Chapter X: (Year of Rome 702.) (2)

When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans. The resemblance of their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they had their right shoulders bare (_dextris humeris exsertis_), the ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fabius, and those who had followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall. M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (_see Plate 21_, third position), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on a commanding post (_Le Puy-de-Marmant_), under the command of the lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700 men.[496]

Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with having “wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more than to the valour of the enemy.”[497]

[Sidenote: Observations.]

VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the “Commentaries,” Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and, according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed, relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out _Cæsar_, which signifies in Gaulish _let him go_, and thus he escaped.[498] Plutarch gives another version: “The Arverni,” he says, “still show a sword hung up in one of their temples, which they pretend to be a spoil taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused, pretending that it had become a sacred object.”[499] This tradition proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was engraved the law of his banishment.

[Sidenote: Cæsar leaves Gergovia in order to join Labienus.]

VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success. Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience, and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (_Nevers_). This town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and, lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain. Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away, and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the Narbonnese--a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire, swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges, irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at Bourbon-Lancy.[500] The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched towards the land of the Senones.[501]

[Sidenote: Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii.]

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an island in the Seine, the _oppidum_ of the Parisii. After leaving his baggage at Agedincum (_Sens_)[502] under the guard of the troops recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important streams and considerable towns.[503] At the news of his approach, the enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (_See Plate 23._)

When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the Seine at Melodunum (_Melun_), and, when once on the right bank, of advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and, retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an _oppidum_ of the Senones, situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the _oppidum_, that is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.

It was already rumoured that Cæsar had raised the siege of Gergovia; the news of the defection of the Ædui, and of the progress of the insurrection, had begun already to spread. The Gauls repeated incessantly that Cæsar, arrested in his march by the Loire, had been compelled, by want of provisions, to retire towards the Roman province. The Bellovaci, whose fidelity was doubtful, had no sooner heard of the revolt of the Ædui, than they collected troops and prepared openly for war.

At the news of so many unfavourable events, Labienus felt all the difficulties of his situation. Placed on the right bank of the Seine, he was threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, who had only to cross the Oise to fall upon him; on the other by Camulogenus, at the head of a well-trained army, ready to give battle; lastly, a large river, which he had crossed at Melun, separated him from Sens, where he had his dépôts and baggage. To escape from this perilous position, he thought it advisable to change his plans: he renounced all offensive movements, and resolved to return to his point of departure by an act of daring. Fearing that, if he went by the road on which he had advanced, he should not be able to cross the Seine at Melun, because his boats would not have re-mounted the river without difficulty, he decided on surprising the passage of the Seine below Paris, and returning to Sens by the left bank, marching over the body of the Gaulish army. Towards evening he convoked a council, and urged on his officers the punctual execution of his orders. He entrusted the boats he had brought from Melun to the Roman knights, with orders to descend the river at the end of the first watch (ten o’clock), to advance in silence for the space of four miles (six kilomètres), which would bring them as far down as the village of Point-du-Joir, and to wait for him. The five cohorts which had least experience were left in charge of the camp, and the five others of the same legion received orders to re-ascend on the right bank of the river in the middle of the night, with all their baggage, and attract by their tumult the attention of the enemy. Boats were sent in the same direction, which were rowed with great noise. He himself, a little after, left in silence with the three remaining legions, and, proceeding down the river, repaired to the spot where the first boats waited for him.

When he arrived there, a violent storm enabled him to carry by surprise the Gaulish posts placed along the whole bank. The legions and cavalry had soon passed the Seine with the assistance of the knights. Day began to appear, when the enemy learnt, almost at the same instant, first, that an unusual agitation prevailed in the Roman camp, that a considerable column of troops was ascending the river, and that in the same direction a great noise of oars was heard; lastly, that lower down the stream the troops were crossing the Seine in boats. This news made the Gauls believe that the legions intended to cross it on three points, and that, perplexed by the defection of the Ædui, they had decided on forcing the road by the left bank.[504] Camulogenus divided also his forces into three corps: he left one opposite the Roman camp; sent the second, less numerous, in the direction of Melodunum,[505] with instructions to regulate its march according to the progress of the enemy’s boats which re-ascended the Seine; and, at the head of the third, went to meet Labienus.

