Chapter VII (2)

In such a state of things as this, it was impossible that a body like the Jesuits should hold their ground. They were the last defenders of authority and tradition, and it was natural that they should fall in an age when statesmen were sceptics, and theologians were Calvinists. Even the people had already marked them for destruction; and when Damiens, in 1757, attempted to assassinate the king, it was generally believed that they were the instigators of the act.[1007] This we now know to be false; but the existence of such a rumour is evidence of the state of the popular mind. At all events, the doom of the Jesuits was fixed. In April 1761, parliament ordered their constitutions to be laid before them.[1008] In August, they were forbidden to receive novices, their colleges were closed, and a number of their most celebrated works were publicly burned by the common hangman.[1009] Finally, in 1762, another edict appeared, by which the Jesuits were condemned without even being heard in their own defence;[1010] their property was directed to be sold, and their order secularized; they were declared 'unfit to be admitted into a well-governed country,' and their institute and society were formally abolished.[1011]

[1007] 'The Jesuits are charged by the vulgar as promoters of that
attempt.' Letter from Stanley, written in 1761, in _Chatham
Correspond._ vol. ii. p. 127. Compare _Campan_, _Mém. de Marie
Antoinette_, vol. iii. pp. 19, 21; _Sismondi_, _Hist. des
Franç._ vol. xxix. pp. 111, 227.

[1008] _Lavallée_, _Hist. des Français_, vol. iii. p. 476.

[1009] _Flassan_, _Diplomatie Franç._ vol. vi. p. 491.

[1010] 'Sans que les accusés eussent été entendus.' _Lavallée_, vol.
iii. p. 477. 'Pas un seul n'a été entendu dans leur cause.'
_Barruel sur l'Hist. du Jacobinisme_, vol. ii. p. 264.

[1011] _Lavallée_, iii. p. 477; _Flassan_, vi. pp. 504, 505; _Sismondi_,
xxix. p. 234; and the letters written by Diderot, who, though he
was in Paris at the time, gives rather an incomplete account,
_Mém. de Diderot_, vol. ii. pp. 127, 130-132.

Such was the way in which this great society, long the terror of the world, fell before the pressure of public opinion. What makes its fall the more remarkable, is, that the pretext which was alleged to justify the examination of its constitutions, was one so slight, that no former government would have listened to it for a single moment. This immense spiritual corporation was actually tried by a temporal court for ill faith in a mercantile transaction, and for refusing to pay a sum of money said to be due![1012] The most important body in the Catholic church, the spiritual leaders of France, the educators of her youth, and the confessors of her kings, were brought to the bar, and sued in their collective capacity, for the fraudulent repudiation of a common debt![1013] So marked was the predisposition of affairs, that it was not found necessary to employ for the destruction of the Jesuits any of those arts by which the popular mind is commonly inflamed. The charge upon which they were sentenced, was not that they had plotted against the state; nor that they had corrupted the public morals; nor that they wished to subvert religion. These were the accusations which were brought in the seventeenth century, and which suited the genius of that age. But in the eighteenth century, all that was required was some trifling accident, that might serve as a pretence to justify what the nation had already determined. To ascribe, therefore, this great event to the bankruptcy of a trader, or the intrigues of a mistress,[1014] is to confuse the cause of an act with the pretext under which the act is committed. In the eyes of the men of the eighteenth century, the real crime of the Jesuits was, that they belonged to the past rather than to the present, and that by defending the abuses of ancient establishments, they obstructed the progress of mankind. They stood in the way of the age, and the age swept them from its path. This was the real cause of their abolition: a cause not likely to be perceived by those writers, who, under the guise of historians, are only collectors of the prattle and gossip of courts; and who believe that the destinies of great nations can be settled in the ante-chambers of ministers, and in the councils of kings.

[1012] _Flassan_, _Hist. de la Diplomatie_, vol. vi. pp. 486-488.

[1013] 'Enfin ils furent mis en cause, et le parlement de Paris eut
l'étonnement et la joie de voir les jésuites amenés devant lui
comme de vils banqueroutiers.' _Lacretelle_, _XVIII^e Siècle_,
vol. ii. p. 252. 'Condemned in France as fraudulent traders.'
_Schlosser's Eighteenth Century_, vol. iv. p. 451.

[1014] Several writers attribute the destruction of the Jesuits to the
exertions of Madame de Pompadour!

After the fall of the Jesuits, there seemed to be nothing remaining which could save the French church from immediate destruction.[1015] The old theological spirit had been for some time declining, and the clergy were suffering from their own decay even more than from the attacks made upon them. The advance of knowledge was producing in France the same results as those which I have pointed out in England; and the increasing attractions of science drew off many illustrious men, who in a preceding age would have been active members of the spiritual profession. That splendid eloquence, for which the French clergy had been remarkable, was now dying away, and there were no longer heard the voices of those great orators, at whose bidding the temples had formerly been filled.[1016] Massillon was the last of that celebrated race who had so enthralled the mind, and the magic of whose fascination it is even now hard to withstand. He died in 1742; and after him the French clergy possessed no eminent men of any kind, neither thinkers, nor orators, nor writers.[1017] Nor did there seem the least possibility of their recovering their lost position. While society was advancing they were receding. All the sources of their power were dried up. They had no active leaders; they had lost the confidence of government; they had forfeited the respect of the people; they had become a mark for the gibes of the age.[1018]

[1015] Choiseul is reported to have said of the Jesuits: 'leur éducation
détruite, tous les autres corps religieux tomberont
d'eux-mêmes.' _Barruel_, _Hist. du Jacobinisme_, vol. i. p. 63.

[1016] In 1771, Horace Walpole writes from Paris that the churches and
convents were become so empty, as to 'appear like abandoned
theatres destined to destruction;' and this he contrasts with
his former experience of a different state of things. _Walpole's
Letters_, vol. v. p. 310, edit. 1840.

