Chapter LVIII (1)

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted—chiefly through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a counter-manœuvre—with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result.[236] All classes in the city, rich and poor,—cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young, all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens, who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war, the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed, furnished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different in every individual case, according to temper and circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:[237] and it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship, but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.[238]

[236] Thucyd. viii, 1.

[237] Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ
διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ~ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις~, καὶ
τἄλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc.

Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean _the petty
officers_, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστὴς, etc. Göller and Poppo
construe it to mean “_the servants of the sailors_.” Neither
of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means
“to the crews generally;” the word ὑπερησία being a perfectly
general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the
examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this
meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before.
To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning “the crews generally, or
the remaining crews, along with the thranitæ,” is doubtless more
or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction
than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

[238] Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, etc.

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations,[239] and the triremes increased in number, the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the previous war under Periklês, was incomparably superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest, in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in picked men, universal ardor, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added to the public outfit, and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city while the preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of private sympathy and patriotism,—a dash of uneasiness from reflection on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act,—yet an elate confidence in Athenian force, such as had never before been entertained.[240] We hear of Sokratês the philosopher, and Meton the astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies, there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were at once forgotten, or never long remembered.[241]

[239] Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in
Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De
Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an
accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias,
and that four hundred triremes, or three hundred triremes, were
newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those
orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to
deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed
by other testimony; even if we admitted the oration ascribed to
Andokidês as genuine, which in all probability it is not.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that
the sum of three thousand talents at least must have been laid
by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of
Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that
over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition
to discharge, out of the current receipts, various sums which it
had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various
temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and
fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote
passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so
paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for
account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See
Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. 117; also
the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii,
p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the
years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

[240] Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3.

[241] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately
after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry
with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii,
1).

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,[242] so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens,—political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês, was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.[243]

[242] Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. “Melius Græci atque nostri; qui,
ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos,
_incolere_ voluerunt.”

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the
god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated
in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare
Herodotus, v, 67; a striking story, as illustrated in this
History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7;
Livy, xxxviii, 43.

In an Inscription in Boeckh’s Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p.
320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of
which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.

[243] Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48,
4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad
finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller,
Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl.
Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum.
Berlin, 1845.

About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but _one_ which escaped unharmed.[244]

[244] Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ
Ἀθηναίων ... ~μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι~ περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.

Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single
one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὁρᾶτε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν
πατρῷαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, ~μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν
Ἀθήνῃσι~.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13)
copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses
the expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is
noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his
affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the
Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to
this point.

Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that _all_ the Hermæ were mutilated, not
recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular
inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all _thrown
down_ (dejicerentur).

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement.[245] But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians,[246] noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods.[247] If we could imagine the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others:[248] an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences and determining practical measures. Accordingly, they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted.[249]

[245] It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this
mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth,
Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191-196. While he
denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the
subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would
suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental
distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was
a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking
the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the
religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. p. 65),
though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

[246] Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, Ἑρμαῖ. See
Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideæ, cap. 2.

Especially the ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted
at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who
protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo
Aguieus, as well as by Hermes.

[247] Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, Pers. 810; Æschyl. Agam.
339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a
god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is
manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus:
see the argument of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker,
Griechische Tragödien, _Sophoklês_, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162.
Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to
the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition
than that of stark madness, ἐμάνη μεγάλως; Herod. iii, 37-38.

Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.)
represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine
punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by
the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the
god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim.
iv, 3).

The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and
Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to
remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring
after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people
were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the
divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian
Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly
was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

[248] Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 _b_, 881 _d_.
ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p.
404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24.

[249] Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at
Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:—

“We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring
impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly
understand how they could have been associated together as
they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the
difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the
contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who were rather disposed by their
views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch.
xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history,
indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast
with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have
undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however,
have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen
would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our
_disjunction_ of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his
_association_ of the two.

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.[250] It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object, just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of Adonis.[251] The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

[250] Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε
γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων
πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine
magnimultorum consensione esse factam,” etc.

[251] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratês, Fr. Inc. 84, ed.
Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164;
Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other: to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus, and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,[252] prompting them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,[253] would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.[254]

[252] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, Orator.
p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly
contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot
be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan
agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were
exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the
Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the
Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that
no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great
familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of
Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.)
ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we
may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês; who, however, is not
very careful, since he tells us that _Thucydidês_ ascribed that
act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (Philochor.
Frag. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094).

[253] Thucyd. vi, 34.

[254] See Thucyd. v, 45; v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7,
4.

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadês.

Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people,—as it would have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their paramount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes.[255] Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, and more than he knew, about such incidents; while to exercise any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic himself a suspected man, “metuunt dubitasse videri.” To rake out and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance,[256] but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.[257]

[255] See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of
Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. 1, 10).

