Chapter XXXV: Section II: Mughals (a.d. 1570-1720) and Maráthás (3)

[Withdrawal of the British Contingent.] As soon as the roads were open Colonel Keating moved towards Surat, but at the solicitation of Rághobá he disobeyed his orders so far as to encamp at Kadod, about twenty miles east of Surat, but not in British territory. Here he awaited the results of the overtures of Colonel Upton. This envoy remained at Poona from the 28th December 1775 till the 1st March 1776, on which date [Negotiations at Poona.] he signed the treaty of Purandhar, in which the office only and not the name of the Peshwa is mentioned. By this compact the Peshwa ceded all claims on the revenue of Broach together with land in the neighbourhood of that town to the British. He also paid twelve lákhs of rupees in compensation for the expenses of the war. Sálsette was to be either retained by the English or restored in exchange for territory yielding three lákhs of rupees annually. The cessions made by Fatesingh Gáikwár were to be restored to him if the Peshwa's Government could prove that he had no right to make them without due authorization from Poona. The treaty of the 6th March was declared null and void. Rághobá was to disband his army and take a pension. If he resisted, the English were to give him no assistance. If he agreed to the terms proposed, he was to live at Kopargaon [1061] on the Godávari with an ample pension. When he received information as to the terms of the new treaty, he at once declined to accept the pension, and, as he could not understand the position of the Bombay Government with regard to that at Calcutta, he proceeded to offer still more favourable terms for further assistance.

[Rághobá at Surat, 1776.] Rághobá was at Mándvi [1062] on the Tápti when he was finally given to understand that the British could no longer aid him. He thereupon took refuge in Surat with two hundred followers. The rest of his army which had been ordered to disperse, gathered round Surat, on pretence of waiting for the payment of the arrears due to them. As their attitude was suspicious, and there were rumours of an expedition having started from Poona under Haripant to subdue them, the Bombay Government garrisoned Surat and Broach with all the forces it could spare.

Colonel Upton meanwhile offered Rághobá, on behalf of the ministers, a larger pension with liberty of residing at Benares. This also was declined, and the ex-Peshwa fled to Bombay, where he lived on a monthly pension allotted him by the Government.

On 20th August 1776, a despatch of the Court of Directors arrived confirming the treaty of the 6th March 1775. At first the Bombay Government were inclined to take this as authorizing the retention of all the territory ceded, but on further deliberation it was decided that as the treaty of Purandhar had been ratified by the Supreme Government subsequent to the signing of the despatch, which was dated 5th April 1776, it was evident that the Court of Directors did not mean to uphold the previous engagement more than temporarily, or until the final treaty had been concluded.

[Negotiations at Poona, 1777.] At the end of 1776, a Bombay officer was sent in place of Colonel Upton to be a resident envoy at Poona for the carrying out of the provisions of the treaty. Mr. Mostyn was the person selected, and he arrived in Poona in March 1777. He soon found that the ministers had little intention of adhering to the treaty, so he at once took up the question that he thought it most important to the Bombay Government to have settled, namely the relations of the Peshwa's Court with Fatesingh Gáikwár as regards the cessions of territory. The ministers asserted that the Gáikwárs merely administered Gujarát on the part of the Peshwa and were entirely dependent upon the Poona government, so that they could conclude no agreement with foreign states except with its approbation. Fatesingh did not deny the dependence, but evaded the question of his right to make direct treaties and claimed the restitution of the cessions on the ground that Raghunáthráv had failed to perform his part of the stipulations. The point was discussed for some time, and at last the question of dependence seems to have been let drop, for in February 1778 Fatesingh paid up the arrears of tribute, made the usual presents to the ministers and their favourites, and was again invested with the title of Sená-Khás-Khel.

In October a despatch from the Court of Directors reached the Governments of Bengal and Bombay, disapproving of the treaty of Purandhar, but ratifying it on the principle factum valet. It was suggested, however, that in case of evasion on the part of the ministers, a fresh treaty should be concluded with Rághobá on the lines of that of 1775.

[Fresh Alliance with Rághobá, 1778.] In November 1778 it was rumoured that the ministers in Poona were intriguing with the French, so the Bombay Government took this opportunity of entering into a treaty with Rághobá, who was still in Bombay. He confirmed the grants of 1775, and as security for the pay of the British contingent that was to help in placing him on the Peshwa's throne in Poona, he agreed to assign the revenues of Balsár and the remainder of Anklesvar, as he had done before. He stipulated, however, that his own agents should collect the dues from these districts, and that the British should take charge of them only in case of the full sum due not being paid and then merely as a temporary measure.

[The Convention of Bhadgaon, 1779.] On the 22nd November 1778 the force moved out of Bombay, and by dint of mismanagement and internal dissension the campaign was brought to an end by the convention of the 16th January 1779. Under this agreement all possessions in Gujarát acquired since the time of Mádhavráv Peshwa were to be restored by the British, together with Sálsette, Uran, and other islands. Rághobá was to be made over to Sindia's charge, and a separate treaty assigned to Sindia the sovereignty of Broach.

[Negotiation with the Gáikwár.] The Council at Bombay disavowed the convention and were inclined to adhere only to the clause allotting Broach to Sindia. Mr. Hornby proposed to the Supreme Government an alliance with Fatesingh, engaging to free him from dependence on the Poona Government and to reconcile the disputants within the Gáikwár family itself. After the arrival of General Goddard with reinforcements from Bengal the Governor General approved of the alliance proposed with Fatesingh as head of the Baroda state, but specially declined to admit any participation or support in the family disputes. The British were to conquer for themselves the Peshwa's share of Gujarát, if they were able to do so.

