Chapter LVI (2)

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march, of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.[122] Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, who had their lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

[122] Thucyd. v, 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς
καθίσταντο, ~ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν
αὐτῶν ἔχοντες~, etc.

The strong and precise language, which Thucydidês here
uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and
much esteemed: among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient
routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to
take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the
generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticized.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi, with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance, indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.[123] While thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis’s army, and the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy.[124]

[123] Thucyd. v, 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργείους) Ἔτρεψαν
οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπῇσαν οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας,
τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has
perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet
satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, ~τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ~, preceding the
infinitive mood as here, signify _design_ or _purpose_; ἕνεκα
being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence
satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe
to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes
of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of
other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή:
others affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ
μή. “Formula ~τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ~ (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque
_consilium_ significat: interdum _effectum_ (_i. e._ ὥστε μή);
hic _causam_ indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μή).” But I agree
with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged
meanings is wholly unauthorized; while the second, which is
adopted by Dr. Arnold himself, is sustained only by feeble and
dubious evidence; for the passage of Thucydidês (ii, 4. τοῦ μὴ
ἐκφεύγειν) may be as well construed, as Poppo’s note thereupon
suggests, without any such supposed exceptional sense of the
words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ
φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of ~ἕνεκα τοῦ~,
or _consilium_. But first an error must be cleared up which
pervades the view of most of the commentators. They suppose that
those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been “_trodden
under foot_,” were so trodden down by _the Lacedæmonians_
in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The
Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular
in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, qualities which are
dwelt upon by Thucydidês in regard to this very battle. They were
not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only
anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they
would spear them, not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the
numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii, 173; Xenoph. Hellen.
iii, 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet
with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially
Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which
they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their
own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy
closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of
course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized
with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their
own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them
down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it
was the Argeians in front—not the Lacedæmonians—who trod down
their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight
men in every file), in order to escape themselves before the
Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv, 4,
11; Œconomic. viii, 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydidês
describes, three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2.
The Argeians soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian
soldiers, who trod them down in order to get away themselves. Out
of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third
is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative, just
as much as if he had written καταπατηθέντας ~ὑπ’ ἄλλων~, or ὑπ’
ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but
not formally specified (_i. e._ those Argeians who trod down
their comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the
second and third conjointly and confusedly, that the _design_ or
_purpose_ (_consilium_) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers.

Farther, the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν
ἐγκατάληψιν, as if the last word were an accusative case coming
_after_ φθῆναι and governed by it. But there is also another
construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense.
In my judgment, τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case
coming _before_ φθῆναι and forming the _subject_ of it. The words
will thus read (ἕνεκα) τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν
αὐτοῖς): “in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians
might not be beforehand in coming upon them;” “might not come
upon them too soon,” _i. e._ “sooner than they could get away.”
And since the word ἐγκατάληψις is an abstract active substantive,
so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute
the concrete words with which it correlates, _i. e._ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαβόντας, subject as well as attribute, for
the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up
and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—ἔστιν οὓς
καὶ καταπατηθέντας ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων φευγόντων (or βιαζομένων), ἕνεκα
τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαβόντας αὐτοὺς (τοὺς
φεύγοντας): “As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the
Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat:
and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own
comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not
be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape.”

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have τοῦ
μὴ φθῆναι used in its regular and legitimate sense of _purpose_,
or _consilium_. We have moreover a plain and natural state of
facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there
any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to
expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire
sentence which was present to the writer’s own mind. To do this
properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of
an expositor of Thucydidês.

[124] Thucyd. v, 73; Diodor. xii, 79.

There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy’s dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.[125]

[125] Thucyd. v, 73.

Such was the important battle of Mantineia, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the preëxisting stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs: but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled “artists in warlike affairs.” So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.[126]

[126] Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην
αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν
ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἑνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχῃ
μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες.

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their return to Sparta.[127]

[127] Thucyd. v, 72.

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.[128] Shortly after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the aid of Mantineia,—probably regretting their previous untoward departure,—together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle,[129] and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them—the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated—was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.[130]

[128] Thucyd. i, 141.

[129] Thucyd. v, 75.

[130] Thucyd. v, 75.

