Chapter XVIII: Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz

The enemy approaching in force, after the raising of the second siege of Badajoz, the Allies crossed the river on the 17th June, 1811, and on the 19th encamped between Elvas and Campo Maior. Elvas had been put in a state of siege, and a position had been marked out behind Campo Maior, in case the French should show any inclination to attack. The bold front which Lord Wellington here showed deceived the two French Marshals, Marmont and Soult, who had now united their armies, and entered Badajoz in triumph, [Sidenote: Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated 26 June, 1811.] congratulating its gallant governor, Philippon. They concluded that he must have received great reinforcements; and although they crossed the Guadiana with a great body of cavalry supported with infantry, and one or two small affairs with the outposts took place,--they declined a general engagement. A want of _entente cordiale_ between Marmont and Soult led soon to a separation,--the latter moving towards Seville, whither Wellington despatched Blake’s Spanish troops,--and the former marching away by the valley of the [Sidenote: Cust.] Tagus towards Almaraz. Thus relieved of their presence, Lord Wellington took up his quarters at Pontalegre, and allowed his army to have some repose after its recent exertions.

This seems a favourable moment for placing before the reader a tabular return (_see next page_) which shows the gradual increase in the Artillery element of Lord Wellington’s army in the Peninsula. Prepared from the monthly returns, it shows the numbers at different periods, distinguishing between the Royal and Foreign Artilleries. The point which will doubtless strike the reader most is the steady increase in the force of Horse Artillery and Artillery drivers, which took place; marking the growing recognition of that which had hitherto been overlooked to a great extent,--the value of mobility in Field Artillery.

RETURN of the ROYAL BRITISH and GERMAN ARTILLERY attached to the ARMY under the Command of the DUKE of WELLINGTON in the PENINSULA and FRANCE at the undermentioned periods.

(_Extracted from the Monthly Returns._)

+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
| | 1811. | 1812. | 1813. | 1814. |
+ +------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
| |March.| May.|January.|April.| May.|July.|December.|January.|April.|
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
|1. General, Field, and Staff Officers, not } | 8| 8| 9| 10| 11| 11| 9| 10| 8|
| included on Company Rolls } | | | | | | | | | |
|2. Royal Horse Artillery | 495| 499| 699| 728| 926| 988| 1,016| 1,007| 1,021|
|3. Royal Foot Artillery | 884|1,111| 996| 1,327|1,876|1,862| 1,950| 1,985| 1,966|
|4. Royal Artillery Drivers | 777| 858| 1,040| 1,159|2,154|2,150| 2,683| 2,719| 2,734|
|5. Ordnance Medical Staff | 9| 10| 18| 18| 27| 26| 29| 29| 29|
|6. Field Train or Commissariat Department } | 84| 86| 129| 121| 130| 128| 153| 154| 148|
| of the Ordnance } | | | | | | | | | |
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
| General Total of Royal British Artillery | 2,257|2,572| 2,891| 3,363|5,124|5,165| 5,840| 5,904| 5,897|
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
|King’s German Artillery | 421| 412| 449| 434| 450| 446| 430| 439| 412|
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+

N.B.--The Field Train Department attached to the Engineers is not included, as it did not appear in the Monthly Returns of the Artillery.

General Howorth vacated the command of the Artillery in the Peninsula in July 1811, being obliged to return to England on account of ill-health,--and was shortly afterwards succeeded by General Borthwick. This officer was wounded at Ciudad Rodrigo, and returned to England,--a coolness having sprung up between him and Lord Wellington, which recurred with one of his successors, and continued until the command of the Artillery devolved upon his favourite, then _Colonel_ Dickson, a few months after the siege of Burgos.

[Sidenote: Major Dickson D.-A.-G. dated Castel Branco, 23 Jul. 1811.]