[Rághobá Escapes from Sindia, 1779.] Rághobá, meanwhile, who had been given over to Sindia to be conveyed to Bundelkhand, escaped with the connivance of his custodian and fled to Broach. This was evidently a move calculated by Sindia to bring on hostilities between Nána Phadnis, the head of the ministerial party, and the English. General Goddard, who was conducting the negotiations with Poona on the part both of the Supreme Government and of the Government of Bombay, received Rághobá on June 12th, but evaded any proposals for a direct alliance. At the end of the rains of the same year, information was received by the English that a coalition against them had been [League against the English, 1780.] formed by the Maráthás, the Nizám, and Hyder Ali of Mysor. The rumour was partially confirmed by the demand by Nána Phadnis for the cession of Sálsette and the person of Rághobá as preliminaries to any treaty. No answer was given, but reinforcements were called for and the overtures with Fatesingh pushed forward. This chief prevaricated about the terms of the treaty and evidently did not like to enter into any special engagement that might perhaps bring down upon him the Poona army. General Goddard therefore advanced on 1st January 1780 against Dabhoi, which was garrisoned by the Peshwa's troops from the Dakhan, whilst the English in Broach expelled the Marátha officers from their posts and re-took possession of Anklesvar, Hánsot, and Ámod. On January 20th Dabhoi was evacuated by the Maráthás and occupied by General Goddard. Fatesingh now showed himself willing to enter into the proposed treaty, and on the 26th January 1780 signed an offensive and defensive alliance.

[Treaty with Fatesingh Gáikwár.] In the re-opening of hostilities there was no mention of Rághobá, but the ground given was simply the non-fulfilment on the part of the Peshwa of his treaty engagement. Rághobá remained under English supervision in the enjoyment of a large allowance. Dabhoi was occupied by an English civil officer with a detachment of irregulars, and General Goddard moved towards Ahmedábád.

By the treaty of 1780 the Peshwa was to be excluded from Gujarát. To avoid confusion in collection, the district north of the Mahi was to belong entirely to the share of the Gáikwár. The English were to enjoy the whole district south of the Tápti, together with the Gáikwár share in the revenue of Surat. In return for the support the English were to give him in withholding tribute from the Peshwa, Fatesingh ceded Sinor on the Narbada and the Gáikwár's villages round Broach. These cessions, however, were not to have effect until Fatesingh was in possession of Ahmedábád. The contingent of 3000 horse was to be still furnished by the Gáikwár government.

[General Goddard takes Ahmedábád, 1780.] As soon as these conditions were agreed upon, General Goddard went with his own army and the contingent furnished by Fatesingh to Ahmedábád. After encamping before it for five days, he took the city by storm on 15th February 1780.

[Operations against Sindia and Holkar.] Sindia and Holkar had combined their forces against the English and were marching up Gujarát, plundering on their way. They were opposed by General Goddard, who marched across the Mahi early in March. The allies turned off towards Chámpáner without risking a pitched battle on the plain. Sindia at once opened negotiations with the view of wasting time during the fair season. His first proposal was that Rághobá should be sent to Jhánsi, where Sindia had allotted him an estate, and that Bájiráv, Rághobá's son, should be appointed diván or manager of the Peshwa Mádhavráv, who was a minor. Bájiráv himself was under age, so Sindia was, of course, to assume temporarily the reins of government.

Goddard at once refused to force Rághobá to take any course other than the one he should select of his own free will; for Sindia did not appear to be aware that the English were now at war with the ministers on their own account and not as allies of an ex-Peshwa. Negotiations were broken off and Sindia and Holkar dislodged from place after place without any decisive engagement being fought. General Goddard was preparing monsoon quarters for his army, when he heard that a division of a Marátha force which had been plundering the Konkan in order to cut off supplies from Bombay had attacked parts of the Surat Athávisi. He detached some troops under Lieut. Welsh and sent them to the south, whilst he remained himself on the Narbada. Lieut. Welsh drove back the marauders and took possession of the forts of Párnera, Indargad, and Bagváda.

After the monsoon of 1780, General Goddard went to besiege Bassein, leaving Major Forbes in charge of the Gujarát army. This officer posted one body of troops at Ahmedábád for the protection of Fatesingh, another at Surat, and a third at Broach. Two battalions of Bengal infantry were sent to Sinor and some few men to Dabhoi.

[1781.] An attack was made by Sindia on the newly acquired district of Sinor, but Major Forbes successfully resisted it and Sindia's position with regard to his own dominions was now such as to prevent him from sending more expeditions against Gujarát.

The military necessities of other parts of India were such as to induce General Goddard to apply to Fatesingh for an increase to his contingent, in accordance with the treaty of 1780. After some personal communications with this Chief in Gujarát, General Goddard was able to arrange with the Gáikwár for the defence of part of that province and thus set free some European troops for service elsewhere.

