Chapter XXV: Conclusion: Of the Peninsular War

The absence of Colonel Dickson from the head-quarters of the army
during the sieges of San Sebastian has had the effect of leaving
the Artillery share in the operations [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson
to D.-A.-G. dated 18 Sept. 1813.] known as the battle of the
Pyrenees, unwritten. He did not rejoin head-quarters until the
17th September, 1813: the period, therefore, between the battle of
Vittoria and that date is, as far as the operations of Lord
Wellington’s army are concerned, almost ignored in his
correspondence. In the chapter on the Old Tenth Battalion, in this
volume, some allusion to the services of the Artillery at this
time will be found; and one or two facts are mentioned in Sir Hew
Ross’s memoir; but, really, the chief work fell upon the Infantry
during these operations. Soult had been sent to take command of
the army of Spain, with orders to assume the offensive at once;
which he did, with the ostensible [Sidenote: Lord Wellington to
Lord Bathurst, 1 Nov. 1813.] view of relieving the blockade of
Pampeluna. This he failed to do, and that city ultimately
surrendered on the 31st October, 1813, relieving Lord Wellington
of a great drag on his movements. The mountainous country, in
which the combats which constituted the battle of the Pyrenees
were fought, was unsuited to the movements of Artillery;
[Sidenote: ‘Memoirs of Sir H. Ross,’ p. 45.] and the Chestnut
Troop, which may be taken as a sample of those engaged, had its
carriages completely shaken to pieces. Soult, having failed to
relieve Pampeluna, made an attempt to raise the siege of San
Sebastian; and, on the very day when the city was stormed, the
31st August, he attacked the Spanish forces on San Marcial for
this purpose, but was defeated with loss. The conduct of the
Spanish on this occasion was much commended by Lord Wellington;
and it was a singular and happy coincidence that this engagement,
[Sidenote: To Lord Bathurst, dated 2 Sept. 1813.] so creditable to
the Spanish troops, was the last fought on Spanish soil. Soult
withdrew his forces across the frontier, and assumed the
defensive. For six weeks Lord Wellington remained inactive,
pending intelligence from the Allies in the north, who were then
concentrating their forces against Napoleon, and would shortly
demand from Lord Wellington a diversion in the south.

During these six weeks, much was done to render the equipment of
the Artillery suitable for a rough and winter campaign; measures
were taken to expedite the arrival, from Lisbon, of some
additional horses which had been sent from England; and, in the
meantime, the troops and [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 3 Oct.
1813.] brigades were, as Colonel Dickson wrote, “kept above water”
by the purchase of mules and French horses.

On the 7th October, Lord Wellington made a forward movement into
France by crossing the Bidassoa. This has always been considered
one of the ablest movements made [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to
D.-A.-G. dated 10 Oct. 1813.] by the great English General. The
passage was effected as follows. The 5th Division and two
9-pounder brigades forded at Fuentarabia. The 1st Division, and
General Wilson’s brigade, with one 9-pounder brigade, and Webber
Smith’s Troop of Horse Artillery, crossed at Irun; the Artillery
of this column being commanded by Major Dyer. The passage of the
1st Division column was covered by the 18-pounder brigade and a
troop of Horse Artillery. General Freire’s Galician army passed at
two fords higher up, covered by a 9-pounder brigade, Bull’s troop
of Horse Artillery, and a brigade of Spanish Artillery. The
passage of the river was effected, and the French position carried
with great ease. The most difficult duty fell upon the Spaniards,
who behaved well. The French, on the other hand, behaved ill. The
18-pounder brigade was especially useful in covering the passage
of the troops.

The attack upon the Puerto de Vera was made by the Light Division
and General Giron’s Spanish reserve army, supported by the 4th
Division, who were successful in getting possession of the pass
and adjoining heights; but not until the 9th October did the
French quit the Montagne de la Rhune.

