Chapter LXI (2)

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus. He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he possessed established connections among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê. So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen in the way—off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon—and pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.[568]

[568] Thucyd. viii, 17-19.

It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks:—

“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king.”[569]

[569] Thucyd. viii, 18.

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it.[570] If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.[571] Besides this monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament, which was their great motive for courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up, the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta realized her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian state.

[570] Thucyd. viii, 84-109.

[571] Thucyd. viii, 44.

The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geômori, the proprietors of land, as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that these geômori were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle; two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This revolution secured—and probably nothing less than a democratical revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic affairs—the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such of the geômori as were slain or banished:[572] the remainder were deprived of all political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with any of the families of the remaining citizens.[573] We may fairly suspect that this latter prohibition is only the retaliation of a similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to maintain the purity of their own blood. What they had enacted as a privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.

[572] Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ
ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ~ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς~, μετὰ
Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων
ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε,
τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ
οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ~ὡς
βεβαίοις ἤδη~ ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς
γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ’
ἀγαγέσθαι παρ’ ἐκείνων οὐδ’ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

[573] Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the “higher
people” at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from
Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by
Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot
have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island
would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.

Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191):
“Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed
than all others since their reduction on their former revolt,
were _proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer
through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending
their condition_. The lower people, _having intelligence of their
design_, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of
three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them,” etc. etc.
etc.

“The _massacre and robbery_ were rewarded by a decree of the
Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent
administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the
last rebellion, had been kept _under the immediate control of the
Athenian government_.”

To call this a _massacre_ is perversion of language. It was an
insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the “higher people”
were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by
their conspiracy—which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact—to
introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that
the “lower people” were bound to sit still and see this done? And
what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection;
which inevitably became bloody, because the “higher people” were
a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with
great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants
is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell
on the followers of the geômori. Thucydidês specifies only the
number of the geômori themselves, who were persons of individual
importance.

I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to
himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to
conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control
from Athens, and that it kept the “higher people” in a state of
severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves
by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.

But if he means by the expression, “_under the immediate
control of the Athenian government_,” that there was any
Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here
given by Thucydidês distinctly refutes him. The conflict was
between two intestine parties, “the higher people and the lower
people.” The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews
of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (οἳ
ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an
indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally
of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of
Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the
Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr.
Mitford is pleased to call “rewarding massacre and robbery,” in
the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samos, immediately before this
intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language
of Thucydidês carries to my mind a full conviction that it was
oligarchical, under an exclusive aristocracy, called The Geômori.
Dr. Thirlwall, however (whose candid and equitable narrative of
this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is
of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical
government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when
it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the
government continued democratical during the first years of the
Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of
the Samian exiles at Anæa, whom he looks upon as oligarchical
refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford’s view of the
peculiarly depressed condition of the “higher people” at Samos
at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not
actually in possession of the government. “Still (he says), as
the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged
class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to
regain a part of the substance of power under different forms,
and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient
pretensions on the first opportunity. _That it had not yet
advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because
otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt
from Athens_: and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that
the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree
of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom
the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost
irreparable.” (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.)
Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion.

Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as
certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting
that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly
possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into
act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none
of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of
all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement
of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadês, after securing Chios, considered
Milêtus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover,
peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so
that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milêtus,
being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication
with Tissaphernês, for which reason he might naturally deem it
of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover,
not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several
Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidês, having come
across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of
central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with
the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are
surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not
yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that
no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr.
Thirlwall’s inference, that the government was _not_ oligarchical.

We have no information how or when the oligarchical government
at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively
hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the
Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a
democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself
improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of
Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if
it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a
body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid
of the enemies of Athens.

Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the
passages of Thucydidês, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible
without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon
them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now
in the hands of the oligarchy, or geômori, and that the Demos
rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The
natural sense of the words ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίσταμαι, is that
of _insurrection against an established government: it does
not mean, “a violent attack by one party upon another;” still
less does it mean, “an attack made by a party in possession of
the government:_” which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr.
Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was
now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian
revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydidês has stated
that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next
says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary
force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ~δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν~, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν
πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23—about the apprehended insurrection of
the Helots against the Spartans—ἢν δὲ ἡ δούλεια ~ἐπανίστηται~:
compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444;
Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also δυνατοὶ is among the words which
Thucydidês uses for an oligarchical party, either in government
or in what may be called _opposition_ (i, 24; v, 4). But it is
not conceivable to me that Thucydidês would have employed the
words ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had
at that time been actually in the government.

Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party
under Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὐτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε
πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ~ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς
ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται~. Here the motive of the previous
ἐπανάστασις is clearly noted; it was in order that they might
_not be under an oligarchical government_: for I agree with
Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear
meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense
prevents our construing it, “in order that their democratical
government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon
them,” which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall’s view were
just.

Lastly, viii, 73, we have οἱ γὰρ ~τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες
τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις~—ἐγένοντό
τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ~ὡς δήμῳ
ὄντι~ ἐπιθήσεσθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς
δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος—“those who having risen in arms against
the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy,”
must imply, _that the persons against whom the rising had taken
place had been a governing oligarchy_. Surely, also, the words
μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις, can mean nothing else except to point out
the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at
two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the
first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical
government, and constituted a democratical government. On the
second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very
democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute
themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on
the first occasion, the established government was already
democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not
conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely
persons making use of the powers of a democratical government
to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely
vanishes.

