Chapter XXXVI: Section II: Mughals (a.d. 1570-1720) and Maráthás (4)

Many seemed to take the note as a preliminary to a mulakgiri on the part of the East India Company. The Rája of Mália, who had just been causing disturbances in the dominions of all his neighbours, had repulsed Bábáji and permitted the self-immolation of a Bhát rather than fulfil an engagement, openly proposed a joint expedition across the Ran to plunder Kachh and Sindh. From the inquiries made by the Resident and from information gathered from the Gáikwár's accounts, it was anticipated that separate engagements need only be entered into with the twenty-nine chiefs to whom the circular invitation had been issued, provided that the rights and interests of subordinate members of the Bháyád were clearly defined in the agreement. When, however, these rights came to be investigated in the light of the peculiar rules of Rájput inheritance, it was found that no less than one hundred and fifty-three persons had a claim to settle independently of each other for their tribute. This greatly prolonged the settlement, but at last the agreements were all framed on one principle. The amount settled was determined by a close scrutiny of the collections of past years, and Colonel Walker found it advisable to make great reductions in the item of extras or kharáját, for which the later Gáekwár collectors had such predilection. The engagements were of the following nature.

[Settlement of 1807. Financial.] First, the chief bound himself his heirs and successors to pay at Baroda each year the tribute fixed in perpetuity in 1807. He also procured a counter security for this payment who engaged himself in this capacity for ten years. The Honourable Company's government had then to become security on the part of the Gáikwár for the fixity of the tribute demanded. This participation of the British in the engagement was insisted upon by the chiefs, and in all probability Colonel Walker was not averse from admitting it. Having thus arranged for the payment of the tribute and guaranteed the amount to be demanded, it was proposed to take measures to prevent internal quarrels between the chiefs themselves. The object of a fixed settlement was simply to remove the necessity for overrunning the country from time to time with an irregular army and to protect the chiefs against extortion. It was found that if the army of the paramount power were removed, all means of keeping order in the province would be lost, and the internecine feuds of the chiefs would soon destroy the good effects of the permanent settlement by materially altering the then existing position of the weaker feudatories and rendering them unable to pay the tribute. It was also the wish of the British Government to bring about such a state of things in Káthiáváda that the presence of an army to control the chiefs would be wholly uncalled-for and that the chiefs themselves would co-operate to keep order and maintain the permanent settlement.

[Political.] A second agreement therefore was called for from each signatory state of the nature of a security for good and peaceful conduct. The counter security to this was usually that of another chief. This bond was perpetual. On the execution of both these engagements the chief received a parvána or guarantee that the Gáikwár government would not take from him more than the tribute agreed upon, and to this deed the countersignature of the Resident on behalf of the British Government was affixed. This guarantee, like the promise of the chief himself, was apparently given in perpetuity. It will be noted that the amount of tribute was fixed permanently, but that it was considered advisable to renew the security every ten years. It is also remarkable that, except in the failzámin or bond for good behaviour, the name of the Peshwa's government, the rights of which over the tribute had only been temporarily alienated, does not appear. The total amount of the tribute thus settled was Rs. 9,79,882.

By means of these engagements the relations of the tributaries to their paramount power were made a matter of contract, instead of as heretofore a series of uncertain and arbitrary exactions dependent upon the respective means of coercion and resistance.

[Peshwa's Share in Káthiáváda.] Seven years of the lease granted to the Gáikwár in 1804 by the Peshwa still remained unexpired and during at least six of these the arrangements that had been made about the Káthiáváda tribute do not seem to have been officially communicated to the Peshwa's government. It was not until 1815, when the Resident at Poona was trying to procure the renewal of the lease for the Gáikwár, that an account of the settlement was drawn up in a draft agreement which the Resident submitted to Bájiráv. In this draft the curious mistake was made of mentioning the settlement instead of only the security bond as decennial. The Peshwa, whose policy was to protract negotiations, submitted in his turn a second draft which he said he was willing to sign. In this he seized at once on the supposition that the tribute was fixed only for ten years and stipulated for an increase at the expiration of that period. He also demanded that certain extra collections should be refunded by the Gáikwár, and assumed the British Government to have become security for the tribute owed by the chiefs to his own government.

It was evident that no accord would be reached on the lines of either of these draft agreements as they stood. Before others were prepared, Gangádhar Shástri had been murdered and the treaty of June 1817 was a completed act, leaving further negotiations unnecessary.

[Later Arrangements.] Meanwhile the tribute since the expiry of the farm of 1804 had been collected by a joint British and Gáikwár expedition, for it was found that partly from their own disputes and partly owing to the instigation of the agents of Bájiráv, the chiefs were little disposed to act up to the engagements of 1807, either with respect to tribute or good conduct. The Peshwa, whose interference in the affairs of the peninsula had been constantly discouraged, declined to trouble himself to collect the tribute, the responsibility of which he asserted rested entirely upon the British and Gáikwár governments. He subsequently ceded the tribute to the British Government on account of military expenses. After his fall in 1819 his territories, including the rights in Gujarát, fell to the British Government, and in 1820 the Gáikwár arranged that the whole of the Káthiáváda tribute, except that due from the districts directly subordinate to Baroda, should be collected by the agency of the British.

[The Mahi Kántha.] Turning to the events on the mainland, we find that soon after Colonel Walker's return from the Káthiáváda expedition, he introduced the Káthiáváda tribute system into the Mahi Kántha, in spite of the opposition of Sitárám Rávji and the anti-English party in the Darbár.

[Supplementary Treaty, 1808.] The territory ceded for the payment of the British contingent in 1805 was found to yield less revenue than had been anticipated, so in 1808 a treaty supplementary to the consolidating one of 1805 was drawn up, allotting additional assignments amounting to about 1,76,168 rupees to the British. This revenue was derived partly from alienated villages in Nadiád, Mahudha, Dholka, Mátar, and near the Ranjar Ghát. The ghásdána or tribute of Bhávnagar was also made over by this agreement. With regard to this latter acquisition, it is to be noticed that the agreement is drawn up in the name of the Honourable Company alone, and not in that of the British Government on account of Ánandráv Gáikwár. It also differs from other engagements of a similar nature in containing a provision against the contingency of future irregular demands being made by the Peshwa's army. The reason for this distinction is evidently that the Bhávnagar contribution was not part of the Káthiáváda revenue farmed to the Gáikwár by Bájiráv, and was thus not divisible on the expiration of the lease. The right to this tribute rested with the British by virtue of the previous cession of Gogha, of which sub-division the fifty nine villages of the Bhávnagar Bháyád formed part.

[Okhámandal, 1809.] Next year the Okhámandal chiefs, who had not come under the settlement of 1807, were driven to engage not to continue their piratical depredations along the coast, and to admit one Sundarji Shivji as Resident on behalf of the British Government. The Gáikwár government then, too, seems to have become their counter security, an arrangement which led to misunderstandings a short while afterwards.

[Disturbances in Káthiáváda, 1811.] In 1811, some disturbances in Navánagar and Junágadh and symptoms of discontent in Okhámandal took the Resident from Baroda into the peninsula with part of the British contingent.

The Jám of Navánagar had got involved in pecuniary transactions with the Ráv of Kachh, and the British Government had mediated with a view of arranging for the repayment by gradual instalments. The Jám, however, repudiated all the engagements of 1807 both as regards the debt and the tribute, ejected the Gáikwár's agent from his dominions, and prepared for war. He also began to incite the neighbouring chiefs to join in sweeping out the paramount power from the whole of Káthiáváda. It was not till after a considerable show of force that he laid down his arms and came to terms. Captain Carnac, the Resident, got him to submit the Kachh claims to the arbitration of the English Government, and after fixing them at Rs. 4,33,830, Captain Carnac made an arrangement similar to that originally intended.

There remained the question of a disputed succession in Junágadh. Bahádur Khán, son of a slave girl, was put forward in opposition to a younger aspirant, Salábat Khán, reputed to be the son of a lady of the Rádhanpur house. The Baroda government with the concurrence of the Resident had admitted the claims of the latter. On a report, however, by the Assistant Resident in Káthiáváda, Captain Carnac was induced to alter his opinion and to support Bahádur Khán, on the grounds that Salábat Khán was a spurious child, and that Bahádur was ready to make concessions of value to the Gáikwár government. The Bombay Council, however, disavowed all countenance of the claims of Bahádur Khán, and the matter was let drop.

[1812.] In the year 1812 the Gáikwár had paid off the pecuniary loan borrowed in 1803 from the British Government, but there still remained the debts for which that government had become bhandári or security in place of the ejected jamádârs of the Arab force. These claims could not be paid off for at least two years longer, so that for that period the Resident was ordered to maintain the same close supervision of Baroda affairs as heretofore.

[1813-14.] The next two years were spent chiefly in discussions with the Poona government about the old claims by the Peshwa on the Gáikwár's estate. There is no doubt that at the time of his death, Dámáji had not paid up nearly all that he had bound himself in 1753 to pay. On the other hand there had been at least six intermediate compacts between the Peshwa and various members of the Gáikwár family. Amongst others was that of 1768 fixing the arrears of the previous three years, that of 1778 and of 1781, by the tenth clause of which Fatehsingh was excused payment of arrears for the time during which he was engaged in hostilities against Rághobá. Then came the agreement with Govindráv in 1797, to which a sort of debit and credit account is appended.

[Peshwa Intrigue in Baroda, 1814.] The Peshwa had been content, for reasons that have been shown above, to let these claims lie dormant during the currency of the ten years' farm. But, as the question of the renewal of this agreement became imminent, he gradually opened more frequent communications with the Baroda council, using these claims as a pretext for sounding the disposition of the chief officials and ascertaining their feelings especially towards the British Government. When the negotiations for the settlement of these claims were fairly set on foot, he used every possible means to protract them till he had finally decided what he should do in 1814, when the Ahmedábád farm expired.

It was easy for Bájiráv to discover who were the malcontents at the Baroda Court. Sitárám, the adopted son of Rávji Áppáji, having been found both incompetent and untrustworthy in the management of affairs, had been practically removed from any post of influence in the council, and was moreover chafing at the refusal of the British Government to recognize him in the same way as they had done his father. He had also been superseded as Suba of Káthiáváda by Vithalráv Deváji. Under these circumstances, and finding that he had the support of a large number of the older court party against the authority of the Resident and of his native agent, he either himself opened communications with Bájiráv or readily listened to the counsels sent to him direct from Poona. Before long, agents were sent to the Peshwa's Court by Takhtbái, wife of Ánandráv, with instructions, it is supposed, to thwart all the proposals and designs of Gangádhar Shástri, who had been recently sent as envoy by the Gáikwár council of administration. The chief obstacle to the settlement of the Peshwa's claims was the counter-demand made by the Baroda government on account of Broach, which had been disposed of without the Gáikwár's consent, and also on account of the damage caused by the inroads of Ába Shelukar, when accredited agent of Bájiráv in Gujarát.

There is no need to detail here the events that took place in Poona during these negotiations. On the expiration of the farm in 1814, Bájiráv appointed Trimbakji Dengle Sarsuba of Ahmedábád. The latter, however, did not leave Poona, where his presence was indispensable to his master, but sent agents with instructions rather of a political than of a fiscal nature. He himself undertook the task of disposing of Gangádhar Shástri, whom he caused to be assassinated at Pandharpur in July 1815.

Meanwhile the Jám of Navánagar had died leaving a disputed succession. The chief's Khavás or family slaves, instigated probably by agents from Ahmedábád, began to usurp the government, and the whole question was submitted by the Darbár to the Peshwa as being lord paramount. The Ahmedábád commander sent a body of two hundred cavalry to Navánagar, but before they could arrive, the Khavás' revolt had been quelled by a British force detached from the contingent. They therefore dispersed through the province inciting discontent and revolt amongst the Játs and Káthis. In Kaira they instigated a tribe of Kolis to attack the British lines by night. Sitárám Rávji's adherents also collected a force at Dhár, a state well-known for lending itself for such purposes, and kept the frontier in confusion. Severe measures at Poona and Baroda soon put an end to this state of things, and at last Trimbakji Dengle was surrendered to the British Government to answer for his share in the murder of Gangádhar Shástri. The discussion of the Gáikwár's debts, however, was carried on all through the year at Poona, whilst Bájiráv was maturing his then vacillating plans for extirpating the British from the west of India.

[Okhámandal ceded to the Gáikwár.] In 1816 the chiefs of Okhámandal again betook themselves to piracy. Their territory was occupied by a British force. It will be remembered that in 1809 the Gáikwár's government had become counter security for these chiefs, but owing to the distance of the district from a military post, the Baroda authorities found themselves unable to spare troops enough to put a check on the misconduct of their tributaries. In A.D. 1816, at the time of occupation, the Bombay Government informed the Baroda administration that they had no wish to permanently establish themselves at so distant a spot, which contained, moreover, a much frequented shrine of Hindu worship, and that they were willing to put the Gáikwár in possession if he would engage to keep up a sufficient force in the district to protect the neighbouring ports and shores from the pirates and wreckers that infested the island of Dwárká and the adjoining mainland. The Bombay Government made a point of asserting on this occasion, in opposition apparently to some proposal by the Baroda Darbár, that they could not admit that the mere fact of having become security or counter-security gave any preferential right to the possession of the country. Finally, the Gáikwár government agreed to the condition proposed, and the district was made over to them.

[British Aid at Junágadh.] In the same year (A.D. 1816) British aid was invoked by the Nawáb of Junágadh who was oppressed by a too powerful minister, backed by the Arab mercenaries. After a settlement of this dispute had been satisfactorily brought about, the Nawáb, in gratitude, waived his rights to tribute over the territories recently ceded to the British in the peninsula, where his family had formerly great influence and considerable property. The escape of Trimbakji Dengle from Thána, and the subsequent attempts of the Peshwa to prevent the re-capture of his favourite and to re-unite the Marátha confederacy, led to the execution of a fresh treaty on June 13th, 1817, in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Government.

[Treaty of Poona, 1817.] It was intended to bind the Peshwa in such a way that he could never again enjoy the ascendancy amongst the Marátha chiefs to which he aspired. The Resident at Poona took this opportunity of also putting an end to the discussions about the mutual claims on each other by the Poona and Baroda governments. The Peshwa agreed to abandon all claims on any territory in possession of the Gáikwár and to accept an annual payment of four lákhs of rupees in satisfaction of all previous debts. The farm of Gujarát was made perpetual to the Gáikwár on the payment of four and a half lákhs annually, but the Káthiáváda tribute was made over to the British Government in liquidation of military expenses. The latter Government, by this treaty, also entered into possession of the Peshwa's revenue in Gujarát, except that of Ulpád, which had been assigned to a favourite officer. All the Peshwa's rights north of the Narbada were also ceded.

[Treaty with the Gáikwár, 1817-18.] These conditions necessitated a readjustment of the agreements with the Gáikwár. On November 1817, a definitive treaty, afterwards supplemented by one of November 1818, was executed between the Baroda and British Governments. The force furnished by the former state was found inefficient and the employment of a larger body of British troops was therefore necessary. To pay for these the Gáikwár ceded his share in the fort of Ahmedábád and the districts immediately surrounding that city. [1065] He also made over some districts near Surat, and the town of Umreth in Kaira with the whole of the rights acquired by the perpetual farm of Ahmedábád. The British remitted the mughlái or dues taken by the Nawábs of Surat on the Gáikwár's possessions near that city. Okhámandal having now been pacified, was also given up to the Gáikwár, but revolted four months afterwards and was not again subdued for a considerable time.

[1819.] At the final settlement of the dominions of the late Peshwa in 1819, the whole of his rights in Gujarát passed in sovereignty to the British, who remitted the four lákhs due from the Gáikwár in composition of arrears claimed by Bájiráv. [1820.] The next year a special inquiry was made into the respective shares of the Peshwa and Baroda governments in the Káthiáváda tribute and in the extra allowance levied by the Gáikwár called ghás-dána allowance. In the course of this inquiry so many abuses of power and instances of extortion on the part of the Gáikwár's officers were brought to light, that the Bombay Government on these grounds, and on account also of the general deterioration in the province since the Gáikwár's troops were stationed there, prevailed upon Sayájiráv, who had now succeeded to the throne, to let the duty of collection be undertaken and superintended by a British officer stationed in Káthiáváda, who should, however, employ the Gáikwár's troops on occasions of necessity. A similar arrangement was made with regard to the Mahi Kántha, where the effects of the settlement of 1811 had been much weakened by the disorderly conduct of the Gáikwár's troops stationed there. The administration of nearly the whole of the province passed into the hands of the British and the period of Marátha ascendancy came to an end.

[General Review.] It remains to review generally the nature and characteristics of the Marátha connection with Gujarát, the chief events in which have been chronicled above. The most prominent feature has already been indicated at the beginning of this section and is apparent throughout the whole narrative. It is, in fact, the small space in history occupied during this period by the people, compared with the share appropriated to the actions of the government and its delegates. The reasons for this are as easily seen as the fact itself. From first to last the Marátha interests in Gujarát were, except at one or two special junctures, simply pecuniary ones. In comparison with other countries within reach of Marátha arms, Gujarát has always had a very large proportion of inhabitants engaged in commerce and manufacturing industries. It was the object of Siváji to get as much booty as he could and carry it away then and there; hence the commercial classes and manufacturers presented the most favourable opportunities for pillage, and the agriculturists were at first only mulcted in forage and provisions. Rapidity of action was another of Siváji's aims, so not only were his visits short and their effects transitory, but all his booty consisted of property that could be carried away by his horsemen. No women or followers accompanied his expeditions, no prisoners were made excepting the few who could afford to pay a heavy ransom. Torture was resorted to only when the captive was suspected of having concealed his treasure. Cows women and cultivators were, according to Siváji's system, exempted from capture. Assignments on revenue were seldom made by him for fear of weakening his own authority. Subsequently the Marátha demands became more regular and assumed the form of a certain proportion of the revenue. The sar-deshmukhi and chauth were supposed to be calculated on the standard assessment so as to avoid subsequent claims as tribute or over-collection. In reality, however, they consisted of a fixed share in actual collections together with whatever extras the officer in charge could manage to extort, and which were, of course, kept undefined in any agreement. The expeditions, too, moved more leisurely and in greater force. The passes and roads in their rear were protected by their own comrades, so that the booty could be brought to the Dakhan in carts, and more bulky property therefore was removed than in former times. The times, too, when the demands were likely to be made were known to the headmen of the district and village, so that the cultivators could be pressed beforehand to furnish their share of the contributions. The extortion by this means passed from the commercial classes down to the agriculturists, the latter having also the burden of supporting a larger and more cumbrous army for a longer period.

When the power of the Dábháde and his deputy the Gáikwár was fairly established, a regular system of administration was introduced. It will be remembered that by the treaty of 1729 as few Marátha officers were to be employed as possible beyond those necessary to collect the Dábháde's share of the revenue. In consequence, however, of the internal struggles of the Muhammadan chiefs, this minimum quota grew to be a large establishment, with the usual accompaniment of alienations and assignments for the support of the officers and their religious institutions which the weakness of the central power had allowed to become customary. The Dábháde himself was non-resident and his deputy usually being too valuable an assistant to be spared from the arena of Dakhan politics, the collection was left to sub-deputies and their subordinates, who in turn delegated a great part of their duties to village officers and even to strangers. The Dábhádes, who were throughout more interested in the Dakhan than in Gujarát, had, no doubt, an idea of raising up a power in the latter province in opposition to the administration of the Peshwa, which was conducted purely by Bráhman agency. It was soon evident, however, that all that could be done politically with Gujarát was to make it a treasury for the support of schemes that had to be carried out in the Dakhan.

The fertility of the soil and the facilities the country afforded for commerce and manufactures both tended to make it unlikely to become a field for recruiting. The inhabitants of the towns had fixed and lucrative occupations; the cultivators were mostly of a class which on account of the fertility of their land neither Muhammadan nor Marátha had been able to impoverish. The Maráthás had still to seek for soldiers in the rugged and barren country on the Gháts and in the Konkan, where the people could only look for a hand-to-mouth existence if they remained at home. The warlike tribes of Gujarát were, as has been already seen, too proud by birth and position to engage themselves to fight for any but their own race and interest. The aboriginal races were not likely to prove effective allies even if they had been willing to move from their own woods and fortresses. None of the Marátha governors of Gujarát seem to have consistently attempted to weld the various interests subordinate to them into a cohesion and unity that they might have made politically useful against the Poona influence. All that they endeavoured to do was to draw from their charge as much revenue as possible and to keep out interlopers. To the taxpayer the result was the same, whether his district was invaded by Kantáji or Piláji. If one anticipated the other in carrying off the harvest, the ryot still had to pay the latter for ejecting the intruder. The only resistance to be feared by the Maráthás was that, not of the cultivators, but of their own race or of the Rájput Girásiás. These latter were treated in all districts as mere robbers, probably because the class which bears that name near Rájpipla, where the Maráthás first came in contact with it subsists usually on blackmail. In the north, however, the Girásiás were landowners of great influence and fixed residence, not likely to be conciliated by the knowledge that the invaders of their country classed them along with Bhils and Kolis as mehvásis or outlaws.

