ McPadden, 79 Conn. 367 (building in course of
construction); Daniels _v._ New York R. Co., 154 Mass. 349; Ryan _v._
Towar, 128 Mich. 463 (water wheel); Peninsular Trust Co. _v._ City,
131 Mich. 571 (reservoir); Hughes _v._ Boston R. Co., 71 N. H. 279
(torpedo on right of way); Delaware R. Co. _v._ Reich, 61 N. J. Law,
635; Walsh _v._ Fitchburg R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301; Railroad Co. _v._
Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235; Paolino _v._ McKendall, 24 R. I. 432
(unguarded fire); Uthermohlen _v._ Bogg’s Run Co., 50 W. Va. 457
_Accord_.

Footnote 139:

The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Lords
Atkinson, Collins, and Loreburn are omitted.

Footnote 140:

See Latham _v._ Johnson, [1913] 1 K. B. 398. In that case Hamilton, L.
J., said (pp. 415–416): “Two other terms must be alluded to—a ‘trap’
and ‘attraction’ or ‘allurement.’ A trap is a figure of speech, not a
formula. It involves the idea of concealment and surprise, of an
appearance of safety under circumstances cloaking a reality of danger.
Owners and occupiers alike expose licensees and visitors to traps on
their premises at their peril, but a trap is a relative term. In the
case of an infant, there are moral as well as physical traps. There
may accordingly be a duty towards infants not merely not to dig
pitfalls for them, but not to lead them into temptation.
‘Allurements,’ too, is a vague word. It may refer only to the
circumstances under which the injured child has entered the close.
Here it is hard to see how infantile temptations can give rights,
however much they may excuse peccadilloes. A child will be a
trespasser still, if he goes on private ground without leave or right,
however natural it may have been for him to do so. On the other hand,
the allurement may arise after he has entered with leave or as of
right. Then the presence in a frequented place of some object of
attraction, tempting him to meddle where he ought to abstain, may well
constitute a trap, and in the case of a child too young to be capable
of contributory negligence it may impose full liability on the owner
or occupier, if he ought, as a reasonable man, to have anticipated the
presence of the child and the attractiveness and peril of the object.”

“Finally, what objects which attract infants to their hurt are traps
even to them? Not all objects with which children hurt themselves
simpliciter. A child can get into mischief and hurt itself with
anything if it is young enough. In some cases the answer may rest with
the jury, but it must be matter of law to say whether a given object
can be a trap in the double sense of being fascinating and fatal. No
strict answer has been, or perhaps ever will be, given to the
question, but I am convinced that a heap of paving stone in broad
daylight in a private close cannot so combine the properties of
temptation and retribution as to be properly called a trap.”

Footnote 141:

Statement abridged. Arguments omitted, and parts of opinions.

Footnote 142:

See also Cole _v._ Willcutt, 214 Mass. 453; Habina _v._ Twin City
Electric Co., 150 Mich. 41; Chesley _v._ Rocheford, 4 Neb. Unoff. 768,
777.

For examples of “traps,” see Lowery _v._ Walker, [1911] A. C. 10;
Rollestone _v._ Cassirer, 3 Ga. App. 161; Foren _v._ Rodick, 90 Me.
276; Hill _v._ President and Trustees, 61 Or. 190; Grant _v._ Hass, 31
Tex. Civ. App. 688; Brinilson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 144 Wis. 614.

Footnote 143:

Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 2 C. P. 311. Hounsell _v._
Smyth, 7 C. B. N. S. 731; Batchelor _v._ Fortescue, 11 Q. B. D. 474;
Watson _v._ Manitou R. Co., 41 Col. 138; Bentley _v._ Loverock, 102
Ill. App. 166; Joseph _v._ Henrici Co., 137 Ill. 171; Indiana R. Co.
_v._ Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399; South Bend Iron Works _v._ Larger, 11
Ind. App. 367; Dixon _v._ Swift, 98 Me. 207; Reardon _v._ Thompson,
149 Mass. 267; Blackstone _v._ Chelmsford Foundry Co., 170 Mass. 321;
Vanderbeck _v._ Hendry, 34 N. J. Law, 467; Fitzpatrick _v._ Cumberland
Glass Co., 61 N. J. Law, 378; Taylor _v._ Turnpike Co., 65 N. J. Law,
102; Victory _v._ Baker, 67 N. Y. 366; Larmore _v._ Crown Point Iron
Co., 101 N. Y. 391; Sterger _v._ Van Sicklen, 132 N. Y. 499;
Englehardt _v._ Central R. Co., 139 App. Div. 786; McCann _v._
Thilemann, 36 Misc. 145; Monroe _v._ Atlantic R. Co., 151 N. C. 374;
Costello _v._ Farmers’ Bank, 34 N. D. 131; Kelley _v._ City, 41 Ohio
St. 263; Schiffer _v._ Sauer, 238 Pa. St. 550; Lunsford’s
Administrator _v._ Colonial Coal Co., 115 Va. 346 _Accord_.

But see Brinilson _v._ Chicago R. Co., 144 Wis. 614.

_As to liability to children licensees_, see Jansen _v._ Siddal, 41
Ill. App. 279; Cleveland R. Co. _v._ Means, (Ind. App.) 104 N. E. 785;
Benson _v._ Baltimore Traction Co., 77 Md. 535; McCoy _v._ Walsh, 186
Mass. 369; Romana _v._ Boston R. Co., 218 Mass. 76; Bottum _v._ Hawks,
84 Vt. 370.

But see Knapp _v._ Doll, 180 Ind. 526 (citing cases); Wilmes _v._
Chicago R. Co., 175 Ia. 101; Lyttle _v._ Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345.

_As to liability where there is a known, permissive, general use by
the public_, see Pomponio _v._ New York R. Co., 66 Conn. 528; Western
R. Co. _v._ Meigs, 74 Ga. 857; Green _v._ Chicago R. Co., 110 Mich.
648; Barry _v._ New York R. Co., 92 N. Y. 289; Taylor _v._ Delaware
Canal Co., 113 Pa. St. 162; Delaney _v._ Milwaukee R. Co., 33 Wis. 67.
Compare Tucker _v._ Draper, 62 Neb. 66.

_Liability in case of gratuitous carriage_: [The judge at the trial in
charging the jury] “suggested that the measure of duty towards a bare
licensee is different, where the licensor accepts the duty of carrying
him, from what it is where he merely permits him to pass through his
premises; and I think the cases support this view.... I think it was
competent for the jury to find, as they must be taken to have found, a
failure of that ordinary care which is due from a person who
undertakes the carriage of another gratuitously. The principle in all
cases of this class is that the care exercised must be reasonable; and
the standard of reasonableness naturally must vary according to the
circumstances of the case, the trust reposed, and the skill and
appliances at the disposal of the person to whom another confides a
duty. There is an obvious difference between the measure of confidence
reposed and responsibility accepted in the case of a person who merely
receives permission to traverse the premises of another, and in the
case where a person or his property is received into the custody of
another for transportation: see in the case of goods, Southcote’s
Case, (1601) 4 Rep. 83 b. cited in Coggs _v._ Bernard, 1 Smith, L. C.,
11th ed., p. 173, and the notes thereto. In the case of persons
received for carriage, PARKE, B., says in Lygo _v._ Newbold, (1854) 9
Ex. 302, at p. 305: ‘A person who undertakes to provide for the
conveyance of another, although he does so gratuitously, is bound to
exercise due and reasonable care.’ In Austin _v._ Great Western Ry.
Co., [1867] 2 Q. B. 442, at p. 445, BLACKBURN, J., says: ‘I think that
what was said in the case of Marshall _v._ York, Newcastle and Berwick
Ry. Co., (1851) 11 C. B. 655, was quite correct. It was there laid
down that the right which a passenger by railway has to be carried
safely does not depend on his having made a contract, but that the
fact of his being a passenger casts a duty on the company to carry him
safely.’”

COLLINS, M. R., in Harris _v._ Perry, [1903] 2 K. B. 219, 225, 226.
And see, also, Sington on Negligence, 61, 62. But compare Beard _v._
Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153.