[Treaty of Sálbai, 1782.] No further attack was made in this direction during the continuance of the war which came to an end on 17th May 1782. The treaty of Sálbai between an envoy of the Governor General on one side and Mahádáji Sindia as plenipotentiary for the Peshwa and minister of Poona on the other, replaced the Marátha territory in Gujarát exactly where it was on the outbreak of hostilities against Rághobá in 1775. It was, however, specially stipulated that no demand for arrears of tribute during the late hostilities should be made against the Gáikwár, a clause that led to misunderstandings many years later. The town of Broach was given over to Sindia in accordance with the secret negotiation of 1779 and the votes of the Bengal and Bombay Councils. The territory round Broach yielding a revenue of three lákhs of rupees, ceded by the Peshwa, was likewise returned. Rághobá was granted a pension of 25,000 rupees a month and allowed to select his own place of residence. He went to Kopargaon and there died a few months after the conclusion of the treaty of Sálbai. Thus came to an end one of the chief sources of disturbance to the Poona government. For the next six years no event of any political importance took place in Gujarát, which province was left almost entirely to the administration of the Gáikwár family.

[Death of Fatesingh, 1789.] In 1789, however, Fatesingh died, leaving Sayájiráv without a guardian. Mánáji, a younger brother, at once seized the reins of government and began the usual sort of negotiations to secure his recognition by the Poona government. He paid a nazarána of 3,13,000 rupees and agreed to pay up thirty-six lákhs of rupees as arrears, though it is not clear on what account, unless that sum had accrued since the treaty of Sálbai, or was part of the long standing account left open by Dámáji in 1753. Mánáji, however, was not allowed to succeed to the post of guardian without opposition. Govindráv Gáikwár was living at Poona, and, though he had himself little influence with the Peshwa's immediate adherents, he had managed to secure the then powerful Sindia on his side. This chief, since his recognition as plenipotentiary at the treaty of Sálbai, had been gradually making good his position with the Peshwa and his favourites as well as with the leading Marátha nobles, so as to be able to successfully oppose Nána Phadnis when the time came for a coalition of the outlying chiefs against the ministerial party. Govindráv offered his son Ánandráv as husband for the daughter of Sindia, a proposal which it is not probable that he ever intended to carry out. A grant of three lákhs of rupees was also promised, in return for which Sindia allowed his garrison in Broach to assist Govindráv's illegitimate son Kánhoji to reach Baroda. Mánáji applied to the Bombay Government on the grounds that the steps taken by Govindráv were contrary to the provisions of the treaty of 1780. As however this treaty had been abrogated by the later agreement at Sálbai, the Bombay Government declined to interfere. Mánáji's agents at Poona contrived to get Nána Phadnis to propose a compromise, to which however Govindráv, at the instigation probably of Sindia, declined to accede. Before any decision was reached Mánáji died.

[1793.] Nána detained Govindráv in Poona till he had agreed to hold by former stipulations and to cede to the Peshwa the Gáikwár's share in the districts south of the Tápti together with his share of the Surat customs. To this the Government of Bombay demurred as an infraction of the provision of the Sálbai treaty whereby the integrity of the Gáikwár's possessions was assured. Nána Phadnis at once withdrew his proposals. Govindráv at last joined his brother at Baroda on 19th December, and took up the office of regent.

[Ába Shelukar Deputy Governor of Gujarát, 1796.] For two years Gujarát remained quiet. In 1796 Bájiráv, son of Rághobá, succeeded to the Peshwa's dignity and at once appointed his younger brother, ten years of age, governor of Gujarát. In accordance with Marátha custom a deputy was sent to take charge of the province, one Ába Shelukar, and he too seems to have administered vicariously, for next year (1797) we find him amongst those taken prisoners with Nána Phadnis when that minister was treacherously seized by Daulatráv Sindia in the Dakhan. Ába was released on promising to pay ten lákhs of rupees as ransom. [1797.] He then joined his appointment as subhedár in order to take measures to get together the money he required.

[Disputes between Ába and Govindráv Gáikwár.] Bájiráv Peshwa was anxious to embroil Ába with Govindráv, whom he knew to be favourable to Nána Phadnis and too powerful to be allowed to acquire influence beyond the reach of head-quarter supervision. A cause of quarrel soon arose. Daulatráv pressed Ába for part payment of the above ten lákhs, and the latter being unable to squeeze enough out of his own territory, forced contributions from some of the villages administered by the Gáikwár. Govindráv at once took up arms against him and applied for aid to the English Agent at Surat. In this city Governor Jonathan Duncan had just assumed chief authority in accordance with an agreement between the English and the Nawáb. Duncan was anxious to secure for his government the land round Surat and the Gáikwár's share in the chauth of the town and district. Govindráv, when this demand was made, referred the Governor to Poona, knowing that under the treaty of Sálbai the British Government had no more right to acquire a share of the Gáikwár territory than the Poona authorities had when they made a somewhat similar demand in 1793, which was withdrawn as stated above. Before the reference could be made, Ába was penned up by Govindráv's own army in Ahmedábád and forced to surrender that city. He was kept in confinement for more than seven years.

[Gujarát farmed to the Gáikwár, 1799.] In the same year (1799) the Peshwa, apparently without formally revoking the appointment of his brother Chimnáji as Subhedár, gave Govindráv a farm for five years of his whole rights in Gujarát, at the rate of five lákhs of rupees a year. These rights included shares in the Káthiáváda and Sorath tribute, the revenue of Petlád, Nápád, Ránpur, Dhandhuka, and Gogha, together with rights to certain customs dues in Cambay and a share in the revenue of the city of Ahmedábád. Govindráv unfortunately died a month before this farm was formally made over by the Peshwa.