The night prior to the crossing of the Bidassoa had been very
stormy, and aided in concealing the movements of the Allies. But
Soult never imagined such a thing possible as [Sidenote: Cust.]
“the astonishing hardihood of passing columns by fords where the
tide rose 16 feet, and where the sands were half a mile broad, to
force such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth.” In his
description of the crossing of the Bidassoa, Sir Augustus Frazer
mentions that, when he reached Irun with Ramsay’s troop and
Michell’s (late Parker’s) brigade, he found 400 Infantry waiting
to pull the guns over the mountain to the places from which they
[Sidenote: ‘Frazer’s Letters,’ p. 290.] were to cover the crossing
of the army. “But,” he adds with pride, “_Bull’s (Ramsay’s) horses
never want assistance_; they were soon posted on a height with
some Spanish [Sidenote: Dated Vera, 10 Oct. 1813.] “Horse
Artillery.” From a subsequent official return to the
Master-General, it appears that the 9-pounder brigade which
accompanied the 1st Division was Captain Dansey’s; and that the
9-pounder brigade which accompanied the 5th Division was Lawson’s,
commanded by the 2nd Captain,--Mosse. Captain Morrison still
commanded the 18-pounder brigade; and Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s troop
of Horse Artillery was held in reserve, moving from one point to
another as most required. Including Major Arriaga’s Portuguese
brigade, and the other troops and brigade already mentioned, there
were 48 British and Portuguese guns engaged at the passage of the
Bidassoa; and the Master-General was informed that the fire of the
Artillery on the occasion was well directed, and that the
exertions made by the officers in bringing forward their
respective brigades to the point of attack were most satisfactory.
Lieut.-Colonel May was Assistant Adjutant-General to the
Artillery, Lieutenant Ord was Brigade-Major, and Lieutenant Pascoe
Adjutant. Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann was in charge of the artillery
in position, and Lieut.-Colonel Frazer and Major Dyer
superintended the bringing forward of the guns.

Further inaction followed the passage of the Bidassoa, until the
fall of Pampeluna, already mentioned, set Lord Wellington free for
a further advance. During this time, attempts were [Sidenote:
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 17 Oct. 1813.] made to supply
mountain batteries for the coming service. Marshal Beresford
brought a few 3-pounders from Lisbon; but it was found almost
impossible to procure mules for them. Three guns of the same
calibre, which had been taken from the French, had been
temporarily equipped for single draught, and placed under the
command of Lieutenant Robe, the son of the gallant officer who
commanded at Roliça and Vimiera. This young officer subsequently
fell at Waterloo, [Sidenote: Ibid. 24 Oct. 1813.] having seen more
battles than years. A medley equipment was found for the guns
brought from Lisbon,--the Artillerymen being Portuguese, but the
drivers and mules being British. These guns were carried on the
backs of the mules, and three of them were added to Lieutenant
Robe’s command. A detachment for rocket-service was also sent from
England, but received by Lord Wellington with very mixed feelings,
as he had rather a horror of the rocket as [Sidenote: Ibid. 31
Oct. 1813.] a weapon of war. The Chestnut Troop and Douglas’s and
Sympher’s field brigades were also got over the mountains to Vera,
for outpost duty, and to be in readiness to support the attack on
the enemy’s position, which Lord Wellington had decided to make as
soon as Pampeluna should surrender. The difficulty in getting
these guns over was very great, and was aggravated by the
tempestuous weather which prevailed; [Sidenote: Ibid. 7 Nov.
1813.] but it was effected without accident. When the news arrived
from Pampeluna, which should have set the army free for forward
movement into France, the weather had become such that movement
was impossible. At Roncesvalles, the fall of snow was so heavy and
unexpected, that three of Captain Maxwell’s guns had to be
abandoned in a redoubt,--the guns being buried under ground and
the carriages concealed under the snow. Ross’s, Douglas’s, and
Sympher’s guns had, however, been advanced still farther to
support in the meditated attack on the position of Sarre; Robe’s
mountain guns were attached to the 6th Division, and the
Portuguese 3-pounders to the Light Division and Giron’s army;
while no fewer than 54 guns had been attached to the left of the
army under Sir John Hope,--Colonel Hartmann being in command. It
will thus be seen that all necessary arrangements had been made,
as far as the Artillery department was concerned.

[Sidenote: Official Report to Master-General, dated St. Pé, 14
Nov. 1813, and Letter from Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. of same
date.]

The attack--which is known as the battle of La Nivelle--took place
on the 10th November, and resulted in the enemy’s entrenched
position being carried at every point, from St. Jean de Luz to the
front of the Puerto de Maia; and in the capture of 51 French
pieces of ordnance, and 1500 prisoners. The following was the
distribution of the Artillery during the battle; and it will be
seen that the greater part remained on the left of the army,--the
nature of the country rendering it extremely difficult to move
Artillery, except by the high road from Irun:--

With Sir Rowland Hill’s corps--

Lieut-Col. Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades { One of 9-prs.
{ One of 6-prs.

With the 6th Division: Lieutenant Robe’s mountain guns.

To support the attack of the 4th { Lieut.-Col. Ross’s troop, R.H.A.
and 7th Divisions on the redoubts and { Major Sympher’s brigade of 9-prs.
position of Sarre. { Captain Douglas’s brigade of 9-prs.

With General Giron’s Spanish reserve: a half brigade of Portuguese 3-prs.

With the Light Division: a half brigade of Portuguese 3-prs.