At sunrise the Roman troops had crossed the river, and the enemy’s army appeared drawn up in order of battle. Labienus exhorts his soldiers to recall to mind their ancient valour, and so many glorious exploits, and, as they marched to the combat, to consider themselves under the eye of Cæsar, who had led them so often to victory: he then gives the signal. At the first shock the 7th legion, placed on the right wing, routs the enemy; but on the left wing, although the 12th legion had transpierced the first ranks with their _pila_, the Gauls defend themselves obstinately, and not one dreams of flight. Camulogenus, in the midst of them, excites their ardour. The victory was still doubtful, when the tribunes of the 7th legion, informed of the critical position of the left wing, lead their soldiers to the back of the enemies, and take them in the rear. The barbarians are surrounded, yet not one yields a step; all die fighting, and Camulogenus perishes with the rest. The Gaulish troops left opposite the camp of Labienus had hurried forward at the first news of the combat, and had taken possession of a hill (probably that of Vaugirard); but they did not sustain the attack of the victorious Romans, and were hurried along in the general rout; all who would not find refuge in the woods and on the heights were cut to pieces by the cavalry.

After this battle Labienus returned to Agedincum; thence he marched with all his troops, and went to join Cæsar.[506]

[Sidenote: The Gauls assume the offensive.]

X. The desertion of the Ædui gave the war a greater development. Deputies are sent in all directions: credit, authority, money, everything is put in activity to excite the other states to revolt. Masters of the hostages whom Cæsar had entrusted to them, the Ædui threaten to put to death those who belong to the nations which hesitate. In a general assembly of Gaul, convoked at Bibracte, at which the Remi, the Lingones, and the Treviri only were absent, the supreme command is conferred on Vercingetorix, in spite of the opposition of the Ædui, who claim it, and who, seeing themselves rejected, begin to regret the favours they had received from Cæsar. But they had pronounced for the war, and no longer dare to separate themselves from the common cause. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of great promise, obey Vercingetorix unwillingly. The latter begins by exacting from the other states hostages to be delivered on a fixed day; orders that the cavalry, amounting to 15,000 men, shall be gathered round his person; declares he has infantry enough at Bibracte, for his intention is not to offer a pitched battle to the Romans, but, with a numerous cavalry, to intercept their convoys of grain and forage. He exhorts the Gauls to set fire with a common accord to their habitations and crops, which are only small sacrifices in comparison to their liberty. These measures having been decided, he demands from the Ædui and the Segusiavi, who bordered upon the Roman province, 10,000 foot soldiers, sends them 800 horse, and gives the command of these troops to the brother of Eporedorix, with orders to carry the war into the country of the Allobroges. On another side, he orders the Gabali and the neighbouring cantons of the Arverni to march against the Helvii, and sends the Ruteni and the Cadurci to lay waste the country of the Volcæ Arecomici. At the same time, he labours secretly to gain the Allobroges, in the hope that the remembrance of their ancient struggles against the Romans is not yet effaced. He promises money to their chiefs, and to their country the sovereignty over the whole Narbonnese.

To meet these dangers, twenty-two cohorts, raised in the province, and commanded by the lieutenant Lucius Cæsar,[507] had to face the enemy on every side. The Helvii, faithful to the Romans, by their own impulse, attacked their neighbours in the open field; but repulsed with loss, and having to deplore the death of their chiefs, among others that of C. Valerius Donnotaurus, they ventured no more outside their walls. As to the Allobroges, they defended their territory with energy, by placing a great number of posts along the Rhone. The superiority of the enemy in cavalry, the interruption of the communications, the impossibility of drawing succour from Italy or the province, decided Cæsar on demanding from the German peoples on the other side of the Rhine, subdued the year before, cavalry and light infantry accustomed to fight intermingled. On their arrival, finding that the cavalry were not sufficiently well mounted, he distributed amongst them the horses of the tribunes, and even those of the Roman knights and the volunteers (_evocati_).[508]

[Sidenote: Junction of Cæsar and Labienus. Battle of the Vingeanne.]

XI. The line of march followed by Cæsar after he had crossed the Loire has been the subject of numerous controversies. Yet the “Commentaries” appear to us to furnish sufficient data to determine it with precision. On leaving Gergovia, Cæsar’s object was, as he tells us himself, to effect a junction with Labienus; with this view, he marched towards the land of the Senones, after having crossed the Loire at Bourbon-Lancy. On his part, Labienus, after returning to Sens, having advanced to meet Cæsar, their junction must necessarily have taken place on a point of the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens; this point, in our opinion, is Joigny. (_See Plate 19._) Encamped not far from the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne, Cæsar could easily receive the contingent which he expected from Germany.