On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at
the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like
that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing
this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the
oligarchy became established there. So long as the island
performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere
with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely
to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between
the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her
apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally
with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to
have been much exaggerated.

The Samian oligarchy, or geômori, dispossessed of the government
on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious
close of the Peloponnesian war,—Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6—where
they are called οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται.

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.[574] The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.[575]

[574] Thucyd. viii, 13.

[575] Thucyd. viii, 20-23.

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen triremes under a Lacedæmonian periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city governments; Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared.[576] The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.[577]

[576] See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. l, pp.
257, 258.

[577] Thucyd. viii, 22.

Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.[578] But he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê—the largest town in that island—very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his endeavors, Methymna as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective homes.[579]

[578] Thucyd. viii, 20.

[579] Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ
~ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός~, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι.

Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been
carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island
from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative.
The land-force _marched along_ by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ
πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων
~παρῄει~ ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydidês does not say
that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê,
prepared to march forward, after that island should have been
conquered, to the Hellespont.

Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν
νεῶν πεζός to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadês
and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five
triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian
seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard
fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this
exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor
and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with
Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These
foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as
those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν
παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ... ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός.

Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ
Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks
of them in his note incorrectly. He says: “The Peloponnesians
who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any
effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians,
being only _the epibatæ_ of five ships.” The fact is that they
were not merely the epibatæ, but the _entire crews_, of five
ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand
men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν ~ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες~ ἐν
Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five
hundred left of them, after some months’ operations and a serious
defeat (viii, 32).

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore; the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself. The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went farther up the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were thêtes armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.[580] They occupied the little islets called Œnussæ, near Chios on the northeast, as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighborhood, but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.

[580] Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. Arnold’s note.

The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt, inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece and the organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years before. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,[581] its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government, in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into extravagance. “Except Sparta (he says),[582] Chios is the only state that I know, which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power.” He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece, and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.

[581] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; Athenæus, vi, p. 265.

[582] Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι
ἐπεξῄσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τὴν χώραν, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ
ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ
μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην, εὐδαιμονήσαντας ἅμα
καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον,
τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.

viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι ... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.[583]

[583] Thucyd. viii, 25, 26.

For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, on the very evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse and two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, and under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C. The remaining thirty-three triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenês, until he could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenês, halting first at the island of Lerus,—off the coast, towards the southward of Milêtus,—was there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came on horseback, in all haste, from Milêtus to the Milesian town of Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milêsians, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.[584]

[584] Thucyd. viii, 26, 27.

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging—as was usual when going into action—at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce themselves with the twenty-five triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by surprise;[585] though strong in situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.[586]

[585] Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced
by the Athenians,—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time
when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical
conspirators,—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed
Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus
(Thucyd. viii, 54).

Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave
omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden
retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance
of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the
Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.

[586] Thucyd. viii, 28.

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa; and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, which marks the low character of many of these Spartan officers,—but the Syracusan Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued.[587] For the present, however, the seamen were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;[588] while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

[587] Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by
what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter
which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us to make out. None
of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some
alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations
given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to
consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and
Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or
of Poppo and Hermann.

[588] Thucyd. viii, 36.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed, the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.[589] So energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.

[589] Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. Arnold’s note.

The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes,—ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian,—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the neighboring islet. He here—in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian general of the district—enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm, from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.[590]

[590] Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus,—at the head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites,—had reached Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Lesbos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned on the next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their liberation.[591]

[591] Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.

The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under Strombichidês—thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing or becoming prisoners.[592] The rest of the Athenian fleet found shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.

[592] Thucyd. viii, 33, 34.

As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.[593] They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, intreating succor, and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.[594] The distress of the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld.

[593] Thucyd. viii, 34-38. Δελφίνιον—~λιμένας~ ἔχον, etc.

That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the
base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last
preparations, against Chios,—was only repeating what they had
once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c.
100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr.
Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of
Chios.

[594] Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the
extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in Athenæus, vi, p. 265.

That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local
legend, connected with the Chapel of the _Kind-hearted Hero_
(Ἥρωος εὐμένους) at Chios.

Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was
universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the
buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.

That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.[595] Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude, had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.[596] Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed,—but additional defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured near Triopium had come in to help,—so that the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milêsians were zealous in the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate mentioned a little above.[597]

[595] See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of
Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x,
Orat. p. 835.

[596] Thucyd. viii, 35-109.

[597] Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ~ἀρκούντως~,
etc.

Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint—such as they soon came to have—against the satrap for irregularity of payment, still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and even before the departure of Theramenês,—whose functions had expired when he had handed over the fleet,—insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect:—

“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions, between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius, or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king, or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies, let each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for, and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king’s territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best power. And if any one within the king’s territory, or within the territory subject to him,[598] shall attack the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend his best defensive aid.”

[598] Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ~ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ, ἢ
ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει~, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων,
βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

The distinction here drawn between _the king’s territory_, and
the territory _over which the king holds empire_, deserves
notice. By the former phrase, is understood, I presume, the
continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together
with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and
peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap
should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had
once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the
plenitude of their power.

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, the same undiminished extent of the king’s dominion, as it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage home, in a small boat, no one knew how.[599]

[599] Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται.