Chapter XIV: Walcheren

An expedition has now to be described, to whose conception and partial execution justice has not been done by historians. Remembered, if at all, for its miserable termination, it is not unfrequently classed among the military operations which an Englishman had better forget. And yet there was a strategic value in the idea, which was proved even by its incomplete realisation; and there was a determination, and an uncomplaining suffering among the English troops, worthy of note in military story, which have been ill repaid by the nameless graves which crowd the island of Walcheren, and by the national forgetfulness of the expedition.

To an Artilleryman the Walcheren Expedition has an interest which well repays him for turning his eyes and thoughts from the Peninsula to this strange island in the Northern Sea. Here no less than seventeen troops and companies of his Corps were present; and so important was their duty considered, that the Master-General, Lord Chatham, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the forces employed, requested the Deputy-Adjutant-General, Brigadier Macleod, himself to accompany the army in command of the Artillery. And on this island, so baneful to our troops, and yet so beautiful, a singular historical question connected with the Regiment was settled, which will receive detailed notice in this chapter.

Forming the right bank of the West Scheldt at its mouth, the islands of South Beveland and Walcheren, now united by a railway embankment, present to the traveller the most singular appearance. Rich and fertile beyond measure, they are yet only saved from submersion by the sea by means of costly dykes, kept efficient by incessant labour. In most places the island of Walcheren, especially, is many feet below the level of the sea; and even its highest points, the towns of Middleburg and Flushing, have frequently suffered great injury from the inroads of the ocean. One such inundation had occurred in 1808, and tended to make the autumn of 1809 exceptionally unhealthy. Dykes now not merely surround the island itself, but also the individual villages and farmhouses on its surface, giving a curious fortified appearance to the whole.

Flushing and Antwerp, in the hands of Napoleon, strongly fortified, and offering protection and anchorage to his fleets, were a strong and perpetual menace to England, and gave an appearance of probability to his threats of invasion, both in the eyes of the English people and their Government. One of the strongest arguments against the Walcheren Expedition has always been that it was a dissipation of England’s military resources, which, if concentrated on the Peninsular campaign, would have produced infinitely greater results. But it is easy to argue thus with the wisdom which follows the fact. The danger which was involved in the fortifications of Antwerp and Flushing was very present to the English people; and immunity in that respect seemed then more desirable than victory at a distance, even although that victory might, in the end, have been a more serious blow at Napoleon’s power. And the importance of Flushing, armed as it was, may be now better realised by imagining it in the hands of a powerful Continental dynasty,--not dismantled and disarmed, as it has been since the siege to be treated of in this chapter,--but with batteries sufficiently strong to protect the anchorage in front, and with a fleet riding there, within a few hours of the English coast. Were such a thing ever to occur again--and it is by no means impossible--Englishmen would perhaps confess that there was more wisdom in the Expedition of 1809, which rendered Flushing harmless, than has generally been allowed.[17]

Much of the unpopularity attending it, and all the incompleteness of execution, were due to a want of harmony between the naval and military commanders, which has never yet been satisfactorily explained, but which undoubtedly was the main cause of the first part of the scheme--the capture of Flushing--being the only part that was executed. Lord Chatham would appear to have been much to blame in the matter; but there has been a mystery connected with it all, which cannot be cleared up. Of that nobleman’s military incapacity there is, however, no doubt; nor is the reader surprised to find that his name disappeared, soon after this Expedition, from the list of the Masters-General of the Ordnance.

The troop of Horse Artillery which accompanied the force was that commanded by Captain A. Macdonald, and is now D Battery, A Brigade. The sixteen companies will be found enumerated in the various tables of the battalions. General Macleod took Captain--afterwards Sir Robert--Gardiner as his Brigade-Major; and it is from the private diaries of these officers that the main Regimental incidents connected [Sidenote: Sir J. T. Jones’s ‘Sieges.’] with this Expedition have been obtained. Captain Drummond was the General’s Aide-de-camp. The field officers who accompanied the Artillery were Colonel Terrot, Lieut.-Colonels Dixon, Franklin, Cookson, and Wood, and Majors Griffiths, Dixon, and Waller. The immense battering train included 70 guns and 74 mortars; and we learn that not merely was a large supply of Congreve’s rockets taken for [Sidenote: A.-A.-Gen. to Colonel Neville, 18 July, 1809.] employment as siege weapons, but also that every man in the Regiment who had been trained to the use of rockets was ordered to embark with the army.