In order to relieve the chief officials of direct responsibility for the revenue, the Gáikwár towards the last quarter of the eighteenth century if not before, introduced the system of letting out each revenue sub-division in farm for from one to five years at a fixed annual rate. The farmer was as often as not an absentee, but the supervision and administration were never entrusted to any one but a Marátha Bráhman. The revenue for the year was settled by an inspection of the accounts of previous years and the crops of each village. The amount was taken in kind, but the actual distribution of the whole on individual cultivators was left to the headman, who was in most cases made responsible for the assessment imposed on his village.

The frequent passages of hostile armies and other causes had left much culturable land a desert. In order to restore the population and induce colonists to settle and cultivate in such spots, leases on favourable terms were granted to desáis, who administered the land as they pleased, and were directly responsible to the head revenue authority of the sub-division for the annual rent. The patels and other village officials also made use of their position with reference to the foreign supervisors in appropriating large tracts of waste land to their own uses. The kamávísdár or farmer for the time being was interested only in recouping himself for the amount he had agreed to pay the Marátha government, together with a margin for bribes paid to underlings at head-quarters for good offices with regard to the farm. He was ready, therefore, to make use of any agency in collecting his revenue that he found effective, and which saved the cost of a personal establishment. In many parts of the country there were hereditary village headmen accustomed to the duty of extorting money from unwilling ryots. In other places, such for instance as Dholka, it had been customary for certain Muhammadans called Kasbátis, to become responsible for the revenue of certain villages in return for a discount on the jama or amount collected (manoti). These manotidárs were found so useful by the Marátha officials that they gradually acquired an hereditary position and claimed proprietary rights in the villages for which they had been formerly mere agents for collection. They also acted as desáis or colonists, and succeeded in getting their leases of certain tracts renewed long after they had ceased to actively improve the land, which had in fact been all brought under regular cultivation.

Such was the agency employed in administering the revenue. The kamávísdár was also the dispenser of justice both civil and criminal. As his object was to make money and not to improve the condition of his charge, his punishments consisted chiefly in fines, and most offences could be paid for. No record of trials was kept except a memorandum of the amount passed at each decision to the credit of the farmer. In civil suits sometimes one-fourth of the amount in dispute was assigned as costs and appropriated by the court. The Girásiás in their own territory exercised somewhat similar jurisdiction, but grave crimes with violence were apparently left to the party injured or his relations to decide after the manner of the offence. Arbitration, too, was a frequent mode of deciding differences of both civil and criminal nature, but the kamávísdár or girásiá usually managed that the State should not be a loser by such a method of settlement.

The whole system indicates clearly enough the slight hold the Maráthás had on the province and their desire to make the most out of it for the furtherance of court intrigues or political ends above the Gháts. There is nothing to show that they contemplated a permanent colonization of the country until the British Government undertook the task of dividing the Marátha nation by the establishment of a powerful and independent court at Baroda.

The home of the Maráthás was always the Dakhan, and for many years after they had effected a lodgment in Gujarát, their army regularly returned for the rainy season to the country from whence they originally came. Their leaders were encouraged to be as much as possible near the court by the Dábháde, or the regent on the one side and by the Peshwa on the other: the former on account of their weight with the army and the Marátha chiefs, the latter in order that their influence in a distant dependency might not grow beyond what prudence recommended or might be counteracted if its tendency to increase became manifest. For similar reasons no force was allowed to be maintained in Gujarát sufficient to consolidate the Marátha acquisitions there into a manageable whole. Dámáji Gáikwár, had he lived, would undoubtedly have done much towards this end by means of his personal influence; but, as it happened, the thin crust of Marátha domination rapidly disappeared before it either was assimilated into the system of the province or hardened over it. A military occupation of a large and civilised district at a distance from the mother-country, and prevented by the jealousy of the central authority and the short-sightedness of those in charge of its exploitation, from either conforming itself to the elements it found already established, or absorbing the vital forces of the government it dispossessed, a system without the breath of life, without elasticity, without the capacity of self-direction, imposed bodily upon a foreign people, without even the care of preparing a foundation, such seems to have been the Marátha government, containing within itself all that was necessary to ensure a precarious, but while it lasted, an oppressive existence.

GUJARÁT DISTURBANCES,

1857-1859.

BY L. R. ASHBURNER Esq., C.S.I.,
LATE OF H.M.'s BOMBAY CIVIL SERVICE.

[CONTRIBUTED May 1880.]

GUJARÁT DISTURBANCES,

1857-1859.

[The Red Salt Scare, 1857.] Very soon after the outbreak of the mutinies in the North-West of India in May 1857, an uneasy feeling began to prevail in the Bombay Presidency, especially in Gujarát. The story of the greased cartridges had been industriously repeated and found credulous listeners in every village. A similar incident occurred in Gujarát. A consignment of salt from the Ran of Kachh having been carried in bags which had previously held red ochre (sindur) had become discoloured. This was observed at Sádra in the Mahi Kántha as the salt was in transit to Rájputána, and a report was at once spread that the salt had been defiled with cow's blood. It was believed in Ahmedábád and throughout Gujarát that this was a device of the British Government to destroy the caste of the people as a preliminary to their forcible conversion to Christianity.

