Chapter XI: (Year of Rome 703.)

(BOOK VIII.[540] OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)

[Sidenote: Expedition against the Bituriges and Carnutes.]

I. The capture of Alesia and that of Vercingetorix, in spite of the united efforts of all Gaul, naturally gave Cæsar hopes of a general submission; and he therefore believed that he could leave his army, during the winter, to rest quietly in its quarters from the hard labours which had lasted, without interruption, during the whole of the past summer. But the spirit of insurrection was not extinct among the Gauls; and convinced by experience that, whatever might be their number, they could not, in a body, cope with troops inured to war, they resolved, by partial insurrections, raised on all points at once, to divide the attention and the forces of the Romans, as their only chance of resisting them with advantage.

Cæsar was unwilling to leave them time to realise this new plan, but gave the command of his winter quarters to his quæstor Mark Antony, quitted Bibracte on the day before the Calends of January (the 25th of December), with an escort of cavalry, joined the 13th legion, which was in winter quarters among the Bituriges, not far from the frontier of the Ædui, and called to him the 11th legion, which was the nearest at hand. Having left two cohorts of each legion to guard the baggage, he proceeded towards the fertile country of the Bituriges, a vast territory, where the presence of a single legion was insufficient to put a stop to the preparations for insurrection.

His sudden arrival in the midst of men without distrust, who were spread over the open country, produced the result which he expected. They were surprised before they could enter into their _oppida_, for Cæsar had strictly forbidden everything which might have raised their suspicion, especially the application of fire, which usually betrays the sudden presence of an enemy. Several thousands of captives were made; those who succeeded in escaping sought in vain a refuge among the neighbouring nations. Cæsar, by forced marches, came up with them everywhere, and obliged each tribe to think of its own safety before that of others. This activity held the populations in their fidelity, and, through fear, engaged the wavering to submit to the conditions of peace. Thus the Bituriges, seeing that Cæsar offered them an easy way to recover his protection, and that the neighbouring states had suffered no other chastisement than that of having to deliver hostages, did not hesitate in submitting.

The soldiers of the 11th and 13th legions had, during the winter, supported with rare constancy the fatigues of very difficult marches, in intolerable cold. To reward them, he promised to give, by way of prize-money, 200 sestertii to each soldier, and 2,000 to each centurion. He then sent them into their winter quarters, and returned to Bibracte, after an absence of forty days. Whilst he was there dispensing justice, the Bituriges came to implore his support against the attacks of the Carnutes. Although it was only eighteen days since he returned, he marched again, at the head of two legions, the 6th and the 14th, which had been placed on the Saône to ensure the supply of provisions.

On his approach, the Carnutes, taught by the fate of others, abandoned their miserable huts, which they had erected on the site of their burgs and _oppida_ destroyed in the last campaign, and fled in every direction. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the rigour of the season, established his camp at Genabum (_Gien_), and lodged his soldiers partly in the huts which had remained undestroyed, partly in tents, under penthouses covered with straw. The cavalry and auxiliary infantry were sent in pursuit of the Carnutes, who, hunted down everywhere, and without shelter, took refuge in the neighbouring countries.[541]

[Sidenote: Campaign against the Bellovaci.]

II. After having dispersed some rebellious meetings and stifled the germs of an insurrection, Cæsar believed that the summer would pass without any serious war. He left, therefore, at Genabum, the two legions he had with him, and gave the command of them to C. Trebonius. Nevertheless, he learnt, by several intimations from the Remi, that the Bellovaci and neighbouring peoples, with Correus and Commius at their head, were collecting troops to make an inroad on the territory of the Suessiones, who had been placed, since the campaign of 697, under the dependence of the Remi.

He then considered that it regarded his interest, as well as his dignity, to protect allies who had deserved so well of the Republic. He again drew the 11th legion from its winter quarters, sent written orders to C. Fabius, who was encamped in the country of the Remi, to bring into that of the Suessiones the two legions under his command, and demanded one of his legions from Labienus, who was at Besançon. Thus, without taking any rest himself, he shared the fatigues among the legions by turns, as far as the position of the winter quarters and the necessities of the war permitted.

