Chapter VI (3)

[923] Constant, in his work on Roman polytheism, says, 'des rites
indécens peuvent être pratiqués par un peuple religieux avec une
grande pureté de c[oe]ur. Mais quand l'incrédulité atteint ces
peuples, ces rites sont pour lui la cause et le prétexte de la
plus révoltante corruption.' This passage is quoted by Mr.
Milman, who calls it 'extremely profound and just.' _Milman's
History of Christianity_, 1840, vol. i. p. 28. And so it
is--extremely profound and just. But it happens that precisely
the same remark was made by Voltaire, just about the time that
Constant was born. Speaking of the worship of Priapus, he says
(_Essai sur les M[oe]urs_, chap. cxliii. in _[OE]uvres de
Voltaire_, vol. xvii. p. 341), 'nos idées de bienséance nous
portent à croire qu'un cérémonie qui nous paraît si infâme n'a
été inventée que par la débauche; mais il n'est guère croyable
que la dépravation des m[oe]urs ait jamais chez aucun peuple
établi des cérémonies religieuses. Il est probable, au contraire,
que cette coutume fut d'abord introduite dans les temps de
simplicité, et qu'on ne pensa d'abord qu'à honorer la Divinité
dans le symbole de la vie qu'elle nous a donnée. Une telle
cérémonie a dû inspirer la licence à la jeunesse, et paraître
ridicule aux esprits sages, dans les temps plus raffinés, plus
corrompus, et plus éclairés.' Compare the remarks on the
indecency of the Spartan customs, in _Thirlwall's Hist. of
Greece_, vol. i. pp. 326, 327.

[924] _Essai sur les M[oe]urs_, chaps. xiv. and xxxi., in _[OE]uvres_,
vol. xv. pp. 391, 514. Neander observes, that in the Greek church
there were more heresies than in the Latin church, because the
Greeks thought more; but he has failed to perceive how this
favoured the authority of the popes. _Neander's History of the
Church_, vol. ii. pp. 198, 199, vol. iii. pp. 191, 492, vol. iv.
p. 90, vol. vi. p. 293, vol. viii. p. 257.

It would be impossible to relate all the original remarks of Voltaire, which, when he made them, were attacked as dangerous paradoxes, and are now valued as sober truths. He was the first historian who recommended universal freedom of trade; and, although he expresses himself with great caution,[925] still the mere announcement of the idea in a popular history forms an epoch in the progress of the French mind. He is the originator of that important distinction between the increase of population and the increase of food, to which political economy has been greatly indebted;[926] a principle adopted several years later by Townsend, and then used by Malthus as the basis of his celebrated work.[927] He has, moreover, the merit of being the first who dispelled the childish admiration with which the Middle Ages had been hitherto regarded, and which they owed to those dull and learned writers, who, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were the principal investigators of the early history of Europe. These industrious compilers had collected extensive materials, which Voltaire turned to good account, and by their aid overthrew the conclusions at which the authors had themselves arrived. In his works, the Middle Ages are, for the first time, represented as what they really were,--a period of ignorance, ferocity, and licentiousness; a period when injuries were unredressed, crime unpunished, and superstition unrebuked. It may be said, with some show of justice, that Voltaire, in the picture he drew, fell into the opposite extreme, and did not sufficiently recognize the merit of those truly great men, who, at long intervals, stood here and there, like solitary beacons, whose light only made the surrounding darkness more visible. Still, after every allowance for that exaggeration which a reaction of opinions always causes, it is certain that his view of the Middle Ages is not only far more accurate than that of any preceding writer, but conveys a much juster idea of the time than can be found in those subsequent compilations which we owe to the industry of modern antiquaries; a simple and plodding race, who admire the past because they are ignorant of the present, and who, spending their lives amid the dust of forgotten manuscripts, think themselves able, with the resources of their little learning, to speculate on the affairs of men, to trace the history of different periods, and even to assign to each the praise it ought to receive.

[925] In his account of the trade of Archangel, he says, 'les Anglais
obtinrent le privilége d'y commercer sans payer aucun droit; et
c'est ainsi que toutes les nations devraient peut-être négocier
ensemble.' _Hist. de Russie_, part i. chap. i., in _[OE]uvres_,
vol. xxiii. p. 35. Remarkable words to have been written by a
Frenchman, born at the end of the seventeenth century; and yet
they have, so far as I am aware, escaped the attention of all the
historians of political economy. Indeed, on this, as on most
matters, sufficient justice has not been done to Voltaire, whose
opinions were more accurate than those of Quesnay and his
followers. However, Mr. M'Culloch, in noticing one of the
economical errors of Voltaire, honestly admits that his 'opinions
on such subjects are, for the most part, very correct.'
_M'Culloch's Principles of Political Economy_, p. 530. For proof
of his sympathy with Turgot's efforts to establish free trade,
compare _Lettres inédites de Voltaire_, vol. ii. pp. 367, 403,
423, with _Longchamp_, _Mém. sur Voltaire_, vol. i. pp. 376, 378.