[1017] 'So low had the talents of the once illustrious church of France
fallen, that in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when
Christianity itself was assailed, not one champion of note
appeared in its ranks; and when the convocation of the clergy,
in 1770, published their famous anathema against the dangers of
unbelief, and offered rewards for the best essays in defence of
the Christian faith, the productions called forth were so
despicable that they sensibly injured the cause of religion.'
_Alison's Hist. of Europe_, vol. i. pp. 180, 181.

[1018] In 1766, the Rev. William Cole writes to Alban Butler: 'I
travelled to Paris through Lille and Cambray in their public
voitures, and was greatly scandalized and amazed at the open and
unreserved disrespect, both of the trading and military people,
for their clergy and religious establishment. When I got to
Paris, it was much worse.' _Ellis's Original Letters_, second
series, vol. iv. p. 485. See also _Walpole's Letters to Lady
Ossory_, vol. ii. p. 513, edit. 1848; and the complaint made at
Besançon in 1761, in _Lepan_, _Vie de Voltaire_, p. 113.

It does, at first sight, seem strange that, under these circumstances, the French clergy should have been able, for nearly thirty years after the abolition of the Jesuits, to maintain their standing, so as to interfere with impunity in public affairs.[1019] The truth, however, is, that this temporary reprieve of the ecclesiastical order was owing to that movement which I have already noticed, and by virtue of which the French intellect, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, changed the ground of its attack, and, directing its energies against political abuses, neglected in some degree those spiritual abuses to which its attention had been hitherto confined. The result was, that in France the government enforced a policy which the great thinkers had indeed originated, but respecting which they were becoming less eager. The most eminent Frenchmen were beginning their attacks upon the state, and in the heat of their new warfare they slackened their opposition to the church. But in the mean time, the seeds they had sown germinated in the state itself. So rapid was the march of affairs, that those anti-ecclesiastical opinions which, a few years earlier, were punished as the paradoxes of designing men, were now taken up and put into execution by senators and ministers. The rulers of France carried into effect principles which had hitherto been simply a matter of theory; and thus it happened, as is always the case, that practical statesmen only apply and work out ideas which have long before been suggested by more advanced thinkers.

[1019] And also to retain their immense property, which, when the
Revolution occurred, was estimated at 80,000,000_l._ English
money, bringing in a yearly revenue of 'somewhat under
75,000,000 francs.' _Alison's Europe_, vol. i. p. 183, vol. ii.
p. 20, vol. xiv. pp. 122, 123.

Hence it followed, that at no period during the eighteenth century did the speculative classes and practical classes thoroughly combine against the church: since, in the first half of the century, the clergy were principally assailed by the literature, and not by the government; in the latter half of the century, by the government, and not by the literature. Some of the circumstances of this singular transition have been already stated, and I hope clearly brought before the mind of the reader. I now purpose to complete the generalization, by proving that a corresponding change was taking place in all other branches of inquiry; and that, while in the first period attention was chiefly directed towards mental phenomena, it was in the second period more directed towards physical phenomena. From this, the political movement received a vast accession of strength. For the French intellect, shifting the scene of its labours, diverted the thoughts of men from the internal to the external, and concentrating attention upon their material rather than upon their spiritual wants, turned against the encroachments of the state an hostility formerly reserved for the encroachments of the church. Whenever a tendency arises to prefer what comes from without to what comes from within, and thus to aggrandize matter at the expense of mind, there will also be a tendency to believe that an institution which hampers our opinions is less hurtful than one which controls our acts. Precisely in the same way, men who reject the fundamental truths of religion, will care little for the extent to which those truths are perverted. Men who deny the existence of the Deity and the immortality of the soul, will take no heed of the way in which a gross and formal worship obscures those sublime doctrines. All the idolatry, all the ceremonials, all the pomp, all the dogmas, and all the traditions by which religion is retarded, will give them no disquietude, because they consider the opinions that are checked to be equally false with those that are favoured. Why should they, to whom transcendental truths are unknown, labour to remove the superstitions which darken the truths? Such a generation, so far from attacking ecclesiastical usurpations, would rather look on the clergy as convenient tools to ensnare the ignorant and control the vulgar. Therefore it is that we rarely hear of a sincere atheist being a zealous polemic. But if that should occur, which a century ago occurred in France; if it should happen that men of great energy, and actuated by the feelings I have described, were to find themselves in the presence of a political despotism,--they would direct against it the whole of their powers; and they would act with the more determined vigour, because, believing that their all was at stake, temporal happiness would be to them not only the first, but also the sole consideration.

It is from this point of view that the progress of those atheistical opinions, which now rose in France, becomes a matter of great though painful interest. And the date at which they appeared, fully corroborates what I have just said respecting the change that took place in the middle of the eighteenth century. The first great work in which they were openly promulgated, was the celebrated Encyclopædia, published in 1751.[1020] Before that time such degrading opinions, though occasionally broached, were not held by any men of ability; nor could they in the preceding state of society have made much impression upon the age. But during the latter half of the eighteenth century, they affected every department of French literature. Between 1758 and 1770, atheistical tenets rapidly gained ground;[1021] and in 1770 was published the famous work, called the _System of Nature_; the success, and, unhappily, the ability of which, makes its appearance an important epoch in the history of France. Its popularity was immense;[1022] and the views it contains are so clearly and methodically arranged, as to have earned for it the name of the code of atheism.[1023] Five years later, the Archbishop of Toulouse, in a formal address to the king on behalf of the clergy, declared that atheism had now become the prevailing opinion.[1024] This, like all similar assertions, must have been an exaggeration; but that there was a large amount of truth in it, is known to whoever has studied the mental habits of the generation immediately preceding the Revolution. Among the inferior class of writers, Damilaville, Deleyre, Maréchal, Naigeon, Toussaint, were active supporters of that cold and gloomy dogma, which, in order to extinguish the hope of a future life, blots out from the mind of man the glorious instincts of his own immortality.[1025] And, strange to say, several even of the higher intellects were unable to escape the contagion. Atheism was openly advocated by Condorcet, by D'Alembert, by Diderot, by Helvétius, by Lalande, by Laplace, by Mirabeau, and by Saint Lambert.[1026] Indeed, so thoroughly did all this harmonize with the general temper, that in society men boasted of what, in other countries, and in other days, has been a rare and singular error, an eccentric taint, which those affected by it were willing to conceal. In 1764 Hume met, at the house of Baron d'Holbach, a party of the most celebrated Frenchmen then residing in Paris. The great Scotchman, who was no doubt aware of the prevailing opinion, took occasion to raise an argument as to the existence of an atheist, properly so called; for his own part, he said, he had never chanced to meet with one. 'You have been somewhat unfortunate,' replied Holbach; 'but at the present moment you are sitting at table with seventeen of them.'[1027]