[Ánandráv Gáikwár, 1800.] As had happened at the death of Dámáji, so again now, the heir Ánandráv was all but an idiot and quite incapable of managing his affairs. The disputes as to the guardianship again set the whole state in confusion. Kánhoji, a son of Govindráv by a Rájputni princess of Dharampor, who had been the first agent of his father in Baroda in 1793, had been put in prison for refusing to give place to Govindráv when the latter at length joined him at Baroda. At the death of Govindráv, Kánhoji managed to obtain his liberty and to secure the ascendancy in the counsels of his weak-minded elder brother. He assumed, in fact, the whole government. His arrogant conduct in this new position excited the Arab guard against him and he was again thrown into confinement. His mother Gajrábái, who was a refugee in Surat, endeavoured to get assistance from the English there, and at the same time made overtures to Malhár, son of Khanderáv Gáikwár, who had formerly been one of Govindráv's bitterest opponents.

[1800.] Meanwhile the administration of the Gáikwár's affairs passed into the hands of Rávji and Bábáji Áppa, two brothers who had been brought to Baroda in 1793 by Govindráv himself. Rávji took charge of the civil work, whilst Bábáji undertook the military duties, which at that time consisted in great measure in collecting the revenue by show of force. These two ministers, on hearing of the proceedings of [The British aid Govindráv's Party.] Gajrábái, outbid her for the aid of the Bombay Government. In addition to the cessions formerly offered by Govindráv, they were willing to give up Chikhli also. Matters were precipitated by the successes of Malháráv in the field. Rávji offered to subsidize five European battalions, and Governor Duncan took upon himself the responsibility of sending an auxiliary force of 1600 men under Major Walker to act with the troops of Rávji and Bábáji north of Ahmedábád. Reinforcements were afterwards sent up, but the campaign was not closed till April 1802, when the fort of Kadi had been taken by storm. Malháráv surrendered and a residence in Nadiád was assigned him with a liberal pension out of the revenues of that sub-division. The fort of Sankheda, which had been held by Ganpatráv Gáikwár for his cousin Malháráv, was soon after this reduced and the country for a time pacified.

[The British and the Gáikwár, 1800.] In March Rávji had an interview at Cambay with Governor Duncan, which was followed on June 6th by a definite treaty, of which the groundwork had been previously sketched in anticipation of the reduction of the revolted Gáikwárs. Two thousand men, besides artillery, were to be subsidized and a jáidád or assignment for their payment was made on the revenue of Dholka and the part of Nadiád not assigned to Malhárráv. Chikhli was given to the British in reward for their aid in storming Kadi, and Residents were to be appointed reciprocally. A large sum of money was borrowed by Rávji, partly from Bombay partly from Baroda bankers, to pay off the arrears due to about 7000 Arab mercenaries, who had usurped a great deal of objectionable influence in civil affairs at the Gáikwár's capital. Major Walker was appointed Resident and proceeded to Baroda on 8th June.

[The Gáikwár's Minister Rávji.] On the same day was signed a secret compact assuring Rávji of the support of the British Government and awarding him a village out of the territory ceded by the treaty of June 6th. It was deemed advisable by the British Government to have at the Baroda court some leading personage who might, in the present state of the relations between Bombay and Poona, further the designs of the former government in preventing a recurrence of the coalition of Marátha powers. Rávji was sure of his reward if he served British interests, whilst in case of the reorganization of a Marátha confederacy the state he was administering would probably play but a very subordinate part in subsequent events.

[Treaty of Bassein, 31st Dec. 1802.] The treaty of June 6th was disapproved by the Court of Directors as being in direct contravention of the treaty of Sálbai. Before, however, any orders had been issued by the Home authorities to restore to the Gáikwár the territory he had ceded, the Peshwa, out of regard for whom the treaty had been disavowed, was a fugitive before the army of Holkar, and by December had ratified these very concessions at the treaty of Bassein. By this treaty the Peshwa virtually placed his independence in the hands of the British. He ceded his share of Surat, thus giving them sole control over that district. In payment of the subsidiary force required he handed over territory in Gujarát, the revenue of which amounted to 12,28,000 rupees, and finally he constituted the British Government arbiter in the disputes between his government and that of Baroda. The grants made by the Gáikwár for the support of the subsidiary force amounted in 1802 to 7,80,000 rupees.

[Arabs Disbanded.] Major Walker attempted to negotiate with the Arab guard, but the greater part of them flew to arms and released Kánhoji Gáikwár. The latter then tried to collect an army near Baroda, and succeeded in obtaining possession of the person of Ánandráv the titular ruler. The British force then took Baroda by storm, after which most of the Arabs submitted, except a few who joined Kánhoji. The rest took the arrears due to them and left the country. Kánhoji was not subdued till February 1803. [Malhárráv in Revolt, 1803.] Malhárráv meanwhile had broken out in rebellion in Káthiáváda and was plundering the Marátha possessions there. Bábáji Áppáji and a young officer named Vithal Deváji (or Divánji) led the operations against him; and to the latter belongs the honour of having captured this troublesome member of the ruling family. The estate of Nadiád, which had been assigned to Madhavráo by Govindráv, was resumed by Rávji Áppáji and made over in its entirety to the British Government. A treaty, supplementary to that of 1802, was drawn up guaranteeing this cession as well as the inám or free gift of the fort and district of Kaira, "out of gratitude for the support given in the recent troubles to the Gáikwár's honour and for assistance in securing the good of the State."