[The Passing of the Pariah Dog.] About the time that the cakes or chapátis were being circulated throughout the North-West of India, a common pariah dog was passed from village to village in the Panch Maháls and eastern Gujarát. It was never ascertained who first set the dog in motion, but it came from the Central India frontier with a basket of food which was given to the village dogs, and a similar supply with the dog was forwarded to the next village. When pestilence or other calamity threatens an Indian village, it is the custom to take a goat or a buffalo to the boundary and drive it into the lands of the adjoining village, in the hope that it will avert evil from the community. A similar belief prevailed among the Jews. There is no reason to suppose that this movement of the dog in Gujarát was a signal of revolt or had any deeper political significance than a vague feeling that troublous times were approaching. Still it was by many regarded as an evil omen and created considerable alarm. [1066]

[Gold Hoarding.] Although Gujarát was apparently tranquil in the hot season of 1857, those who were most familiar with native opinion were aware of the existence of very serious discontent, and indications of the storm which lowered on the horizon were not wanting. When disturbances are impending natives invariably convert their savings into gold, because gold is more portable and more easily concealed than silver. A sudden and unusual demand for gold in the markets, especially by the native troops, had been observed. This fall of the political barometer should never be disregarded. It indicates the approach of a storm with great certainty.

[Seditious Native Press.] The native press, which had been merely disloyal, now assumed an attitude of decided hostility. Every paper contained the most exaggerated accounts of the massacre of Europeans in the North-West Provinces, and absurd rumours were circulated of the approach of a combined Russian and Persian army, which, it was said, had reached Attok and would shortly invade Hindustán. It is much to be regretted that the measures which were found necessary in 1880 for the suppression of seditious publications were not enforced in 1857. Had this been done much evil would have been averted. The native mind would not have become familiar with the spectacle of the British Government held up to the execration and contempt of its subjects and the vilest motives attributed to every public measure.

[Maulvi Saráj-ud-din.] The native press was not the only source of sedition. The fall of the British Government was openly predicted in every masjid, and in Ahmedábád a Maulvi named Saráj-ud-din became especially prominent by preaching a jehád in the Jáma Masjid to audiences of native officers and savárs of the Gujarát Horse and troops from the Ahmedábád cantonment. The Maulvi was expelled from Ahmedábád and found his way to Baroda, where he was afterwards arrested; but the impunity he so long enjoyed brought great discredit upon Government, for it was very naturally supposed that a government which tamely submitted to be publicly reviled was too weak to resent the indignity. Oriental races are so accustomed to violent measures that they seldom appreciate moderation or forbearance. The generation that had known and suffered from the anarchy of the Peshwa had passed away. The seditious language of the native press and the masjid was addressed to a population too ignorant to understand the latent power of the British Government.

[Apparent Weakness of British Rule.] In 1857 the immense continent of Hindustán was governed by what appeared to the people to be a few Englishmen unsupported by troops, for they knew that the native army was not to be depended on, and the European troops were so few that they were only seen in the larger military cantonments. It must have seemed an easy task to dispose of such a handful of men, and it probably never occurred to those who took part in the insurrection that the overthrow of the British Government would involve more serious operations than the capture or murder of the Europeans who governed the country so easily. They could not perceive that England would never submit to a defeat, and that the handful of men who ruled India were supported by the whole power of the nation. The plotters had no very definite ideas for the future. The Musalmáns regarded the subversion of a government of Káfirs as a triumph of Islám, and both Muslims and Hindus looked forward to a period of anarchy during which they might indulge that appetite for plunder which had been restrained for so many years. The descendants of the feudal aristocracy of the Peshwa are an ignorant and improvident race deeply involved in debt. They could not fail to see that under the operation of our laws their estates were rapidly passing into the possession of the more intelligent mercantile classes, and they hoped to recover their position in the revolution that was about to ensue.

[Administrative Defects.] A great change had taken place in the character of the administration. The civilians of the school of Duncan, Malcolm, and Mountstuart Elphinstone, though not deeply learned in the law, were accomplished earnest men, sufficiently acquainted with the unalterable principles of right and wrong to administer substantial justice to a simple people who had not yet learnt the art of lying. The people asked for justice rather than law. They were satisfied with the justice they obtained from the able and upright men who ruled this country during the first half of this century. The writings and official reports of the officers of that period indicate a knowledge of native customs and feelings and a sympathy with the people that is unknown in the present day, for knowledge and sympathy cannot be acquired except by a long and familiar residence amongst the people which is now becoming every year more impossible. When the overland route rendered communication with England more easy and frequent, a reaction set in against patriarchal administration. Concubinage with native women, which had been common, was now declared vulgar, if not immoral; and the relations between Europeans and Natives soon became less cordial than they had been during the early period of British rule. About this time a considerable immigration of lawyers appeared in India. [The Courts Disliked.] These briefless gentlemen, envious of the official monopoly of the Civil Service, raised an outcry that justice was being administered by men who had not acquired that knowledge of law which the formality of eating a certain number of dinners at the Temple was supposed to guarantee. They worked the press so industriously to this cry, that in the course of a few years they had succeeded in impressing their views on the Court of Directors in London and on the less intelligent members of the Civil Service in India.

Unfortunately the Sadar Court was then presided over by a succession of feeble old gentlemen who had not sufficient force of character to resist this selfish agitation, and by way of refuting the charge of ignorance of law devoted themselves to the study of those petty technicalities which have so often brought the administration of justice into contempt, and which the progress of law reform has not even now removed from the law of England. In 1827, Mountstuart Elphinstone had enacted a Civil and Criminal Code which was still the substantive law of the land. It was simple and admirably suited to the people, but justice was administered according to the spirit rather than the letter of the law. A district officer would have incurred severe censure if his decisions were found to be inequitable, however they might have been supported by the letter of the law. The national character for even-handed justice had made the English name respected throughout India and far across the steppes of Central Asia. But the demoralizing example of the Sadar Adálat soon extended to the lower grades of the service. The Civil Service was afflicted with the foolishness which, we are told, precedes ruin. Its members diligently searched their law-books for precedents and cases, and rejoiced exceedingly if they could show their knowledge of law by reversing the decision of a lower Court on some long-forgotten ruling of the Courts of Westminster. The first effect of this evil was to fill the courts with corrupt and unprincipled vakils who perverted the course of justice by perjury, forgery, and fraud of every description. Litigation increased enormously, no cause was too rotten, no claim too fraudulent to deprive it of the chance of success. The grossest injustice was committed in the name of the law, and though the Civil Service was above all suspicion of corruption, the evil could hardly have been greater if the Judges had been corrupt. This state of affairs gave rise to great discontent, for the administration of justice fell almost entirely into the hands of the vakils. When men quarrelled they no longer said, "I'll beat or I'll kill you," but "I'll pay a vakil Rs. 50 to ruin you," and too often this was no mere idle threat.

[The Inám Commission.] The operations of the Inám Commission and of the Survey Department were also a fruitful cause of alarm and discontent. Many of the estates of the more influential Jághírdárs had been acquired by fraud or violence during the period of anarchy which preceded the fall of the Peshwa. The Patels and Deshmukhs had also appropriated large areas of lands and had made grants of villages to temples and assignments of revenue to Bráhmans, religious mendicants, and dancing girls. The Peshwa had never recognized these alienations as any limitation of his rights, for he farmed his revenues, and so long as a large sum was paid into his treasury by the farmers it was immaterial to him how much land was alienated. But when the Survey Department revealed the fact that nearly a fourth part of the fertile province of Gujarát was unauthorizedly enjoyed by these parasites; and that in other districts the proportion of alienations was nearly equally large, a due regard for the public interests demanded that there should be an investigation into the title on which the lands were held rent-free. It became the duty of the Inám Commission to make this inquiry, and though a very small portion of land was resumed or rather assessed to the land revenue and the rules for the continuation of cash allowances were extremely liberal, they could hardly be expected to give satisfaction to those who had so long enjoyed immunity from any share of the public burdens. The Bráhmans and the priesthood of every sect deeply resented the scrutiny of the Inám Commission and excited an intensely fanatical spirit by representing the inquiry as a sacrilegious attack on their religious endowments and a departure from the principle of neutrality and toleration which had been the policy of Government from a very early period.

[The Army Disloyal.] Notwithstanding all these elements of danger there would probably have been no revolt if the army had remained loyal. Fortunately the Bombay army was composed of a great variety of races, Musalmáns of the Shia and Sunni sects, Maráthás of the Dakhan and Konkan, Parváris, Pardeshis, and a few Jews and Christians. Little community of sentiment could exist, in so heterogeneous a force, and to this circumstance we may trace the failure of each mutinous outbreak in the regiments of the Bombay army. Many of its regiments had, however, recruited extensively in the North-West Provinces which were then the centre of the political cyclone, and it was soon discovered that seditious overtures were being made to them not only by their brethren in the regiments which had already mutinied, but by discontented persons of higher rank. [Báiza Bái of Gwálior.] The most important of these was a clever woman known as the Báiza Bái. She was the daughter of a Dakhan Sardár named Sirji Ráo Ghátke, and had been married in early life to His Highness Dowlat Ráo Sindia the Mahárája of Gwálior. On his death she had been allowed to adopt Jankoji Ráo as heir to the gádi, and during his minority she had been appointed by the British Government Regent of the Gwálior state. In this position the Bái had accumulated great wealth. She had deposited £370,000 (37 lákhs of rupees) for safe custody in the treasury at Benares, and it was known that she had other resources at Gwálior. Her avarice and ambition were insatiable. She sent emissaries to all the Marátha chiefs and Thákors in Western India calling on them to take up arms and restore the empire of Shiváji. She appealed to the troops, urging them to emulate the deeds of their comrades in the Bengal army who had already nearly exterminated the Europeans in the North-West, and warned them that if they did not now strike in defence of their religion they would shortly be converted to Christianity and made to drink the blood of the sacred cow.

[Pársi Riot in Broach, June 1857.] In May and June 1857 our troops were fighting before Delhi, only just holding their own, and making little impression on the walls of the city which were strongly held by the mutinous regiments. Gujarát was still tranquil. It is true there had been a riot in Broach originating in a long-standing feud between the Pársis and Musalmáns of that town, but it had no political significance and had been promptly suppressed. The ringleaders were arrested, tried, and sentenced to be hanged for the murder of a Pársi, but there is no reason to suppose that this disturbance had any immediate connection with the outbreak in the North-West. It was probably only a coincidence, but the violence of the rioters was no doubt encouraged by the weakness of our position in Gujarát, and the exaggerated rumours which reached them of the massacre of our countrymen.