With Lieut.-General Sir John Hope’s corps--
Lieut.-Col. Webber Smith’s troop, R.H.A.
Captain Ramsay’s troop, R.H.A.
” Carmichael’s brigade of 9-pounders.
” Mosse’s brigade of heavy 6-pounders.
” Greene’s brigade of 9-pounders.
” Cairnes’ brigade of 9-pounders.
” Michell’s brigade of 9-pounders.
Major Arriaga’s Portuguese 9-pounders.
” Morrison’s 18-pounders.

There was also a brigade of Spanish Artillery with General
Freire’s army.

The Artillery with Sir John Hope’s column was but little engaged,
as its advance depended on the success of the right; but it kept
up a heavy and successful cannonade, and met with a few
casualties. The Artillery on the right, in support of the attack
on the redoubts, was, however, of essential service; and was
skilfully handled by the field officers in charge,
Lieut.-Colonels Frazer and Buckner. They opened a vigorous fire on
the first redoubt, while the 4th Division was moving forward to
assault it, and the effect of the fire was such as to compel the
enemy to abandon the redoubt without waiting for the assault. At
this time the Chestnut Troop distinguished itself especially. “I
must particularly notice,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “the gallant
manner in which Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s troop was moved to an
advanced position, when it reopened its fire at the distance of
350 yards from the work, and covered the approach of the others.
In this operation Lieutenant Day was severely wounded.” As soon as
the enemy quitted the first redoubt, the guns moved forward to
support the 7th Division in the attack of the second, but after a
few rounds it also was abandoned. In the subsequent operations on
the right, the Artillery were unable to take much part, on
[Sidenote: Cust.] account of the difficulty in moving the guns.
The frightful state of the roads also aided the ultimate escape of
the enemy without pursuit. To use Sir Augustus Frazer’s words, the
[Sidenote: Frazer’s ‘Letters,’ p. 342.] ground over which the
battle of La Nivelle was fought was “so rugged, that it would be
difficult to attempt a sketch of it. You must fancy rocks, and
hills, and woods, and mountains, interspersed with rough heaths
and rivers, and everything but plain ground.” The casualties in
the Artillery were as follows:--

Lieut.-Col. Rosa’s troop--
Killed: 1 man, and 1 horse.
Wounded: 1 officer, 10 non-commissioned officers and men, and 4 horses.

Lieut.-Col. Smith’s troop--
Killed: 1 man, and 2 horses.
Wounded: 6 non-commissioned officers and men, and 7 horses.

Major Bull’s (Ramsay’s) troop--
Killed: 1 man, and 1 horse.
Wounded: 2 non-commissioned officers and men.

Captain Michell’s brigade--Wounded: 3 gunners.

Captain Carmichael’s brigade--Wounded: No officers or men. 1 horse.

Lieutenant Robe’s brigade--Killed: 1 mule.

Total--Killed: 3 men, 4 horses, 1 mule.
Wounded: 1 officer, 21 non-commissioned officers and men, 12 horses.

The entire losses of the Allies at La Nivelle amounted to 2694
killed and wounded. The conduct of the Artillery during the battle
was such as to excite the following comments: [Sidenote: Frazer’s
‘Letters,’ p. 335.] “Flattering compliments were paid by all on
the undoubted service of the three batteries of Artillery on
[Sidenote: Official Despatch, 14 Nov. 1813.] this occasion, i.e.
the attack on the redoubts.” “I beg you will further state to the
Master-General,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “that I have every reason
to be satisfied with the conduct of all the field officers,
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, employed on this
occasion; as also of Lieut.-Colonel May, and the officers of the
Artillery Staff.” In his private letter to General Macleod,
Colonel Dickson wrote: “The attack of the first redoubt at Sarre
it was expected would be a very obstinate operation, and for that
reason all the eighteen guns were brought up against it; however,
their fire was so active and well directed, and Frazer pushed the
guns up so close, [Sidenote: Dated St. Jean de Luz, 21 Nov. 1813.]
that the enemy could not stand it.” In another report, Colonel
Dickson said that the mountain guns under Lieutenant Robe, and the
Portuguese guns of similar calibre, were most active and useful,
accompanying their respective corps during the day, and supporting
the advance of their [Sidenote: Major Dyer to Lieut.-Col.
Hartmann, 12 Nov. 1813.] light troops. Captain Ramsay’s troop and
Captain Carmichael’s brigade, with Sir J. Hope’s force, were
especially mentioned;--the former for having repeatedly silenced
the guns opposed to him, and dismounted one in the redoubt in
front of the 12th and 16th Dragoons; and the latter for having
repeatedly driven back the enemy’s skirmishers, silenced their
guns, and dismounted one in the redoubt opposite the 1st German
Regiment of Infantry. Lord Wellington, [Sidenote: To Lord
Bathurst, dated St. Pé, 13 Nov. 1813.] in his despatch, said: “The
artillery which was in the field was of great use to us; and I
cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence and activity with
which it was brought to the point of attack, under the direction
of Colonel Dickson, over the bad roads through the mountains, at
this season of the year.”