On the 19th July, 1811, Lord Wellington sent for Colonel Fletcher, Colonel Framingham, and Major Dickson, and informed them that it was his intention to attempt the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and after a little conversation as to the means of transport, &c., he desired Major Dickson to proceed to Oporto, to superintend the conveyance of the English battering train up the Douro to Lamego, and thence by land to Francoso, whence it would also be conveyed by land to its final destination. This battering train had arrived in Lisbon in the first instance, and had been carried secretly to Oporto, with a view to the proposed siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, its ostensible destination being Cadiz.[28] Two new companies of Artillery which had arrived in Lisbon were now ordered to Oporto to assist Major Dickson. In all these arrangements Lord Wellington underrated the strength of the French army in the north of the Peninsula.

[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated Oporto, 27 Aug. 1811.]

Major Dickson reached Almeida, on his way to Oporto, on the 28th July, and arrived at the latter place on the 3rd August, where he found Captain Bredin’s and Captain Glubb’s companies--now H Battery, 1st Brigade, and 5 Battery 5th Brigade--waiting his orders. Before the 13th the whole of the train had been embarked in boats, about 160 in number, and despatched to Lamego; but the work and the climate proved too much for Major Dickson, and before he could follow the train he was struck down with a violent fever, accompanied by delirium. When first attacked, he requested Lord Wellington to send some one to take up his duties, and, accordingly, his friend Captain May was sent, and superintended the movement of the train until the 5th September, when the gallant Dickson, only half recovered, and travelling in a litter, arrived at Lamego. Here he found that all the guns and stores had marched for Villa da Ponte, and that Captain May was on the point of following [Sidenote: Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Villa da Ponte, 13 Sept. 1811.] them. On the 8th Major Dickson left Lamego, and reached Villa da Ponte on the 10th, where he fell an immediate victim to a relapse of fever, which lasted acutely several days. Captain Bredin’s company had, in the meantime, been recalled to the head-quarters of the army, to take over the brigade of guns from Captain Thompson’s, which was almost _hors de combat_ from sickness.[29] The troops left with the battering train were therefore reduced to Captain Glubb’s company of Royal Artillery, about 250 Portuguese Artillery, and from 1200 to 1400 Portuguese Militia, intended to assist on the march. Captain Holcombe’s company of Royal Artillery was hourly expected. That company is now No. 4 Battery 2nd Brigade.

[Sidenote: Ibid. 20 Sept. 1811.]

On the march, the battering train had been arranged by Captain May as follows. It was divided, as far as the ordnance was concerned, into five divisions; each gun marched with 350 rounds, and each howitzer and mortar with 160 rounds. An officer was placed in charge of each division, and each division marched separately. The remaining stores and ammunition requisite to furnish a total of 800 rounds per gun, and 400 for each howitzer and mortar, were under the charge of the Commissary and other officers, and marched in rear.

While at Villa da Ponte, awaiting orders from Lord Wellington for a further advance, Major Dickson’s correspondence was of a nature which reveals to the reader more of the personal element than his letters, as a rule, allow to become visible. The alternate hoping and despairing as to orders for advance,--the _ennui_ produced by enforced idleness,--the impetuous way in which he would fling himself into professional discussions with General Macleod, merely to occupy his leisure,--the spasmodic fits of zeal in improving the arrangement of the immense train,--all unite to present to the reader a very vivid picture of him whose hand, so long still, penned these faded letters. His recurring attacks of fever--followed by apologies like the following: “The fact is, when I am well I forget all, take violent exercise at all times and seasons, and knock myself up; but I am determined to be more careful in future”--followed by an inevitable relapse, in proof of the failure of his good resolutions,--combine to bring before the reader a very lovable picture of a very earnest man. It is by such study alone that the Artilleryman can realise the characters of the great among his predecessors in the Corps, and by such links that he can bind them to himself with that almost family tie, of which the Regimental union is but an expansion.

[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 27 Sept. 1811.]