In the case of a gratuitous loan of a chattel, the lender owes no duty
to the borrower except to give warning of any defects actually known
to the lender. Gagnon _v._ Dana, 69 N. H. 264; Coughlin _v._ Gillison,
[1899] 1 Q. B. 145. “A contract of gratuitous service, however, such
as one of carriage, involves a duty of reasonable care, and must
therefore be distinguished from a contract of gratuitous bailment or a
gift, which does not.” Salmond on Torts, 361.

Footnote 144:

Foster _v._ Portland Min. Co., (C. C. A.) 114 Fed. 613; Central R. Co.
_v._ Robertson, 95 Ga. 430; Chicago R. Co. _v._ Reinhardt, 235 Ill.
576, 139 Ill. App. 53; Indianapolis Water Co. _v._ Harold, 170 Ind.
170; Lawson _v._ Shreveport Waterworks Co., 111 La. 73; Schaaf _v._
St. Louis Basket Co., 151 Mo. App. 35; Furey _v._ New York R. Co., 67
N. J. Law, 270; Fogarty _v._ Bogart, 59 App. Div. 114; Toledo Real
Estate Co. _v._ Putney, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 486; Bush _v._ Johnston,
23 Pa. St. 209 _Accord_. Compare Moffatt _v._ Kenny, 174 Mass. 311.

Footnote 145:

The case is reprinted from the Law Times Reports, except the opinions
of Crompton, J., and Blackburn, J., which are taken from the Weekly
Reporter.

Footnote 146:

The reference should be 25 L. J. (N. S.) or 34 L. J.

Footnote 147:

Felton _v._ Aubrey, 74 Fed. 350; De Haven _v._ Hennessey, (C. C. A.)
137 Fed. 472; Standard Car Co. _v._ McGuire, 161 Fed. 527; Pomponio
_v._ New York R. Co., 66 Conn. 528; Rink _v._ Lowry, 38 Ind. App. 132;
Schmidt _v._ Michigan Coal Co., 159 Mich. 308; Clarkin _v._
Biwabik-Bessemer Co., 65 Minn. 483; Hyatt _v._ Murray, 101 Minn. 507;
Schaaf _v._ St. Louis Basket Co., 151 Mo. App. 35; Knowles _v._ Exeter
Mfg. Co., 77 N. H. 268; Houston R. Co. _v._ Bulger, 35 Tex. Civ. App.
478; Houston R. Co. _v._ O’Leary, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 601
(explosion of car containing fire-works); St. Louis R. Co. _v._
Balthrop, (Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 246; Hoadley _v._ International
Paper Co., 72 Vt. 79 _Accord_.

Illinois R. Co. _v._ Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500; Cunningham _v._ Toledo R.
Co., 260 Ill. 589; Dixon _v._ Swift, 98 Me. 207; O’Brien _v._ Union R.
Co., 209 Mass. 449 _Contra_. See also Fox _v._ Warner Asphalt Co., 204
N. Y. 240; Roche _v._ American Ice Co., 140 App. Div. 341; Rosenthal
_v._ United Beef Co., 52 Misc. 166. Compare Knight _v._ Lanier, 69
App. Div. 454.

Footnote 148:

Statement abridged.

Footnote 149:

Corby _v._ Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556; Rooney _v._ Woolworth, 78 Conn.
167; Graves _v._ Thomas, 95 Ind. 361; Penso _v._ McCormick, 125 Ind.
116; Morrison _v._ Carpenter, 179 Mich. 207; Wheeler _v._ St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co., 66 Mo. App. 260 _Accord_. Compare Ellsworth _v._
Metheney, (C. C. A.) 104 Fed. 119; Cahill _v._ Stone, 153 Cal. 571;
Martin _v._ Louisville Bridge Co., 41 Ind. App. 493; Quigley _v._
Clough, 173 Mass. 429; Phillips _v._ Library Co., 55 N. J. Law, 307;
Beck _v._ Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; Hanson _v._ Spokane Valley Land Co.,
58 Wash. 6.

Footnote 150:

Statement and arguments omitted.

Footnote 151:

Farrant _v._ Barnes, 11 C. B. N. S. 553; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 137.

Footnote 152:

And see Bolch _v._ Smith, 7 H. & N. 736; 31 L. J. (Ex.) 201.