[1020] M. Barante (_Littérature Française au XVIII^e Siècle_, p. 94)
says, 'On arriva bientôt à tout nier; déjà l'incrédulité avait
rejeté les preuves divines de la révélation, et avait abjuré les
devoirs et les souvenirs chrétiens; on vit alors l'athéisme
lever un front plus hardi, et proclamer que tout sentiment
religieux était une rêverie et un désordre de l'esprit humain.
C'est de l'époque de l'Encyclopédie que datent les écrits où
cette opinion est le plus expressément professée. Ils furent peu
imités.' This last sentence is erroneous, I am sorry to say.

[1021] 'Dans un intervalle de douze années, de 1758 à 1770, la
littérature française fut souillée par un grand nombre
d'ouvrages où l'athéisme étoit ouvertement professé.'
_Lacretelle_, _XVIII^e Siècle_, vol. ii. p. 310.

[1022] Voltaire, who wrote against it, mentions its diffusion among all
classes, and says it was read by 'des savants, des ignorants,
des femmes.' _Dict. Philos._ article _Dieu_, section iv., in
_[OE]uvres de Voltaire_, vol. xxxviii. p. 366: see also vol.
lxvii. p. 260; _Longchamp et Wagnière_, _Mém. sur Voltaire_,
vol. i. pp. 13, 334; _Lettres inédites de Voltaire_, vol. ii.
pp. 210, 216; and a letter from him in _Correspond. de
Dudeffand_, vol. ii. p. 329. Compare _Tennemann_, _Gesch. der
Philos._ vol. xi. p. 320: 'mit ungetheiltem Beifalle aufgenommen
worden und grossen Einfluss gehabt hat.'

[1023] 'Le code monstrueux d'athéisme.' _Biog. Univ._ vol. xxix. p. 88.
Morellet, who in such matters was by no means a harsh judge,
says, '_Le Système de la Nature_, surtout, est un catéchisme
d'athéisme complet.' _Mém. de Morellet_, vol. i. p. 133.
Stäudlin (_Gesch. der theolog. Wissenschaften_, vol. ii. p. 440)
calls it 'ein System des entschiedenen Atheismus:' while
Tennemann, who has given by far the best account of it I have
met with, says, 'Es machte bei seinem Erscheinen gewaltiges
Aufsehen, und ist fast immer als das Handbuch des Atheismus
betrachtet worden.' _Gesch. der Philos._ vol. xi. p. 349.

[1024] 'Le monstrueux athéisme est devenu l'opinion dominante.'
_Soulavie_, _Règne de Louis XVI_, vol. iii. p. 16: the address
of the archbishop with a deputation, 'muni des pouvoirs de
l'assemblée générale du clergé,' in September 1775.

[1025] _Biog. Univ._ vol. x. pp. 471, 669, vol. xxvii. p. 8, vol. xxx.
p. 542; _Mém. de Brissot_, vol. i. p. 305; _Tocqueville_, _Règne
de Louis XV_, vol. ii. p. 77.

[1026] _Mem. of Mallet du Pan_, vol. i. p. 50; _Soulavie_, _Règne de
Louis XVI_, vol. v. p. 127; _Barruel_, _Hist. du Jacobin._, vol.
i. pp. 104, 135, 225, vol. ii. p. 23, vol. iii. p. 200; _Life of
Romilly_, vol. i. pp. 46, 145; _Stäudlin_, _Theolog.
Wissenschaften_, vol. ii. p. 440; _Georgel_, _Mém._ vol. ii. pp.
250, 350; _Grimm_, _Correspond._ vol. xv. p. 87; _Mém. de
Morellet_, vol. i. p. 130; _Lepan_, _Vie de Voltaire_, p. 369;
_Tennemann_, _Gesch. der Philos._ vol. xi. p. 350; _Musset
Pathay_, _Vie de Rousseau_, vol. ii. pp. 177, 297; _Mém. de
Genlis_, vol. v. p. 180; _Hitchcock's Geol._ p. 263; _Mém.
d'Epinay_, vol. ii. pp. 63, 66, 76.

[1027] This was related to Romilly by Diderot. _Life of Romilly_,
vol. i. pp. 131, 132: see also _Burton's Life of Hume_, vol. ii.
pp. 220. Priestley, who visited France in 1774, says, that 'all
the philosophical persons to whom I was introduced at Paris
(were) unbelievers in Christianity, and even professed
atheists.' _Priestley's Memoirs_, vol. i. p. 74. See also a
letter by Horace Walpole, written from Paris in 1765 (_Walpole's
Letters_, edit. 1840, vol. v. p. 96): 'their avowed doctrine is
atheism.'