The extent of the battering train under Major Dickson’s command was as follows:--34 24-pounders, 4 18-pounders, 16 iron 5½-inch howitzers, 2 8-inch howitzers, and 8 10-inch mortars; and much of his leisure at Villa da Ponte was devoted to improving and renewing the somewhat shattered [Sidenote: Ibid. 22 Nov, 1811.] carriages of this ordnance. On the 16th November he received an order from Lord Wellington to commence moving the battering train to Almeida; and by the 21st the last [Sidenote: Ibid. 4 Dec. 1811.] division, spare carriages, &c., had left. The march was most successful. No fewer than 1100 bullocks were employed for the divisions alone, apart from the reserve of stores; and in no case did the march occupy more than six days, although the country was very mountainous; nor did a single accident occur. The bringing up the reserve of ammunition and stores was delayed by want of means of conveyance; and pending its arrival, Lord Wellington requested Major Dickson to superintend the unspiking of the ordnance in Almeida, and the placing the batteries in a state of defence. In this occupation the reader is requested to leave him while he returns to the movements of Lord Wellington, which were now assuming an active form.

The English General had moved northward, with the view of besieging Ciudad Rodrigo; and a summary of his movements may be given from some admirable MS. letters, written by Captain May on his return to the head-quarters of the army. On the 23rd September the enemy’s advanced guard was near Ciudad Rodrigo. The French army was under Marmont and Dorsenne, and numbered 60,000 men, including 6000 cavalry. On the 24th, the whole of this cavalry had crossed the Agueda, about 10,000 infantry remaining on the other side. On the 25th the enemy advanced, and Wellington disputed the ground, retiring gradually to the position at Fuente de Guinaldo. In this advance the enemy’s cavalry and artillery were principally engaged; and on the side of the Allies, the Cavalry, Portuguese Artillery, and Cole’s and Picton’s divisions of Infantry. During this forward movement the enemy, by a charge of cavalry, gained possession of five Portuguese guns, which, however, were speedily recaptured by the 5th Regiment of Foot, in a most gallant and intrepid manner. On the 26th, the Allies remained all day in the position of Guinaldo, which extended from the right and front of the town for four miles towards Ituero, the woods being occupied by two Infantry brigades from the right down to the Agueda. Thus posted, they witnessed the arrival of the whole French army, the last of which did not arrive until sunset. On satisfying himself as to their numbers, and bearing in mind the great extent of country to be watched, Lord Wellington determined to retire in the evening to a more favourable position for concentration and battle. The army, therefore, began its march to the rear at 10 P.M., and next day, the 27th, everything was in the neighbourhood of the new position, which occupied a length of about six miles. The left was near Reudon, on the Coa, and the right in the rear of Çouta, resting on the mountains. When daylight revealed to the enemy the masterly retreat which had taken place, some cavalry and infantry were pressed forward, and the Allied piquets were driven in; but Wellington, suddenly assuming the offensive, drove them back from Alfaites to Aldea da Ponte, his troops occupying the latter village. After sunset, however, the enemy advanced in such force, in front and also on the flanks of the village, that the officer commanding there wisely withdrew his troops to Alfaites. This final advance of the French was made to cover a retreat which had now been determined on. On the morning of the 28th nothing could be seen of them; and on the 29th it was learnt that they were moving back on Ciudad Rodrigo. After they had thrown provisions into that city, they continued to retire, and went into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. The British army did the same between the Coa and the Agueda, Lord Wellington, with his head-quarters at Freneda, keeping watch on the city which he had determined to take.

The only brilliant affair which took place between this time and the successful sieges, which will now have to be mentioned, was the surprise of Girard’s division by General Hill, at Arroyo de Molinos. As, however, the Artillery with Hill’s force was Portuguese,--Major Hawker’s 9-pounder brigade of Royal Artillery having been unable to get up on account of the state of the roads,--its further notice in this work will be unnecessary.

Taking advantage of the French troops being scattered in their cantonments, and having ascertained that large reinforcements from Marmont’s army had been detached to Valencia, Lord Wellington resolved on a short, sharp siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the end of December he sent for [Sidenote: Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. 1 Jan. 1812.] Major Dickson, and directed him to move forward the battering train and stores from Almeida, Galegos being made the intermediate depôt. To the latter place the army head-quarters were moved on the 7th July.