When this army was assembled, he marched against the Bellovaci, established his camp on their territory, and sent cavalry in every direction, in order to make some prisoners, and learn from them the designs of the enemy. The cavalry reported that the emigration was general, and that the few inhabitants who were to be seen were not remaining behind in order to apply themselves to agriculture, but to act as spies upon the Romans. Cæsar, by interrogating the prisoners, learnt that all the Bellovaci able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that they had been joined by the Ambiani, the Aulerci,[542] the Caletes, the Veliocasses, and the Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest, on a height surrounded by marshes (Mont Saint-Marc, in the forest of Compiègne) (_see Plate 29_); their baggage had been transported to more distant woods. The command was divided among several chiefs, but the greater part obeyed Correus, on account of his well-known hatred to the Romans. Commius had, a few days before, gone to seek succour from the numerous Germans who lived in great numbers in the neighbouring countries (probably those on the banks of the Meuse). The Bellovaci resolved with one accord to give Cæsar battle, if, as report said, he was advancing with only three legions, for they would not run the risk of having afterwards to encounter his entire army. If, on the contrary, the Romans were advancing with more considerable forces, they proposed to keep their positions, and confine themselves to intercepting, by means of ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which were very scarce at that season.

This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Cæsar full of prudence, and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He took, therefore, every possible care to dissimulate the number of his troops; he had with him the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions, composed of old soldiers of tried valour, and the 11th, which, formed of picked young men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his confidence, although it could not be compared with the others with regard to bravery and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemies by showing them only three legions, the only number they were willing to fight, he placed the 7th, 8th, and 9th in one line; whilst the baggage, which was not very considerable, was placed behind, under the protection of the 11th legion, which closed the march. In this order, which formed almost a square, he came unawares in sight of the Bellovaci. At the unexpected view of the legions, which advanced in order of battle and with a firm step, they lost their courage; and instead of attacking, as they had engaged to do, they confined themselves to drawing themselves up before their camp, without leaving the height. A valley, deeper than it was wide (_magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente_), separated the two armies. On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of the barbarians, Cæsar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the idea of attacking them, and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls, in a strong position (the camp of Saint Pierre-en-Chatre [_in Castris_], in the forest of Compiègne).[543] (_See Plates 29 and 30._) He caused it to be surrounded with a parapet twelve feet high, surmounted with accessory works, proportioned to the importance of the retrenchment (_loriculamque pro ratione ejus altitudinis_),[544] and preceded by a double fosse, fifteen feet wide, with a square bottom;[545] towers of three stories were constructed from distance to distance, and united together by covered bridges, the exterior part of which was protected by hurdle-work. In this manner, the camp was protected not only by a double fosse, but also by a double row of defenders, some of whom, placed on the bridges, could, from this elevated and sheltered position, throw their missiles farther and with a better aim; while the others, placed on the _vallum_, nearer to the enemy, were protected by the bridges from the missiles which showered down upon them. The entrances were defended by means of higher towers, and were closed with gates.

These formidable retrenchments had a double aim: to increase the confidence of the barbarians, by making them believe that they were feared; and, next, to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced with safety, when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there were no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain which extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few foragers did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which was still more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had brought only 500 German cavalry.

The enemies remained for several days shut up in their impregnable position. Cæsar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an investment alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater number of troops. He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as possible the 13th legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in winter quarters among the Bituriges; to join it with the 6th and the 14th, which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum, and to come himself with these three legions by forced marches. During this time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent surprises. But this daily service, as is often the case, ended by being negligently performed; and one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with too much ardour, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing, they were surrounded by foot-soldiers, in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief, met with his death. True to his Gaulish manner, he would not allow his age to dispense him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he was hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage raised the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered the Romans more circumspect. Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which were continually taking place within sight of the two camps, about the fordable places of the marsh, the German infantry, which Cæsar had sent for from beyond the Rhine, in order to mix them with the cavalry, joined in a body, boldly crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little resistance, continued the pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized not only the enemies who fought, but even those who were in reserve. Instead of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled cowardly; they did not stop till they were within their camp, and some even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily damped by the least reverse as they became arrogant on the smallest success.