The Roman army was composed of eleven legions: the 1st, lent by Pompey, and the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.[509] The effective force of each of them varied from 4,000 to 5,000 men; for, if we see (lib. V. 49) that on the return from Britain two legions reckoned together only 7,000 men, their effective force was soon increased by considerable re-enforcements which came to the army of Gaul in 702;[510] the legion lent by Pompey was of 6,000 men;[511] and the 13th, at the breaking out of the civil war, had in its ranks 5,000 soldiers.[512] Cæsar had then at his disposal, during the campaigns which ended with the taking of Alesia, 50,000 legionaries, and perhaps 20,000 Numidian or Cretan archers, and 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry, a thousand of whom were Germans, making a total of about 75,000 men, without counting the valets, who were always very numerous.

When the junction of the troops had been effected, Cæsar sought above all to approach the Roman province, in order to carry succour to it with more ease; he could not think of taking the most direct road, which would have led him into the country of the Ædui, one of the centres of the insurrection; he was, therefore, obliged to pass through the territory of the Lingones, who had remained faithful to him, and to proceed into Sequania, where Besançon offered an important place of arms. (_See Plate 19._) He started from Joigny, following the road which he had taken when he marched to meet Ariovistus (696),[513] and the winter before, when he moved from Vienne to Sens. After reaching the Aube at Dancevoir, he proceeded towards the little river Vingeanne, crossing, as the “Commentaries” say, the extreme part of the territory of the Lingones (_per extremos Lingonum fines_).[514] His intention was, no doubt, to cross the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler.

Whilst the Romans abandoned that part of Gaul which had revolted, in order to approach nearer to the province, Vercingetorix had assembled his army, amounting to more than 80,000 men, at Bibracte; it had come in great part from the country of the Arverni, and counted in its ranks the cavalry furnished by all the states. Having been informed of Cæsar’s march, he started at the head of his troops, to bar the road through Sequania. Passing, as we believe, by Arnay-le-Duc, Sombernon, Dijon, and Thil-Châtel, he arrived at the heights of Occey, Sacquenay, and Montormentier, where he formed three camps, at a distance of 10,000 paces (fifteen kilomètres) from the Roman army. (_See Plate 24._) In this position Vercingetorix intercepted the three roads which Cæsar could have taken towards the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler, or at Chalon.[515] Resolved on risking a battle, he convoked the chiefs of the cavalry. “The moment of victory,” he told them, “has arrived; the Romans fly into their province, and abandon Gaul. If this retreat delivers us for the present, it ensures neither peace nor rest for the future; they will return with greater forces, and the war will be endless. We must attack them, therefore, in the disorder of their march; for if the legions stop to defend their long convoy, they will not be able to continue their road; or if, which is more probable, they abandon their baggage in order to secure their own safety, they will lose what is indispensable to them, and, at the same time, their prestige. As to their cavalry, they will surely not dare to move away from the column; that of the Gauls must show so much the more ardour, as the infantry, ranged before the camp, will be there to intimidate the enemy.” Then, the cavalry exclaimed, “Let every one swear, by a solemn oath, never to return to the home of his forefathers, his wife, or his children, if he has not ridden twice through the ranks of the enemy!” This proposition was received with enthusiasm, and all took the oath.

The day on which Vercingetorix arrived on the heights of Sacquenay,[516] Cæsar, as we have seen, encamped on the Vingeanne, near Longeau. Ignorant of the presence of the Gauls, he started next day, in marching column, the legions at a great distance from each other, separated by their baggage. When his vanguard arrived near Dommarien, it could perceive the hostile army. Vercingetorix was watching the moment they (the Romans) debouched, to attack. He had divided his cavalry in three bodies, and his infantry had descended from the heights of Sacquenay in order to take a position along the Vingeanne and the Badin. (_See Plate 24._) As soon as the vanguard of the enemy appears, Vercingetorix bars its way with one of the bodies of cavalry, while the two others show themselves in order of battle on the two wings of the Romans. Taken unexpectedly, Cæsar divides his cavalry also into three bodies, and opposes them to the enemy. The combat engages on all sides; the column of the Roman army halts; the legions are brought into line, and the baggage placed in the intervals. This order, in which the legions were, no doubt, in column of three deep, was easy to execute, and presented the advantages of a square. Wherever the cavalry gives way or is too hotly pressed, Cæsar sends to its support the cohorts, which he draws from the main body to range them in order of battle.[517] By this manœuvre he renders the attacks less vigorous, and increases the confidence of the Romans, who are assured of support. Finally, the German auxiliaries, having gained, to the right of the Roman army, the summit of a height (the hill of Montsaugeon), drive the enemies from it, and pursue the fugitives as far as the river, where Vercingetorix stood with his infantry. At the sight of this rout, the rest of the Gaulish cavalry fear to be surrounded, and take to flight. From this time the battle became a mere carnage. Three Ædui of distinction are taken and brought to Cæsar: Cotus, chief of the cavalry, who, at the last election, had contended with Convictolitavis for the sovereign magistracy; Cavarillus, who, since the defection of Litavicus, commanded the infantry; and Eporedorix, whom the Ædui had for chief in their war against the Sequani, before the arrival of Cæsar in Gaul.[518]