The main interest to the military reader in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, in 1812, attaches to the gallantry of the Infantry. The monotonous, albeit shortlived, work in the batteries is drowned in the recollection of the scenes of valour at the final assault. In these pages, therefore, the Artillery share in the sieges will assume, of necessity, the form of a few dry statistics.

The Artillery present at the siege included 185 of the Royal Artillery and 370 of the Portuguese. The names of the officers of the Royal Artillery who were present were General Borthwick, Major Dickson, Captains Holcombe, Thompson, Power, Dundas, and Dyneley; Lieutenants Bourchier, Love, Johnstone, Ingilby, Smith, and Grimes; and Captain May, Brigade-Major.

The batteries opened in the afternoon of the 14th January, 1812, the guns having narrowly escaped being spiked in the morning of that day. On the night of the 19th, the breaches were pronounced practicable, and Wellington announced in orders, “Ciudad Rodrigo _must_ be stormed this evening.” Except on the 16th and part of the 17th, the weather was clear and admirably suited for artillery practice, and the batteries were in action daily for an average of eight and a half hours.

The guns employed were as follows:--On January 14th, 20 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; on January 15th, 23 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; on January 16th and 17th, the same; on January 18th, 30 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; and on January 19, 30 24-pounders.[30]

The expenditure of ammunition during this short siege was as follows,--the total number of guns in battery having been 34 24-pounders, and 4 18-pounders:--

24-pr. guns: Round shot, 8950. Rounds expended per gun, 263.
18-pr. guns: Round shot, 565. Rounds expended per gun, 141.

The absence of mortars and howitzers from this siege was explained by the increased amount of transport required for shell, compared with shot, and by the fact that Lord Wellington had resolved on an assault the moment a breach was practicable, without any other siege operations. Shot were, therefore, all that was necessary, except for keeping the enemy from working at the breach.

[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 29 Jan. 1812.]

The following extract from a letter written by Major Dickson after the siege, is interesting:--“Lord Wellington has certainly made a most brilliant _coup_, and, I am convinced, astonished the enemy by the rapidity of his operations. They intended to relieve the place and raise the siege about this day (29th January). We were certainly favoured by the most delightful weather--excessively cold, but perfectly dry. It was not even necessary to put the powder under the laboratory tents, which I was enabled to spare to keep the poor fellows from the pinching frost; for we were nearly without cover.... I am hard pressed for time, but I must say a word in favour of our fine fellows of the Corps. They were (Portuguese and all) at relief and relief, off and on; but nothing could exceed their zeal and activity, and their work speaks for itself. _Never was better practice made._ I had only 430 Artillerymen of both nations,--about 130 British, and the rest Portuguese. We had somewhere more than 50 Artillerymen killed and wounded, but no officer materially hurt. The latter days, to make it up, I had some help from our own field Artillery:--part of Lawson’s company was one day in the trenches, and part of Sympher’s German company another.”

[Sidenote: MS. Return dated 26 Jan. 1812.]

The actual number of killed and wounded between the 14th and 19th January,--while the siege lasted,--was as follows (excluding Portuguese Artillery):--[31]

Captains Dyneley and Power, wounded.

Captain Glubb’s company, now 5 Battery, 5th Brigade; 2 gunners
died of their wounds; 2 gunners wounded slightly.

Captain Holcombe’s company, now 4 Battery, 2nd Brigade; 1 gunner
killed; 17 non-commissioned officers and men wounded.

Captain Lawson’s company, now H Battery, 8th Brigade; 1 gunner
died of his wounds; 2 gunners wounded.

Captain Sympher’s company (K.G.A.); 1 gunner killed; 3 gunners
wounded.

The ammunition expended was:--8950 rounds from 24-pounders, and 565 from 18-pounders.