Footnote 153:

Bennett _v._ Louisville R. Co., 102 U. S. 577; Alabama Steel Co. _v._
Clements, 146 Ala. 259; Hobart Tie Co. _v._ Keck, 89 Ark. 122; Whitney
_v._ New York R. Co., 87 Conn. 623; Christopher _v._ Russell, 63 Fla.
191; Southern Express Co. _v._ Williamson, 66 Fla. 286; Horton _v._
Harvey, 119 Ga. 219; Latham _v._ Roach, 72 Ill. 179; Spry Lumber Co.
_v._ Duggan, 182 Ill. 218; Calvert _v._ Springfield Electric Co., 231
Ill. 290; Laurie _v._ McCullough, 174 Ind. 477; Young _v._ People’s
Gas Co., 128 Ia. 290; Anderson _v._ Hair, 103 Ky. 196; Carleton _v._
Franconia Iron Co., 99 Mass. 216; McDermott _v._ Sallaway, 198 Mass.
517; Marston _v._ Reynolds, 211 Mass. 590; Jacobsen _v._ Simons, 217
Mass. 194; Samuelson _v._ Cleveland Iron Co., 49 Mich. 164; Donaldson
_v._ Wilson, 60 Mich. 86; Pelton _v._ Schmidt, 104 Mich. 345; Nash
_v._ Minneapolis Mill Co., 24 Minn. 501; Emery _v._ Minneapolis
Exposition, 56 Minn. 460; Kean _v._ Schoening, 103 Mo. App. 77; Shaw
_v._ Goldman, 116 Mo. App. 332; Montague _v._ Hanson, 38 Mont. 376;
Land _v._ Fitzgerald, 68 N. J. Law, 28; Smith _v._ Jackson, 70 N. J.
Law, 183; Ackert _v._ Lansing, 59 N. Y. 646; Weller _v._ Consolidated
Gas Co., 198 N. Y. 98; Wilson _v._ Olano, 28 App. Div. 448; Withers
_v._ Brooklyn Exchange, 106 App. Div. 255; Higgins _v._ Ruppert, 124
App. Div. 530; Massey _v._ Seller, 45 Or. 267; Newingham _v._ Blair,
232 Pa. St. 511; Freer _v._ Cameron, 4 Rich. Law, 228; League _v._
Stradley, 68 S. C. 515; Richmond R. Co. _v._ Moore, 94 Va. 493; Smith
_v._ Parkersburg Ass’n, 48 W. Va. 232; Landry _v._ Great Northern R.
Co., 152 Wis. 379 _Accord_.

_As to child accompanying invitee_: see Butler _v._ Chicago R. Co.,
155 Mo. App. 287.

_Liability to children invitees_: see Miller _v._ Peck Dry Goods Co.,
104 Mo. App. 609; Houck _v._ Chicago R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 559.

_Liability where plaintiff departs from or goes beyond the permission
or invitation_: New York Oil Co. _v._ Pusey, 211 Fed. 622; Louisville
R. Co. _v._ Sides, 129 Ala. 399; First Nat. Bank _v._ Chandler, 144
Ala. 286; Coberth _v._ Great Atlantic Co., 36 App. D. C. 569;
Etheredge _v._ Central R. Co., 122 Ga. 853; Bennett _v._ Butterfield,
112 Mich. 96; Hutchinson _v._ Cleveland Iron Co., 141 Mich. 346; Trask
_v._ Shotwell, 41 Minn. 66; Ryerson _v._ Bathgate, 67 N. J. Law, 337;
Gilfillan _v._ German Hospital, 115 App. Div. 48; Castoriano _v._
Miller, 15 Misc. 254; Weaver _v._ Carnegie Steel Co., 223 Pa. St. 238;
Hagan _v._ Delaware Steel Co., 240 Pa. St. 222; Pierce _v._ Whitcomb,
48 Vt. 127; Peake _v._ Buell, 90 Wis. 508; Lehmann _v._ Amsterdam
Coffee Co., 146 Wis. 213.

But compare Pauckner _v._ Wakem, 231 Ill. 276.