[926] 'The idea of the different ratios by which population and food
increase, was originally thrown out by Voltaire; and was picked
up and expanded into many a goodly volume by our English
political economists in the present century.' _Laing's Notes_,
second series, p. 42.

[927] It is often said that Malthus was indebted to Townsend's writings
for his views on population; but this obligation has been too
strongly stated, as, indeed, is always the case when charges of
plagiarism are brought against great works. Still, Townsend is to
be considered as the precursor of Malthus; and if the reader is
interested in tracing the paternity of ideas, he will find some
interesting economical remarks in _Townsend's Journey through
Spain_, vol. i. pp. 379, 383, vol. ii. pp. 85, 337, 387-393;
which must be compared with _M'Culloch's Literature of Political
Economy_, pp. 259, 281-3. Voltaire having preceded these authors,
has, of course, fallen into errors which they avoided; but
nothing can be better than the way in which he opposes the
ignorant belief of his own time, that every thing should be done
to increase population. 'Le point principal n'est pas d'avoir du
superflu en hommes, mais de rendre ce que nous en avons le moins
malheureux qu'il est possible,' is the summing-up of his able
remarks, in _Dict. Philos._, article _Population_, sect. 2, in
_[OE]uvres_, vol. xli. p. 466. Godwin, in his notice of the
history of these opinions, is evidently ignorant of what was done
by Voltaire. _Sinclair's Corresp._ vol. i. p. 396.

With such writers as these, Voltaire was always at war; and no one has done so much to lessen the influence they once exercised over even the highest branches of knowledge. There was also another class of dictators, whose authority this great man was equally successful in reducing, namely, the old class of classical scholars and commentators, who, from the middle of the fourteenth till early in the eighteenth century, were the chief dispensers of fame, and were respected as being by far the most distinguished men Europe had ever produced. The first great assaults made upon them were late in the seventeenth century, when two controversies sprung up, of which I shall hereafter give an account,--one in France, and one in England,--by both of which their power was considerably damaged. But their two most formidable opponents were, undoubtedly, Locke and Voltaire. The immense services rendered by Locke in lessening the reputation of the old classical school, will be examined in another part of this work; at present we are only concerned with the steps taken by Voltaire.

The authority wielded by the great classical scholars rested not only on their abilities, which are undeniable, but also on the supposed dignity of their pursuits. It was generally believed that ancient history possessed some inherent superiority over modern history; and this being taken for granted, the inference naturally followed, that the cultivators of the one were more praiseworthy than the cultivators of the other; and that a Frenchman, for instance, who should write the history of some Greek republic, displayed a nobler turn of mind than if he had written the history of his own country. This singular prejudice had for centuries been a traditional notion; which men accepted, because they had received it from their fathers, and which it would have been almost an impiety to dispute. The result was, that the few really able writers on history devoted themselves chiefly to that of the ancients; or, if they published an account of modern times, they handled their theme, not according to modern ideas, but according to ideas gathered from their more favourite pursuit. This confusion of the standard of one age with the standard of another, caused a double evil. Historians, by adopting this plan, injured the originality of their own minds; and, what was far worse, they set a bad example to the literature of their country. For every great nation has a mode of expression, and of thought, peculiar to itself, and with which its sympathies are intimately connected. To introduce any foreign model, however admirable it may be, is to violate this connexion, and to impair the value of literature by limiting the scope of its action. By such a course, the taste may possibly be refined, but the vigour will certainly be weakened. Indeed, the refinement of the taste may well be doubted, when we see what has taken place in our country, where our great scholars have corrupted the English language by a jargon so uncouth, that a plain man can hardly discern the real lack of ideas which their barbarous and mottled dialect strives to hide.[928] At all events, it is certain, that every people worthy of being called a nation, possess in their own language ample resources for expressing the highest ideas they are able to form; and although, in matters of science, it may be convenient to coin such words as are more easily understood in foreign countries, it is a grave offence to depart on other subjects from the vernacular speech; and it is a still graver one, to introduce notions and standards for action, suited perhaps to former times, but which the march of society has left far behind, and with which we have no real sympathy, though they may excite that sickly and artificial interest which the classical prejudices of early education still contrive to create.

