Chapter LVIII (3)

[308] See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several
circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφὴ
παρανόμων, which Andokidês alleges that his father Leogoras
brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of
six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out
of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes;
but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe
that it could have taken place until after the public mind was
tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidês, especially as
Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidês immediately
before those disclosures were given in.

[309] See for evidence of these general positions respecting the
circumstances of Andokidês, the three Orations: Andokidês de
Mysteriis, Andokidês de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem.

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, since the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of Eleusis, originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in their families.[310] Celebrated annually in the month of August or September, under the special care of the basileus, or second archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred offices at Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by the hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgments which always overtook such impious men.[311]

[310] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in
Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.

[311] Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster.
sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias
against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii,
p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous
impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on
unlucky and forbidden days, “in derision of our gods and our
laws,”—ὡς καταλεγῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The
lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had
brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias
had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living
in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ’
οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν
ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις
προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅπερ οὗτος ἐξερματεκόσι.

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias
among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem
particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill
health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke,
Fragm. Comic. Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.[312] It was about this same time[313] that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life.

[312] Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib.
c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklês
(Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Œdip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of
the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, Legg.
ii, 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in
the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging
these mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these
ceremonies in the _Eleusinia_, forming the first treatise in the
work of Lobeck called Aglaophamus; and in the Dissertation called
_Eleusinia_, in K. O. Müller’s Kleine Schriften. vol ii, p. 242,
_seqq._

[313] Diodor. xiii. 6

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the
mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the
state to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and
for punishment on the delinquents.[314] And the enemies of
Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity
favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had
artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The
matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these
holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by
reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate
companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor
habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal
restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him
not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an
association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily
accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries
did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with
the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the
same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and
parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this
subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army
at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in
conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand,
and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile
designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the
Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole
night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed
appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only
been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent
inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected
with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for
the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther
aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the
Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the
oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few
months before,[315] in order that it might put these hostages to
death, whenever it thought fit.

[314] We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be
the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from
banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53).

[315] Thucyd. vi, 53-61.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is recorded verbatim.

“Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian priests.”[316]

[316] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης,
Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ
θεὼ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ
δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα
στολὴν οἵανπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα
αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δᾳδοῦχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον
Φηγεέα· τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ
ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ’ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ
κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος.

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of prejudgment, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the army itself.[317]

[317] Thucyd. vi, 61.

It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadês received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but as soon as they arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the accused—one of whom[318] was his own cousin and namesake—were tried, condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated; while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred families pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the mysteries,[319] and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

[318] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13.

[319] Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat.
vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to
raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the
order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering
what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good
reason to believe that he _would_ have taken this step, had it
been practicable.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him; while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable, could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadês at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,[320] down to a recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for remarking.

[320] To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens
by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the
mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous
acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic
penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French
Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on
French criminal jurisprudence—_Jousse_, Traité de la Justice
Criminelle, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672:—

“Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Leze Majesté
Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu’on doit
regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus
exécrables.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs
manières.—1. En niant l’existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de
ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on
profane ou qu’on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu’on
_frappe les Images de Dieu_ dans le dessein de l’insulter. C’est
ce qu’on appelle _Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au prémier Chef_.”

Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol.
iv, pp. 97-99:—

“_La profanation des Sacremens et des Mystères de la Réligion
est un sacrilège des plus exécrables._ Tel est le crime de
ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs
et mauvais, _en dérision des Mystères_; ceux qui _profanent
la sainte Eucharistie_, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière
que ce soit; ceux qui en mépris de la Réligion, profanent les
Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties,
ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes: _ceux qui,
en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs
débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images
consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints_, en
mépris de la Réligion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent
de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes _sont des crimes de
Leze-Majesté divine au prémier chef_, parce qu’ils s’attaquent
immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de
l’offenser.”

“... La peine du Sacrilège, par l’Ancien Testament, étoit celle
du feu, et d’être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables
étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches,
suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est
arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du
crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l’accusé.—Dans _le
sacrilège au prémier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte
Vierge, et les Saints_, v. g. à l’égard de ceux qui foulent aux
pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en
abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la
peine est le feu, l’amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en
est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; _ceux
qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s’en moquent et les contrefont
dans leurs débauches_: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale,
parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité.”

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned
to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even his enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadês; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty; and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by perfidious means.[321]

[321] The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence
of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various
authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy
to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the
Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far
as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

1. The “hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants,” (to
adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons,—see Dr.
Lingard’s History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88,—words, the
like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to
the Hermokopids,) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from
the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was
a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates,
Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were
real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that
they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the
Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor
who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had
pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated
plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found
no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that
terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give
credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not
put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They
contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they
got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated
in _that_ deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as
a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet it is
impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or
Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot
wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar
circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should
trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under
the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and
Diokleidês in presumptive credibility.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in
believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the
Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that,
looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connection
between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we
to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put
themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed
force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning
and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a
moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the
Popish Plot. These were true charges, at least there is strong
presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons
were convicted and punished for having done acts which they
really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether
it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is
another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in
punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon
depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the
cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the
English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The
suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even
greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real,
and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in
England.