[Contingent Strengthened, 1803.] Very soon after this agreement Rávji applied for an addition to the subsidiary force, in payment of which he assigned Mátar Mahudha and the customs of Kim-Kathodra, a station about seventeen miles north of Surat. His reason for strengthening the subsidiary force appears to have been that owing to the reduction of the Arabs, his own force was not enough to guard even the frontier, and that a great part of that duty fell on the European contingent, which was numerically insufficient for service on so extended a scale. [Death of Rávji, 1803.] This was the last public act of note on the part of Rávji Áppa, who died in July 1803, after adopting one Sitárám to succeed to his estate.

[War with Sindia.] Whilst these arrangements were being carried out at Baroda, Bájiráv Peshwa, chafing at the dependence to which his straits of the previous winter had reduced him with regard to the English, was actively propagating dissension between Sindia and the Calcutta Government. Not long after, the war that had been some time imminent broke out, and a contingent of 7352 men from Gujarát was ordered to the field. In August or September Broach and Pávágad [1063] both fell to the British.

[The Revenue Collecting Force.] Under the treaty of Sirjé Anjangaon in December 1803, both Pávágad and Dohad were restored to Sindia, but Broach remained British. By this means one of the rising Marátha powers was extruded from the centre to the outlying portion of the province. The employment of all the British contingent against Sindia's possessions in Gujarát precluded Major Walker from furnishing any portion of the army that was annually sent to collect the tribute in Káthiáváda. Rávji Áppáji had expressly stipulated that some part of the contingent might be so used when it could be spared from its main duties. The Supreme Government agreed to the proposal when made by Governor Duncan, on the grounds of the advantage both to the Gáikwár and the tributaries of employing on this disagreeable duty a strong and well-disciplined force. Already some of the tributaries had made overtures to Major Walker with a view to obtaining British protection against powerful neighbours. Governor Duncan was in favour of accepting the duty of protection and also of helping the Gáikwár's commander in his expeditions through the peninsula on these grounds. Firstly, the officer in command could exercise a certain supervision over the collections in which the British as part assignees had a direct interest. Secondly, a way could thus be opened for the acquisition of a port on the coast from which the intrigues, supposed to be carried on by agents from the Isle of France, could be watched and counteracted. From such a point, too, the views of the Bombay Government as regards Kachh could be promoted. Thirdly, the commandant could take steps to improve the system of forcible collections, and towards abolishing the barbarous features of this rude method of levying tribute. He could also, perhaps, suggest some system by which the advantages of all three parties concerned would be better secured than by reliance on the uncertainty of temporary expeditions. The fourth and last reason given savours strongly of the Marátha policy of the time, of which the leading maxim was Divide et impera. It was represented that Bábáji, who had successfully collected the tribute during 1802-03 and whose subordinate and companion Vithal Deváji was a person of similar energy and capability, might possibly acquire too great influence if left in a quasi-independent command at such a distance from the Court. It was politic, then, to join with the force under his command a strong foreign body, thus dividing both the power and the responsibility. The war with Sindia caused these proposals to fall into abeyance for some time.

[Renewal of Farm, 1804.] Meanwhile the Resident at Poona was doing his best to secure for the Gáikwár a further lease for ten years of the farm of the Peshwa's dominions in Gujarát, so that the inconveniences of dual government might be avoided. In October 1804 a ten years' farm was granted in the name of Bhagvantráv Gáikwár at an annual rate of 4 1/2 lákhs of rupees.

[The British and the Gáikwár, 1805.] This grant led to the consolidation of all previous engagements into a single treaty, which was signed in April 1805. Previous agreements were confirmed and the whole brought into consonance with the treaty of Bassein. Districts yielding 11,70,000 rupees per annum were made over for the support of the subsidiary force, and arrangements were also made for the repayment of the cash loan advanced by the British Government in 1802, when the liquidation of the arrears due to the Arabs was a matter of urgent political necessity. The British contingent was to be available in part for service in Káthiáváda, whenever the British Government thought such an employment of it advisable.

Finally, the British Government was constituted arbiter in all disputes of the Gáikwár, not alone with foreign powers, but also in the adjustment of his financial transactions with the Peshwa his paramount power. These transactions, which ranged back from the capture of Dámáji in 1751, had never been the subject of a formal investigation, and were by this time complicated by the numerous engagements with third parties into which both governments had been obliged to enter at their various moments of distress. Bájiráv, who was apparently intriguing for a Marátha coalition against his new protectors, was careful not to bring before the notice of the chiefs, whose esteem he wished to gain, a provision which exhibited him as in any way dependent upon the arbitration of a foreign power. He therefore granted the farm for ten years to the Gáikwár, as much by way of remanding for a time the proposed inquiries and settlement of their respective claims as for the purpose of diverting the attention of the British to the administration of this new appanage, whilst leaving him free scope for his intrigues in the Dakhan. He used, moreover, every pretext to defer the consideration of the Gáikwár question until he could make use of his claims to further his own designs. His success in preventing a discussion of these transactions is apparent by the fact that in the financial statement of the Gáikwár's affairs made by Colonel Walker in 1804, no mention of the Poona demand is to be found.

No important event took place during the next year or two. Bábáji relinquished the command of the force in Káthiáváda in favour of Vithalráv Deváji, whilst he himself took part in the civil administration at Baroda. The Resident, too, seems to have been likewise engaged in internal matters and in securing the country against an invasion by Kánhoji, now a fugitive at the court of Holkar.