[928] With the single exception of Porson, not one of the great English
scholars has shown an appreciation of the beauties of his native
language; and many of them, such as Parr (in all his works) and
Bentley (in his mad edition of Milton), have done every thing in
their power to corrupt it. And there can be little doubt, that
the principal reason why well-educated women write and converse
in a purer style than well-educated men, is because they have not
formed their taste according to those ancient classical
standards, which, admirable as they are in themselves, should
never be introduced into a state of society unfitted for them. To
this may be added, that Cobbett, the most racy and idiomatic of
all our writers, and Erskine, by far the greatest of our forensic
orators, knew little or nothing of any ancient language; and the
same observation applies to Shakespeare. On the supposed
connexion between the improvement of taste and the study of
classical models, there are some remarks worth attending to in
_Rey's Théorie et Pratique de la Science Sociale_, vol. i.
pp. 98-101.

It was against these evils that Voltaire entered the field. The wit and the ridicule with which he attacked the dreaming scholars of his own time, can only be appreciated by those who have studied his works. Not, as some have supposed, that he used these weapons as a substitute for argument, still less that he fell into the error of making ridicule a test for truth. No one could reason more closely than Voltaire, when reasoning suited his purpose. But he had to deal with men impervious to argument; men whose inordinate reverence for antiquity had only left them two ideas, namely, that every thing old is right, and that every thing new is wrong. To argue against these opinions would be idle indeed; the only other resource was, to make them ridiculous, and weaken their influence, by holding up their authors to contempt. This was one of the tasks Voltaire set himself to perform; and he did it well.[929] He, therefore, used ridicule, not as the test of truth, but as the scourge of folly. And with such effect was the punishment administered, that not only did the pedants and theologians of his own time wince under the lash, but even their successors feel their ears tingle when they read his biting words; and they revenge themselves by reviling the memory of that great writer, whose works are as a thorn in their side, and whose very name they hold in undisguised abhorrence.

[929] 'We can best judge, from the Jesuitical rage with which he was
persecuted, how admirably he had delineated the weaknesses and
presumption of the interpreters of the ancients, who shone in the
schools and academies, and had acquired great reputation by their
various and copiously exhibited learning.' _Schlosser's
Eighteenth Century_, vol. i. p. 120. At p. 270, M. Schlosser
says, 'And it was only a man of Voltaire's wit and talents, who
could throw the light of an entirely new criticism upon the
darkness of those grabbing and collecting pedants.'

These two classes have, indeed, reasons enough for the hatred with which they still regard the greatest Frenchman of the eighteenth century. For, Voltaire did more than any other man to sap the foundation of ecclesiastical power, and to destroy the supremacy of classical studies. This is not the place for discussing the theological opinions which he attacked; but of the state of classical opinions an idea may be formed, by considering some of those circumstances which were recorded by the ancients respecting their history, and which, until the appearance of Voltaire, were implicitly believed by modern scholars, and through them by the people at large.

It was believed that, in ancient times, Mars ravished a virgin, and that the offspring of the intrigue were no other than Romulus and Remus, both of whom it was intended to put to death; but they were fortunately saved by the attentions of a she-wolf and a woodpecker; the wolf giving them suck, and the woodpecker protecting them from insects. It was, moreover, believed that Romulus and Remus, when grown up to man's estate, determined to build a city, and that, being joined by the descendants of the Trojan warriors, they succeeded in erecting Rome. It was believed that both brothers came to an untimely end; Remus being murdered, and Romulus being taken up to heaven by his father, who descended for that purpose in the midst of a tempest. The great scholars then proceeded to relate the succession of several other kings; the most remarkable of whom was Numa, whose only communications with his wife were carried on in a sacred grove. Another of the sovereigns of Rome was Tullus Hostilius, who, having offended the clergy, perished from the effects of their anger; his death being caused by lightning, and preceded by pestilence. Then again, there was one Servius Tullius, who was also a king, and whose greatness was prognosticated by the appearance of flames round his head as he was sleeping in his cradle. After this, it was but a slight matter that the ordinary laws of mortality should be suspended; we were, therefore, assured that those ignorant barbarians, the early Romans, passed two hundred and forty-five years under the government of only seven kings, all of whom were elected in the prime of life, one of whom was expelled the city, and three of whom were put to death.

These are a few of the idle stories in which the great scholars took intense delight, and which, during many centuries, were supposed to form a necessary part of the annals of the Latin empire. Indeed, so universal was the credulity, that, until they were destroyed by Voltaire, there were only four writers who had ventured openly to attack them. Cluverius, Perizonius, Pouilly, and Beaufort were the names of these bold innovators; but by none of them was any impression made on the public mind. The works of Cluverius and Perizonius, being composed in Latin, were addressed entirely to a class of readers who, infatuated with a love of antiquity, would listen to nothing that diminished the reputation of its history. Pouilly and Beaufort wrote in French; both of them, and especially Beaufort, were men of considerable ability; but their powers were not versatile enough to enable them to extirpate prejudices which were so strongly protected, and which had been fostered by the education of many successive generations.