[Mutiny at Mhow, July 1857.] On July 1st, 1857, the 23rd Bengal Native Infantry and the 1st Bengal Cavalry stationed at Mhow mutinied and murdered Colonel Platt, Captain Fagan, Captain Harris, and a number of European subordinates of the Telegraph Department. The troops of His Highness Holkar fraternized with the mutineers, attacked the Residency, and after a desultory fight drove out Colonel Durand the Resident, who took refuge in Bhopál with the surviving Europeans of Indor. Information of the mutiny at Mhow soon reached Ahmedábád, and treasonable negotiations were at once opened for a simultaneous rising of the Gujarát Horse and of the troops in the cantonment; but they could not agree to combined operations. The Maráthás hoped for the restoration of the dynasty of the Peshwa, while the Pardeshis looked towards Dehli where their brethren were already in arms, without any very definite comprehension of what they were fighting for, but with some vague idea that they would establish a Musalmán Ráj on the throne of the Great Mughal.

[Mutiny at Ahmedábád, July 1857.] On July 9th, 1857, seven savárs of the Gujarát Horse raised a green flag in their regimental lines in Ahmedábád and attempted to seize the quarter guard in which the ammunition was stored; but the guard made some slight show of resistance, and finding the regiment did not join them the mutineers left the lines in the direction of Sarkhej. They were followed by the Adjutant, Lieutenant Pym, with twelve savárs, and Captain Taylor, the commandant, joined them soon after with three men of the Koli Corps, whom he had met on the Dholka road. The savárs were overtaken near the village of Tájpor, and having taken up a strong position between three survey boundary-marks opened fire on their officers and the Kolis, the savárs standing aloof. After many shots had been exchanged without result, Captain Taylor advanced to parley, and while endeavouring to reason with his men was shot through the body. The Kolis now re-opened fire and having shot two of the savárs the rest laid down their arms. They were tried under Act XIV. of 1857 and hanged. The savárs who followed Lieutenant Pym passively declined to act against their comrades, and if the Kolis had not been present the mutineers would have escaped. Captain Taylor's wound was severe; the bullet passed through his body, but he eventually recovered. The execution of the savárs had a good effect on the troops, but it became evident that a serious struggle was impending, and Lord Elphinstone, who was then at the head of the Bombay Government, took all the precautions that were possible under the circumstances.

[Mr. Ashburner's Force.] Mr. Ashburner, Assistant Magistrate of Kaira, was ordered to raise a force of 200 Foot and 30 Horse for the protection of his districts, and Husain Khán Battangi, a Musalmán gentleman of Ahmedábád, was authorized to enlist 2000 of the dangerous classes. It was not expected that this Ahmedábád force would add to our fighting strength, but the employment of the rabble of Ahmedábád on good pay kept them out of mischief till the crisis was passed. Mr. Ashburner's small force was composed of Rájputs, Makránis, and Kolis. They were a very useful body of men and were afterwards drafted into the Kaira Police of which they formed the nucleus. It was this force that suppressed the rising of the Thákors on the Mahi, which will be described below.

[Genl. Roberts.] General Roberts, a very able soldier, commanded the Northern Division at this time. He fully realized the critical position of affairs in Gujarát. He was aware that the troops were on the verge of mutiny, that the Thákors were sharpening their swords and enlisting men, and that no relief could be expected till after the rains. But he was not the man to despond or to shirk the responsibility now thrown upon him. He proved equal to the occasion and met each emergency as it arose with the calm determination of a brave man.

[Rising at Amjera.] When the troops at Mhow mutinied, the Rája of Amjera took up arms and attacked Captain Hutchinson the Political Agent of Bhopáwar. He fled and was sheltered by the Rája of Jábwa. At the same time (July 1857) the Musalmán Kanungus or accountants and Zamíndárs of the [And in the Panch Maháls, July 1857.] Panch Maháls revolted, laid siege to the fort of Dohad, and threatened the Kaira district. Captain Buckle, the Political Agent, Rewa Kántha, marched from Baroda with two guns under Captain Sheppee, R. A., and two companies of the 8th Regiment Native Infantry, to relieve Dohad, while Major Andrews, with a wing of the 7th Regiment, two guns under Captain Saulez, R. A., and 100 Sabres of the Gujarát Horse, marched on Thásra to support Mr. Ashburner and act generally under his orders. On the approach of Captain Buckle's force the insurgents abandoned the siege, and Captain Hutchinson soon after re-established his authority in Bhopáwar by the aid of the Málwa Bhil Corps which remained loyal. He arrested the Rája of Amjera and hanged him.

[Mutinies at Abu and Erinpur, 1857.] On the 5th August the Jodhpur Legion stationed at Abu mutinied. They made a feeble attack on the barracks of H. M. 33rd Regiment and Captain Hall's bungalow, into which they fired a volley of musketry, but were repulsed, leaving one of their men on the ground badly wounded. The fog was so dense that it was impossible to use firearms effectively. Mr. Lawrence of the Civil Service was the only person wounded. A party of the 17th Bombay Native Infantry who were on duty at Ábu, were suspected of complicity with the Jodhpur Legion and were disarmed. The head-quarters of the Legion mutinied at Erinpur on the same day as the attack at Ábu; they made the Adjutant, Lieutenant Conolly, prisoner and plundered the treasury.