The name of nearly every Artillery officer with the Expedition will appear in the course of the narrative. In the meantime the following numerical return of the force under General Macleod’s command will be found worthy of perusal. (_See opposite page._)

The Second Division of the army, which General Macleod accompanied, sailed from the Downs on Saturday, the 29th July, 1809, and anchored the same evening in the Stein Diep. On the following day they weighed anchor, and moved into the Room Pot, where they found the First Division, and where orders were at once given for the troops to land in light marching order. At 4 P.M. the first six battalions landed, without opposition, at the Bree Zand, and during the night the remainder of the troops, under the command of Sir Eyre Coote, continued to disembark, with the several brigades of Artillery attached to them,--the last named being under the command of Colonel Terrot. The following detail shows the Artillery attached to this part of the army:--

Captain Marsh’s Light 6-pr. Brigade, attached to Lieut-Gen. Frazer.
” Webber Smith’s ” ” Major-Gen. Graham.
” Massey’s ” ” Lieut.-Gen. Lord Paget.

There was also a Heavy Brigade under Captain S. Adye.

About 3 P.M. the reserve, under Sir John Hope, proceeded to South Beveland (immediately adjoining Walcheren), accompanied by Captain Wilmot’s Light 6-pounder Brigade.

On Monday, the 31st July, Ter Veer, a village at the opposite end of the island of Walcheren from Flushing, was invested, two guns of Captain Macdonald’s troop and two 8-inch mortars having been landed to assist; and it surrendered the following day. Until the fall of Flushing, Ter Veer was employed as a landing-place and depôt for ordnance stores,--the Balaclava of the Walcheren Expedition. The army then advanced across the island, and proceeded to invest Flushing. During the siege, frequent reinforcements of the French garrison took place, their troops being transported by sea from Cadsand, and the weather being such as to render it very difficult for the English fleet to intercept them. The defence made by the French was very gallant, although the wretched inhabitants were the main sufferers during the bombardment. By Napoleon’s positive order, and notwithstanding the remonstrances of the French Commandant, one of the dykes near Flushing was partly cut, and the sea poured into the English trenches to a considerable extent, increasing the discomfort and difficulties which the heavy and almost incessant rains had already produced.

ARTILLERY EMBARKED for the SCHELDT EXPEDITION, under the EARL OF CHATHAM, in 1809.

INDEX.

A. Field Officers.
B. Captains.
C. Subalterns.
D. Surgeons.
E. N. C. Officers.
F. Gunners.
G. Drummers.
H. Total.
I. Officers.
J. N. C. Officers.
K. Drivers.
L. Artificers and Trumpeters.
M. Total.
N. General Total.
O. Horses.

+-------------------------------+---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+------------------------+------+------+
|Number of Troops and Companies,| ROYAL ARTILLERY. |ROYAL ARTILLERY DRIVERS.| | |
| with Drivers attached; +---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
| also Ports of Embarkation. | A.| B.| C.| D.| E. | F. | G.| H. | I.| J. | K. | L.| M. | N. | O. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+-------------------------------+-----------+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
|PORTSMOUTH. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Eight companies | 4| 16| 24| 4| 104| 800| 16| 968| 2| 10| 90| 8| 110| 1,078| 150|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|RIVER THAMES. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|One troop: Royal Horse } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artillery (now D Batt., } | | 2| 3| 1| 13| 81| | | | | | | | | |
| A Brigade) } | | | | | | | | 100| | | 54| 8| 62| 162 | 162|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Eight companies | 4| 16| 24| 4| 104| 800| 16| 968| 7| 41| 308| 37| 393| 1,361| 515|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|With the battering train | | | | | | | | | 7| 54| 500| 42| 603| 603| 1,000|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+-------------------------------+---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
| Total | 8| 34| 51| 9| 221| 1,681| 32| 2,036| 16| 105| 952| 95| 1,168| 3,204| 1,827|
+-------------------------------+---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+

N. B. A few casualties occurred prior to the sailing of the Expedition. About 50 additional horses were embarked, and rather more than 100 men were left behind sick, and for other causes; but these are the numbers prepared from the official returns, both in Record Office and United Service Institution.