The service, therefore, rendered by Voltaire in purging history of these foolish conceits, is, not that he was the first by whom they were attacked, but that he was the first to attack them with success; and this because he was also the first who mingled ridicule with argument, thus not only assailing the system, but also weakening the authority of those by whom the system was supported. His irony, his wit, his pungent and telling sarcasms, produced more effect than the gravest arguments could have done; and there can be no doubt that he was fully justified in using those great resources with which nature had endowed him, since by their aid he advanced the interests of truth, and relieved men from some of their most inveterate prejudices.

It is not, however, to be supposed that ridicule was the only means employed by Voltaire in effecting this important object. So far from that, I can say with confidence, after a careful comparison of both writers, that the most decisive arguments advanced by Niebuhr against the early history of Rome, had all been anticipated by Voltaire; in whose works they may be found, by whoever will take the trouble of reading what this great man has written, instead of ignorantly railing against him. Without entering into needless detail, it is enough to mention that, amidst a great variety of very ingenious and very learned discussion, Niebuhr has put forward several views with which later critics have been dissatisfied; but that there are three, and only three, principles which are fundamental to his history, and which it is impossible to refute. These are:--I. That, on account of the inevitable intermixture of fable essential to a rude people, no nation can possess trustworthy details respecting its own origin. II. That even such early documents as the Romans might have possessed, had been destroyed before they were incorporated into a regular history. III. That ceremonies established in honour of certain events alleged to have taken place in former times, were a proof, not that the events had happened, but that they were believed to have happened. The whole fabric of the early history of Rome at once fell to pieces, as soon as these three principles were applied to it. What, however, is most remarkable, is, that not only are all three laid down by Voltaire, but their bearing upon Roman history is distinctly shown. He says that no nation is acquainted with its own origin; so that all primitive history is necessarily an invention.[930] He remarks, that since even such historical works as the Romans once possessed, were all destroyed when their city was burned, no confidence can be placed in the accounts which, at a much later period, are given by Livy and other compilers.[931] And, as innumerable scholars busied themselves in collecting evidence respecting ceremonies instituted in celebration of certain events, and then appealed to the evidence in order to prove the events, Voltaire makes a reflection which now seems very obvious, but which these learned men had entirely overlooked. He notices, that their labour is bootless, because the date of the evidence is, with extremely few exceptions, much later than the date of the event to which it refers. In such cases, the existence of a festival, or of a monument, proves, indeed, the belief which men entertain, but by no means proves the reality of the occurrence concerning which the belief is held.[932] This simple, but important maxim, is, even in our own days, constantly lost sight of, while before the eighteenth century it was universally neglected. Hence it was that historians were able to accumulate fables which were believed without examination;[933] it being altogether forgotten, that fables, as Voltaire says, begin to be current in one generation, are established in the second, become respectable in the third, while in the fourth generation temples are raised in honour of them.[934]

[930] 'C'est l'imagination seule qui a écrit les premières histoires.
Non seulement chaque peuple inventa son origine, mais il inventa
aussi l'origine du monde entier.' _Dict. Philos._ article
_Histoire_, sec. 2, in _[OE]uvres_, vol. xl. p. 195. See also his
article on Chronology, vol. xxxviii. p. 77, for the application
of this to the history of Rome, where he says, 'Tite Live n'a
garde de dire en quelle année Romulus commença son prétendu
règne.' And at vol. xxxvi. p. 86, 'tous les peuples se sont
attribués des origines imaginaires; et aucun n'a touché à la
véritable.'

[931] 'Qu'on fasse attention que la république romaine a été cinq cents
ans sans historiens; que Tite Live lui-même déplore la perte des
autres monuments qui périrent presque tous dans l'incendie de
Rome,' &c. _Dict. Philos._ in _[OE]uvres_, vol. xl. p. 202. At p.
188, 'ce peuple, si récent en comparaison des nations asiatiques,
a été cinq cents années sans historiens. Ainsi, il n'est pas
surprenant que Romulus ait été le fils de Mars, qu'une louve ait
été sa nourrice, qu'il ait marché avec mille hommes de son
village de Rome contre vingt-cinq mille combattants du village
des Sabins.'

[932] 'Par quel excès de démence, par quel opiniâtreté absurde, tant de
compilateurs ont-ils voulu prouver dans tant de volumes énormes,
qu'une fête publique établie en mémoire d'un événement était une
démonstration de la vérité de cet événement?' _Essai sur les
M[oe]urs_, in _[OE]uvres_, vol. xv. p. 109. See also the same
remark applied to monuments, in chap. cxcvii., _[OE]uvres_, vol.
xviii. pp. 412-414; and again, in vol. xl. pp. 203, 204.