The success of the Allies on the right obliged the enemy to
abandon the works at St. Jean de Luz, but any further immediate
advance was forbidden to Lord Wellington by the [Sidenote: Colonel
Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 28 Nov. 1813.] incessant rain which fell
for some days. During this period of compulsory inactivity, every
endeavour was made to generate confidence among the French
inhabitants, and although rendered difficult by the irregularities
committed by the Allied troops, the attempts were ultimately
successful. Writing on the 5th December, 1813, Colonel Dickson,
after his usual announcement that it had never ceased raining, and
that the country was quite impassable, went on to say: “The
inhabitants continue to return to their homes, and we are the best
friends possible.” The dulness of the weather at St. Jean de Luz,
and the inactivity which Colonel Dickson abhorred, were cheered by
an announcement that the Portuguese Government had been pleased to
promote him to the rank of Colonel in their service, in
recognition of his recent services.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, dated 14 Dec. 1813.]

The weather having at length sufficiently moderated to admit of
further operations in the field, Lord Wellington forced the
passage of the Nive at Ustaritz and Cambo, on the 9th December,
with the view of extending his right towards the Adour. On the
10th, Soult made an attack on [Sidenote: MS. Return to the
Master-General, dated 15 Dec. 1813.] the Allies’ left, near
Biarritz, and on the Light Division near Arcangues; but he failed
in both. The services on this occasion of Captain Ramsay’s troop,
and of a division of Captain Mosse’s brigade, were very
conspicuous. A similar attempt was made on the 11th, in which the
French were [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to General Macleod, dated
15 Dec. 1813.] again repulsed; Captain Ramsay’s troop, and the
whole of Captain Mosse’s brigade, again rendering most valuable
assistance in the defence of the position. Marshal Soult, being
thus disappointed in his hopes of making an impression on the
Allied left, drew the greater part of his force back to Bayonne on
the night of the 12th December, and in the early morning of the
13th, made a determined attack with great force on Sir Rowland
Hill’s corps, which was in position on the right of the Nive. His
attempts were, however, vigorously repulsed, and he had eventually
to retire into his entrenched camp, with great loss. The Artillery
with Sir Rowland Hill consisted of the Chestnut Troop and Colonel
Tulloh’s Portuguese brigades. With reference to their conduct,
Colonel Dickson wrote: “Nothing could be stronger than the manner
in which Sir Rowland expressed to me his satisfaction at the
conduct of both these corps.” Colonel Tulloh was wounded on this
occasion. At the same time as the passage of the Nive was forced,
Sir John Hope’s corps on the left reconnoitred Bayonne. General
Hay, who commanded the 5th Division with this corps, wrote as
follows with reference to two guns of Captain Ramsay’s troop,
which were attached to him. [Sidenote: General Hay to Colonel
Dickson, dated 12 Dec. 1813.] “I take the first spare moment to
mention to you how much I was pleased, on the 9th instant, with
the very gallant, zealous, and skilful conduct of Captain Cator,
who commanded two guns of Captain Ramsay’s troop of Horse
Artillery attached to me on that day, which were of the greatest
use in assisting me to dislodge a very superior body of the enemy
opposed to me.”

The attacks made on the 13th by Soult were admirably planned, but
the dogged courage of the five Infantry brigades, which was the
whole force which Sir Rowland Hill had at first to oppose to him,
was invincible. Although driven back into his intrenchments, his
position was one which was most objectionable to the Allies. His
attacks were like _sorties_ from a fortress,--which he could make
in great force upon any point, and if he failed, his retreat was
short and [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 15 Dec. 1813.]
easy. It was resolved, therefore, to strengthen the position
occupied by the Allies,--to fortify one or two salient
points,--and to place some guns of position. The army then went
into cantonments,--the Spaniards recrossing the Bidassoa for that
purpose,--but, as may be imagined, winter quarters in front of an
enemy, known to be very active, did not conduce to any sense of
repose among the commanders. The conduct of the Artillery at the
action of the 13th December [Sidenote: To Lord Bathurst, 14 Dec.
1813.] was thus noticed by Lord Wellington: “The British Artillery
under Lieut.-Colonel Ross, and the Portuguese Artillery under
Colonel Tulloh, distinguished themselves.” In the same despatch,
the name of Norman Ramsay appears, as having been favourably
mentioned by Sir John Hope. Like that brave General, Ramsay had
also been twice wounded during the operations on the Nive.