This, sad as it is, only forms a single aspect of that immense movement, by which, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, the French intellect was withdrawn from the study of the internal, and concentrated upon that of the external world. Of this tendency, we find an interesting instance in the celebrated work of Helvétius, unquestionably the ablest and most influential treatise on morals which France produced at this period. It was published in 1758;[1028] and, although it bears the title of an essay on 'the Mind,' it does not contain a single passage from which we could infer that the mind, in the sense in which the word is commonly used, has any existence. In this work, which, during fifty years, was the code of French morals, principles are laid down which bear exactly the same relation to ethics that atheism bears to theology. Helvétius, at the beginning of his inquiry, assumes, as an incontestable fact, that the difference between man and other animals is the result of a difference in their external form; and that if, for example, our wrists, instead of ending with hands and flexible fingers, had merely ended like a horse's foot, we should have always remained wanderers on the face of the earth, ignorant of every art, entirely defenceless, and having no other concern but to avoid the attacks of wild beasts, and find the needful supply of our daily food.[1029] That the structure of our bodies is the sole cause of our boasted superiority, becomes evident, when we consider that our thoughts are simply the product of two faculties, which we have in common with all other animals; namely, the faculty of receiving impressions from external objects, and the faculty of remembering those impressions after they are received.[1030] From this, says Helvétius, it follows, that the internal powers of man being the same as those of all other animals, our sensibility and our memory would be useless, if it were not for those external peculiarities by which we are eminently distinguished, and to which we owe every thing that is most valuable.[1031] These positions being laid down, it is easy to deduce all the essential principles of moral actions. For, memory being merely one of the organs of physical sensibility,[1032] and judgment being only a sensation,[1033] all notions of duty and of virtue must be tested by their relation to the senses; in other words, by the gross amount of physical enjoyment to which they give rise. This is the true basis of moral philosophy. To take any other view, is to allow ourselves to be deceived by conventional expressions, which have no foundation except in the prejudices of ignorant men. Our vices and our virtues are solely the result of our passions; and our passions are caused by our physical sensibility to pain and to pleasure.[1034] It was in this way that the sense of justice first arose. To physical sensibility men owe pleasure and pain; hence the feeling of their own interests, and hence the desire of living together in societies. Being assembled in society, there grew up the notion of a general interest, since, without it, society could not hold together; and, as actions are only just or unjust in proportion as they minister to this general interest, a measure was established, by which justice is discriminated from injustice.[1035] With the same inflexible spirit, and with great fullness of illustration, Helvétius examines the origin of those other feelings which regulate human actions. Thus, he says that both ambition and friendship are entirely the work of physical sensibility. Men yearn after fame, on account either of the pleasure which they expect the mere possession of it will give, or else as the means of subsequently procuring other pleasures.[1036] As to friendship, the only use of it is to increase our pleasures or mitigate our pains; and it is with this object that a man longs to hold communion with his friend.[1037] Beyond this, life has nothing to offer. To love what is good for the sake of the goodness, is as impossible as to love what is bad for the sake of the evil.[1038] The mother who weeps for the loss of her child, is solely actuated by selfishness; she mourns because a pleasure is taken from her, and because she sees a void difficult to fill up.[1039] So it is, that the loftiest virtues, as well as the meanest vices, are equally caused by the pleasure we find in the exercise of them.[1040] This is the great mover and originator of all. Every thing that we have, and every thing that we are, we owe to the external world; nor is Man himself aught else except what he is made by the objects which surround him.[1041]

[1028] _Biog. Univ._ vol. xx. p. 29.

[1029] 'Si la nature, au lieu de mains et de doigts flexibles, eût
terminé nos poignets par un pied de cheval; qui doute que les
hommes, sans art, sans habitations, sans défense contre les
animaux, tout occupés du soin de pourvoir à leur nourriture et
d'éviter les bêtes féroces, ne fussent encore errants dans les
forêts comme des troupeaux fugitifs?' _Helvétius_, _De
l'Esprit_, vol. i. p. 2. Had Helvétius ever read the attack of
Aristotle against Anaxagoras for asserting that [Greek: dia to
cheiroas echein, phronimôtaton einai tôn zôôn ton anthrôpon]?
_Cudworth_, _Intellect. Syst._ vol. iii. p. 311.

[1030] _De l'Esprit_, vol. i. p. 2.

[1031] _Ibid._ vol. i. p. 4.

[1032] 'En effet la mémoire ne peut être qu'un des organes de la
sensibilité physique.' vol. i. p. 6. Compare what M. Lepelletier
says on this, in his _Physiologie Médicale_, vol. iii. p. 272.

[1033] 'D'où je conclus que tout jugement n'est qu'une sensation.' _De
l'Esprit_, vol. i. p. 10; '_juger_, comme je l'ai déjà prouvé,
n'est proprement que _sentir_.' p. 41.

[1034] 'Né sensible à la douleur et au plaisir, c'est à la sensibilité
physique que l'homme doit ses passions; et à ses passions, qu'il
doit tous ses vices et toutes ses vertus.' _Ibid._ vol. ii. p.
53; and see vol. i. p. 239.

[1035] 'Une fois parvenu à cette vérité, je découvre facilement la
source des vertus humaines; je voie que sans la sensibilité à la
douleur et au plaisir physique, les hommes, sans désirs, sans
passions, également indifférents à tout, n'eussent point connu
d'intérêt personnel; que sans intérêt personnel ils ne se
fussent point rassemblés en société, n'eussent point fait
entr'eux de conventions, qu'il n'y eût point eu d'intérêt
général, par conséquent point d'actions justes ou injustes; et
qu'ainsi la sensibilité physique et l'intérêt personnel ont été
les auteurs de toute justice.' _Ibid._ vol. i. p. 278.

[1036] _De l'Esprit_, vol. ii. pp. 19, 20, 30, 34, 293, 294, 318.
Compare Epicurus, in _Diog. Laert. de Vit. Philos._ lib. x. seg.
120, vol. i. p. 654.

[1037] _De l'Esprit_, vol. ii. p. 45. He sums up: 'il s'ensuit que
l'amitié, ainsi que l'avarice, l'orgueil, l'ambition et les
autres passions, est l'effet immédiat de la sensibilité
physique.'

[1038] 'Il lui est aussi impossible d'aimer le bien pour le bien, que
d'aimer le mal pour le mal.' _Ibid._ vol. i. p. 73.