[933] 'La plupart des histoires out été crues sans examen, et cette
créance est un préjugé. Fabius Pictor raconte que, plusieurs
siècles avant lui, une vestale de la ville d'Albe, allant puiser
de l'eau dans sa cruche, fut violée, qu'elle accoucha de Romulus
et de Rémus, qu'ils furent nourris par une louve, etc. Le peuple
romain crut cette fable; il n'examina point si dans ce temps-là
il y avait des vestales dans le Latium, s'il était vraisemblable
que la fille d'un roi sortît de son couvent avec sa cruche, s'il
était probable qu'une louve allaitât deux enfants au lieu de les
manger; le préjugé s'établit.' _Dict. Philos._ article
_Préjugés_, in _[OE]uvres_, vol. xli. pp. 488, 489.

[934] 'Les amateurs du merveilleux disaient: Il faut bien que ces faits
soient vrais, puisque tant de monuments en sont la preuve. Et
nous disions: Il faut bien qu'ils soient faux, puisque le
vulgaire les a crus. Une fable a quelque cours dans une
génération; elle s'établit dans la seconde; elle devient
respectable dans la troisième; la quatrième lui élève des
temples.' _Fragments sur l'Histoire_, article i. in _[OE]uvres_,
vol. xxvii. pp. 158, 159.

I have been the more particular in stating the immense obligations history is under to Voltaire, because in England there exists against him a prejudice, which nothing but ignorance, or something worse than ignorance, can excuse;[935] and because, taking him on the whole, he is probably the greatest historian Europe has yet produced. In reference, however, to the mental habits of the eighteenth century, it is important to show, that in the same period similar comprehensiveness was being displayed by other French historians; so that in this case, as in all others, we shall find that a large share of what is effected, even by the most eminent men, is due to the character of the age in which they live.

[935] In this case, as in many others, ignorance has been fortified by
bigotry; for, as Lord Campbell truly says of Voltaire, 'since the
French Revolution, an indiscriminate abuse of this author has
been in England the test of orthodoxy and loyalty.' _Campbell's
Chief Justices_, vol. ii. p. 335. Indeed, so extensively has the
public mind been prejudiced against this great man, that, until a
very few years ago, when Lord Brougham published a life of him,
there was no book in the English language containing even a
tolerable account of one of the most influential writers France
has produced. This work of Lord Brougham's, though a middling
performance, is at least an honest one, and, as it harmonizes
with the general spirit of our time, it has probably had
considerable weight. In it he says of Voltaire, 'nor can any one
since the days of Luther be named, to whom the spirit of free
inquiry, nay, the emancipation of the human mind from spiritual
tyranny, owes a more lasting debt of gratitude.' _Brougham's Life
of Voltaire_, p. 132. It is certain, that the better the history
of the eighteenth century is understood, the more the reputation
of Voltaire will increase; as was clearly foreseen by a
celebrated writer nearly a generation ago. In 1831, Lerminier
wrote these remarkable, and, as the result has proved, prophetic
words: 'Il est temps de revenir à des sentimens plus respectueux
pour la mémoire de Voltaire.... Voltaire a fait pour la France ce
que Leibnitz a fait pour l'Allemagne; pendant trois-quarts de
siècle il a représenté son pays, puissant à la manière de Luther
et de Napoléon; il est destiné à survivre à bien des gloires, et
je plains ceux qui se sont oubliés jusqu'à laisser tomber des
paroles dédaigneuses sur le génie de cet homme.' _Lerminier_,
_Philosophie du Droit_, vol. i. p. 199. Compare the glowing
eulogy in _Longchamp et Wagnière_, _Mémoires sur Voltaire_, vol.
ii. pp. 388, 389, with the remarks of Saint-Lambert, in _Mém.
d'Epinay_, vol. i. p. 263.

The vast labours of Voltaire towards reforming the old method of writing history, were greatly aided by those important works which Montesquieu put forward during the same period. In 1734,[936] this remarkable man published what may be truly called the first book in which there can be found any information concerning the real history of Rome; because it is also the first in which the affairs of the ancient world are treated in a large and comprehensive spirit.[937] Fourteen years later, there appeared, by the same author, the _Spirit of Laws_; a more famous production, but, as it seems to me, not a greater one. The immense merit of the _Spirit of Laws_ is, indeed, incontestable, and cannot be affected by the captious attempts made to diminish it by those minute critics, who seem to think that when they detect the occasional errors of a great man, they in some degree reduce him to their own level. It is not such petty cavilling which can destroy an European reputation; and the noble work of Montesquieu will long survive all attacks of this kind, because its large and suggestive generalizations would retain their value even if the particular facts of which the illustrations consist were all unfounded.[938] Still, I am inclined to believe, that in point of original thought it is barely equal to his earlier work, though it is unquestionably the fruit of much greater reading. Without, however, instituting a comparison between them, our present object is merely to consider the contributions they jointly contain towards a right understanding of history, and the way in which those contributions are connected with the general spirit of the eighteenth century.