[Sidenote: Blockade of Alesia.]

XII. Vercingetorix, after the defeat of his cavalry, decided on a retreat; taking his infantry with him, without returning to his camp, he marched immediately towards Alesia, the _oppidum_ of the Mandubii. The baggage, withdrawn from the camp, followed him without delay.[519] Cæsar ordered his baggage to be carried to a neighbouring hill, under the guard of two legions, pursued the enemies as long as daylight permitted, killed about 3,000 men of their rear-guard, and established his camp, two days afterwards, before Alesia.[520] After having reconnoitred the position of the town, and taking advantage of the disorder of the enemy, who had placed his principal confidence in his cavalry, which was thrown into consternation by its defeat, he resolved to invest Alesia, and exhorted his soldiers to support the labours and fatigues of a siege with constancy.

Alise-Sainte-Reine, in the department of the Côte-d’Or, is, undoubtedly, the Alesia of the “Commentaries.” The examination of the strategic reasons which determined the march of Cæsar, the correct interpretation of the text, and, lastly, the excavations lately made, all combine to prove it.[521]

Ancient Alesia occupied the summit of the mountain now called Mont Auxois; on the western slope is built the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine. (_See Plates 25 and 26_.) It is an entirely isolated mountain, which rises 150 to 160 mètres above the surrounding valleys (_erat oppidum Alesia in colle summo, admodum edito loco ..._). Two rivers bathe the foot of the mountain on two opposite sides: they are the Ose and the Oserain (_cujus collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina subluebant_). To the west of Mont Auxois the plain of Laumes extends, the greatest dimension of which, between the village of Laumes and that of Pouillenay, is 3,000 paces or 4,400 mètres (_ante oppidum planities circiter millia passuum III in longitudinem patebat_). On all other sides, at a distance varying from 1,100 to 1,600 mètres, rises a belt of hills, the plateaux of which are at the same height (_reliquis ex omnibus partibus colles, mediocri interjecto spatio, pari altitudinis fastigio oppidum cingebant_).

The summit of Mont Auxois has the form of an ellipse, 2,100 mètres in length, and 800 mètres broad in its greatest diameter. Including the first spurs which surround the principal mass, it is found to contain a superficies of 1,400,000 square mètres, 973,100 mètres of which for the upper plateau and 400,000 mètres for the terraces and spurs. (_See Plate 25_.) The town appears to have crowned the whole of the plateau, which was protected by scarped rocks against all attack.[522]

This _oppidum_ could, apparently, only be reduced by a complete investment. The Gaulish troops covered, at the foot of the wall, all the slopes of the eastern part of the mountain; they were there protected by a fosse and by a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. Cæsar established his camps in favourable positions, the infantry on the heights, the cavalry near the watercourses. These camps, and twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses,[523] formed a line of investment of 11,000 paces (sixteen kilomètres).[524] The redoubts were occupied in the day by small posts, to prevent any surprise; by night, strong detachments bivouacked in them.

The works were hardly begun, when a cavalry engagement took place in the plain of Laumes. The combat was very hot on both sides. The Romans were giving way, when Cæsar sent the Germans to their assistance, and ranged the legions in order of battle in front of the camps, so that the enemy’s infantry, kept in awe, should not come to the assistance of the cavalry. That of the Romans recovered confidence on seeing that they were supported by the legions. The Gauls, obliged to fly, became embarrassed by their own numbers, and rushed to the openings left in the wall of unhewn stones, which were too narrow for the occasion. Pursued with fury by the Germans up to the fortifications, some were slain, and others, abandoning their horses, attempted to cross the fosse and climb over the wall. Cæsar then ordered the legions, who were drawn up before his retrenchments, to advance a little. This movement carried disorder into the Gaulish camp. The troops within feared a serious attack, and the cry to arms rose on all sides. Some, struck with terror, threw themselves into the _oppidum_; Vercingetorix was obliged to order the gates to be closed, for fear the camp should be abandoned. The Germans retired, after having killed a great number of the cavalry, and taken a great number of horses.