During the few weeks which preceded the resumption of hostilities
in 1814, the mortality among the Artillery horses exceeded
anything that had yet been witnessed.[44] An accident, which
occurred to a supply sent from England to reinforce them, by which
many were killed on board the transports during a storm, was
particularly ill-timed. And, to crown the evil, Lord Wellington,
having decided on the passage of the Adour, ordered the pontoon
train to be increased, and horsed without delay. There was no
alternative but to take the horses from one of the Artillery
brigades; and the unfortunate Captain Cairnes was again the
victim. Luckily for him, the promotions consequent on the
formation of the Rocket troops had just been notified from
England; and as Norman Ramsay received his promotion to the rank
of 1st Captain, and returned to England, the command of his troop
was given to Captain Cairnes.

The movements in the spring of 1814 were important, and on a
considerable scale. In the end of January, the enemy showed
considerable activity on the Adour, and fitted out several
gun-boats to keep the navigation open, and to [Sidenote: Colonel
Dickson to D.-A.-G, dated 30 Jan. 1814.] annoy the posts of the
Allies. Against these Lieutenant Robe’s mountain brigade was first
employed, but it was soon found necessary to supplement it with
guns of a heavier calibre. But in the following month, a change in
the weather--from rain to frost--induced Lord Wellington to
commence the execution of operations, which he had been quietly
designing for some weeks. These included the passage of the Adour
near its mouth,--a feat deemed by Soult impossible,--and a
simultaneous attack on the left of the French army to conceal his
real intention from Soult. Colonel Dickson was sent to assist Sir
John Hope in the former operation, which the reader knows was
well and skilfully executed. While the covering fire of the
Artillery at the passage of the Adour was generally effective,
that of the now famous 18-pounder brigade was especially so. Lord
Wellington superintended the operations on the right; and as his
numbers were now superior to his enemy’s, he was able without risk
to carry out both parts of his scheme at the same time, and to
drive Soult’s forces back from their position. The various
operations, which culminated in the battle of Orthes, are too long
to reproduce in a work of this description; suffice it to give an
account of the services of the Artillery at that great battle.
Colonel Dickson being away, the command of the Artillery with the
right of the army fell to Major Carncross. Colonel Frazer had been
ordered to go with Sir John Hope’s army to the Adour, in charge of
Captain Lane’s rocket detachments, which did good service during
the passage of the river. It may here be mentioned, that during
the operations prior to the investment of Bayonne, which followed
the passage of the Adour, Colonel Frazer was wounded. Although,
however, Major Carncross was senior officer of Artillery on the
field, yet, being with Sir Howland Hill’s column, he did not
participate in the action so much as Major Dyer, who was with
Marshal Beresford’s column, and from whose reports the services of
the various batteries can more readily be traced. On the morning
of the 27th February, the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and light [Sidenote:
Major Jenkinson, R.H.A., to Colonel Frazer, dated 4 March, 1814.]
divisions of Infantry, Colonel Vivian’s and Lord Edward Somerset’s
brigades of Cavalry, Ross’s and Gardiner’s troops of Horse
Artillery, and Maxwell’s, Sympher’s, Turner’s (late Douglas’s),
and Michell’s brigades of Field Artillery, had crossed the river
Pau, over which a pontoon bridge had been placed during the night.
Colonel Ross was no longer with [Sidenote: ‘Memoirs of Sir Hew
Ross,’ p. 55.] the Chestnut Troop, he having returned to England
on leave, and given the command to his 2nd Captain, Major
Jenkinson. The enemy was found to be in full force on a strong
[Sidenote: Major Jenkinson, 4 March, 1814.] height near the
villages of St. Marie and St. Boe’s, and his left covering Orthes,
and the fords between Depart and Biron. The battle commenced early
in the day, and ended after severe fighting, and a loss to the
Allies of 2200 killed and wounded, in the total defeat of the
French, with a loss, which--if the numerous deserters be included,
who came [Sidenote: ‘Cust’s Annals.’] over afterwards--has been
estimated at no fewer than 14,000. Although the verdict of Lord
Wellington might [Sidenote: Despatch to Lord Bathurst, dated 1
March, 1814.] satisfy the most fastidious Artilleryman, “The
conduct of the Artillery throughout the day deserved my entire
approbation,”--a few extracts from the correspondence of the
officers present at the battle cannot fail to be interesting;--and
the opinions of Generals of division must be [Sidenote: Colonel
Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 4 March, 1814.] deemed valuable. Taking
the latter first, it is recorded that Sir Thomas Picton expressed
himself in terms of the highest praise with reference to Captain
Turner’s brigade; and Sir Lowry Cole did the same in regard to
Major Sympher’s. The last-named officer, who had done such good
and continuous service in the Peninsular War, was killed at
Orthes, at the very commencement of the action. Major Jenkinson
wrote in general terms, that “all the General Officers speak in
high terms of the services of Ross’s and Gardiner’s troops, as
also of poor Sympher’s brigade.” Major Dyer, in his [Sidenote: To
Colonel Dickson, dated 3 March, 1814.] report, wrote: “I had the
satisfaction about one o’clock to get Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s and
Gardiner’s troops of Horse Artillery, and the German brigade of
Artillery attached to the 4th Division, into position opposite the
enemy’s strongest columns: the fire from their guns was
tremendous, and, being admirably served, soon caused the enemy to
retire. The brigades then took up separate positions and annoyed
the enemy. About 4 o’clock the guns ceased firing, the enemy
retreating in great confusion, leaving some pieces of cannon on
the field. I have to regret the loss of Major Sympher and many
valuable Artillerymen.” [Sidenote: Dated 3 March, 1814.] In his
official report to Marshal Beresford, Major Dyer wrote: “I should
really feel that I omitted a duty imposed upon me if I did not
recommend to your Excellency’s notice the conduct of Major
Sympher, Major Gardiner, and Major Jenkinson on that brilliant
day.” Captain Beane’s troop of Horse Artillery was with Sir
Rowland Hill’s force, under Major Carncross; and that officer was
[Sidenote: Major Carncross to Colonel Dickson, dated 10 March,
1814.] able to speak with pride of the steady, well-directed, and
destructive fire kept up by it, although exposed to a very severe
fire of musketry. On the 2nd March, Sir Rowland Hill’s force came
up with the enemy, and Captain Beane’s troop performed services
for which it was specially mentioned in orders. Four guns
belonging to it were brought into action with great effect; and
one of them, under Lieutenant Brereton, after a few rounds,
silenced two of the enemy’s, and forced them to retire. On this
day, Captain Macdonald, of Captain Beane’s troop, distinguished
himself in leading on the Portuguese troops, who had been forced
back; and received Sir Rowland Hill’s thanks in public orders on
the following day. Sir Rowland took the opportunity of assuring
Major Carncross that, on the several occasions on which the troop
had been recently engaged, he had been much satisfied with the
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men composing it.