[936] _Vie de Montesquieu_, p. xiv., prefixed to his works.

[937] Before Montesquieu, the only two great thinkers who had really
studied Roman history were Macchiavelli and Vico: but
Macchiavelli did not attempt any thing approaching the
generalizations of Montesquieu, and he suffered, moreover, from
the serious deficiency of being too much occupied with the
practical utility of his subject. Vico, whose genius was perhaps
even more vast than that of Montesquieu, can hardly be considered
his rival; for, though his _Scienza Nova_ contains the most
profound views on ancient history, they are rather glimpses of
truth, than a systematic investigation of any one period.

[938] Which M. Guizot (_Civilisation en France_, vol. iv. p. 36), in
his remarks on the _Esprit des Lois_, does not take sufficiently
into consideration. A juster appreciation of Montesquieu will be
found in _Cousin_, _Hist. de la Philosophie_, part ii. vol. i. p.
182; and in _Comte_, _Philosophie Positive_, vol. iv. pp.
243-252, 261. Compare _Charles Comte_, _Traité de Législation_,
vol. i. p. 125, with _Meyer_, _Esprit des Institutions
Judiciaires_, vol. i. p. lxi., respecting the vast innovations he
introduced.

In this point of view, there are, in the works of Montesquieu, two leading peculiarities. The first is, the complete rejection of those personal anecdotes, and those trivial details respecting individuals, which belong to biography, but with which, as Montesquieu clearly saw, history has no concern. The other peculiarity is, the very remarkable attempt which he first made to effect an union between the history of man and those sciences which deal with the external world. As these are the two great characteristics of the method adopted by Montesquieu, it will be necessary to give some account of them, before we can understand the place he really occupies, as one of the founders of the philosophy of history.

We have already seen that Voltaire had strongly insisted on the necessity of reforming history, by paying more attention to the history of the people, and less attention to that of their political and military rulers. We have also seen, that this great improvement was so agreeable to the spirit of the time, that it was generally and quickly adopted, and thus became an indication of those democratic tendencies, of which it was in reality a result. It is not, therefore, surprising that Montesquieu should have taken the same course, even before the movement had been clearly declared; since he, like most great thinkers, was a representative of the intellectual condition, and a satisfier of the intellectual wants, of the age in which he lived.

But, what constitutes the peculiarity of Montesquieu in this matter, is, that with him a contempt for those details respecting courts, ministers, and princes, in which ordinary compilers take great delight, was accompanied by an equal contempt for other details which are really interesting, because they concern the mental habits of the few truly eminent men who, from time to time, have appeared on the stage of public life. This was because Montesquieu perceived that, though these things are very interesting, they are also very unimportant. He knew, what no historian before him had even suspected, that in the great march of human affairs, individual peculiarities count for nothing; and that, therefore, the historian has no business with them, but should leave them to the biographer, to whose province they properly belong. The consequence is, that not only does he treat the most powerful princes with such disregard as to relate the reigns of six emperors in two lines,[939] but he constantly enforces the necessity, even in the case of eminent men, of subordinating their special influence to the more general influence of the surrounding society. Thus, many writers had ascribed the ruin of the Roman Republic to the ambition of Cæsar and Pompey, and particularly to the deep schemes of Cæsar. This, Montesquieu totally denies. According to his view of history, no great alteration can be effected, except by virtue of a long train of antecedents, where alone we are to seek the cause of what to a superficial eye is the work of individuals. The republic, therefore, was overthrown, not by Cæsar and Pompey, but by that state of things which made the success of Cæsar and Pompey possible.[940] It is thus that the events which ordinary historians relate are utterly valueless. Such events, instead of being causes, are merely the occasions on which the real causes act.[941] They may be called the accidents of history; and they must be treated as subservient to those vast and comprehensive conditions, by which alone the rise and fall of nations are ultimately governed.[942]

[939] He says of the emperor Maximin, 'il fut tué avec son fils par ses
soldats. Les deux premiers Gordiens périrent en Afrique. Maxime,
Balbin, et le troisième Gordien furent massacrés.' _Grandeur et
Décadence des Romains_, chap. xvi., in _[OE]uvres de
Montesquieu_, p. 167.

[940] _Ibid._ chap. xi., in _[OE]uvres de Montesquieu_, pp. 149-153.
Compare a similar remark, respecting Charles XII., in _Esprit des
Lois_, livre x. chap. xiii. _[OE]uvres_, p. 260.