Day after day was passing in this manner, when Cæsar was informed of the arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused multitude in motion, embarrassed with its own mass and its numerous chariots, when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up in line before the camp, to give the column time to move away. Cæsar saw no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, or, on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions advance in order to disturb the enemy in his retreat. Having observed that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown on the marsh; the legions crossed over them, and soon attained the summit of the height, which was defended on both sides by abrupt declivities. There he collected his troops, and advanced in order of battle up to the extremity of the plateau, whence the engines, placed in battery, could reach the masses of the enemy with their missiles.

The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position, were ready to accept battle, if the Romans dared to attack the mountain; besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led Cæsar to resolve on leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing a camp on this spot, and retrenching it. When the works were completed, the legions were placed before the retrenchments, and the cavalry distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the same time their order of battle, placed them in front of the camp, and, towards the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to them. Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish troops, who fled in haste.

Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy, he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry in pursuit; but he marched only slowly, for fear of some stratagem, as the barbarians might have formed the design of drawing the Romans to a disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass over a distance of ten miles, and halt in a place strongly fortified by nature, Mont Ganelon, where they pitched their camp. In this position, they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to forage.[546]

[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne.]

III. After several encounters of this kind, Cæsar learnt by a prisoner that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with 6,000 picked infantry and 1,000 horsemen, were preparing an ambuscade in the places where the abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans. In consequence of this information, he sent forward the cavalry, which was always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some light-armed auxiliaries; and he himself, with a greater number of legions, followed them as near as possible.

The enemy had posted themselves in a plain (that of Choisy-au-Bac) of about 1,000 paces wide in every direction, and surrounded on one side by forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to pass (the Aisne). The cavalry were acquainted with the designs of the Gauls; feeling themselves supported, they advanced resolutely, in squadrons, towards this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all sides. Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity favourable for the execution of his plan, and began by attacking the first squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock, without concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, “which,” says Hirtius, “happens usually in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a dangerous confusion.” There, on the contrary, the squadrons remained separated, fought in detached bodies, and, when one of them advanced, its flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest of his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all sides, without any decisive result, until the enemy’s infantry, debouching from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to fall back. The lightly-armed soldiers, who preceded the legions, placed themselves between the squadrons, and restored the fortune of the combat. After a certain time, the troops, animated by the approach of the legions and the arrival of Cæsar, and ambitious of obtaining alone the honour of the victory, redoubled their efforts, and gained the advantage. The enemies, on the other hand, were discouraged and took to flight; but they were stopped by the very obstacles which they intended to throw in the way of the Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped through the forest and crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken under this catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell pierced with wounds.

After this success, Cæsar hoped that, if he continued his march, the enemy, in dismay, would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not without great difficulties.

The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their infantry, fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked, by sound of trumpets, a general assembly, and decided by acclamation to send deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them from oppression, for during his life it was not the Senate who governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers, Cæsar replied, “that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other Gaulish peoples, but that they alone had persisted in the revolt. It was very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead; but how could it be believed that, with nothing but the help of a weak populace, a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain a war, contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the Senate, and the desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn upon themselves was for him a sufficient reparation.”

The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the exception of Commius, who fled to the country whence he had recently drawn succours. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the following reason: the year before, in the absence of Cæsar, T. Labienus, informed that Commius was conspiring and preparing an insurrection, thought that, without accusing him of bad faith, says Hirtius, he could repress his treason. Under pretext of an interview, he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus with some centurions to kill him; but, when they were in the presence of the Gaulish chief, the centurion who was to strike him missed his blow, and only wounded him; swords were drawn on both sides, and Commius had time to escape.[547]

[Sidenote: Devastation of the Country of the Eburones.]

IV. The most warlike tribes had been vanquished, and none of them dreamt of further revolt. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of the newly-conquered countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to withdraw themselves from the Roman dominion. Cæsar, in order to put a stop to this emigration, distributed his army into different countries. He ordered the quæstor Mark Antony to come to him, with the 12th legion, and sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite part of Gaul (to the country situated between the Creuse and the Vienne), where it was said that several peoples were in arms, and where the lieutenant Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions, appeared not to be sufficiently strong;[548] lastly, he ordered T. Labienus to join him in person, and to send the 15th legion,[549] which he had under his command, into Cisalpine Gaul, to protect the colonies of Roman citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians, who, the summer before, had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of Trieste).