Vercingetorix resolved to send away all his cavalry by night, before the Romans had completed the investment. He urges the cavalry, on their departure, to return each to his country, and recruit the men able to carry arms; he reminds them of his services, and implores them to think of his safety, and not to deliver him as a prey to the enemies, him who has done so much for the general liberty: their indifference would entail with his loss that of 80,000 picked men. On an exact calculation, he has only provisions for one month; by husbanding them carefully, he may hold out some time longer. After these recommendations, he causes his cavalry to leave in silence, at the second watch (nine o’clock). It is probable that they escaped by ascending the valleys of the Ose and the Oserain. Then he orders, on pain of death, all the corn to be brought to him. He divides among the soldiers individually the numerous cattle which had been collected by the Mandubii; but as to the grain, he reserves the power of distributing it gradually and in small quantities. All the troops encamped outside withdraw into the _oppidum_. By these dispositions he prepares to wait for the succour of Gaul, and to sustain the war.

As soon as Cæsar was informed of these measures by the prisoners and deserters, he resolved to form lines of countervallation and circumvallation, and adopted the following system of fortifications: he ordered first of all to be dug, in the plain of Laumes, a fosse twenty feet wide, with vertical walls, that is, as wide at the bottom as at the level of the ground (_see Plates 25 and 28_), so as to prevent lines so extensive, and so difficult to guard with soldiers along their whole extent, from being attacked suddenly by night, and also to protect the workmen from the darts of the enemy during the day. Four hundred feet behind this fosse, he formed the countervallation. He then made two fosses of fifteen feet wide, of equal depth,[525] and filled the interior fosse--that is, the one nearest to the town--with water derived from the river Oserain. Behind these fosses he raised a rampart and a palisade (_aggerem ac vallum_), having together a height of twelve feet. Against this was placed a fence of hurdles with battlements (_loricam pinnasque_); strong forked branches were placed horizontally at the junction of the hurdle-fence and the rampart, so as to render them more difficult to scale. (_See Plate 27._) Lastly, he established towers on all this part of the countervallation, with a distance of eighty feet between them.

It was necessary at the same time to work at widely extended fortifications, and to fetch in wood and provisions, so that these distant and toilsome expeditions diminished incessantly the effective force of the combatants; and the Gauls, too, often attempted to harass the workmen, and even made vigorous sallies, through several gates at a time. Cæsar judged it necessary to increase the strength of the works, so that they might be defended with a smaller number of men. He ordered trees or large branches to be taken, the extremities of which were sharpened and cut to a point;[526] they were placed in a fosse five feet deep; and, that they might not be torn up, they were tied together at the lower part; the other part, furnished with branches, rose above ground. There were five rows of these, contiguous and interlaced; whoever ventured amongst them would be wounded by their sharp points; they were called _cippi_. In front of these sorts of _abatis_ were dug wolves’ pits (_scrobes_), trunconic fosses, of three feet deep, disposed in the form of a quincunx. In the centre of each hole was planted a round stake, of the thickness of a man’s thigh, hardened in the fire, and pointed at the top; it only rose about four inches above ground. In order to render these stakes firmer, they were surrounded at the base with earth well stamped down; the rest of the excavation was covered with thorns and brushwood, so as to conceal the trap. There were eight rows of holes, three feet distant from each other: they were called _lilies_ (_lilia_), on account of their resemblance to the flower of that name. Lastly, in front of these defences were fixed, level with the ground, stakes of a foot long, to which were fixed irons in the shape of hooks. These kind of caltrops, to which they gave the name of _stimuli_,[527] were placed everywhere, and very near each other.

