Chapter LX

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS
AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during
the winter of 414-413 B.C.—Invasion of Attica by
Agis and the Peloponnesian force—fortification of
Dekeleia.—Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse,
under Demosthenês.—Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He
determines to attack the Athenians at sea.—Naval combat in
the harbor of Syracuse—the Athenians victorious.—Gylippus
surprises and takes Plemmyrium.—Important consequences
of the capture.—Increased spirits and confidence of the
Syracusans, even for sea-fight.—Efforts of the Syracusans
to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian
towns.—Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans
in the Great Harbor.—Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement
marching to aid Syracuse—Renewed attack by Gylippus
on the Athenians.—Disadvantages of the Athenian fleet
in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in the
narrow space.—Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to
the narrow space.—The Syracusans threaten attack upon
the Athenian naval station.—Additional preparations
of Nikias—battle renewed.—Complete defeat of the
Athenians.—Danger of the Athenian armament—arrival of
Demosthenês with the second armament.—Voyage of Demosthenês
from Korkyra.—Imposing effect of his entry into the Great
Harbor.—Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious
and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês.—Position and
plans of Demosthenês.—Nocturnal march of Demosthenês
to surprise Epipolæ, and turn the Syracusan line of
defence.—Partial success at first—complete and ruinous
defeat finally.—Disorder of the Athenians—great loss
in the flight.—Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive
plans, of the Syracusans.—Deliberation and different
opinions of the Athenian generals.—Demosthenês insists
on departing from Sicily—Nikias opposes him.—Demosthenês
insists at least on removing out of the Great
Harbor.—Nikias refuses to consent to such removal.—The
armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither acting nor
retiring.—Infatuation of Nikias.—Increase of force and
confidence in Syracuse.—Nikias at length consents to
retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated.—Eclipse
of the moon—Athenian retreat postponed.—Eclipses
considered as signs—differently interpreted—opinion of
Philochorus.—Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of
the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor.—Partial success
ashore against Gylippus.—The Syracusans determine to block
up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the
whole Athenian armament.—Large views of the Syracusans
against the power of Athens—new hazards now opened to
endanger that power.—Vast numbers, and miscellaneous
origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for
or against Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the mouth
of the harbor.—The Athenians resolve to force their way
out—preparations made by the generals.—Exhortations of
Nikias on putting the crews aboard.—Agony of Nikias—his
efforts to encourage the officers.—Bold and animated
language of Gylippus to the Syracusan fleet.—Syracusan
arrangements. Condition of the Great Harbor—sympathizing
population surrounding it.—Attempt of the Athenian fleet
to break out—battle in the Great Harbor.—Long-continued
and desperate struggle—intense emotion—total defeat of the
Athenians.—Military operations of ancient times—strong
emotions which accompanied them.—Causes of the defeat of
the Athenians.—Feelings of the victors and vanquished after
the battle.—Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make
a second attempt—the armament are too much discouraged
to obey.—The Athenians determine to retreat by land—they
postpone their retreat, under false communications from
Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept
their retreat.—Retreat of the Athenians—miserable condition
of the army.—Wretchedness arising from abandoning the
sick and wounded.—Attempt of the generals to maintain
some order—energy of Nikias.—Exhortations of Nikias to
the suffering army.—Commencement of the retreat—harassed
and impeded by the Syracusans.—Continued conflict—no
progress made by the retreating army.—Violent storm—effect
produced on both parties—change of feeling in the last
two years.—Night march of the Athenians, in an altered
direction, towards the southern sea.—Separation of
the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The
first division under Nikias gets across the river
Erineus.—The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued,
overtaken, and forced to surrender.—Gylippus overtakes
and attacks the division of Nikias.—Nikias gets to the
river Asinarus—intolerable thirst and suffering of the
soldiers—he and his division become prisoners.—Total
numbers captured.—Hard treatment and sufferings of
the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse.—Treatment of
Nikias and Demosthenês—difference of opinion among the
conquerors.—Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of
Gylippus—both the generals are slain.—Disgrace of Nikias
after his death, at Athens—continued respect for the memory
of Demosthenês.—Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias.—How
far that opinion is just.—Opinion of the Athenians about
Nikias—their steady over-confidence and over-esteem
for him, arising from his respectable and religious
character.—Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest
personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed. 287-352