[941] On the difference between cause and occasion, see _Grandeur et
Décad._ chap. i. p. 126.

[942] 'Il y a des causes générales, soit morales, soit physiques, qui
agissent dans chaque monarchie, l'élèvent, la maintiennent, ou la
précipitent; tous les accidents sont soumis à ces causes; et si
le hasard d'une bataille, c'est-à-dire une cause particulière, a
ruiné un état, il y avoit une cause générale qui faisoit que cet
état devoit périr par une seule bataille. En un mot, l'allure
principale entraîne avec elle tous les accidente particuliers.'
_Grand. et Décad. des Romains_, chap. xviii. p. 172.

This, then, was the first great merit of Montesquieu, that he effected a complete separation between biography and history, and taught historians to study, not the pecularities of individual character, but the general aspect of the society in which the peculiarities appeared. If this remarkable man had accomplished nothing further, he would have rendered an incalculable service to history, by pointing out how one of its most fertile sources of error might be safely removed. And although, unhappily, we have not yet reaped the full benefit of his example, this is because his successors have really had the capacity of rising to so high a generalization: it is, however, certain, that since his time, an approximation towards such elevated views may be noticed, even among those inferior writers who, for want of sufficient grasp, are unable to adopt them to their full extent.

In addition to this, Montesquieu made another great advance in the method of treating history. He was the first who, in an inquiry into the relations between the social conditions of a country and its jurisprudence, called in the aid of physical knowledge, in order to ascertain how the character of any given civilization is modified by the action of the external world. In his work on the _Spirit of Laws_, he studies the way in which both the civil and political legislation of a people are naturally connected with their climate, soil, and food.[943] It is true, that in this vast enterprise he almost entirely failed; but this was because meteorology, chemistry, and physiology, were still too backward to admit of such an undertaking. This, however, affects the value only of his conclusions, not of his method; and here, as elsewhere, we see the great thinker tracing the outline of a plan, which, in the then state of knowledge, it was impossible to fill up, and the completion of which he was obliged to leave to the riper experience and more powerful resources of a later age. Thus to anticipate the march of the human intellect, and, as it were, forestal its subsequent acquisitions, is the peculiar prerogative of minds of the highest order; and it is this which gives to the writings of Montesquieu a certain fragmentary and provisional appearance, which was the necessary consequence of a profoundly speculative genius dealing with materials that were intractable, simply because science had not yet reduced them to order by generalizing the laws of their phenomena. Hence it is, that many of the inferences drawn by Montesquieu are untenable; such, for instance, as those regarding the effect of diet in stimulating population by increasing the fecundity of women,[944] and the effect of climate in altering the proportion between the births of the sexes.[945] In other cases, an increased acquaintance with barbarous nations has sufficed to correct his conclusions, particularly those concerning the effect which he supposed climate to produce on individual character; for we have now the most decisive evidence, that he was wrong in asserting[946] that hot climates make people unchaste and cowardly, while cold climates make them virtuous and brave.

[943] _De l'Esprit des Lois_, books xiv. to xviii. inclusive; in
_[OE]uvres_, pp. 300-336.

[944] _Ibid._ livre xxiii. chap. xiii. p. 395. Compare _Burdach_,
_Traité de Physiologie_, vol. ii. p. 116.

[945] _Ibid._ livre xvi. chap. iv., and livre xxiii. chap. xii.
pp. 317, 395.

[946] _Ibid._ livre xiv. chap. ii., livre xvii. chap. ii., and
elsewhere.

These, indeed, are comparatively trifling objections, because, in all the highest branches of knowledge, the main difficulty is, not to discover facts, but to discover the true method according to which the laws of the facts may be ascertained.[947] In this, Montesquieu performed a double service, since he not only enriched history, but also strengthened its foundation. He enriched history by incorporating with it physical inquiries; and he strengthened history by separating it from biography, and thus freeing it from details which are always unimportant, and often unauthentic. And although he committed the error of studying the influence of nature over men considered as individuals,[948] rather than over men considered as an aggregate society, this arose principally from the fact that, in his time, the resources necessary for the more complicated study had not yet been created. Those resources, as I have shown, are political economy and statistics; political economy supplying the means of connecting the laws of physical agents with the laws of the inequality of wealth, and, therefore, with a great variety of social disturbances; while statistics enable us to verify those laws in their widest extent, and to prove how completely the volition of individual men is controlled by their antecedents, and by the circumstances in which they are placed. It was, therefore, not only natural, but inevitable, that Montesquieu should fail in his magnificent attempt to unite the laws of the human mind with the laws of external nature. He failed, partly because the sciences of external nature were too backward, and partly because those other branches of knowledge which connect nature with men were still unformed. For, as to political economy, it had no existence as a science until the publication of the _Wealth of Nations_ in 1776, twenty-one years after the death of Montesquieu. As to statistics, their philosophy is a still more recent creation, since it is only during the last thirty years that they have been systematically applied to social phenomena; the earlier statisticians being merely a body of industrious collectors, groping in the dark, bringing together facts of every kind without selection or method, and whose labours were consequently unavailable for those important purposes to which they have been successfully applied during the present generation.