Ἀσύμφορόν θ’ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ
τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπί τε
τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα ~συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ
γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θ’ αἱ πράξεις
καθίστανται~. ~Οἰκείαν~ οὖν χρὴ τὴν ~τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους~, αὐτῷ
τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν
καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.

Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklês, Œdip.
Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country,
so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute
the soil and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon,
Hiero. iv, 4, and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning
and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ὕβρις) outrage
against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species
of ὕβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that
the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or
banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole
population.

[256] Thucyd. vi, 27.

[257] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20.

The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action; while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.[258] The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses,[259] by parties of revellers caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadês.

[258] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch,
Alkibiad. c. 18.

[259] Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings
and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were
the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded
of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet
separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen
of good family—the Chevalier d’Etallonde and Chevalier de la
Barre—were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured
a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in
aggravation of this offence they were charged with having
sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was
exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to
have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right
hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post
in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow
fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to
the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually
executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre—d’Etallonde having
escaped—in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed
to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time
with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary
and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices
(Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres,
vol. xlii, pp. 361-379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du
Sang Innocent, vol. xii, p. 133).

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how—as in this
mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens—the occurrence of one act of
sacrilege turns men’s imagination, belief, and talk, to others,
real or imaginary:—

“Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit sécrètement cette trame, il
arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont
d’Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l’on soupçonna que des soldats
ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.

“Malheureusement l’evêque d’Amiens, étant aussi evêque
d’Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une
importance qu’elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires:
il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; _et
on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année
entière_. On disoit qu’il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui
brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties,
et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu’ils avoient
répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en
avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux
répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l’Europe. Vous
connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu’à quel point la populace porte la
credulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

“La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de
délations. Chacun disoit ce qu’il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu’il
avoit entendu ou cru entendre.”

It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de
la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular
judicature, but by a limited court of professional judges sitting
at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris,
the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that the trireme of Lamachus—who was doubtless more diligent about the military details than either of his two colleagues—was already moored in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held for the departing officers,[260] who probably laid before their countrymen an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiadês. “Athenians,” said he, “you are going to despatch this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement prove untrue.” While Alkibiadês strenuously denied the allegation, the prytanes—senators presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes—at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave—Andromachus by name—whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had offered.[261]

[260] Andokidês (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely—Ἦν
μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ
Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριήρης ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμει ἡ
Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, etc.

[261] Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding,—probably in substance true,—enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done, they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ,—for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done, of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,—they calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects in Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve, manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos and Mantineia were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.[262]

[262] Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. 7,
8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily,
in a very inaccurate manner.

But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the trial until a certain number of days after his return.[263] Such was the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.[264]

[263] Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ’ ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα,
μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται,
θεραπεύων ὅτι δι’ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ’ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν
Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ~ἄλλους ῥήτορας
ἐνιέντες~, οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν
ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι
ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν,
μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.

[264] The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation
against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to
the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being
substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It
is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês.
But when Andokidês goes on to say, that “in consequence of this
information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the
rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death
in their absence,” (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês
most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at _that
time_. If Alkibiadês was not then tried, neither could the other
persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in
the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been
first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadês before the sailing
of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against
him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when
the information of Andokidês himself had satisfied the Athenians
on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented
by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, was founded, in
part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been
on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when
Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may
well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that
ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês
is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He
mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that
information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius
appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as _not_ having
fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v.
Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias,
that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been
concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different
from the statement of Andokidês, and would lead us to suppose
that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês himself
informed.

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard,—epibatæ, or marines,—each with a panoply furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.[265] The number of horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus, for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration, like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful, known to none of them accurately, and into a sea of undefined possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water’s edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

[265] Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file, displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina.[266] Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details, given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

[266] Thucyd. vi, 32; Diodor. xiii, 3.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian pentekonters; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes of profit.[267] Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice at Egesta, that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian promontory.

[267] Thucyd. vi, 44.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies.[268]

[268] Thucyd. vi, 44-46.

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, about July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.[269] No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.[270]

[269] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: “It is not
specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes
it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government
of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration,
since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of
Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The
democratical party now bore the sway,” etc.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford
founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had
spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues
to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered
vituperative strain.

[270] Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, etc.

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable, and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian[271] allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months’ provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.[272]

[271] Thucyd. vi, 34. Ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον,
~ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε~, ὅμως
εἰρήσεται.

That “habitual quiescence” which Hermokratês here predicates of
his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless
activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which
Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144;
vi, 7). Both of the governments, however, were democratical. This
serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications
about _all_ democracies; for it is certain that one democracy
differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted,
however, whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to
his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his
language implies.

[272] Thucyd. vi, 33-36.

Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.[273] Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.[274]

[273] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς
ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, etc.

[274] Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ’ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε
προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε
τοιάδε, etc.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same
as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’
ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. (iv, 21).