When this work was finished, Cæsar ordered retrenchments to be dug, almost similar, but on the opposite side, in order to resist attacks from the exterior. This line of circumvallation, of fourteen miles in circuit (twenty-one kilomètres), had been formed on the most favourable ground, in conforming to the nature of the locality. If the Gaulish cavalry brought back an army of succour, he sought by these means to prevent it, however numerous it might be, from surrounding the posts established along the circumvallation. In order to avoid the danger which the soldiers would have run in quitting the camps, he ordered that every man should provide himself with provisions and forage for thirty days. Notwithstanding this precaution, the Roman army suffered from want.[528]

Whilst Cæsar adopted these measures, the Gauls, having convoked an assembly of their principal chiefs, probably at Bibracte, decided not to collect all their men able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix wished, but to demand from each people a certain contingent, for they dreaded the difficulty of providing for so large and so confused a multitude, and of maintaining order and discipline. The different states were required to send contingents, the total of which was to amount to 283,000 men; but, in reality, it did not exceed 240,000. The cavalry amounted to 8,000.[529]

The Bellovaci refused their contingent, declaring that they intended to make war on their own account, at their own will, without submitting to anybody’s orders. Nevertheless, at the instance of Commius, their host, they sent 2,000 men.

This same Commius, we have seen, had in previous years rendered signal service to Cæsar in Britain. In return for which, his land, that of the Atrebates, freed from all tribute, had recovered its privileges, and obtained the supremacy over the Morini. But such was then the eagerness of the Gauls to re-conquer their liberty and their ancient glory, that all feelings of gratitude and friendship had vanished from their memory, and all devoted themselves body and soul to the war.

The numbering and the review of the troops took place on the territory of the Ædui. The chiefs were named; the general command was given to the Atrebatan Commius; to the Æduans Viridomarus and Eporedorix, and to the Arvernan Vercasivellaunus, cousin of Vercingetorix. With them were joined delegates from each country, who formed a council of direction for the war. They began their march towards Alesia, full of ardour and confidence: each was convinced that the Romans would retreat at the mere sight of such imposing forces, especially when they found themselves threatened at the same time by the sallies of the besieged, and by an exterior army powerful in infantry and in cavalry.

Meanwhile, the day on which the besieged expected succour was past, and their provisions were exhausted; ignorant, moreover, of what was taking place among the Ædui, they assembled to deliberate on a final resolution. The opinions were divided: some proposed to surrender, others to make a sally, without waiting till their vigour would be exhausted. But Critognatus, an Arvernan distinguished by his birth and credit, in a discourse of singular and frightful atrocity, proposed to follow the example of their ancestors, who, in the time of the war of the Cimbri, being shut up in their fortresses, and a prey to want, ate the men who were unable to bear arms, rather than surrender. When the opinions were gathered, it was decided that that of Critognatus should only be adopted at the last extremity, and that for the present they would confine themselves to sending out of the place all useless mouths. The Mandubii, who had received the Gaulish army within their walls, were compelled to leave with their wives and children. They approached the Roman lines, begged to be taken for slaves and supplied with bread. Cæsar placed guards along the _vallum_, with orders not to admit them.

At length Commius and the other chiefs, followed by their troops, appear before Alesia; they halt upon a neighbouring hill, scarcely 1,000 paces from the circumvallation (the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse). The following day they draw their cavalry out of their camp; it covered the whole plain of Laumes. Their infantry establishes itself at a short distance on the heights. The plateau of Alesia commanded the plain. At the sight of the army of succour, the besieged meet together, congratulate each other, yield to excess of joy, and then they rush out of the town, fill the first fosse with fascines and earth, and all prepare for a general and decisive sally.

Cæsar, obliged to face the enemy on two sides at once, disposed his army on the two opposite lines of the retrenchments, and assigned to each his post; he then ordered the cavalry to leave its camps, and to give battle. From all the camps placed on the top of the surrounding hills, the view extended over the plain, and the soldiers, in suspense, waited for the issue of the event. The Gauls had mixed with their cavalry a small number of archers and light-armed soldiers, to support them if they gave way, and arrest the attack of the cavalry of the enemy. A good number of the latter, wounded by these foot-soldiers, whom they had not perceived until then, were obliged to retire from the battle. Then the Gauls, confident in their numerical superiority, and in the valour of their cavalry, believed themselves sure of victory; and from all sides, from the besieged, as well as from the army of succour, there arose an immense cry to encourage the combatants. The engagement was in view of them all; no trait of courage or of cowardice remained unknown; on both sides, all were excited by the desire of glory and the fear of dishonour. From noon till sunset the victory remained uncertain, when the Germans in Cæsar’s pay, formed in close squadrons, charged the enemy, and put them to the rout; in their flight they abandoned the archers, who were surrounded; then, from all parts of the plain, the cavalry pursued the Gauls up to their camp without giving them time to rally. The besieged, who had sallied out of Alesia, returned in consternation, and almost despairing of safety.

