Chapter II

THE NECESSITY, BIRTH, AND PROGRESS OF THE ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

Of all the so-called Battalion Records, which were kept at the various Head-quarter offices at Woolwich up to the year 1859, and the details of which are, at the best, of the most scanty description, perhaps the most meagre and most disappointing are those of the Royal Horse Artillery.

From the well-known _esprit_ of this branch of the service, it might have been expected that its earlier history would have been treated almost with effusion by those in whose custody was a book purporting to contain a record of its services. But it may be said with truth that for one item of information obtained from the written records of this brilliant arm, ten have been obtained from the traditions handed down verbally, and fondly treasured by successive generations of officers; and even a greater part of the required information has been obtained from works of general military history, and from extant official letter-books.

The first section of these old Record Books professes to treat of the circumstances of the original formation of the particular part of the Regiment concerned. In the Records of the Royal Horse Artillery this section is compressed into two lines. “The Royal Horse Artillery was formed as an additional corps to the Regiment of Artillery on the 1st February, 1793.” Remarkable for its brevity, this account of the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery is also remarkable for its inaccuracy. It was _not_ an additional corps to the Royal Artillery, but from the very commencement an essential, integral part of it. The Driver Corps, formed in 1794, _was_ an additional corps to the Royal Artillery; but its officers were, until after Waterloo, drawn from a different source, and its men were never Artillerymen. The Royal Horse Artillery, on the other hand, was invariably officered by the Royal Artillery, and was recruited from its ranks. Of the wisdom, or otherwise, of this policy, it will be necessary to treat hereafter; but of the fact there can be no doubt. Yet again, in the brief record quoted above, are compressed other inaccuracies. The Horse Artillery did not spring into existence, as a corps, on 1st February, 1793, as the words would imply. Two troops were authorised in January of that year, but not for twelve years of straggling augmentations of staff-officers and troops, can it be said to have attained its proper maturity. The earlier wars of the French Revolution were the boyhood of the Royal Horse Artillery, as the Peninsular campaign was its glorious manhood. After Waterloo, until the Crimean War, its history was a blank page.

It is fortunate that an officer of the Regiment has been found, at once so capable and so patient in tracing out the circumstances which impressed on the world the necessity [Sidenote: Captain H. W. L. Hime, Royal Artillery. Proceedings R. A. Institution.] of this arm, as the author of the papers on ‘The Mobility of Field Artillery, Past and Present.’ According to this writer, England was the last among the leading nations in Europe to adopt the use of Horse Artillery. As early as 1788, the subject had strongly attracted the attention of the Master-General of the Ordnance; but, unfortunately, he referred it to a committee. The period of gestation, so to speak, in committees on military subjects is very great; in this particular instance the winter of 1792 had arrived without any result from their labours.

The introduction of Horse Artillery into the Prussian service dates from 1759; and in 1792 this arm was introduced into the French and Swedish armies. In other European countries improvement had been made in Field Artillery, without, however, adopting the system of _mounted detachments_; but this latter is the distinctive mark of Horse Artillery. It has been asserted, and on good authority, that Horse Artillery was used in India prior even to its adoption by Frederick the Great--and dating as far back as 1756. If the existence of an Artillery without mobility was sufficient to impress on the authorities in that country a sense of the necessity of some improvements, the argument was not wanting. In an engagement between the English [Sidenote: ‘History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindostan,’ vol. i. pp. 312-368.] and French troops near Trichinopoly in 1753, “the English, _for more expedition_, marched without any field-pieces;” and when the infantry advanced against the French in an action fought shortly afterwards, “the _artillery, in the hurry, could not keep up with the battalion_.” The advantage of a more mobile artillery must certainly have been apparent after such melancholy exhibitions.