As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the Eburones, to lay it waste; as he could not secure Ambiorix, who was still wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything by fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return to a country on which he had brought such a terrible calamity: the legions and the auxiliaries were charged with this execution. Then, he sent Labienus with two legions to the country of the Treviri, who, always at war with the Germans, were only kept in obedience by the presence of a Roman army.[550]

[Sidenote: Expedition against Dumnacus.]

V. During this time, Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to go into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by partial insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne, learnt that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of the Pictones; he was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their king, who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained invariably faithful to the Romans. He started immediately for Lemonum (_Poitiers_). On the road, he learnt from prisoners that Duratius was shut up there, and besieged by several thousand men under the orders of Dumnacus, chief of the Andes. Rebilus, at the head of two weak legions, did not dare to measure his strength with the enemy; he contented himself with establishing his camp in a strong position. At the news of his approach, Dumnacus raised the siege, and marched to meet the legions. But, after several days’ fruitless attempts to force their camp, he returned to attack Lemonum.

Meanwhile, the lieutenant Caius Fabius, occupied in pacifying several peoples, learnt from Caninius Rebilus what was going on in the country of the Pictones; he marched without delay to the assistance of Duratius. The news of the march of Fabius deprived Dumnacus of all hope of opposing at the same time the troops shut up in Lemonum and the army of succour. He abandoned the siege again in great haste, not thinking himself safe until he had placed the Loire between him and the Romans; but he could only pass that river where there was a bridge (at Saumur). Before he had joined Rebilus, before he had even obtained a sight of the enemy, Fabius, who came from the north, and had lost no time, doubted not, from what he heard from the people of the country, that Dumnacus, in his fear, had taken the road which led to that bridge. He therefore marched thither with his legions, preceded, at a short distance, by his cavalry. The latter surprised the column of Dumnacus on its march, dispersed it, and returned to the camp laden with booty.

During the night of the following day, Fabius again sends his cavalry forward, with orders to delay the march of the enemy, so as to give time for the arrival of the infantry. The two cavalries are soon engaged; but the enemy, thinking that he had to contend only with the same troops as the day before, draws up his infantry in line, so as to support the squadrons, when, suddenly, the legions appear in order of battle. At this sight, the barbarians are struck with terror, the long train of baggage is thrown into confusion, and they disperse. More than 12,000 men were killed, and all the baggage fell into the hands of the Romans.

Only 5,000 fugitives escaped from this rout; they were received by the Senonan Drappes, the same who, in the first revolt of the Gauls, had collected a crowd of vagabonds, slaves, exiles, and robbers, to intercept the convoys of the Romans. They took the direction of the Narbonnese with the Cadurcan Lucterius, who, as has been seen in the preceding chapter (p. 275), had before attempted a similar invasion. Rebilus pursued them with two legions, in order to avoid the shame of seeing the province suffering any injury from such a contemptible rabble.

As for Fabius, he led the twenty-five cohorts against the Carnutes and the other peoples, whose forces had already been reduced by the defeat they had just experienced with Dumnacus. The Carnutes, though often beaten, had never been completely subdued; they gave hostages; the Armorican peoples followed their example. Dumnacus, driven out of his own territory, went to seek a refuge in the remotest part of Gaul.[551]

[Sidenote: Capture of Uxellodunum.]

VI. Drappes and Lucterius, when they learnt that they were pursued by Rebilus and his two legions, gave up the design of penetrating into the province; they halted in the country of the Cadurci, and threw themselves into the _oppidum_ of Uxellodunum (_Puy-d’Issolu_, near Vayrac), an exceedingly strong place, formerly under the dependence of Lucterius, who soon excited the inhabitants into revolt.