The English army was drawn up against Flushing as follows: General Graham’s division on the right, General Grosvenor’s next; then Lord Paget’s at West Zouberg, and General Houston’s at Oust Zouberg. Six batteries were formed, five of which were manned by the Royal Artillery, and one by seamen. The former were numbered and armed as follows:--

No. 1 Battery.--[18]1200 yards from the town.
13 24-prs. }This was evidently No. 5 Battery, according
2 8-in. howitzers } to the numbering of the Engineers;
6 8-in. mortars } _vide_ Jones’s ‘Sieges.’

No. 3 Battery.--2200 yards from the town.
6 10 in. mortars {This was evidently No. 1 Battery in the Engineers’ catalogue.

No. 4 Battery.--1600 yards from the town.
4 10-in. mortars.
10 24-pounders.

No. 5 Battery.--1600 yards from the town.
2 10-in. howitzers. { This was evidently No. 7 Battery in the
{ Engineers’ catalogue.

No. 6 Battery.--1760 yards from the town.
3 24-pounders.
4 10 in. howitzers.

N.B.--Two additional batteries, Nos. 7 and 8, were afterwards
armed: No. 7 with 2 10-inch mortars, No. 8 with 6 24-pounders.

These batteries were opened on the 13th August, at 1 P.M. At early morning on the 15th August Flushing surrendered. Including the ammunition expended by the sailors from No. 2 Battery, which was armed with six 24-pounders, and opened on Sunday, the 14th August, the following was the expenditure of ammunition, other than rockets, during the short siege:--

Rounds.
24-pr. guns 6582
10-in. mortars 1743
8-in. ” 1020
10-in. howitzers 269
8-in. ” 380
----
Total 9994
----

N.B.--Sir R. Gardiner’s MS. agrees exactly in this particular with
Sir J. T. Jones’s ‘Sieges.’

Rockets had been used before the opening of the batteries, and continued to be employed in great profusion, and with fatal effect. Great part of the city, including the Hôtel de Ville, was burnt to the ground, and hundreds of the inhabitants were killed. To this day shot may be seen in the walls of many of the houses,--handing down from one generation to another the traditions of the siege.

The chief labour and hardship, however, to the English troops preceded the opening of the batteries. It was during their construction that the energies of officers and men were most severely tried. The roads between Ter Veer and the trenches became almost impassable with constant traffic and rain; the landing of the guns and stores was attended with great difficulty; it was impossible to procure cattle in sufficient quantities for purposes of draught; and many of the horses intended for the later operations had to be landed at Walcheren to draw the stores from Ter Veer. As for the trenches themselves, a few extracts from Sir R. Gardiner’s diary will enable the reader to realise the conditions under which the Artillerymen worked:--

“August 10th. Ascertained, by the saltness of the water, that the dyke had been cut.... The water making great progress in the communication from the right to West Zouberg. The cross-roads very deep and bad; great difficulty in drawing the guns from the park to the several batteries.

“August 11th. A violent thunder-storm and incessant rains during the night precluded all work the greatest part of it. The water rose in the gun-battery on the left about six inches.

“August 12. The roads much worse, and the water rose very high in the trenches. The water-gauge showed the rising of the water to be 4 inches. The magazine of No. 1 Battery on the right was filled with water during the night from the heavy rains, and it was feared would not be ready to receive the ammunition. _The exertions of the men, however, overcame every obstacle._”

Three companies, commanded by Captains Drummond, Campbell, and Fyers, had landed at Ter Veer on the 8th August, and proved of great service in the batteries at Oust Zouberg; but the Artillery before Flushing had been weakened the previous day by the removal of the detachments of Captains Buckner’s and Brome’s companies, with Captains Adye and Light, under the command of Colonel Cookson, to join the force in South Beveland, in consequence of a letter received from Sir John Hope. There was considerable anxiety in South Beveland. The forts had, certainly, been occupied by the English; and Captain Wilmot had succeeded in unspiking and rendering serviceable almost all the guns which they found; but there were many reasons for disquiet. Provisions were not so easily obtained as had been expected in such a country; the inhabitants, without exhibiting actual hostility, were decidedly cool and unfriendly; rumours were spread, which magnified every hour, announcing large reinforcements, not merely to Antwerp, but to every Dutch garrison, and describing swarms of French troops being pushed forward in waggons and boats to form a large army at Bergen-op-Zoom, or some such place, with a view to assuming the offensive; the drains made on their resources by the army in Walcheren alarmed the military chiefs; and the disagreement between the Admiral and Lord Chatham as to the method of conducting future operations had already ceased to be secret. It does not, therefore, surprise the reader to find that when, after the fall of Flushing, all the troops and horses which had been originally intended for the second operation, as the design on Antwerp was termed, were about to return to South Beveland, a decided hesitation manifested itself among the authorities, which ended in a suspense from further action. Before the end of August, the whole of the Horse Artillery, Cavalry, and all the horses of the battering train had returned to England;--Captains Wilmot’s, Buckner’s, and Brome’s companies were ordered to follow, after dismantling the forts in South Beveland;--on the 2nd September, Lord Chatham’s head-quarters were moved to Middleburg, in Walcheren;--on the 3rd, the embarkation of much of the ordnance, stores, &c., for England commenced;--on the 10th, Lord Chatham announced that he had received the King’s commands to return home; and on the 14th, accompanied by his staff, including General Macleod, he sailed from Flushing.

The much-vaunted Expedition was therefore at an end; and with the exception of the garrison of Walcheren, the army returned home by instalments. But in the successful part of the campaign,--the capture of Flushing, there is more than a crumb of comfort for the Artilleryman who is in search of incidents creditable to his corps. The words penned after the siege by Lord Chatham, who was observant, although incapable, are worthy of a high place in the Regimental records. “It is _impossible_,” he wrote, [Sidenote: Lord Chatham’s Despatch announcing the surrender of Flushing.] “for me to do sufficient justice to the distinguished conduct of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, under the able direction and animating example of Brigadier-General Macleod.” And in a letter presently to be quoted, the reader will see that in the duller work of dismantling the works, under circumstances of great difficulty and sickness, the men of the Royal Artillery earned noble words of commendation.

Walcheren has been remembered for the sickness which scourged the English army in 1809, when it has been forgotten as to everything else;--and the sickness certainly was fearful; although perhaps due more to exposure, injudicious diet, and inefficient hospital arrangements, than to any local influences, such as were conceived by superstition and fear. The former, it is known, _did_ exist; and their results have been seen in later days, during the first winter of the war in the Crimea, much as they were in Walcheren. But the latter,--the mysterious local fevers, which were believed to be indigenous to this island,--seem to have marvellously disappeared, or to be innocuous, as far as the healthy, contented, and long-lived inhabitants of its beautiful villages are concerned. Be that, however, as it may; the sickness among the English troops in 1809 was very great. On the 30th August there were 5000 sick; on the 3rd September the number increased to 5745; on the 5th September it rose to 8000; and on the 8th it was no less than 10,948, with fresh cases occurring every hour. The sickness in the Artillery may be gathered from a return which is extant. On the 27th September there had been left in Walcheren a total strength of 1089 officers and men belonging to the Royal Artillery and Royal Artillery Driver Corps. Before the 16th October,--in less than three weeks,--255 had been sent sick to England, 396 were sick at Walcheren, and 109 were in their graves. From a return of the officers who were invalided to England, we find the names of many not yet mentioned, including Captains Oliver, Monro, Parker, Wallace, Greene, and Scott; and Lieutenants J. Evans, Parker, Dalton, Pringle, Grant, Chapman, and Drawbridge. The names of others, who remained to the date of the evacuation of the island, will be mentioned presently.