[1039] _Ibid._ vol. ii. p. 249.

[1040] _Ibid._ vol. ii. p. 58.

[1041] 'Nous sommes uniquement ce que nous font les objets qui nous
environnent.' _Ibid._ vol. ii. p. 306.

The views put forward in this celebrated work I have stated at some length; not so much on account of the ability with which they are advocated, as on account of the clue they furnish to the movements of a most remarkable age. Indeed, so completely did they harmonize with the prevailing tendencies, that they not only quickly obtained for their author a vast European reputation,[1042] but, during many years, they continued to increase in influence, and, in France in particular, they exercised great sway.[1043] As that was the country in which they arose, so also was it the country to which they were best adapted. Madame Dudeffand, who passed her long life in the midst of French society, and was one of the keenest observers of her time, has expressed this with great happiness. The work of Helvétius, she says, is popular, since he is the man who has told to all their own secret.[1044]

[1042] Saint Surin, a zealous opponent of Helvétius, admits that 'les
étrangers les plus éminents par leurs dignités ou par leurs
lumières, désiraient d'être introduits chez un philosophe dont
le nom retentissait dans toute l'Europe.' _Biog. Univ._ vol. xx.
p. 33.

[1043] Brissot (_Mémoires_, vol. i. p. 339) says, that in 1775, 'le
système d'Helvétius avait alors la plus grande vogue.' Turgot,
who wrote against it, complains that it was praised 'avec une
sorte de fureur' (_[OE]uvres de Turgot_, vol. ix. p. 297); and
Georgel (_Mémoires_, vol. ii. p. 256) says, 'ce livre, écrit
avec un style plein de chaleur et d'images, se trouvoit sur
toutes les toilettes.'

[1044] 'D'ailleurs le siècle de Louis XV se reconnut dans l'ouvrage
d'Helvétius, et on prête à Mme. Dudeffand ce mot fin et profond:
"C'est un homme qui a dit le secret de tout le monde."'
_Cousin_, _Hist. de la Philos._ I. série, vol. iii. p. 201.
Compare _Corresp. de Dudeffand_, vol. i. p. xxii.; and a similar
sentiment in _Mém. de Roland_, vol. i. p. 104. The relation of
Helvétius's work to the prevailing philosophy is noticed in
_Comte's Philos. Pos._ vol. iii. pp. 791, 792. vol. v.
pp. 744, 745.

True it was, that, to the contemporaries of Helvétius, his views, notwithstanding their immense popularity, bore the appearance of a secret; because the connexion between them and the general march of events was, as yet, but dimly perceived. To us, however, who, after this interval of time, can examine the question with the resources of a larger experience, it is obvious how such a system met the wants of an age of which it was the exponent and the mouthpiece. That Helvétius must have carried with him the sympathies of his countrymen, is clear, not only from the evidence we have of his success, but also from a more comprehensive view of the general complexion of those times. Even while he was still pursuing his labours, and only four years before he published them, a work appeared in France, which, though displaying greater ability, and possessing a higher influence than that of Helvétius, did, nevertheless, point in exactly the same direction. I allude to the great metaphysical treatise by Condillac, in many respects one of the most remarkable productions of the eighteenth century; and the authority of which, during two generations, was so irresistible, that, without some acquaintance with it, we cannot possibly understand the nature of those complicated movements by which the French Revolution was brought about.

In 1754,[1045] Condillac put forth his celebrated work on the mind; the very title of which was a proof of the bias with which it was written. Although this profound thinker aimed at nothing less than an exhaustive analysis of the human faculties, and although he is pronounced by a very able, but hostile critic, to be the only metaphysician France produced during the eighteenth century,[1046] still he found it utterly impossible to escape from those tendencies towards the external which governed his own age. The consequence was, that he called his work a 'Treatise on Sensations;'[1047] and in it he peremptorily asserts, that every thing we know is the result of sensation; by which he means the effect produced on us by the action of the external world. Whatever may be thought of the accuracy of this opinion, there can be no doubt that it is enforced with a closeness and severity of reasoning which deserves the highest praise. To examine, however, the arguments by which his view is supported, would lead to a discussion foreign to my present object, which is, merely to point out the relation between his philosophy and the general temper of his contemporaries. Without, therefore, pretending to anything like a critical examination of this celebrated book, I will simply bring together the essential positions on which it is based, in order to illustrate the harmony between it and the intellectual habits of the age in which it appeared.[1048]

[1045] _Biog. Univ._ vol. ix. p. 399.

[1046] 'Condillac est le métaphysicien français du XVIII^e siècle.'
_Cousin_, _Hist. de la Philos._ I. série, vol. iii. p. 83.

[1047] 'Traité des Sensations,' which, as M. Cousin says, is, 'sans
comparaison, le chef-d'[oe]uvre de Condillac.' _Hist. de la
Philos._ II. série, vol. ii. p. 77.

[1048] On the immense influence of Condillac, compare _Renouard_, _Hist.
de la Médecine_, vol. ii. p. 355; _Cuvier_, _Eloges_, vol. iii.
p. 387; _Broussais_, _Cours de Phrénologie_, pp. 45, 68-71, 829;
_Pinel_, _Alién. Mentale_, p. 94; _Brown's Philos. of the Mind_,
p. 212.