[Sidenote: To Lord Liverpool, dated 20 Jan. 1812.]

In Lord Wellington’s despatch, announcing the successful termination of the siege, he--after extolling Major Dickson’s conduct of the Artillery operations--proceeded to say: “The rapid execution produced by the well-directed fire kept up from our batteries affords the best proof of the merits of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, and of the Portuguese Artillery, employed on this occasion; but I must particularly mention Brigade-Major May, and Captains Holcombe, Power, Dyneley, and Dundas, of the Royal Artillery.”

General Borthwick’s name is not mentioned, either in the despatch or among the wounded; but he appears in Kane’s list--generally most accurate in its details--as having been in command of the Artillery, and also as having been wounded, during the siege.

Ciudad Rodrigo had hardly fallen, before Lord Wellington resolved to attempt a third siege of Badajoz,--now that he had suitable ordnance. He ordered Major Dickson to proceed on the 30th January to Setubal, calling at Elvas to make some necessary arrangements. From Setubal he was directed to send 16 24-pounders of a new battering train, which had arrived, to Elvas,--as well as 20 guns of the same calibre, which were to be furnished from the navy. The whole of these guns were to travel on block carriages. The difficulty of sending the heavy guns of the train at Almeida to Elvas led to this arrangement: but it was decided to send the 24-pounder howitzers, as being much lighter, and also a number of 24-pounder carriages, which were stored at Almeida. By this means it was hoped to have speedily equipped at Elvas a new battering train of 36 iron 24-pounder guns, and 16 24-pounder howitzers,--an armament very different from the brass Portuguese guns which had assailed the stronghold of Philippon twice before.

So incessant was the work which now devolved on Major Dickson that he had no time for correspondence, and there is a great blank, where the student had hoped to find much that was interesting. From other sources, therefore, the Artillery details of a siege, which can never be forgotten, must be procured. As at Ciudad Rodrigo, the Infantry share in the operations dwarfs all other;--but it dwarfs it to even a greater extent. The story of the storming of Badajoz is one which will thrill the heart of every Briton for all time; which will bind together by sacred memories the regiments which were so nobly represented on that day; and which will impress on all, who study it, the truth of Napier’s words, that “a British army bears with it an awful power.” The scene on the night of the 6th April, 1812, was one before which the energy, zeal, and proficiency of the Artillery on the preceding days pale away into nothingness; and the chronicling of their humble statistics seems almost an impertinence. For, the night of the 6th [Sidenote: Napier.] was, indeed, one in which “many died, and there was much glory;” it was one in which death took many and hideous forms,--“the slain dying not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; some perishing by steel, some by shot, some by water, some crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by fiery explosions;” and yet it was a night in which the most cruel death was fair to look on,--because hallowed by marvellous courage and rare devotion.

[Sidenote: Tables published by an officer of Artillery in 1819.]

The breaches, which were rendered famous by this combat “so fiercely fought, so terribly won,” were virtually made between the 30th March and the 6th April. On the 30th March 8 18-pounders were in action for purely breaching purposes; on the following day, this number was increased, by 12 24-pounders, and 6 18-pounders, to 26 guns; and these remained in action, for 13 hours a day, until the storming of the place. Of round shot, alone, no fewer than 18,832 24-pr., and 13,029 18-pr., were expended during the short siege; besides 1163 24-pounder grape shot, and 496 of the same from the 18-pounders. Of the round shot, 23,896 were employed in forming the three breaches. Besides the breaching guns, there were 10 24-pounder and 18-pounder guns, and 16 5½-inch howitzers, employed for enfilading and other fire. From the last mentioned, 507 common shell and 1319 spherical case were fired during the siege.

[Sidenote: Tables published by an officer of Artillery in 1819.]

The three breaches were rendered practicable from a distance of between 600 and 700 yards; and the curtain breach was made in one day, the day of the assault. To the rapidity of the making of this breach was much of the success in the final storming due; because, had several days been required, measures would have been adopted by the defenders during the intervening nights to render it wholly impracticable. In making this curtain breach, 14 guns were employed, with an expenditure of 3514 rounds.