After Lord Chatham’s departure, it was intended at first to strengthen the island for defence in the event of a French attack. Napoleon being, however, as he said, perfectly satisfied that the English should die in Zealand without any assistance from him, and the continued sickness appalling the authorities, it was decided to dismantle the newly-armed batteries with a view to the evacuation of the place. This was done under the control and supervision of Major William Dixon, R.A., assisted by the remnants of the twelve companies, left as part of the garrison of the island. On his arrival in Woolwich, with these companies, he made a report to the Deputy Adjutant-General, which cannot fail to be interesting. “It would be of no use now, [Sidenote: Major Dixon to D.-A.-Gen., 3 Jan. 1810.] sir,” he wrote, “to enter into a detailed account of the state of defence in which Walcheren was placed at the moment the order came to withdraw; but, in justice to the officers and men I had the good fortune to command, you will permit me to state that, up to the 15th November, every possible exertion was made to withstand an attack in the field, or a siege in the fortified places. All the Dutch mortars and many of the guns were exchanged for English; the extra foreign ammunition sent off to England; Flushing, Veer, and Rammekens completed; the coast strengthened by batteries mounted with heavy ordnance; the field brigades distributed to the different corps of the army; and depôts of ammunition established throughout. These labours were effected without any assistance from the troops of the Line, and under circumstances peculiarly trying;--the companies diminished by sickness to one-third of their original strength, and even then jaded and worn by an oppression and feeling from climate, which I cannot describe, but which actually did not amount to disease. Yet, sir, notwithstanding this, I am happy to say they performed every part of their duty without a murmur, and obeyed every order with zeal and alacrity.

“It will be plain to you, sir, that as we had risen to this state of defence, so in proportion were our labours increased when we came to dismantle. All that was done had to be undone; and every article of guns, ammunition, and stores throughout the island, to be embarked in the least possible time. The same diligence was continued, and within the given period not a trace remained in the works of the ordnance with which they had been defended.... Without meaning to take at all from the general report of the good conduct of the officers and men employed in the island of Walcheren, but as you are aware that, from various causes, there are degrees even in excellence itself, I hope I shall not be considered as acting inconsistently when I recommend the following officers as more particularly deserving your approbation. To Captains Maitland and Light I am greatly indebted for their activity and zeal in completing the defences of Walcheren. To Captain Adye I owe everything for the assistance he gave in dismantling the works, and embarking the guns, ammunition, and stores; and to his name, which, in every respect, deservedly stands first, I beg leave to add those of Captains Rawlinson, Maitland, and Macartney, in the same undertaking. The whole of the subalterns went through every part of the duties imposed on them with zeal and goodwill, even in serving on board the _shutes_ with parties of gunners to load and unload these vessels. I could place no reliance on the Dutch who navigated them, but was thus compelled to ensure their services by guarding against their escape. The navy, I presume, could not (for they certainly _would_ not) grant us any assistance. Nautical skill we were not supposed to possess, but necessity, at length, helped us to find it. I shall conclude, sir, by recommending to your favour Lieutenant Anderson, the acting Adjutant, whose zeal and activity neither sickness nor fatigue could arrest, and I cannot hesitate in pronouncing him one of the finest young men I ever met in my life.”

The amount of ordnance and stores captured in the islands of South Beveland and Walcheren, and either sent to England or destroyed, was very considerable. Summarised, according to date of capture, the following is a list of the guns and mortars which were taken.[19]