[1807.] In 1807 the Resident made over Ába Shelukar, late Sar Subhedár of the Peshwa, to the British Government, by whom he could be prevented from engaging in fresh conspiracies. After this Colonel Walker was at last enabled to leave Baroda in order to assist in the settlement of the Káthiáváda tribute question, an object he had long had in view, but which the necessity for his continuous presence at the Gáikwár's capital had hitherto prevented him from undertaking.

[Káthiáváda Tribute.] The changes with regard to the collection of the tribute from the chiefs of Káthiáváda that were carried out in 1807 deserve a special description. Firstly, they placed the relations of the tributary to the paramount power on quite a new basis. Secondly, by them the British influence over both parties concerned was much increased and the connection between the governments of Bombay and Baroda drawn closer. Thirdly, they were subsequently, as will be seen hereafter, the subject of much discussion and delay in the settlement of the questions at issue between the Peshwa and the Gáikwár. And lastly, their effect was most beneficial to both the chiefs and their subjects in removing the uncertainty that had hitherto pervaded the whole revenue administration of Káthiáváda.

Before entering on the details of the settlement itself, some description is necessary of the social and political state of the peninsula at the time the changes were introduced.

[State of Káthiáváda, 1807.] The greater part of the population of Káthiáváda consisted of two classes, chiefs and cultivators, called Bhumiás and ryots. The power of the chief ranged from the headship of a single village up to absolute jurisdiction over several score. The ryots were usually tenants long resident in the province. The chiefs were in almost every case foreigners, invaders from the north and north-east; Muhammadan adventurers from the court of Ahmedábád; Káthis animated by the love of plunder and cattle-lifting; and Miánás and Vághelás who had settled on the coast on account of the facilities it afforded for their favourite pursuits of wrecking and piracy. More numerous than any others were the Rájputs, driven south by the disturbed state of their native kingdoms or by the restless spirit of military adventure to be found in a class where one profession alone is honourable. There is a certain uniformity in the building up of all these chieftainships. A powerful leader, with a sufficient band of followers, oppressed his weaker neighbours till they were glad to come to terms and place themselves under his protection, so as both to escape themselves and to take their chance of sharing in the plunder of others. It frequently happened in the growth of one of these states that the bháyád or relations of the chief (who are sure to be numerous in a polygamous society) were influential enough to assume, in their turn, a partial independence and to claim recognition as a separate state. As a rule, however, they continued to unite with the head of the family against external foes, and only disagreed as to domestic administration. It is also noticeable that though so addicted to the profession of arms, the Rájputs cannot be called a military race; they possess few of the true military virtues; hence the slowness of their advance, and their failure in competition with perhaps less courageous though more compact and pliable races. In Káthiáváda fortified strongholds, formidable enough to an army moving rapidly without siege trains, arose in all directions, and even villages were surrounded by a high mud wall as a protection against cattle-lifters.

The groundwork of these states being itself so unstable, their relations with each other were conducted on no principle but the law of the stronger. General distrust reigned throughout. Each chief well knew that his neighbours had won their position as he had won his own by the gradual absorption of the weaker, and that they were ready enough whenever opportunity offered to subject his dominions to the same process. The administration of his territory consisted merely in levying, within certain limits sanctioned by long usage, as much revenue as would suffice to maintain himself and his forces in their position with regard to the surrounding states. When a foreign enemy appeared there was no co-operation amongst the local chiefs in resistance. It was a point of honour not to yield except to a superior force. Each chief, therefore, resisted the demands made upon him until he considered that he had done enough to satisfy the family conscience and then, agreeing to the terms proposed, he allowed the wave of extortion to pass on and deluge the domains of his neighbour. It should be remembered that the peninsula had never been subjugated, though overrun times innumerable. The evil of invasion was thus transitory. To a chief the mere payment of tribute tended in no wise to derogate from his independence. In his capacity of military freebooter he acknowledged the principle as just. His country had been won by the sword and was retained by the sword and not by acquiescence in the payment of tribute, so that if he could avoid this extortion he was justified in doing so. If he weakened his state in resisting foreigners, he knew that his neighbours would certainly take advantage of the favourable juncture and annex his territory. It was his policy therefore, after resistance up to a certain point, to succumb.

[The Revenue Raid System.] Owing to this local peculiarity and to the general want of union in the province, both the Mughals and Maráthás found it advantageous to follow a system of successive expeditions rather than to incur the expense of permanently occupying the peninsula with an army which would necessarily have to be a large one. There is every reason to believe that in adopting the raid system the Musalmáns were only pursuing the practice of their predecessors, who used to take tribute from Jodhpur to Dwárka.

Some of the subhedárs of Ahmedábád divided their tributary district into three circuits of collection and personally undertook the charge of one each year. This was the mulakgiri land-raiding system. Besides this chief expedition, there was the smaller one of the Bábi of Junágadh and the still more minute operations of the Rával of Bhávnagar against some of his weaker neighbours. The great Ahmedábád expedition had long been an annual grievance and was conducted with some show of system and under special rules called the Raj-ul-Mulak. Three of these rules are of importance, and seem to have been generally acquiesced in before the great incursions of Bábáji and Vithalráv at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first was that the paramount power (by which was meant the foreign government which was strong enough to enforce tribute from all the chiefs) had authority to interfere in cases of dismemberment, or in proceedings tending to the depreciation of the revenue or to the dismemberment of any tributary state. It was again an acknowledged rule that whilst the mulakgiri expedition of the paramount power was in motion no other army should be in the field throughout the whole province. The third provision was not so well established, but it appears to have been understood that the tribute from each state should be regulated by some standard of former date. In practice, however, the measure of the Marátha demand was simply the power to enforce payment.