Colonel Framingham commanded the Allied Artillery during the siege, but Major Dickson virtually directed the operations. From a rough MS. diary in the Record Office, in the handwriting of the latter officer, it would appear that the strength of the Artillery was as follows:--

N.-C. officers
and men.

Captain Holcombe’s company 110
Captain Gardiner’s ditto[32] 110
Captain Glubb’s (commanded by Captain Power) company 78
Captain Rettberg’s (King’s German Artillery) ditto 30

There were also 377 of the 3rd Regiment, and 249 of the 2nd Regiment, of Portuguese Artillery.

[Sidenote: To Lord Liverpool, 7 April, 1812.]

In his despatch, after the storming of the city, Lord Wellington said: “Major Dickson conducted the details of the Artillery service during this siege, as well as upon former occasions, under the general superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Framingham, who, since the absence of Major-General Borthwick, has commanded the Artillery with this army. I cannot sufficiently applaud the officers and soldiers of the British and Portuguese Artillery during this siege, particularly Lieut.-Colonel Robe, who opened the breaching batteries, Majors May and Holcombe, Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Bourchier, of the Royal Artillery; Captain de Rettberg, of the King’s German Artillery; and Major Tulloh, of the Portuguese. Adverting to the extent of the details of the Ordnance Department during this siege, to the difficulty of weather, &c., with which Major Dickson had to contend, I must mention him most particularly to your Lordship.” Besides the officers named in the despatch, there were present in the batteries Captains Power, Latham, Dundas, and Dansey; and Lieutenants Weston, Connel, Grimes, and Love.

The loss of the Royal Artillery during the siege was as follows:--

Killed: Captain Latham, Lieutenant Connel, and 23 non-commissioned
officers and men.
Wounded: Captain Dundas, Lieutenants Grimes and Love, and 48
non-commissioned officers and men.[33]
Major Tulloh, an officer of the Royal Artillery attached to the
Portuguese, was also wounded.

The troops of Horse Artillery commanded by Majors Bull and Ross were present at the investment and siege of Badajoz; and although not included in the detail made [Sidenote: Major Ross to Sir H. Dalrymple, 8 April, 1812.] out by Major Dickson for duty in the trenches, it is evident that they must have taken part in the operations, for Major Ross was severely wounded by a grape-shot. But his name does not appear in Lord Wellington’s lists.

The losses in the other arms of the service employed in the siege were very great. No fewer than 5000 officers and men fell during the siege, and of that number 3500 fell on the night of the 6th April. Sixty officers and upwards of seven hundred men were slain on the spot.

[Sidenote: Napier.]

No wonder that, “when the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.”

The recollections of such a night are among the greatest treasures which an army can cherish. Even the reaction after success, the irregularities and licence displayed by the troops in the captured city, while certainly dimming, could not permanently injure the glory of the marvellous assault. Such traditions are a weapon for discipline, which only a soldier can estimate. Inspired by them, men will feed the lamp of their present lives with the oil of past glory, and strain every nerve to make the flame burn pure and clear.

Perhaps one of the highest motives, which can influence a soldier, is the desire to be worthy of his predecessors, and true to the reputation which they have earned for their corps. It carries him at once out of himself, and introduces an unselfish element even into his own ambition and aims. Only those who have served long in a regiment which they love can understand the fond jealousy for its honour, which will inspire its members. Its history never dies; the deeds of the years that are gone are the living possession of all; the valour which may have been exhibited in former days lives again in the breasts of those, who hunger for an opportunity of similar display; and the men who, by their courage and skill, may have earned honour for their corps, still haunt in no shadowy form the dreams of the young aspirant, and the memories of the old.

* * * * *

NOTE.--In alluding to the services of the two scientific corps at
this siege of Badajoz, Sir J. Jones wrote that “as an engineer and
artillery operation, it succeeded to the utmost letter.”