_List of Captured Ordnance._

-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Date. | Place. | Guns. | Howitzers. | Mortars.
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1, 1809 |Action on }| 4 6-prs. | |
| landing }| 1 3-pr. | |
| | | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Fort Haak {| 4 24-prs. | }| 3 coehorn.
| {| 3 12-prs. | }|
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1, 1809 |Camp Veere | 5 18-prs (iron) |{ 3 7½-in. howitzers|
| | 2 ” (brass) |{ 1 5½-in. howitzer |
| | 9 24-prs. | |
| | 6 12-prs. | |
| | 14 6-prs. | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Camp Veere | 3 brass wall-pieces| 1 8½-in. howitzer | 8
| Arsenal | 2 swivel guns | |
| | 1 18-pr. ” | |
| | 4 8-pr. ” | |
| | 4 6-pr. ” | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 4, 1809.|Fort Rammekens | 4 18-pr. ” | | 1
| | 6 12-pr. ” | |
| | 3 6-pr. ” | |
| | 3 2-pr. ” | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1, 1809 |Coast Batteries,}| 12 26-prs. ” | | 7
| Walcheren }| | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Fort Bathz, }| 15 24-prs. ” |{ 3 8-inch }| 4
| S. Beveland }| |{ 8 6-inch }|
-------------+----------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Waarden Battery,}| 12 24-prs. ” | |
| S. Beveland }| | |
| | | |
|West Borselin }| 12 24-prs. ” | |
| Battery }| | |
| | | |
|East Borselin }| 8 24-prs. ” | |
|Battery }| | |
| | | |
|Barland Battery }| 12 24-prs. ” | |
| | | |
|Ounderskirk }| 6 24-prs. ” | |
| Battery }| | |
-------------+----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+--------------
Aug. 16, 1809|Flushing {| 96 brass guns | 22 howrs. (brass) {| 56 mortars
| {| | {| (brass)
| {| 70 iron ” | |
| {|122 ” carronades | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+--------------

There were, in addition to the ordnance mentioned above, very large supplies of ammunition and stores of every description, of which the islands were denuded on their evacuation by the English.

The embarkation of the troops from Walcheren was conducted under circumstances of great difficulty. The weather was unfavourable, and for many days after the men were on board, the wind was so adverse as to prevent the ships from sailing. A rear-guard had been left on shore to guard against any attack from the enemy, whose vessels had been accumulating for some weeks in the neighbourhood; and the troops on board the English ships were held in readiness for immediate disembarkation, should the expected attack take place. Some reinforcements which reached the island from England during the embarkation, including two companies of Artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Gold and Major Carncross, were not required to land, but their arrival had a moral effect in ensuring a peaceable evacuation of the place. From Colonel Gold, who landed for a few hours, a graphic description of the state of Walcheren was forwarded to General Macleod in Woolwich. Major Dixon had previously boasted of the thoroughness of his measures in destroying [Sidenote: Major Dixon to D.-A.-Gen., 4 Dec. 1809.] the fortifications. “I am most happy,” he wrote, “to say that not an article in point of honour or value will be found in the island when the enemy again takes possession: never was there a clearer sweep (I mean in a military point of view); and I am satisfied that he will not for years be enabled to use the Bason for the purposes of the navy. All the parapets are also thrown down, and not a vestige is to be seen of gun, ammunition, or store throughout the island.” This picture was confirmed and completed by [Sidenote: Colonel Gold to D.-A.-Gen., 10 Dec. 1809.] Colonel Gold, who wrote as follows: “I arrived just in time to witness the destruction of the Arsenal, which is completely effected; the entrance to the Bason, in which the French navy were sheltered last winter, is entirely choked up by blowing up the pieces of the flood-gates. Never was a scene of greater _public mischief_. On putting foot on shore I found Macartney in the midst of a wreck of carriages, and, at Flushing, Pilkington and Dixon surrounded by their own conflagrations; while Middleburg presented the most pacific appearance, and even at a church in Flushing, immediately opposite to the scene of destruction, divine service going on as if nothing unusual had occurred.... I have been across the island to-day, and although, from the many good descriptions I had heard, I was fully prepared, I could not have conceived any country so intolerably bad for military operations; and that you (General Macleod) made your batteries and got your guns into them is surprising.”

From these extracts, it will be seen that the first object of this much-abused Expedition was completely effected, and Walcheren rendered innocuous, as a means of menacing England. That this was mainly owing to the energy and perseverance of the troops has, it is hoped, also been made apparent. Alas! that the story of this Expedition, as of so many others from England, would be incomplete without the mention of failures in the supply departments of the army. Three months after the fall of Flushing, the troops were [Sidenote: Dated Flushing, 14 Nov. 1809.] still suffering from want of necessary comforts. “It will be doing us a very great favour,” wrote Major Dixon, “if you can by any means expedite the arrival of the _bedding_. It is now miserably cold, and I am convinced that much of our indisposition arises from the want of necessary accommodation and comfort. By a letter from the Honourable Board (two packets ago) I expected bedding for the whole of the Ordnance Department, but nothing of the kind has yet appeared.” From complaints like these the reader cannot fail to suspect that much of the exaggerated abuse of the climate of Walcheren was employed to shield those departments, whose members, in this as in other wars, have evinced a belief that the army exists for them, not they for the army.