Rebilus appeared immediately before the town, which, surrounded on all sides by steep rocks, was, even without being defended, difficult of access to armed men. Knowing that there was in the _oppidum_ so great a quantity of baggage that the besieged could not send them secretly away without being overtaken by the cavalry, and even by the infantry, he divided his cohorts into three bodies, and established three camps on the highest points. (_See Plate 31._) Next, he ordered a countervallation to be made. On seeing these preparations, the besieged remembered the ill fortune of Alesia, and feared a similar fate. Lucterius, who had witnessed the horrors of famine during the investment of that town, took especial care for the provisions, and, with the consent of all, having 2,000 men in Uxellodunum, he left by night, with Drappes and the rest of the troops, to procure them.

After a few days they collected, by good-will or by force, a great quantity of provisions. During this time the garrison of the _oppidum_ attacked the redoubts of Rebilus several times, which obliged him to interrupt the work of the countervallation, which, indeed, he would not have had sufficient forces to defend.

Drappes and Lucterius established themselves at a distance of ten miles from the _oppidum_, with the intention of introducing the provisions gradually. They shared the duties between them. Drappes remained with part of the troops to protect the camp. Lucterius, during the night-time, endeavoured to introduce beasts of burden into the town, by a narrow and woody path. The noise of their march gave warning to the sentries. Rebilus, informed of what was going on, ordered the cohorts to sally from the neighbouring redoubts, and at daybreak fell upon the convoy, the escort of which was slaughtered. Lucterius, having escaped with a small number of his followers, was unable to rejoin Drappes.

Rebilus soon learnt from prisoners that the rest of the troops which had left the _oppidum_ were with Drappes at a distance of twelve miles, and that, by a fortunate chance, not one fugitive had taken that direction to carry him news of the last combat. The Roman general sent in advance all the cavalry and the light German infantry; he followed them with one legion without baggage, leaving the other as a guard to the three camps. When he came near the enemy, he learnt by his scouts that the barbarians, according to their custom, neglecting the heights, had placed their camp on the banks of a river (probably the Dordogne); that the Germans and the cavalry had surprised them, and that they were already fighting. Rebilus then advanced rapidly at the head of the legion, drawn up in order of battle, and took possession of the heights. As soon as the ensigns appeared, the cavalry redoubled their ardour, the cohorts rush forward from all sides, the Gauls were taken or killed, the booty was immense, and Drappes fell into the hands of the Romans.

Rebilus, after this successful exploit, which cost him but a few wounded, returned under the walls of Uxellodunum. Fearing no longer any attack from without, he set resolutely to work to continue his circumvallation. The day after, C. Fabius arrived, followed by his troops, and shared with him the labours of the siege.

While the south of Gaul was the scene of serious troubles, Cæsar left the quæstor Mark Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the Bellovaci. To deprive the Belgæ of all idea of revolt, he had proceeded to the neighbouring countries with two legions, had exacted hostages, and restored confidence by his conciliating speeches. When he arrived among the Carnutes, who, the year before, had been the first to revolt, he saw that the remembrance of their conduct kept them in great alarm, and he resolved to put an end to it by causing his vengeance to fall only upon Gutruatus, the instigator of the war. This man was brought and delivered up; and although Cæsar was naturally inclined to indulgence, he could not resist the tumultuous entreaties of his soldiers, who made that chief responsible for all the dangers they had run, and for all the misery they had suffered. Gutruatus died under the stripes, and was afterwards beheaded.

It was in the land of the Carnutes that Cæsar received news, by the letters of Rebilus, of the events which had taken place at Uxellodunum, and of the resistance of the besieged. Although a handful of men shut up in a fortress was not very formidable, he judged it necessary to punish their obstinacy, for fear that the Gauls should acquire the conviction that it was not strength, but constancy, which had failed them in resisting the Romans; and lest this example might encourage the other states, which possessed fortresses advantageously situated, to recover their independence.

Moreover, it was known everywhere amongst the Gauls that Cæsar had only one summer more to hold his command, and that after that they would have nothing more to fear. He left, therefore, the lieutenant Quintus Calenus[552] at the head of his two legions, with orders to follow him by ordinary marches, and with his cavalry he hastened by long marches towards Uxellodunum.