It is worthy of remark that about the beginning of this century the resistance to the collection of tribute was stronger towards the west than in the east and south of the province. In the Mahi Kántha the lawlessness of the Koli chiefs, who had established themselves in the ravines and on the hills, necessitated the employment of a military force for collections. In the neighbourhood of Bijápur and Kadi, the chiefs would not pay tribute except under the compulsion of a siege or raid, but the mulakgiri system only reached its full development west of Dholka.

From these explanatory remarks the system and practice of the Maráthás can be clearly understood.

[The Maráthás in Sorath.] The Maráthás found their way to Sorath very early in their Gujarát career. The first raid probably took place about 1711, when the Muhammadans were occupied near Ahmedábád. After this incursions were frequent, and under Dámáji Gáikwár became, as has been seen above, annual. This leader did more. He took to wife a daughter of the Gohil chief of the small state of Láthi in east central Káthiáváda, whose dowry in land gave him the standpoint he sought in the heart of the peninsula. He managed also to secure his position in what are known as the Amreli Maháls, probably under the force of circumstances similar to those which caused the weaker Rájputs to gravitate towards the stronger of their own tribe. His expedition through the peninsula, generally as near the time of harvest as possible, was made regularly every year as soon as he had amassed a sufficient number of troops on the mainland to admit of a force being detached for mulakgiri. The object of these inroads was plunder, not conquest; the leaders would readily have entered into negotiations for the payment of the tribute had the chieftains been disposed to treat otherwise than after defeat. The expenses of such an army were heavy, and the more so as the time during which it would be in the field was quite indefinite, and dependent entirely upon the amount of resistance offered. In more than one instance the Marátha leaders, who usually had no artillery for a siege, were obliged to regularly beleaguer a town. Early in this century the town of Mália successfully defended itself against a remarkably well equipped force under Bábáji, and the Junágadh state was usually avoided by the Maráthás as much as possible on account of the time it would take to reduce its army to terms.

It is not on record that the mulakgiri force habitually devastated the country over which it passed, or caused much greater hardships to the ryots than are inseparable from the passage of an army in the field. There are, however, well authenticated stories of the depredations and damage committed during these expeditions. A village is said to have been deserted by order of the bhumia in order that the timber of its houses might furnish fuel for the Marátha army on its march. Tortures were doubtless inflicted on men supposed to be well off, who were suspected to have hidden their property. A Marátha army was usually, if not always, ill disciplined, as is proved by the testimony of Mr. Forbes, an eye witness of the campaigns of 1775. [1064] From the same writer it is learned what an immense proportion the camp followers bore to the actual combatants. If this were the case in a real campaign against a formidable and active enemy, it is likely that the irresponsible element was still larger in an expedition like this of mulakgiri, where the enemy was insignificant and the country at the mercy of the invaders. It is probable therefore that the troops have been credited with misconduct that should in point of fact be attributed to these Pindháris. In after years, when the expeditions were conducted systematically, villages on the line of march were always allowed the alternative of entertaining a pioneer or two as a sort of guarantee. If no bandhári of this sort were accepted, the army occupied the place. In many cases the demands for supplies made by these pioneers were so exorbitant that the villagers preferred to compound in turn with them also for their absence. Another method by which a chieftain might avoid the necessity of the army's passing through his territories was by sending to the commander of the expedition an envoy empowered to treat for the amount of tribute and to execute a provisional guarantee for its future liquidation. This deed was destroyed on the subsequent confirmation by the chief himself of the agreement for the sum fixed.

[Securities.] This habit of taking securities in all engagements was so prevalent in all parts of the province, and played so prominent a part in the financial administration of the Gáikwár's home and tributary domains, that its main features are worth describing.

It is a well known characteristic of Hindu dealings that no transaction is carried on by two parties alone if a third can possibly be dragged in. This practice no doubt originated in the former insecure state of society when no man considered himself safe in person or property from government on the one hand and his neighbour on the other. With classes like Kolis and predatory Rájputs, the feeling is intelligible enough, and from these it spread into other branches of the society. To such a pitch was distrust carried in the early part of the nineteenth century, that the Gáikwár himself could find no one to enter into a contract with him without the guarantee of one of his own subjects. The consequences of this practice and the power it threw into the hands of the Arab mercenaries, who were the principal securities for the public debts, are matters that touch the history of the Baroda State rather than that of the province. The chiefs in their dealings employed a special sort of security which owed its validity not to political consideration like that of the Arab Jamádárs but entirely to its religious and traditional character.