A period of inactivity followed the battle of Orthes; and not
until April did Wellington resume active operations; but in the
meantime Marshal Beresford, with a considerable force, proceeded
to Bordeaux, and was received with great delight. Louis XVIII. was
proclaimed, and the badges of the Empire were doffed by the
magistrates. During this time Colonel Dickson’s life had become a
burden to him. Innumerable accidents and delays occurred to the
horses which were on the way to reinforce his brigades; and at the
same time the drain on his resources to meet the wants [Sidenote:
To D.-A.-G. dated 2 April, 1814.] of the pontoon train daily
increased. “The pontoon equipment,” he wrote, “has become such a
_sink_ of horses under the stupidity, inability, and inactivity of
the Driver officers, that I have been obliged, in consequence of
the continued observations of Lord Wellington, to place Artillery
officers to superintend the care of the horses, until the arrival
of the Alicante army, when officers and men of the Royal Artillery
are to be posted to the pontoon train, by which the bridge
department will revert to the Corps it always belonged to. The bad
state of the concern in its mode of organization enabled me to
convince his Lordship of the benefit that would arise by having
it under one head and managed by the same officers. _He was
ignorant of its having formerly been an Artillery concern; and he
added that he did not know how it had got into the hands of the
Engineers at first._”

To return, however, to the movements of the army. Marshal Soult,
having learnt what had taken place at Bayonne, commenced to retire
upon Toulouse, and Wellington followed [Sidenote: Cust.] in
pursuit, but very leisurely. The Allies had 40,000 bayonets and 60
guns to oppose to Soult’s 28,000 and 38 guns; but a reinforcement
was expected by the latter in the shape of Suchet’s army from the
east of Spain; and the position at Toulouse, on which he was
retreating had been strengthened by gradual intrenchments during
the past few weeks. In the commencement of Soult’s retreat, one or
two smart actions had taken place between divisions of the Allies
and the French, but without any result other than perhaps
increasing the rapidity of Soult’s movements. Toulouse was an
important strategic post for the French; it commanded the passage
of the Garonne; a number of roads met there, which would enable
Soult to carry out many different schemes; and it was the chief
military arsenal in the south of France. Here, if ever, something
might be done to benefit the fast-failing fortunes of the French
Emperor, whom the Allies in [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to
D.-A.-Gen. 13 April, 1814.] the north were hunting relentlessly to
his doom. When Wellington reached the Garonne, his first intention
was to cross it above Toulouse; but this was found so difficult
that the idea was given up, and a flank march having been made on
the 3rd April to a convenient situation about a mile above
Grenade, and below Toulouse, the pontoon bridge was laid early in
the morning of the 4th, and three divisions (the 3rd, 4th, and
6th) with their artillery, as also six regiments of Cavalry with
Major Gardiner’s troop of Horse Artillery, crossed without
opposition. During this operation, however, the river rose
considerably, owing to the rains which had fallen during the
previous night; and at last the further passage of troops was
suspended. Heavy rain fell again on the night of the 4th, and the
river increased so much that the pontoons were obliged to be
drawn into the banks, and the army was thus divided into two
parts. Strangely enough, Marshal Soult did not avail himself of
this circumstance, although it was the morning of the 8th before
the river was sufficiently low to admit of the bridge being
relaid. The Spanish corps, Colonel Arentschild’s Portuguese
Artillery, and the head-quarters staff passed over on that day.
The bridge was then moved a little farther up the river, and early
on the [Sidenote: MS. Official Despatch to the Master-General,
dated Toulouse, 13 April, 1814.] morning of the 10th April the
Light Division crossed. On this day was fought the battle of
Toulouse. The offensive was taken by Lord Wellington, who attacked
a strong position which the enemy had fortified to cover the city
of Toulouse, and succeeded in obtaining entire possession of it
after an obstinate resistance. In consequence of this defeat,
Soult evacuated Toulouse during the night of the 11th, retiring by
the route to Carcassone. The distribution and services of the
Artillery of the Allies were as follows. The Portuguese Artillery,
consisting of ten 9-pounder guns, under Colonel Arentschild,
covered the attack made by the Spaniards on the left of the