Cæsar, arriving unexpectedly before that town, found it completely invested on all accessible points. He judged that it could not be taken by assault (_neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla conditione posse_), and, as it was abundantly provided with provisions, he conceived the project of depriving the inhabitants of water. The mountain was surrounded nearly on every side by very low ground; but on one side there existed a valley through which a river (the Tourmente) ran. As it flowed at the foot of two precipitous mountains, the disposition of the localities did not admit of turning it aside and conducting it into lower channels. It was difficult for the besieged to come down to it, and the Romans rendered the approaches to it still more dangerous. They placed posts of archers and slingers, and brought engines which commanded all the slopes which gave access to the river. The besieged had thenceforth no other means of procuring water but by fetching it from an abundant spring which arose at the foot of the wall, 300 feet from the channel of the Tourmente. (_See Plate 31._) Cæsar resolved to drain this spring, and for this purpose he did not hesitate to attempt a laborious undertaking: opposite the point where it rose, he ordered covered galleries to be pushed forwards against the mountain, and, under protection of these, a terrace to be raised, labours which were carried on in the middle of continual fights and incessant fatigues. Although the besieged, from their elevated position, fought without danger, and wounded many Romans, yet the latter did not yield to discouragement, but continued their task. At the same time they made a subterranean gallery, which, running from the covered galleries, was intended to lead up to the spring. This work, carried on free from all danger, was executed without being perceived by the enemy; the terrace attained a height of sixty feet, and was surmounted by a tower of ten stories, which, without equalling the elevation of the wall, a result it was impossible to obtain, still commanded the fountain. (_See Plate 32._) Its approaches, battered by engines from the top of this tower, became inaccessible; in consequence of this, many men and animals in the place died of thirst. The besieged, terrified at this mortality, filled barrels with pitch, grease, and shavings, and rolled them in flames upon the Roman works, making at the same time a sally, so as to prevent them from extinguishing the fire; soon it spread to the covered galleries and the terrace, which stopped the progress of the inflammable materials. Notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground and the increasing danger, the Romans still persevered in their struggle. The battle took place on a height, within sight of the army; loud cries were raised on both sides; each individual sought to rival his fellows in zeal, and the more he was exposed to view, the more courageously he faced the missiles and the fire.

Cæsar, as he was sustaining great loss, determined to feign an assault, in order to create a diversion: he ordered some cohorts to climb the hill on all sides, uttering loud cries. This movement terrified the besieged, who, fearing to be attacked on other points, called back to the defence of the wall those who were setting fire to the works. Then the Romans were able to extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, the siege span out in length; the Gauls, although exhausted by thirst and reduced to a small number, did not cease to defend themselves vigorously. At length, the subterranean gallery having reached the veins of the spring, they were taken and turned aside. The besieged, seeing the fountain all at once dried up, believed, in their despair, that it was an intervention of the gods, submitted to necessity, and surrendered.

Cæsar considered that the pacification of Gaul would never be completed if the same resistance was encountered in many other towns. He thought it indispensable to spread terror by a severe example, so much the more as “the well-known mildness of his temper,” says Hirtius, “would not allow this necessary rigour to be ascribed to cruelty.” He ordered all those who had carried arms to have their hands cut off, and sent them away, as living witnesses of the chastisement reserved for rebels. Drappes, who had been taken prisoner, starved himself to death; Lucterius, who had been arrested by the Arvernan Epasnactus, a friend of the Romans, was delivered up to Cæsar.[553]

[Sidenote: Excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu.]

VII. The excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu in 1865 leave no further doubt as to the site of Uxellodunum. (_See Plates 31 and 32._)

The Puy d’Issolu is a lofty mountain, situated not far from the right bank of the Dordogne, between Vayrac and Martel; it is isolated on all sides except towards the north, where it is joined by a defile of 400 mètres wide (the Col de Roujon) to heights named the Pech-Demont. Its plateau, crowned by a circle of perpendicular rocks, commands, almost in every direction, the low ground which surrounds it. This is what the author of the VIIIth book _De Bello Gallico_ expresses by these words: _Infima vallis totum pæne montem cingebat in quo positum erat præruptum undique oppidum Uxellodunum_. This plateau, with a surface of eighty hectares in extent, presents strongly-marked undulations: its general incline lies from the north to the south, in the direction of the length of the mountain mass; its highest point is 317 mètres above the level of the sea, and it rises 200 mètres above the valleys which surround it.