[947] On the supreme importance of method, see my defence of Bichat in
the next chapter.

[948] How completely futile this was, as regards results, is evident
from the fact, that a hundred years after he wrote, we, with all
our increased knowledge, can affirm nothing positively respecting
the direct action of climate, food, and soil, in modifying
individual character; though it has, I trust, appeared in the
second chapter of this Introduction, that something can be
ascertained respecting their indirect action, that is, their
action on individual minds through the medium of social and
economical organisation.

Only two years after the publication of the _Spirit of Laws_, Turgot delivered those celebrated lectures, of which it has been said, that in them he created the philosophy of history.[949] This praise is somewhat exaggerated; for in the most important matters relating to the philosophy of his subject, he takes the same view as Montesquieu; and Montesquieu, besides preceding him in point of time, was his superior certainly in learning, perhaps in genius. Still, the merit of Turgot is immense; and he belongs to that extremely small class of men who have looked at history comprehensively, and have recognized the almost boundless knowledge needed for its investigation. In this respect, his method is identical with that of Montesquieu, since both of these great men excluded from their scheme the personal details which ordinary historians accumulate, and concentrated their attention upon those large general causes, by the operation of which the destinies of nations are permanently affected. Turgot clearly perceived, that, notwithstanding the variety of events produced by the play of human passions, there is amid this apparent confusion a principle of order, and a regularity of march, not to be mistaken by those whose grasp is firm enough to seize the history of man as a complete and single whole.[950] It is true that Turgot, subsequently engaged in political life, never possessed sufficient leisure to fill up the splendid outline of what he so successfully sketched: but though in the execution of his plan he fell short of Montesquieu, still the analogy between the two men is obvious, as also is their relation to the age in which they lived. They, as well as Voltaire, were the unconscious advocates of the democratic movement, inasmuch as they discountenanced the homage which historians had formerly paid to individuals, and rescued history from being a mere recital of the deeds of political and ecclesiastical rulers. At the same time, Turgot, by the captivating prospects which he held out of future progress,[951] and by the picture which he drew of the capacity of society to improve itself, increased the impatience which his countrymen were beginning to feel against that despotic government, in whose presence amelioration seemed to be hopeless. These, and similar speculations, which now for the first time appeared in French literature, stimulated the activity of the intellectual classes, cheered them under the persecutions to which they were exposed, and emboldened them to the arduous enterprise of leading on the people to attack the institutions of their native land. Thus it was, that in France every thing tended to the same result. Every thing indicated the approach of some sharp and terrible struggle, in which the spirit of the present should war with the spirit of the past; and in which it should be finally settled, whether the people of France could free themselves from the chains in which they had long been held, or whether, missing their aim, they were doomed to sink still lower in that ignominious vassalage, which makes even the most splendid periods of their political history a warning and a lesson to the civilized world.

[949] 'Il a créé en 1750 la philosophie de l'histoire dans ses deux
discours prononcés en Sorbonne.' _Cousin_, _Hist. de la
Philosophie_, I. série, vol. i. p. 147. There is a short notice
of these striking productions in _Condorcet_, _Vie de Turgot_,
pp. 11-16.

[950] Nothing can be better than his summary of this vast conception:
'Tous les ages sont enchaînés par une suite de causes et d'effets
qui lient l'état du monde à tous ceux qui l'ont précédé.' _Second
Discours en Sorbonne_, in _[OE]uvres de Turgot_, vol. ii. p. 52.
Every thing Turgot wrote on history is a development of this
pregnant sentence. That he understood the necessity of an
historian being acquainted with physical science, and with the
laws of the configuration of the earth, climate, soil, and the
like, is evident in his fragment, _La Géographie Politique_, in
_[OE]uvres_, vol. ii. pp. 166-208. It is no slight proof of his
political sagacity, that in 1750 he distinctly foretold the
freedom of the American colonies. Compare _[OE]uvres de Turgot_,
vol. ii. p. 66, with _Mém. sur Turgot_, vol. i. p. 139.

[951] A confidence which is apparent in his economical as well as in his
historical works. In 1811, Sir James Mackintosh writes, that
Turgot 'had more comprehensive views of the progress of society
than any man since Bacon:' _Mem. of Mackintosh_, vol. ii. p. 133;
and see a similar remark by Dugald Stewart, in his _Philos. of
the Mind_, vol. i. p. 246.