It has already been mentioned in this work that rapidity of movement, more especially under fire, was rendered hopeless by the frequent employment of peasants to act as drivers to the batteries. The formation of the Royal Horse Artillery did not free the Field Batteries from this evil. A quaint circumstance in proof of this is narrated by the [Sidenote: Hime.] author already mentioned. “In 1798, the Commandant of Woolwich inspected some guns manned by gunners of the 8th Battalion, R.A. The guns were each drawn by three horses in single file, which were driven by contract drivers on foot, hired for the occasion, dressed in white smocks [Sidenote: ‘Aide-Mémoire to the Military Sciences,’ art. ‘Ordnance.’] with blue collars and cuffs, and armed with long carter’s whips of the ordinary farm pattern. When this formidable array had been reviewed, the Commandant, General Lloyd, and the Garrison Adjutant, expressed their joint opinion that field artillery movements could not be performed quicker.” The increase of mobility over that old system--of which the above is a real, although, perhaps, exceptional illustration--which followed the introduction of Horse Artillery can best be shown by another and later instance. At the battle of Fuentes d’Onor, Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery--now D Battery, B Brigade--was surrounded and cut off by the French cavalry. It was at the time under the command of the 2nd Captain, Norman Ramsay. [Sidenote: Gleig.] “Guns thus dealt with are almost always lost, and consequently the army ceased to think of Ramsay and his men, except as prisoners. Presently, however, a great commotion was observed among the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point, where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated [Sidenote: Napier.] some extraordinary occurrence.... Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated; an English shout pealed high and clear; the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his troop, his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain; the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low, and pointed weapons, in desperate career.” Between the crawling peasant-driven team on Woolwich parade, and this glowing description of a Horse Artillery battery but a very few years later, there is a contrast, which shows at a glance the immense stride in the direction of mobility, which had followed the introduction of that branch of the Regiment to whose story this chapter is devoted. Much of this improvement was due to the fostering care of the Master-General, and of the Deputy-Adjutant-General, afterwards Sir John Macleod; much also was due to the encouragement of General Officers, who found to their amazement a force of Artillery, which could conform to their most rapid movements; and not a little was due to the practical school of experience opened in the Peninsula; but, to their honour be it stated, the rapid progress towards the standard of perfection attained by the Royal Horse Artillery was mainly due to the labours, the devotion, of the officers belonging to it, who were inspired by the same _esprit_ and the same conscientious regard for their duties, as have continued to animate the officers of that brilliant arm to this day.

While the Committee, appointed to decide the question of Horse Artillery in connection with our service, was--according to wont--babbling harmlessly and fruitlessly in the fourth year of its existence, a virtual rupture took place between England and France. The Duke of Richmond, then Master-General, immediately took the matter himself in hand; and of three schemes, very dissimilar, over which the Committee had been debating, he selected the following, as the basis of the organization of a troop of Royal Horse Artillery.

INDEX.
A. Horses.
B. Drivers.
C. Ammunition.
D. Captains.
E. Lieuts.
F. N.C.O.’s.
G. Gunners.
H. Drummers.
I. Civil Lists.

---------------------------+----+---+----+-------------------+---+---------------
| | | | Distribution of | |
| | | | detachments. | |
Detail. | | | +---+---+-------+---+ | Remarks.
| A. | B.| C.| D.| E.| F.| G.| H.| I.|
---------------------------+----+---+--------+-------+---+---+---+---------------
5½-inch howitzers (2) | 8| 4| 160| 1| 1| 2| 20| ..| ..| 4 men held the
Waggons (2) | 8| 4| | | | | | | | horses in
| | | | | | | | | | action.
3-prs. (2) | 8| 4| 480| 1| 1| 2| 20| ..| ..| Ditto.
Waggons (2) | 8| 4| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
6-prs., Col. Williams’ (2) | 4| 2| 160| ..| 1| 2| 20| ..| ..| Ditto.
Tumbrils (2) | 4| 2| | | | | | | |
Horses for detachments | 66| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
2 Sergeants, Sergt.-Major,}| 2| ..| ..| ..| ..| 2| ..| ..| ..|
and Clerk of Stores }| | | | | | | | | |
Drummers to have }| 2| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 2| ..|
bugle horns, and }| | | | | | | | | |
act as orderly men }| | | | | | | | | |
1 forge cart | 3| 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
1 waggon for Artificers’ }| 3| 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
Stores }| | | | | | | | | |
Officers’ horses not }| | | | | | | | | |
included }| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
| | | | | | | | | |
CIVIL LIST. | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
1 Commissary of horse | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
2 Conductors of horse | 2| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 2|
1 Collar-maker | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
1 Wheeler | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
1 Blacksmith | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
1 Farrier | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
+----+---+----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------------
Total | 123| 22| 800| 2| 3| 8| 60| 2| 7|
---------------------------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------------

The formation of the first two troops, A and B, took place at Woolwich, having been ordered in January 1793. The Captains were R. Lawson, afterwards so distinguished in Egypt, and the Brigade-Major of the Regiment, J. Macleod, afterwards Deputy-Adjutant-General. In these--as in the other troops subsequently formed--great care was taken to appoint none but officers of well-known ability. This fact, combined with the permission given to the Horse Artillery to select the best recruits joining the Regiment, had the immediate effect of causing the new branch to be looked on as a _corps d’élite_: as, indeed, was the case in every other country in Europe, except Austria. Whether this has proved a benefit, or otherwise, to the corps, will hereafter be considered. The _esprit_ generally to be found in a _corps d’élite_ was fanned by other, minor, considerations. It must be remembered that the gunners of Field Artillery, other than Horse Artillery, and of Garrison Artillery, were, and still are, interchangeable. But in the Horse Artillery “the men were magnificently dressed, they were amply paid, and they were not haunted by the constant dread of being suddenly and forcibly torn from the Field Artillery service, which they loved, and thrust into the Garrison Artillery service, [Sidenote: Hime.] which was strange to them.” Only 4 guns per troop were granted at first; and the establishment consisted, in addition to the officers, of 8 non-commissioned officers, 49 gunners, [Sidenote: R. H. A. Records.] and 35 drivers. On the formation of C and D Troops, on 1st November, 1793, the armament of each troop was raised to 6 guns, and the establishment per troop was 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 45 drivers, and 187 horses.