The materials from which the philosophy of Condillac was originally drawn, were contained in the great work published by Locke about sixty years before this time. But though much of what was most essential was borrowed from the English philosopher, there was one very important point in which the disciple differed from his master. And this difference is strikingly characteristic of the direction which the French intellect was now taking. Locke, with some looseness of expression, and possibly with some looseness of thought, had asserted the separate existence of a power of reflection, and had maintained that by means of that power the products of sensation became available.[1049] Condillac, moved by the prevailing temper of his own time, would not hear of such a distinction. He, like most of his contemporaries, was jealous of any claim which increased the authority of the internal, and weakened that of the external. He, therefore, altogether rejects the faculty of reflection as a source of our ideas; and this partly because it is but the channel through which ideas run from the senses, and partly because in its origin it is itself a sensation.[1050] Therefore, according to him, the only question is as to the way in which our contact with nature supplies us with ideas. For in this scheme, the faculties of man are solely caused by the operation of his senses. The judgments which we form are, says Condillac, often ascribed to the hand of the Deity; a convenient mode of reasoning, which has only arisen from the difficulty of analyzing them.[1051] By considering how our judgments actually arise, we can alone remove these obscurities. The fact is, that the attention we give to an object is nothing but the sensation which that object excites;[1052] and what we call abstract ideas are merely different ways of being attentive.[1053] Ideas being thus generated, the subsequent process is very simple. To attend to two ideas at the same time, is to compare them; so that comparison is not a result of attention, but is rather the attention itself.[1054] This at once gives us the faculty of judging, because directly we institute a comparison, we do of necessity form a judgment.[1055] Thus, too, memory is a transformed sensation;[1056] while the imagination is nothing but memory, which, being carried to its highest possible vivacity, makes what is absent appear to be present.[1057] The impressions we receive from the external world being, therefore, not the cause of our faculties, but being the faculties themselves, the conclusion to which we are driven is inevitable. It follows, says Condillac, that in man nature is the beginning of all; that to nature we owe the whole of our knowledge; that we only instruct ourselves according to her lessons; and that the entire art of reasoning consists in continuing the work which she has appointed us to perform.[1058]

[1049] Whether or not Locke held that reflection is an independent as
well as a separate faculty, is uncertain; because passages could
be quoted from his writings to prove either the affirmative or
the negative. Dr. Whewell justly remarks, that Locke uses the
word so vaguely as to 'allow his disciples to make of his
doctrines what they please.' _History of Moral Philosophy_,
1852, p. 71.

[1050] 'Locke distingue deux sources de nos idées, les sens et la
réflexion. Il seroit plus exact de n'en reconnoître qu'une, soit
parceque la réflexion n'est dans son principe que la sensation
même, soit parce qu'elle est moins la source des idées que le
canal par lequel elles découlent des sens.' _Condillac_, _Traité
des Sensations_, p. 13: see also, at pp. 19, 216, the way in
which sensation becomes reflection; and the summing up, at p.
416, 'que toutes nos connoissances viennent des sens, et
particulièrement du toucher.'

[1051] He says of Mallebranche (_Traité des Sensations_, p. 312), 'ne
pouvant comprendre comment nous formerions nous-mêmes ces
jugemens, il les attribue à Dieu; manière de raisonner fort
commode, et presque toujours la ressource des philosophes.'

[1052] 'Mais à peine j'arrête la vue sur un objet, que les sensations
particulières que j'en reçois sont l'attention même que je lui
donne.' _Traité des Sensations_, p. 16.

[1053] 'Ne sont que différentes manières d'être attentif.' p. 122.

[1054] 'Dès qu'il y a double attention, il y a comparaison; car être
attentif à deux idées ou les comparer, c'est la même chose.'
p. 17.

[1055] 'Dès qu'il y a comparaison, il y a jugement.' p. 65.

[1056] 'La mémoire n'est donc que la sensation transformée.' p. 17.
Compare p. 61.

[1057] 'L'imagination est la mémoire même, parvenue à toute la vivacité
dont elle est susceptible.' p. 78. 'Or j'ai appelé imagination
cette mémoire vive qui fait paroître présent ce qui est absent.'
p. 245.

[1058] 'Il résulte de cette vérité, que la nature commence tout en nous:
aussi ai-je démontré que, dans le principe ou dans le
commencement, nos connoissances sont uniquement son ouvrage, que
nous ne nous instruisons que d'après ses leçons, et que tout
l'art de raisonner consisté à continuer comme elle nous a fait
commencer.' p. 178.

It is so impossible to mistake the tendency of these views, that I need not attempt to estimate their result otherwise than by measuring the extent to which they were adopted. Indeed, the zeal with which they were now carried into every department of knowledge, can only surprise those who, being led by their habits of mind to study history in its separate fragments, have not accustomed themselves to consider it as an united whole, and who, therefore, do not perceive that in every great epoch there is some one idea at work, which is more powerful than any other, and which shapes the events of the time and determines their ultimate issue. In France, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, this idea was, the inferiority of the internal to the external. It was this dangerous but plausible principle which drew the attention of men from the church to the state; which was seen in Helvétius the most celebrated of the French moralists, and in Condillac the most celebrated of the French metaphysicians. It was this same principle which, by increasing, if I may so say, the reputation of Nature, induced the ablest thinkers to devote themselves to a study of her laws, and to abandon those other pursuits which had been popular in the preceding age. In consequence of this movement, such wonderful additions were made to every branch of physical science, that more new truths concerning the external world were discovered in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century than during all the previous periods put together. The details of these discoveries, so far as they have been subservient to the general purposes of civilization, will be related in another place; at present I will indicate only the most prominent, in order that the reader may understand the course of the subsequent argument, and may see the connexion between them and the French Revolution.