The whole eastern slope of the mountain, that which looks towards Vayrac and the Dordogne, is surmounted with rocks, which have a height of as much as forty mètres; consequently, no operation took place on this side during the time of the siege. The western slope alone was the theatre of the different combats. Its declivities are not inaccessible, especially between the village of Loulié and the hamlet of Leguillat, but they are sufficiently abrupt to make the Latin author say: _Quo, defendente nullo, tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile_. At the very foot of this declivity, and at 200 mètres beneath the culminating point of the plateau, the Tourmente flows, a little river ten mètres broad, embanked between this declivity and that of the opposite heights: _Flumen infimam vallem dividebat_, &c. Such a disposition of the localities, as well as the slight descent of the Tourmente (one mètre in 1,000), rendered it impossible to turn off that river. (_Hoc flumem averti loci natura prohibebat_, &c.)

There is no spring on the plateau of Puy-d’Issolu; but several issue from the sides of the mountain, one of which, that of Loulié, is sufficiently abundant to provide for the necessities of a numerous population. This was the spring which the Romans succeeded in turning off. At the time of the siege, it issued from the side of the mountain at _S_ (_see Plate 31_), at twenty-five mètres from the wall of the _oppidum_, and at a distance of about 300 mètres from the Tourmente. These 300 mètres make about 200 Roman paces. We see, therefore, that in the Latin text the word _pedum_ must be replaced by _passuum_. We also see that the word _circuitus_ (VIII. 4) must be taken in the sense of the _course_ of the river.

The “Commentaries” say (VIII. 33) that Rebilus established three camps in very elevated positions. Their sites are indicated by the nature of the localities: the first, _A_, was on the heights of Montbuisson; the second, _B_, on those of the Château de Termes; the third, _C_, opposite the defile of Roujon, on the Pech-Demont. It appears from the excavations that the Romans had not retrenched the two first, which is easily explained, for the heights to the west of the Puy-d’Issolu are impregnable. Moreover, the Romans at Uxellodunum were not in the same situation as at Alesia. There they had before them 80,000 men, and in their rear a very numerous army of succour; here, on the contrary, it was only a question of reducing a few thousand men. The camp _C_ required to be protected, because it was possible for troops to descend from the tableau of the Puy-d’Issolu towards the defile of Roujon, which, being situated fifty mètres lower down, gives an easy access to the heights of Pech-Demont. The excavations have, in fact, brought to light a double line of parallel fosses, which barred the defile behind, and formed at the same time a countervallation.

The Gauls could only quit the town by this defile, and by the western slope of the mountain. It became, consequently, interesting to ascertain if the Romans made a countervallation along the Tourmente, on the slopes of the heights of the castle of Termes and of Montbuisson. Unfortunately, the railway from Perigueux to Capdenac, which passes over the very site where the countervallation might have been made, has destroyed all traces of the Roman works: the excavations made above this line have produced no result.

The most interesting discovery was that of the subterranean gallery.[554] Until the moment when the excavations were commenced, a part of the rain-water absorbed by the plateau of the Puy-d’Issolu issued near the village of Loulié by two springs, _A_ and _A’_. (_See Plate 32._) The spring _A’_ flows from a ravine, and corresponds to the _thalweg_ of the slope; as to the source _A_, it is easily seen by the appearance of the ground that it has been turned from its natural course. The excavations, in fact, have proved that it is produced by the waters which run in the Roman gallery. This gallery has been opened over an extent of forty mètres. It was dug in a solid mass of tufa nearly ten mètres thick, which had been formed in the centuries anterior to Cæsar. Its form is that of a semicircular vault, supported by two perpendicular sides; its average dimensions are 1·80m. in height, by a width of 1·50 mètres. The mud carried along by the waters, and accumulated since the time of the siege of Uxellodunum, had almost filled the gallery, leaving only at the top of the _intrados_ an empty space in the form of a segment of a circle, with 0·50m. chord by 0·15m. for the absciss of its curve. Through this empty space the water ran at the time of the excavations.

Before reaching the tufa, the first subterranean works of the Romans had been made in the pure soil, which had to be propped: fragments of blindage have been found, some of them fixed in silicious mud, corroded or reduced to the state of ligneous paste, others petrified by their long contact with the waters charged with calcareous sediments. A considerable number of these petrified blocks, and remains of wood, collected in the interior of the gallery, are deposited in the museum of Saint-Germain.