After a day employed in making a great number of hurdles, ladders, and hooks, the Gauls of the army of succour left their camp in silence towards the middle of the night, and approached the works in the plain. Then, suddenly uttering loud cries, in order to warn the besieged, they throw their fascines, to fill up the fosse, attack the defenders of the _vallum_ with a shower of sling-balls, arrows, and stones, and prepare everything for an assault. At the same time, Vercingetorix, hearing the cries from without, gives the signal with the trumpet, and leads his troops out of the place. The Romans take in the retrenchments the places assigned to them beforehand, and they spread disorder among the Gauls by throwing leaden balls, stones of a pound weight, and employing the stakes placed in the works beforehand; the machines rain down upon the enemy a shower of darts. As they fought in the dark (the shields being useless), there were in both armies many wounded. The lieutenants M. Antony and C. Trebonius, to whom was entrusted the defence of the threatened points, supported the troops that were too hardly pressed by means of reserves drawn from the neighbouring redoubts. So long as the Gauls kept far from the circumvallation, the multitude of their missiles gave them the advantage; but when they approached, some became suddenly entangled in the _stimuli_; others fell bruised into the _scrobes_; others again were transpierced by the heavy _pila_ used in sieges, which were thrown from the tops of the _vallum_ and the towers. They had many disabled, and nowhere succeeded in forcing the Roman lines. When day began to break, the army of succour retired, fearing to be taken in their uncovered flank (the right side) by a sally from the camps established on the mountain of Flavigny. On their side, the besieged, after losing much valuable time in transporting the material for the attack, and in making efforts to fill up the first fosse (the one which was twenty feet wide), learnt the retreat of the army of succour before they had reached the real retrenchment. This attempt having failed, like the other, they returned into the town.

Thus twice repulsed with great loss, the Gauls of the army of succour deliberated on what was to be done. They interrogate the inhabitants of the country, who inform them of the position and the sort of defences of the Roman camps placed on the heights.

To the north of Alesia there was a hill (Mont Réa) which had not been enclosed in the lines, because it would have given them too great an extent; the camp necessary on that side had, for this reason, to be established on a slope, and in a disadvantageous position (_see Plate 25, camp D_); the lieutenants C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius Rebilus occupied it with two legions. The enemy’s chiefs resolved to attack this camp with one part of their troops, whilst the other should assail the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes. Having decided on this plan, they send their scouts to reconnoitre the localities, secretly arrange among themselves the plan and the means of execution, and decide that the attack shall take place at noon. They choose 60,000 men amongst the nations most renowned for their valour. Vercasivellaunus, one of the four chiefs, is placed at their head. They sally at the first watch, towards nightfall, proceed by the heights of Grignon and by Fain towards Mont Réa, arrive there at break of day, conceal themselves in the depressions of the ground to the north of that hill, and repose from the fatigues of the night. At the hour appointed, Vercasivellaunus descends the slopes and rushes upon the camp of Reginus and Rebilus; at the same moment, the cavalry of the army of succour approaches the retrenchments in the plain, and the other troops, sallying from their camps, move forwards.

When, from the top of the citadel of Alesia, Vercingetorix saw these movements, he left the town, carrying with him the poles, the small covered galleries (_musculos_), the iron hooks (_falces_),[530] and everything which had been prepared for a sally, and proceeded towards the plain. An obstinate struggle follows;, everywhere the greatest efforts are made, and wherever the defence appears weakest, the Gauls rush to the attack. Scattered over extensive lines, the Romans defend only with difficulty several points at the same time, and are obliged to face two attacks from opposite sides. Fighting, as it were, back to back, everybody is agitated by the cries he hears, and by the thought that his safety depends upon those that are behind him; “it lies in human nature,” says Cæsar, “to be struck more deeply with the danger one cannot see.”[531]