Taking a general view of the external world, we may say, that the three most important forces by which the operations of nature are effected, are heat, light, and electricity; including under this last magnetic and galvanic phenomena. On all these subjects, the French, for the first time, now exerted themselves with signal success. In regard to heat, not only were the materials for subsequent induction collected with indefatigable industry, but before that generation passed away, the induction was actually made; for while the laws of its radiation were worked out by Prevost,[1059] those of its conduction were established by Fourier, who, just before the Revolution, employed himself in raising thermotics to a science by the deductive application of that celebrated mathematical theory which he contrived, and which still bears his name.[1060] In regard to electricity, it is enough to notice, during the same period, the important experiments of D'Alibard, followed by those vast labours of Coulomb, which brought electrical phenomena under the jurisdiction of the mathematics, and thus completed what [OE]pinus had already prepared.[1061] As to the laws of light, those ideas were now accumulating which rendered possible the great steps that, at the close of the century, were taken by Malus, and still later by Fresnel.[1062] Both of these eminent Frenchmen not only made important additions to our knowledge of double refraction, but Malus discovered the polarization of light, undoubtedly the most splendid contribution received by optical science since the analysis of the solar rays.[1063] It was also in consequence of this, that Fresnel began those profound researches which placed on a solid basis that great undulatory theory of which Hooke, Huygens, and above all Young, are to be deemed the founders, and by which the corpuscular theory of Newton was finally overthrown.[1064]

[1059] Compare _Powell on Radiant Heat_, p. 261, in _Second Rep. of
Brit. Assoc._; _Whewell's History of Sciences_, vol. ii. p. 526;
and his _Philosophy_, vol. i. pp. 339, 340. Prevost was
professor at Geneva; but his great views were followed up in
France by Dulong and Petit; and the celebrated theory of dew by
Dr. Wells is merely an application of them. _Herschel's Nat.
Philosophy_, pp. 163, 315, 316. Respecting the further
prosecution of these inquiries, and our present knowledge of
radiant heat, see _Liebig and Kopp's Reports_, vol. i. p. 79,
vol. iii. p. 30, vol. iv. p. 45.

[1060] On Fourier's mathematical theory of conduction, see _Comte_,
_Philos. Positive_, vol. i. pp. 142, 175, 345, 346, 351, vol.
ii. pp. 453, 551; _Prout's Bridgewater Treatise_, pp. 203, 204;
_Kelland on Heat_, p. 6, in _Brit. Assoc. for_ 1841; _Erman's
Siberia_, vol. i. p. 243; _Humboldt's Cosmos_, vol. i. p. 169;
_Hitchcock's Geology_, p. 198; _Pouillet_, _Elémens de
Physique_, ii. 696, 697.

[1061] Coulomb's memoirs on electricity and magnetism were published
from 1782 to 1789. _Fifth Report of Brit. Assoc._ p. 4. Compare
_Liebig and Kopp's Reports_, vol. iii. p. 128; and on his
relation to [OE]pinus, who wrote in 1759, see _Whewell's Induc.
Sciences_, vol. iii. pp. 24-26, 35, 36, and _Haüy_, _Traité de
Minéralogie_, vol. iii. p. 44, vol. iv. p. 14. There is a still
fuller account of what was effected by Coulomb in M. Pouillet's
able work, _Elémens de Physique_, vol. i. part ii. pp. 63-79,
130-135.

[1062] Fresnel belongs to the present century; but M. Biot says that the
researches of Malus began before the passage of the Rhine in
1797. _Biot's Life of Malus_, in _Biog. Univ._ vol. xxvi. p.
412.

[1063] _Pouillet_, _Elémens de Physique_, vol. ii. part ii. pp. 484,
514; _Report of Brit. Assoc. for 1832_, p. 314; _Leslie's Nat.
Philos._ p. 83; _Whewell's Hist. of Sciences_, vol. ii. pp.
408-410; _Philos. of Sciences_, vol. i. p. 350, vol. ii. p. 25;
_Herschel's Nat. Philos._ p. 258.

[1064] The struggle between these rival theories, and the ease with
which a man of such immense powers as Young was put down, and,
as it were, suppressed, by those ignorant pretenders who
presumed to criticize him, will be related in another part of
this work, as a valuable illustration of the history and habits
of the English mind. At present the controversy is finished, so
far as the advocates of emission are concerned; but there are
still difficulties on the other side, which should have
prevented Dr. Whewell from expressing himself with such extreme
positiveness on an unexhausted subject. This able writer says:
'The undulatory theory of light; the only discovery which can
stand by the side of the theory of universal gravitation, as a
doctrine belonging to the same order, for its generality, its
fertility, and its certainty.' _Whewell's Hist. of the Induc.
Sciences_, vol. ii. p. 425; see also p. 508.

Thus much as to the progress of French knowledge respecting those parts of nature which are in themselves invisible, and of which we cannot tell whether they have a material existence, or whether they are mere conditions and properties of other bodies.[1065] The immense value of these discoveries, as increasing the number of known truths, is incontestable: but, at the same time, another class of discoveries was made, which, dealing more palpably with the visible world, and being also more easily understood, produced more immediate results, and, as I shall presently show, exercised a remarkable influence in strengthening that democratic tendency which accompanied the French Revolution. It is impossible, within the limits I have assigned to myself, to give anything like an adequate notion of the marvellous activity with which the French now pushed their researches into every department of the organic and inorganic world; still it is, I think, practicable to compress into a few pages such a summary of the more salient points as will afford the reader some idea of what was done by that generation of great thinkers which flourished in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

[1065] As to the supposed impossibility of conceiving the existence of
matter without properties which give rise to forces (note in
_Paget's Lectures on Pathology_, 1853, vol. i. p. 61), there are
two reasons which prevent me from attaching much weight to it.
First, a conception which, in one stage of knowledge, is called
impossible, becomes, in a later stage, perfectly easy, and so
natural as to be often termed necessary. Secondly, however
indissoluble the connexion may appear between force and matter,
it was not found fatal to the dynamical theory of Leibnitz; it
has not prevented other eminent thinkers from holding similar
views; and the arguments of Berkeley, though constantly
attacked, have never been refuted.