The gallery does not lead directly to the spring which existed in the time of the Gauls. The Roman miners, after having made their way straightforward for a length of six mètres, came upon a thick bed of blue marl of the lias: they turned to their left to avoid digging through it, and advanced four mètres farther, following the marl, which they left to the right. When they reached the end of the marls, a horizontal layer of hard rock, one mètre thick, obliged them to bring the gallery back to its former direction, and to raise it, in order to avoid this new obstacle without going out of the tufas, which, formed by the waters, would necessarily lead towards the spring. (_See Plate 32._) From this second turning, the gallery continued close to the line of separation of the marls and the tufas. It rose rapidly, until it reached the limit of the deposits of tufa. At this point blindage had again been necessary. It was there chiefly that the blocks of petrification presented a peculiar character: some lay thrown down in the gallery, pierced by sockets with a rectangular section, which show the dimensions and the way in which it had been worked; others, with a rounded base, are veritable uprights, still standing on the rock.

Independently of the excavations made to find the Roman fosses and the subterranean gallery, others have been made on the slope of Loulié, in the soil which is near the spring. They have brought to light numerous fragments of Gaulish pottery and of amphoræ, and, which is a further confirmation of the identity of the Puy d’Issolu with Uxellodunum, remains of arms similar in all respects to those found in the fosses of Alesia.[555] Under the earthfalls which during nineteen centuries have taken place on the slope of Loulié, all the traces of the fire described in the “Commentaries” have been also found. The site of the terrace and the covered galleries which were fired were also traced on the ground. _Plate 32_ represents the slope which was the scene of the struggle: the terrace, the tower, and the covered galleries are represented on it, as well as the subterranean gallery, according to a very exact survey made on the spot.

[Sidenote: Complete Submission of Gaul.]

VIII. Whilst these events were taking place on the banks of the Dordogne, Labienus, in a cavalry engagement, had gained a decisive advantage over a part of the Treviri and Germans, had taken prisoner their chief, and thus subjected that people, who were always ready to support any insurrection against the Romans. The Æduan Surus fell also into his hands: he was a chief distinguished for his courage and his birth, and the only one of that nation who had not yet laid down his arms.

From that moment Cæsar considered Gaul to be completely pacified; he resolved, however, to go himself to Aquitaine, which he had not yet visited, and which Publius Crassus had partly conquered. Arriving there at the head of two legions, he obtained the complete submission of that country without difficulty: all the tribes sent him hostages. He proceeded next to Narbonne with a detachment of cavalry, and charged his lieutenants to put the army into winter quarters. Four legions, under the orders of Mark Antony, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium; two among the Ædui, and two among the Turones, on the frontier of the Carnutes, to hold in check all the countries bordering on the ocean. These two last legions took up their winter quarters on the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, so that no part of Gaul should be without troops. Cæsar remained but a short time in the province, presiding hastily over the assemblies, determining cases of public contestation, and rewarding those who had served him well. He had had occasion, more than any one, to know their sentiments individually, because, during the general revolt of Gaul, the fidelity and succour of the province had aided him in triumphing over it. When these affairs were settled, he returned to his legions in Belgium, and took up his winter quarters at Nemetocenna (_Arras_).

There he was informed of the last attempts of Commius, who, continuing a partisan war at the head of a small number of cavalry, intercepted the Roman convoys. Mark Antony had charged C. Volusenus Quadratus, prefect of the cavalry, to pursue him; he had accepted the task eagerly, in the hope of succeeding this time better than the first; but Commius, taking advantage of the rash ardour with which his enemy had rushed upon him, had wounded him seriously, and escaped; he was discouraged, however, and had promised Mark Antony to retire to any spot which should be appointed him, on condition that he should never be compelled to appear before a Roman.[556] This condition having been accepted, he had given hostages.[557]

Gaul was henceforth subjugated; death or slavery had carried off its principal citizens. Of all the chiefs who had fought for its independence, only two survived, Commius and Ambiorix. Banished far from their country, they died unknown.