enemy’s position. This Artillery was warmly engaged during the
best part of the day, and distinguished itself greatly by its
firmness and correct firing. A German brigade, under Captain
Daniel, and Captain Brandreth’s 9-pounder brigade, both under
Major Dyer, were for some time employed in covering the movements
of Marshal Beresford’s column in its attack on the right of the
position; and on that being carried, they moved up to higher
ground, and assisted in taking the remainder of the position, and
also in moderating the fire of the enemy from the opposite side of
the canal, across which the French were ultimately driven. The
enemy’s fire from that point had greatly annoyed the Allies; and
Colonel Dickson expressed himself highly satisfied with the
counter-effect produced by the fire of Captain Brandreth’s and
Captain Daniel’s guns.

Major Gardiner’s troop of Horse Artillery was at first employed in
supporting the left of the Spanish attack, and afterwards moved to
the ridge carried by Marshal Beresford, where Colonel Dickson
reported that it was “of infinite service.” While these
operations were going on, the 3rd and Light Divisions were
employed in threatening the enemy’s position along the canal,
towards the point where it joined the Garonne. In this service,
Captain Turner’s (late Douglas’s) brigade was engaged. Captain
Bean’s troop and Captain Maxwell’s brigade (now No. 4 Battery, 7th
Brigade) were on the opposite side of the river with Sir Rowland
Hill’s corps, engaged in the attack made upon the tête de pont.
The officers on the Staff of the Artillery at the battle of
Toulouse were Lieut.-Colonel May, Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, and
Lieutenants Ord and Bell. From these officers Colonel Dickson
reported that he had received every assistance. [Sidenote: MS.
Return to B. O.] The casualties among the Artillery engaged
amounted to 1 officer (Lieutenant Blumenbach, K.G.A., killed) and
58 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded. Among the
horses, 28 were killed and 13 wounded. The casualties among the
Royal Horse Artillery engaged amounted to 8 men and 4 horses; and
among the Royal Artillery brigades to 29 men and 23 horses. The
remaining casualties occurred among the Germans and Portuguese.

[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. 13 April, 1814.]

Early in the morning of the 12th, the Allies took possession of
Toulouse, and the white flag was hoisted. Lord Wellington was
received by the corporation at the Town Hall, and addressed them,
pointing out the necessity of weighing well the step which they
were about to take at a moment when a congress was possibly
sitting, for the purpose of making peace with Napoleon. _Vive le
Roi!_ however, was heard from every lip, and every one mounted a
white cockade. In the evening of the 12th, a messenger arrived
from Paris with the intelligence of Napoleon’s abdication, and the
restoration of the Bourbons. The intelligence was very welcome to
the inhabitants of Toulouse, who could not but feel rather nervous
after the step which they had taken. The same messengers carried
to Marshal Soult the news of the Allies entering Paris, and of the
official dethronement of Napoleon by the Senate; but he would give
them no credence. How faithfully Napoleon was served by his
Lieutenants, and how devotedly they clung to his cause, must be
apparent to the most superficial reader of his history. In him,
who has been called the incarnation of war in all its bad as well
as good attributes, they saw but one who was _facile princeps_ in
the profession which they loved;--seeing this, they clung to his
cause to the bitter end; and with a hungering in their hearts for
his leadership, even while serving another prince, they turned to
him, after his escape from Elba, with an enthusiasm more like the
love of a woman than the cold, reasoning affection of a man.
Soldiers, indeed, have many of the qualities of the other sex.
Once let them believe in a leader, and no disasters, no slanders
will upset their creed; and from a leader, whom they love, even
many harsh words will be forgotten in the presence of one word of
kindness. There are those who think that a soldier’s mind is like
a blank page, on which their own views and wishes may with ease be
inscribed. And in one sense they are right. Let skill and courage
once be visible in a commander, and the obedience and enthusiasm
of his men will be his; but let him supplement these qualities by
thoughtful consideration, by kind words, by ready participation in
hardships, and he will earn from them a love which shall pass even
the love of women. But the kind words will not win it without the
skill, nor the consideration without the courage.