“I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl.
xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial
murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted
by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the
excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries
of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of
justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to
have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed
traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the
improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind,
a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few
individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the
imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared
not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the
innocent.”

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a
legislative body, and in their judicial character when the
Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp.
231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite
equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese
judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were
more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning
prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this
affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: “I shall show them that I am alive.” He fully redeemed his word.[322]

[322] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy’s camp an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal in the cause.[323] And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence except in the field.

[323] Thucyd. ii, 65. τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν,
etc.

Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the celebrated courtezan Laïs, then a very young girl.[324] Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and twenty talents,[325] and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

[324] The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear
involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad
Philisti, Fragment. v.

[325] Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα ~ἀπέδοσαν~,
καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word
ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to
their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for
their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had
Thucydidês said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put
up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at
least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that
proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker’s note, we
shall see that μεταπέμπειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in
the sense of μεταπέμπεσθαι. The case may perhaps be the same with
ἀπέδοσαν for ἀπέδοντο.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies—unless we are to reckon the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished; the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous,[326] and when he had disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry, informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles serving along with him.[327]

[326] Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42.

[327] Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii, 6.

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls, apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added, were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles,—houses, walls, trees, and standing water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the march back was a long one.[328] Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

[328] Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c.
13.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division—in hollow square, with the baggage in the middle—was held in reserve near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.[329]

[329] Thucyd. vi, 67-69.

Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier’s mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians, as compared to the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority,—this is a striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought by his own delay,—but who would come short in actual conflict, from want of discipline.[330] Moreover, he reminded them that they were far away from home, and that defeat would render them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens, since it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.

[330] Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί
τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι
Σικελιώτας, οἳ ~ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς~, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὔ· διὰ τὸ
τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb
πανδημεί. Compare πανδαμεὶ, πανομιλεὶ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavorable augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed a mere phenomenon of the season,[331] so that they still farther astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence with which they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helôrine road.[332]

[331] Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ’ ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα,
καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, πολὺ μείζω
ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally
unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be
seen in the next chapter but one.

[332] Thucyd. vi, 70.

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.[333]

[333] Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias
refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct,
though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became
masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x,
28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the
treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of
the Syracusan priests.

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his
position before he returned to Katana. But the language of
Thucydidês indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after
the battle.

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.[334]

[334] Thucyd. vi, 71-74.

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at present, we have only to turn back to his own predictions and recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary to overcome them.[335] He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well as every man at Athens:[336] upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of which was,—to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.[337]

[335] Thucyd. vi, 21-26.

[336] Thucyd. vi, 20.

[337] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι,
καὶ μόνοι ~οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ
διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες~.

Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athenians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him.[338] And this is the more to be noted, since the removal of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily, though _their_ disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army.[339] The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

[338] Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ~ὕστερον
ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι~, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: “It is
disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to
_send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our
own fault in making bad calculations at first_.” (Thucyd. vi, 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens,
prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed
a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of
force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover,
such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was
anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês
can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the
grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that
the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by
his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been
forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable
passage, ii, 65, of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ
πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς·
ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον ~οἱ
ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες~,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε
ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον
ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

“Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in
two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian
power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, _had not
the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently
supplied by the government at home_. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα
τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify “_not voting afterwards
the needful supplies to their absent armament_:” for Nikias was
prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans
by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost
before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently
the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and
weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.”
Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of
the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that
these words do _not_ signify “_voting the needful supplies_.”

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with
ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not
be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα,
etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ
πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive
word for these particulars, meaning “_supplies_.” The words
really mean: “_taking farther resolutions_ (after the expedition
was gone) _unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament_.”
Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα,
or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used
in the most general sense, for “what is suitable;” “what is
advantageous or convenient:” γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ
πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ηὔξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε
πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160,
B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests
which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other
irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament,
especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew
out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding
of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any
of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony
was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the
expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note, that _one
of the causes_ of the failure of the Athenian expedition in
Sicily, was, that it was “insufficiently supplied by Athens.” Of
the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii,
42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting
forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says
nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling
upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and
collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they
expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the
autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the
supplies _were sent_, as soon as they could be, and as soon as
Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not
the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, “that the armament
_was allowed_ to be reduced to great distress and weakness
before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The
second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known
his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress
coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful
appearances.

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or
inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of
Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved
their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the
having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire
strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês
plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of
Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias,
whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and
tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that
he conceived the mismanagement of the general as _the cause_
of the failure of the armament, not as “one of two causes,”
as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully
the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a
Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which
this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have
set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the
apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown
by Nikias (vii, 42).

[339] Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p.
464.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;[340] so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.

[340] Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.