If we confine our view to the globe we inhabit, it must be allowed that chemistry and geology are the two sciences which not only offer the fairest promise, but already contain the largest generalizations. The reason of this will become clear, if we attend to the ideas on which these two great subjects are based. The idea of chemistry, is the study of composition;[1066] the idea of geology, is the study of position. The object of the first is, to learn the laws which govern the properties of matter; the object of the second is, to learn the laws which govern its locality. In chemistry, we experiment; in geology, we observe. In chemistry, we deal with the molecular arrangement of the smallest atoms;[1067] in geology, with the cosmological arrangement of the largest masses. Hence it is that the chemist by his minuteness, and the geologist by his grandeur, touch the two extremes of the material universe; and, starting from these opposite points, have, as I could easily prove, a constantly increasing tendency to bring under their own authority sciences which have at present an independent existence, and which, for the sake of a division of labour, it is still convenient to study separately; though it must be the business of philosophy, properly so called, to integrate them into a complete and effective whole. Indeed it is obvious, that if we knew all the laws of the composition of matter, and likewise all the laws of its position, we should likewise know all the changes of which matter is capable spontaneously, that is, when uninterrupted by the mind of man. Every phenomenon which any given substance presents must be caused either by something taking place in the substance, or else by something taking place out of it, but acting upon it; while what occurs within must be explicable by its own composition, and what occurs without must be due to its position in relation to the objects by which it is affected. This is an exhaustive statement of every possible contingency, and to one of these two classes of laws every thing must be referrible; even those mysterious forces which, whether they be emanations from matter, or whether they be merely properties of matter, must in an ultimate analysis depend either on the internal arrangement, or else on the external locality of their physical antecedents. However convenient, therefore, it may be, in the present state of our knowledge, to speak of vital principles, imponderable fluids, and elastic æthers, such terms can only be provisional, and are to be considered as mere names for that residue of unexplained facts, which it will be the business of future ages to bring under generalizations wide enough to cover and include the whole.

[1066] Every chemical decomposition being only a new form of
composition. _Robin et Verdeil_, _Chimie Anatomique_, vol. i.
pp. 455, 456, 498: 'de tout cela il résulte, que la dissolution
est un cas particulier des combinaisons.'

[1067] What is erroneously called the atomic theory, is, properly
speaking, an hypothesis, and not a theory: but hypothesis though
it be, it is by its aid that we wield the doctrine of definite
proportions, the corner stone of chemistry.

These ideas of composition and of position being thus the basis of all natural science, it is not surprising that chemistry and geology, which are their best, but still their insufficient representatives, should in modern times have made more progress than any other of the great branches of human knowledge. Although the chemists and geologists have not yet risen to the full height of their respective subjects,[1068] there are few things more curious than to note the way in which, during the last two generations, they have been rapidly expanding their views--encroaching on topics with which, at first sight, they appeared to have no concern--making other branches of inquiry tributary to their own--and collecting from every quarter that intellectual wealth which, long hidden in obscure corners, had been wasted in the cultivation of special and inferior pursuits. This, as being one of the great intellectual characteristics of the present age, I shall hereafter examine at considerable length; but what I have now to show is, that in these two vast sciences, which, though still very imperfect, must eventually be superior to all others, the first important steps were made by Frenchmen during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

[1068] Many of them being still fettered, in geology, by the hypothesis
of catastrophes; in chemistry, by the hypothesis of vital
forces.

That we owe to France the existence of chemistry as a science, will be admitted by everyone who uses the word science in the sense in which alone it ought to be understood, namely, as a body of generalizations so irrefragably true, that, though they may be subsequently covered by higher generalizations, they cannot be overthrown by them; in other words, generalizations which may be absorbed, but not refuted. In this point of view, there are in the history of chemistry only three great stages. The first stage was the destruction of the phlogistic theory, and the establishment, upon its ruins, of the doctrines of oxidation, combustion, and respiration. The second stage was the establishment of the principle of definite proportions, and the application to it of the atomic hypothesis. The third stage, above which we have not yet risen, consists in the union of chemical and electrical laws, and in the progress we are making towards fusing into one generalization their separate phenomena. Which of these three stages was in its own age the most valuable, is not now the question; but it is certain that the first of them was the work of Lavoisier, by far the greatest of the French chemists. Before him several important points had been cleared up by the English chemists, whose experiments ascertained the existence of bodies formerly unknown. The links, however, to connect the facts, were still wanting; and until Lavoisier entered the field, there were no generalizations wide enough to entitle chemistry to be called a science; or, to speak more properly, the only large generalization commonly received was that by Stahl, which the great Frenchman proved to be not only imperfect, but altogether inaccurate. A notice of the vast discoveries of Lavoisier will be found in many well-known books:[1069] it is enough to say, that he not only worked out the laws of the oxidation of bodies and of their combustion, but that he is the author of the true theory of respiration, the purely chemical character of which he first demonstrated; thus laying the foundation of those views respecting the functions of food, which the German chemists subsequently developed, and which, as I have proved in the second chapter of this Introduction, may be applied to solve some great problems in the history of Man. The merit of this was so obviously due to France, that though the system now established was quickly adopted in other countries,[1070] it received the name of the French chemistry.[1071] At the same time, the old nomenclature being full of old errors, a new one was required, and here again France took the initiative; since this great reformation was begun by four of her most eminent chemists, who flourished only a few years before the Revolution.[1072]

[1069] See, for instance, _Cuvier_, _Progrès des Sciences_, vol. i.
pp. 32-34, 40; _Liebig's Letters on Chemistry_, p. 282;
_Turner's Chemistry_, vol. i. pp. 184, 185; _Brande's
Chemistry_, vol. i. pp. lxxxv.-lxxxix. 302; _Thomson's Animal
Chemistry_, pp. 520, 634, and a great part of the second volume
of his _History of Chemistry_; also _Müller's Physiol._ vol. i.
pp. 90, 323.

[1070] According to Mr. Harcourt (_Brit. Assoc. Report for 1839_,
p. 10), Cavendish has this merit, so far as England is
concerned: 'He, first of all his contemporaries, did justice to
the rival theory recently proposed by Lavoisier.'

[1071] La chimie française. _Thomson's Hist. of Chemistry_, vol. ii.
pp. 101, 130. On the excitement caused by Lavoisier's views, see
a letter which Jefferson wrote in Paris, in 1789, printed partly
in _Tucker's Life of Jefferson_, vol. i. pp. 314, 315; and at
length in _Jefferson's Correspond._ vol. ii. pp. 453-455.