Chapter LV (3)

I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of
Endius was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was
nevertheless named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the
peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in
which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really
named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to
general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be
nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark
of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and
most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to explain here is,
how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês.
Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the
terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then
have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself,
nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family,
that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his
Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but)
from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian
family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to
his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of
the genitive of his real father’s name. Doubtless this was an
anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are
to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, Thucydidês
would not have stepped aside to particularize it.

[70] Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ
Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, ~πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς~,
ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε
αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (~πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους~, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν
ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἄλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε
ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ~ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς
οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς
Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ~.

[71] Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν ~ὅρκους ἔδωκεν
αὐτοῖς~, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας
αὐτῷ, καὶ ~θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν~, ὡς οὐ τοῦ
τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came?[72] what powers they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all:[73] he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

[72] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου
~πάνυ φιλανθρώπως~, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν
ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες.

[73] Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ
τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ~πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων~, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν
τοὺς Ἀργείους, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding’s Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.[74]

[74] Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.[75]

[75] Thucyd. v, 46.

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted to introduce the envoys—already at hand in the city—from Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.[76]

[76] Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.[77] [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

[77] Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν
ἑκάτεροι.

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.[78]

[78] Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ~ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν~ ἕκαστοι.
The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the
phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ~ἄρχουσιν~
ἑκάτεροι.

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of
troops, required to be left open for application to the actual
time.

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.”

“The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”[79]

[79] Thucyd. v, 47.

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance[80] concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.[81]

[80] Thucyd. v, 48.

[81] Thucyd. v, 48-50.

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.[82] That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legation, or theôry, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.[83] Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was entertained to see what figure the theôry of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

[82] Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ ~Ὀλυμπίοις
τοῖς νυνί~ (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.

[83] Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in
Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the
tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend
were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never
molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose
to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never
disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch,
Aratus, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a
Rhodian theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in
safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little
can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of
420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though
all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the
Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).

Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.[84] But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation, it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

[84] Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were
usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city
in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil.
iii, 3, 12.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;[85] dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself, which it was his purpose to do, both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favor.

[85] Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν
τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας,
~πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι~· διότι ἅρματα
μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε,
καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἄλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης
παρεσκευασάμην.

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless
we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and
the Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself
towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half
of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian
ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few
lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious
that the poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and
_third_, in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest
and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and
_fourth_. Euripidês informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice
and proclaimed twice—δὶς στεφθέντ’ ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι.
Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this
word δὶς to τρὶς, without any authority, which completely alters
the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has
properly restored the word δὶς.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival
remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the
Oratio de Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son
of Alkibiadês at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps
more. Isokratês repeats the loose assertion of Euripidês,
πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The
spurious Oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês
also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I
have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in
themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be
believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century
B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a
very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story
of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine
chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about
Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid.
cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of
the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians,
Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be
substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ.
i, p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at
Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the
seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the
seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same
race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging
to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever
a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since
the course involved going _twelve_ times round the goal (Pindar,
Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race
described by Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to
construe strictly the expression of the poet,—~δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν~
ὄχον,—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to
run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to
the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description
in Sophoklês (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers
indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main
circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the
twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον δωδεκάδρομον) _were_ common to both
(Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).

Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory
at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also
gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be
entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted
from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316)
says: “We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these
chariot-victories of Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly
fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424.”

In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C.
424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that
the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in
the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an
Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send
thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition,
and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary
to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur
just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying
troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued
Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet
time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display
of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass
by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans
occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the
Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from
Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce
for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate
for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals.
The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is
general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians
had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C. without impediment, these
stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning.
But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves
that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended
with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but
immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all
suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there
was only _one_ chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all
the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that
in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained _the_ prize: thus
implying that Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the
same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of
these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and
unfounded.

We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the
stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were
not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or
batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat,
and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh
heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was
sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much
more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in
case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger
would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory
of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five
days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of
spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained
chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of
them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two
that was it is impossible to say.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man, two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that _they_ were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.[86]

[86] Thucyd. v, 49, 50.

As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception of Lepreum—were present by their theôries[87] as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan theôry “shone by its absence” in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster,[88] that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand hoplites from Mantineia as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing. Lichas,[89] a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.[90] Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.[91] The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

[87] Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας
καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν
Λεπρεατῶν.

[88] Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων
μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε
Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.

[89] See a previous note, p. 56.

[90] Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι
ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους,
καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς
ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος
δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and
harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more
serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the
Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder
or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him
in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered
and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out,
and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to
strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the
dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).

[91] It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered
and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve
years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph.
Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.[92]

[92] Thucyd. v, 51, 52.