[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Toulouse, 18 April,
1814.]

On Soult’s refusing to credit the intelligence from Paris, Lord
Wellington made arrangements for moving forward with the army. On
the 16th, however, a French officer arrived from Paris with
despatches for Marshal Soult; and this was followed by an officer
arriving from the French army to treat with Lord Wellington. Had
the despatches but arrived a little sooner, a loss of life would
have been saved at Bayonne. A _sortie_ was made from the city, on
the 14th April, which, although unsuccessful, resulted in the
death of General Hay and not a few brave officers, and in the
capture of that most brave and chivalrous leader, Sir John Hope.

The war was now over; but, before closing this chapter, let a word
be said with reference to the services of an officer of the Corps
who commanded with distinction the rocket detachments attached to
the Allied army at Leipsic in 1813, and who met a soldier’s death
many years after, at the battle of Inkermann--Thomas Fox
Strangways. At Leipsic he commanded, from the circumstance that
his Captain, Bogue, fell early in the day. He was then but a
subaltern; but ere he left the field, at the head of his brigade
he received the personal [Sidenote: From a Letter written by Lady
Fox Strangways.] thanks of the Allied sovereigns; and the Emperor
of Russia, taking from his breast the order of St. Anne, placed it
upon that of the young officer whose services had been so eminent
on that day. In recounting the story of the battle, Sir Edward
Cust says that such was the fearful effect of the rockets, that a
whole brigade surrendered after enduring their fire for a few
minutes; and it has also been recorded, on the best evidence,
that, at a most critical time of the battle, the Crown Prince of
Sweden rode up to him, and implored him to advance his brigade, as
nothing else would save the day. To his exertions at Leipsic was
the subsequent organization of regular rocket troops due; and on
this taking place the command of the brave men, who had
distinguished themselves at Leipsic, passed into the hands of one
both able and brave,--one who had done noble service in the
Peninsula, which he was to repeat at Waterloo,--gentle and yet
enthusiastic,--the late Sir E. C. Whinyates.

In closing this narrative of the services of the Artillery in the
Peninsula, it is impossible to avoid feeling that it has fallen
immeasurably short of the narrative to which these services are
justly entitled. It is felt that the attempt to place before the
reader the chivalry, courage, and endurance of those who
represented the Corps in the great wars with France, has been
defeated by considerations of space, as well as by the writer’s
inexperience. To realise these qualities thoroughly, it will be
necessary for the reader to clothe these skeleton pages with the
noble drapery of Napier.

But if these qualities, which are matter of history, have failed
to receive adequate description, how much greater has been the
shortcoming in endeavouring to picture those virtues, which can
only be detected in the intimacy of private friendship, or the
study of private correspondence! It is only from the latter that
the student is now able to see how almost brotherly was the
relationship between the officers of the Corps in Lord
Wellington’s army. For example:--on hearing of Colonel Dickson’s
promotion by the Portuguese Government, in the winter of 1813,
what were the words of the man whom he had superseded, and who was
as able as himself? “I wish,” wrote Sir Augustus Frazer, “that he
were a General; he fully deserves all that can be given him either
as honour or reward.” And as he felt, so did all. In the letters,
also, announcing the Artillery losses at the various battles in
that war, of which it has been said that the Allies “left 40,000
of their own number dead on [Sidenote: Cust.] the plains and
mountains of the Peninsula,” how fervently does the loving,
brotherly spirit appear! Each good quality in the dead is fondly
dwelt upon; and as one gazes on the loving words, written on pages
now so faded by hands so long still, there rises a picture of a
Regimental unity which it were a sacrilege now to disturb by
internal differences. It is, indeed, well at times to close our
eyes to the present, and to look back at the past;--a standard is
often to be found there which shall dwarf that which we may have
set up in our self-esteem, and thought colossal. Possibly, never
in the whole history of the Regiment has there been a time of such
intellectual life among its members, as at the present day; but as
the great school of experience, which in the beginning of this
century made giants of our Artillerymen, is not now open, it may
be that there is almost a danger in this mental activity, unless
it be tempered by the study of comrades, who in days gone by were
the embodiments of duty, courage, and hardihood. Thus history may
furnish to the student a stability, which shall allay present
restlessness.