[Bháts and Chárans, 1807.] A society of the military type like the Rájput has a tendency towards caste and privilege. Without a leader the warlike instincts of the tribe would not carry them beyond petty robberies; whilst with a leader they can achieve greater exploits of valour and destruction. The successful chief then is idolized, and after a certain stage the privileges of the chieftainship become hereditary. Once this system is established, the celebration of ancestors follows, and when circumstances are favourable to the perpetuation of the hereditary position, the genealogy of the chief is a matter of the highest importance, and the person entrusted with the record of this is vested with peculiar sanctity. It is the genealogist's duty to enter in the record, not only the direct line but the names of the more distant relations of the chief by whom he is retained, and also to be the continual chanter of the glorious deeds of their common ancestors. He is therefore a referee of the highest authority in questions of pedigree or of the partition of inheritance. An injury to his person might entail the loss of the pedigree of the ruling family (especially as many of the bards kept no written record) and thus produce a misfortune which would be felt by the whole tribe. The chief, being a warrior, must take his chance in the field with the rest, but the person of the genealogist was sacred and inviolable. Amongst the Rájputs the greatest reverence was paid to purity of pedigree, and each principal family had its Bhát to record births and deaths amongst its members and to stimulate pride in their lineage by the recital of the wars and exploits of their ancestors.

These Bháts necessarily multiplied beyond the number of the families that could entertain them, so that many took to banking and some to cultivation. Surrounded as they were by the social system of the Hindus, it was not long before they became differentiated into a distinct caste, and the inviolability of their persons, formerly due only to respect for the pedigree, was now extended to the whole tribe, even though a large proportion of it performed none of the duties of genealogists. Similar to the Bháts in many respects, notably in that of sacredness of person, were the Chárans, numerous in Káthiáváda, where they had founded villages and lived as ordinary cultivators. This tribe also claimed divine origin like the race whose annals they had the privilege of recording. It is said that Rája Todar Mal, the celebrated minister of the Dehli empire, was the first to introduce the practice of taking these Bháts as securities for the Rájputs. The assertion is possibly true, but rests merely on tradition, and after ages usually find some great man as a sponsor for all such innovations. It is clear however that for many years before 1807 no dealings of Kolis or Rájputs with the state or with each other took place without the security of a Bhát being taken. This practice seems to have been as prevalent on the mainland as in the peninsula, the Kolis having doubtless borrowed it from their Rájput neighbours after the Bháts had become a separate caste.

Under this system the Bháts acquired considerable wealth, as they usually demanded a percentage on the amount for which they became security. There are instances in which they presumed upon the strength of their engagements and sacred character to bully or dictate to their employer. Such was the case of the Rával of Bhávnagar in 1808, which is also interesting in another way, as showing how the spirit of industry and commerce tends to sap the old observances which have their roots in superstition. This chief engaged in trade, fostered merchants, and increased his revenue. When his security, a Bhát, got troublesome and interfering, he applied to the power to whom he paid tribute to have the old security bond cancelled and a fresh one taken on his own personal responsibility. In doing this he seems to have been prompted by nothing but his appreciation of the modern code of commercial honour.

To return to the mulakgiri. The tribute for which preliminary security had been taken seems to have fluctuated from year to year, but always with reference to a fixed standard. It was one of the Marátha rules never to recede from a former demand lest they should be thereby setting up a precedent for future years. They preferred to secure a year or two's arrears at the full rate to the payment of all the arrears due at a reduced rate.

In spite of this fiction of a settled jama or tribute, the Maráthás, when they had a sufficient force at their back, invariably demanded a larger sum, the excess being called khará-ját or extra distinct from the actual tribute. This ingenious plan of increasing the collections originated, it is said, with Shivrám Gárdi, and was carried out scrupulously by both Bábáji and Vithalráv in their tours. In fact during the last few years of the old system Vithalráv had so good a force with him that the extra demand formed a large proportion of the whole tribute collected and had been paid only under strong protest. [British Intervention.] The British had not long been established in Ránpur, Gogha, and Dhandhuka before a few petty chiefs of Gohilvád and Sorath applied to the Resident at Baroda for protection against the mulakgiri of the Nawáb of Junágadh and the Rával of Bhávnagar, offering to cede the sovereignty of their states to the British on condition that certain rights and privileges were preserved to the chiefs and their families. The conditions they named were not such as were likely to meet with the approval of the British Government, and do not seem to have received much consideration. The proposals had, however, the effect of drawing the attention of the Bombay Government towards the state of Káthiáváda, and permission to aid the mulakgiri of the Gáikwár by detaching a few companies of British troops was accorded by the Supreme Government. The outbreak of hostilities with Sindia led to the whole question as to the best means of collecting the tribute being for a time deferred. The internal disputes of some of the more turbulent states, a few years afterwards, gave the Resident an opportunity of sending an envoy to one or two courts to see how matters stood, and to open a way for a settlement in conjunction with the Gáikwár. Affairs at Baroda, as mentioned above (page 416), detained the Resident there till 1807, in which year he joined Vithalráv's army with a British contingent, at a place in the Morvi state.

[Settlement of 1807.] Before treating directly with the chiefs a circular was sent round to all of them both by the Gáikwár's agent and by Colonel Walker the Resident, containing the basis of the proposals with regard to the tribute about to be submitted to them. The position of the British Government throughout this negotiation is not clearly defined. Vithalráv in his circular mentions indeed that a British force was with his own, but urges the chiefs to come to a settlement entirely with the government he represented. Colonel Walker's note was longer, more explicit, and conciliatory, but at the same time assumes a tone of protection and superiority. The replies of the chiefs were various, and, as a rule, seem to show that they regarded the British Government as the chief mover in these negotiations. They were probably aware of the position in which the engagements of the Gáikwár had placed him with reference to the British, and for some years had had the latter as their neighbours in the east of the peninsula. They were therefore not able at once to take in the whole scope of the action of the British Government in the tribute question.