It only remains to tell the singular story, whose conclusion has affected the regimental privileges of the Royal Artillery from the fall of Flushing to this day. Mention has been made several times in this work of a custom, which placed the bells of a captured city, or an equivalent, at the disposal of the commanding officer of the Artillery of the besieging force. The privilege--as the reader will remember--had been exercised so recently as at the siege of Copenhagen. After the surrender of Flushing, General Macleod preferred [Sidenote: Lieut.-Col. Mosheim to Lieut.-Colonel Wood, 4/9/1809.] the usual claim. The Mayor and Corporation replied through the Commandant that they acknowledged with due respect a right established by custom immemorial that the bells belonged to the commanding officer of the Royal Artillery, if he thought proper to enforce his claim, but that they were persuaded he would grant consideration to their already sufficiently distressed condition, and not deprive the unfortunate town of its bells, which they would be as incapable of replacing, as they felt unable to tender any compensation for them. On the following day, General Macleod replied that, in consideration of the destruction brought upon the town of Flushing by the system of defence which the French General had thought proper to adopt, he had no wish to add to the misery of the inhabitants by seizing the bells, or by demanding a strict compensation to the full amount of their value. In consenting, however, to sacrifice to a great extent his own rights and pretensions, he could not, he said, in any degree compromise those of the Corps. He must, therefore, demand a modified sum in order specifically to mark the transaction, and to enable him at the same time to contribute to the comforts of the officers and men who had partaken in the artillery duties of the siege.

Valuing the bells at 2000_l._, General Macleod expressed his readiness to accept 500_l._ This offer was communicated [Sidenote: M. Becker to Lieut.-Colonel Mosheim, 6 Sept, 1809.] by the French commandant to the Mayor of Flushing, but was received with indignation:[20] “On nous a rapporté,” wrote the Mayor, “que Messieurs les officiers de l’Artillerie Royale persistoient dans leur demande à ce que la ville de Flussingen leur offrit un compromis en indemnité des cloches, qui--suivant une ancienne coûtume Anglaise--leur reviendroient, comme une récompense de leur service contre une place assiégée, qui s’étoit rendue par capitulation aux troupes de sa Majesté Britannique, et qu’ayant supposé les dites cloches à 2000_l._ _sterling_ ils avoient fait grâce à la ville, en considération de son malheur, des trois quarts de cette somme, et se contentoient par conséquent d’un quart, montant à 500_l._ _sterling_. Vivement pénétré du sentiment de la situation malheureuse à laquelle la ville de Flussingen et ses pauvres bourgeois sont réduits, nous ne cessons cependant pas d’être nés descendans des anciens Hollandais, et tous les désastres que nous avons éprouvés ne nous ont pas tellement enlevé cet esprit franc et sincère, qui caractérise notre nation, et qui rivalise en ce point avec la nation Anglaise, que nous ne sentirions pas l’offense qui nous est faite, et que nous n’oserions l’exprimer. Oui, Monsieur! malgré tout ce qui puisse nous en arriver, nous ne pouvons que regretter l’offre qui nous est faite.... Nous avons de la peine à nous persuader que la demande qu’on nous a faite a été autorisée par le Commandant en chef. Comment, Monsieur? La ville de Flussingen, ses malheureux habitans qui excitent la compassion de tout le monde, qui sont ruinés, sans ressource, qui n’ont pas de quoi pouvoir dans leur propres besoins; cette ville de Flussingen, ces habitans, qui à plus d’un titre méritent la considération particulière du Gouvernement Anglais, et qui, nous n’en doutons pas, deviendroient les objets de sa moralité! Cette ville, et ces habitans, disons-nous, seroient-ils, après avoir passé par tous ces malheurs, réduits à cette extrémité de voir laisser enlevé ses cloches, faute de moyen de représenter la valeur supposée? Non, Monsieur, il est impossible que le Gouvernement Anglais autorise une pareille demande envers la ville de Flussingen, et nous sommes fermement résolus de lui emporter nos plaintes, en cas que Messieurs les Officiers de l’Artillerie persistent dans leur demande contraire à l’équité et à la capitulation; et nous ne doutons pas que l’âme généreuse de sa Majesté Britannique n’y fasse droit. Vous-même, Monsieur, qui connaissez la situation de Flussingen, qui savez qu’une somme de 5500f. de Hollande est au-dessus de nos forces, et qui avez déjà montré compassion à nos maux, ne manquerez pas--nous nous en flattons--d’employer vos efforts auprès de Messieurs les Officiers de l’Artillerie pour qu’ils désistent de leurs prétentions. Nous prenons la liberté de vous adresser un double de notre lettre, vous priant de l’adresser à son Excellence _My Lord_ Chatham, et d’appuyer auprès de son Excellence nos réclamations raisonnables.”