So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy’s force, at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party, philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat of Mantineia had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders, who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,[131] and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.[132]

[131] Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the credit
gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of
Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution,
notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: ~Οἱ
γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες~ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over
defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the
Athenian army under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the
later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2,
15-17.

[132] Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80.

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.[133] Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business.”[134]

[133] Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydidês is incurably corrupt,
in regard to several words of this clause; though the general
sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to
be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an
oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been
essential that the oath should be _tendered_ by one litigant
party and _taken_ by the other: perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν
λῇν (Valckenaer’s conjecture) might be preferable to εἶμεν λῇν.

To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr.
Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this
practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous
practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny,
in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, sects. 309-313,
vol. vii, pp. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant
party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to
take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of
the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and
formalities, with respect to this _jusjurandum delatum_, which
Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.

[134] Thucyd. v, 77. Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι,
αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, ~οἴκαδ’
ἀπιάλλειν~. See Dr. Arnold’s note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.
ch. xxiv. vol. iii, p. 342.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words,
but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and
almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text.
The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantineia; all
hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well
decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it
stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even
with rudeness, if they desired any change.

I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδείξαντας)
has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the
Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a
resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to
Argos.

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance, holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment.[135] If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.”

[135] Thucyd. v, 79. Αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τᾶν
ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσου, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου
τινὸς, διακριθῆμεν.

The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the
joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to
interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a
foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were
at this time standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens, and
between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose
to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the
alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard
themselves against such necessity in this clause.

M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat.
Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle,
1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of
this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantineia, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.[136] And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter, according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.[137] The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum,—through the Brasideian settlers planted there,—they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

[136] All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced
by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed
with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of
Nikias) αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους, Thucyd. v, 19.
The last clause of this treaty guarantees αὐτοδικíαν to all,
though in language somewhat different, τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ
πάτρια δικάζεσθαι. The expression in this treaty αὐτοπόλιες is
substantially equivalent to αὐτοτελεῖς in the former.

It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydidês the very
convenient Herodotean word δωσίδικοι (Herodot. vi, 42), though
there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it
would be useful to his meaning.

[137] Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii, 81.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon—about November or December, 418 B.C.—had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly, Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.[138] In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.[139] Having no intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the Peace of Nikias.[140]

[138] Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.

[139] The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian
towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the
gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious
festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the
precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his
treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.

[140] Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ~ἀνανεωσάμενοι~ τὰς
σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told
that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but
I know no truce previously between them except the general truce
for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with
Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.[141]

[141] Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι
ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ’ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον
κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνα
ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία
ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80.

This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of the victory of Mantineia and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta, raised her ascendency in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose, perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before; accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counter-work her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens, such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:[142] a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women[143] to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

[142] Pausanias, ii, 20, 1.

[143] See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note of
Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta,—a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.[144]

[144] Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80.

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of about four months,[145] from February to June, 417 B.C., and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,[146] who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

[145] Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight months:
but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from
the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first
establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidês does
not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.

[146] Thucyd. v, 82. ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν
Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiadês brought assistance from Athens,[147] especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,[148] required a long time. Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without,—a party defeated but not annihilated,—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.[149] Accordingly about the end of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.[150]

[147] Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ
γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.

[148] Pausanias, ii, 36, 3.

[149] Thucyd. i, 107.

[150] Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the
Argeians _had already_ built their long walls down to the
sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους ~ᾠκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι
τῆς θαλάσσης~ (xii, 81). Thucydidês uses the participle of the
present tense—~τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα~ τείχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες,
etc.

The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices—always offered previous to leaving their own territory—so unfavorable, that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.[151] Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.[152]

[151] Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~μελλήσαντες~ ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν
στρατεύειν ... ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ~μέλλησιν~
τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ’
αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.

I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of
_loitering delay_, but is to be construed by the previous verb
μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126—“prospect of
action immediately impending:” compare Diodor. xii, 81.

[152] Thucyd. vi, 7.

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia, hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.[153] Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.[154] Nor was the license of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

[153] Thucyd. v, 115.

[154] Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate
Oratio de Pace, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the war
was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the
Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This
assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was
one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among
others, some of them more powerful. Thucydidês tells us that the
_persuasions_ of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance
with Sparta were repeated and unavailing.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.[155]

[155] Thucyd. v, 83.

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region, situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman, Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.