On the northern slopes of the mountain of Flavigny (at the point marked _J C_, _Plate 25_), Cæsar had chosen the most convenient spot for observing each incident of the action, and for sending assistance to the places which were most threatened. Both sides were convinced that the moment of the decisive struggle had arrived. If the Gauls do not force the lines, they have no further hope of safety; if the Romans obtain the advantage, they have reached the end of their labours. It is especially at the retrenchments on the slopes of Mont Réa that the Romans run the greatest danger, for the commanding position of the enemy gives them an immense disadvantage (_iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium, magnum habet momentum_). One part of the assailants throw darts; another advances, forming the tortoise; fresh troops incessantly relieve the soldiers who are weary. All strive desperately to fill the fosses, to render useless the accessory defences by covering them with earth, and to scale the rampart. Already the Romans begin to feel the want of arms and strength. Cæsar, informed of this state of things, sends Labienus to their succour with six cohorts, and orders him, if the troops cannot maintain themselves behind the retrenchments, to withdraw them and make a sally, but only at the last extremity. Labienus, encamped on the mountain of Bussy, descends from the heights to proceed to the place of combat. Cæsar, passing between the two lines, repairs to the plain, where he encourages the soldiers to persevere, for this day, this hour will decide whether they are to gather the fruit of their former victories.

Meanwhile the besieged, having abandoned the hope of forcing the formidable retrenchments of the plain, direct their attack against the works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of Flavigny, and transport thither all their materials of attack; with a shower of arrows they drive away the Roman soldiers who fight from the top of the towers; they fill the fosses with earth and fascines, clear a passage for themselves, and, by means of iron hooks, tear down the wattling of the parapet and the palisade. Young Brutus is first sent thither with several cohorts, and after him the lieutenant C. Fabius with seven more; at last, as the action becomes still hotter, Cæsar himself hurries to them with new reserves.

After the fortune of the fight has been restored, and the enemies driven back, he proceeds towards the place where he had sent Labienus, draws four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, orders a part of the cavalry to follow him, and the other part to go round by the exterior lines, to take the enemy in the rear by issuing from the camp of Grésigny. On his side, Labienus, seeing that neither the fosses nor the ramparts can arrest the efforts of the Gauls, rallies thirty-nine cohorts which have arrived from the neighbouring redoubts, and which chance offers to him, and informs Cæsar that, according to what had been agreed, he is going to make a sally.[532] Cæsar hastens his march in order to share in the combat. As soon as, from the heights on which they stood, the legionaries recognise their general by the colour of the garment which he was in the habit of wearing in battle (the purple-coloured _paludamentum_),[533] and see him followed by cohorts and detachments of cavalry, they sally from the retrenchments and begin the attack. Shouts arise on both sides, and are repeated from the _vallum_ to the other works. When Cæsar arrives, he sees the lines abandoned, and the battle raging in the plain of Grésigny, on the banks of the Ose. The Roman soldiers throw away the _pilum_, and draw their swords. At the same time, the cavalry of the camp of Grésigny appears in the rear of the enemy; other cohorts approach. The Gauls are put to the rout, and in their flight encounter the cavalry, who make great slaughter among them. Sedulius, chief and prince of the Lemovices, is slain; the Arvernan Vercasivellaunus is taken prisoner. Seventy-four ensigns are brought to Cæsar. Of all this army, so numerous as it was, few combatants return to their camp safe and sound.

Witnesses, from the top of their walls, of this sanguinary defeat, the besieged despaired of their safety, and called in the troops who were attacking the countervallation.[534] As the result of these reverses, the Gauls of the army of succour fly from their camp; and if the Romans, compelled to defend so many points at one time, and to assist each other mutually, had not been worn out by the labours of a whole day, the entire mass of the enemies might have been annihilated. Towards the middle of the night the cavalry sent in pursuit came up with their rear-guard; a great part of them were taken prisoners or killed; the others dispersed, to return to their countries.

Next day, Vercingetorix convokes a council. He declares that he has not undertaken this war out of personal interest, but for the cause of the liberty of all. “Since they must yield to fate, he places himself at the discretion of his fellow-citizens, and offers them, in order to appease the Romans, to be delivered up, dead or alive.” A deputation is at once sent to Cæsar, who requires that the arms and the chiefs be delivered to him. He places himself in front of his camp, inside the retrenchments; the chiefs are brought, the arms are laid down, and Vercingetorix surrenders to the conqueror. This valiant defender of Gaul arrives on horseback, clad in his finest arms, makes the circuit of Cæsar’s tribunal, dismounts, and laying down his sword and his military ensigns, exclaims: “Thou hast vanquished a brave man, thou, the bravest of all!”[535] The prisoners were distributed by head to each soldier, by way of booty, except the 20,000 who belonged to the Ædui and Arverni, and whom Cæsar restored in the hope of bringing back those people to his cause.