[Sidenote: Dated Middleburg, 8 Sept. 1809.]

This appeal was answered by General Macleod to the effect that he could not, under any consideration, relinquish the rights of his Corps: that he persisted in his claim, which had received the perfect approbation of Lord Chatham; but that, in consideration of the representations made by the magistrates, he again renounced the idea of deriving emolument to himself at the expense of the distresses of the inhabitants, but would persist in the right of his Corps, unless the magistrates should consent to pay the still further reduced sum of one hundred guineas in establishment of the right;--“to be disposed of in charity to the soldiers’ wives and widows of the Royal Artillery, as may be thought proper hereafter.”

As General Macleod was on the eve of leaving Walcheren for England, he transferred the correspondence to Colonel Terrot, with the intimation that he himself would have no objection to an appeal to the English Legislature, should [Sidenote: Dated Middleburg, 9 Sept. 1809.] the magistrates of Flushing insist on it; but “in that case,” he wrote, “it is to be understood that the appeal is for the _whole_ of the bells, or for the full amount of their value. The appeal leaves no room for generosity on either side.”

The magistrates were obstinate, and the appeal was forwarded to England. On the 12th November intimation was sent to Major Dixon, in Walcheren, now in command of the Artillery, that the decision was unfavourable to the claims [Sidenote: Dated Doctors’ Commons, 26 October, 1809.] of the Corps. The following extract from the decision, addressed by Sir Charles Robinson to the Earl of Liverpool, explains the grounds on which it was based. “With respect to the bells of the church, the demands of the Artillery are, I conceive, altogether unsustainable. It is apparently not supported on the part of the Prize Commissioners, since they do not advert to this claim in their letter of the 4th of October. Anciently, there prevailed a law of pillage, which assigned to different corps and to different individuals a privileged claim to particular articles. Whether this was a privilege of the Artillery under the ancient custom of England, as described in the Petition, I am not informed; but in the modern usage of respecting property and public edifices, and more particularly those set apart for divine worship, such a demand cannot, I conceive, be sustained. What the custom may be,--whether deserving of any compensation in the division of what is properly _prize_, or from any other quarter,--may be a subject of consideration according to circumstances. But I am of opinion that the demand ought not to be enforced against the town.”

From subsequent correspondence which is extant, and which passed between General Macleod and Sir Anthony Farrington, it is evident that the former felt much regret that an old Regimental privilege should have disappeared during operations in which he had occupied so prominent a place; but the reader will admit that no one could have conducted the cause of the Corps in a more unselfish, chivalrous, and yet resolute manner.

N.B.--The comments of an officer of the sister corps, on the
conduct of the Artillery at the siege of Flushing, were very
favourable. Two extracts from Sir J. Jones’s work may be given.

“The guns of the batteries on the right of the attack were more
particularly directed to enfilade and take _en écharpe_ the
rampart of the western sea-line, in order to silence the fire of
its artillery on the fleet, now preparing to force the passage of
the Scheldt. This they accomplished very effectually, by disabling
or very severely wounding many of the traversing platforms and
their carriages, and much injuring the guns themselves.”

Again:

“Discharges of carcasses and shells from the mortar batteries,
with powerful flights of rockets intermixed, were kept up
throughout the night on the devoted town, and frequently large
portions of it burned with fury.”--JONES’S ‘Sieges,’ vol. ii. pp.
269-271.