The officers appointed to command the new troops were, E. Howorth, afterwards Sir E. Howorth, who subsequently commanded the Artillery at Talavera, Busaco, and Fuentes d’Onor, and J. M. Hadden, who afterwards became Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. The reader will continue to observe the selection always made of able officers to command the troops of Horse Artillery. In 1794, E and F Troops were formed, and the command given respectively to Captain W. Cuppage, an officer who afterwards held for twenty-six years the appointment of Inspector of the Royal Carriage Department, and to Captain J. Butler, an officer who afterwards became Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.

In 1794, the number of guns per troop was augmented to 8; and this remained the establishment until 1804, in which year the number was reduced to 6; at which it continued until the reductions after the battle of Waterloo. In 1794, when the number of guns was raised to 8, the following was the establishment: 15 non-commissioned officers, 97 gunners, 71 drivers, 246 horses per troop. This was reduced in the following year very considerably, and became 15 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 51 drivers, and 170 horses.

The next variation in the establishment was caused by the formation, in Ireland, of G Troop, from detachments serving in that country. The command of the new troop was given to Captain--afterwards Sir--G. B. Fisher, an officer who in 1827 was appointed Commandant of Woolwich. For two years after the formation of G Troop, the establishment of the troops was as follows: 8 guns, 16 non-commissioned officers, 96 gunners, 58 drivers, and 190 horses. An augmentation of 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 gunner per troop took place in 1803.

In 1804, the number of guns per troop having being reduced to 6, H Troop was formed at Woolwich, and the command given to Captain A. Macdonald, a smart officer, who subsequently had the good fortune to command the Horse Artillery of the Cavalry Division at Waterloo. On the reduction to 6 guns, the strength of each troop was, 14 non-commissioned officers, 75 gunners, 46 drivers, and 142 horses.

In 1805, an augmentation of four troops took place--I, K, L, and M; and the commands were given respectively to Captain W. Millar, an officer who subsequently became Inspector of Artillery, and Director-General of the Field Train Department; to Captain C. Godfrey, an officer who went on half-pay a few years later, in 1811; to Captain N. Foy, who died in 1817; and to Captain the Hon. W. H. Gardner, who died as a Colonel-Commandant in 1856.

For the few years following this augmentation, the establishment remained virtually the same; but, in January 1813, 194 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men were added to act as Rocket Detachments, and also as a depôt to supply the troops on service. A depôt for the Royal Horse Artillery has existed under various names, and in somewhat chequered circumstances. It commenced--as stated above--in 1813; it existed for many years in the form of an Adjutant’s Detachment at Woolwich; in 1859 it was transferred to Canterbury; on a somewhat larger scale it was transferred to Maidstone after the amalgamation of the Royal and Indian Artilleries; for a short time subsequently, the Horse Artillery Batteries at home acted as a depôt for those serving abroad; and, at the date of the publication of this work, the last-mentioned arrangement is supplemented by the existence of two Horse Artillery Batteries in the general depôt for the Regiment.

In 1814, the various Rocket Detachments were combined, those at home becoming the 1st, and those abroad the 2nd, Rocket Troop. The officers appointed to command these were Captain W. G. Elliott, an officer who retired from the Regiment in 1828, and Captain--afterwards Sir--E. C. Whinyates, an officer whose ability, zeal, and services have hardly been surpassed in the Regiment. He ultimately--after a long and active career--became Commandant of Woolwich, where his kindly manners were long remembered. He commanded the Rocket Troop at Waterloo, where he was severely wounded.

Among the many heart-breaking reductions which exasperate the Artillery student, perhaps none are more distressing, than the reduction of the 2nd Rocket Troop in 1816. _The 1st Rocket Troop had never been out of England_; the 2nd had done good service at Leipsic and Waterloo. Neither of them had had a long existence; but one had had a stirring, glorious history. On the 16th May, 1815, the following order had been issued:--“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to command that _the Rocket Troop of Royal Artillery, which was present at the Battle of Leipsic_, be permitted to wear the word ‘Leipsic’ on their appointments, in commemoration of their services on that occasion.” And to the same troop the reward fell, given to those who had been at the Battle of Waterloo. Yet, when the pruning-knife came to be used, the troop which had earned these honours was selected for reduction; and, as if adding insult to injury, the word ‘Leipsic’ came actually to be worn by the surviving troop, which had never been on active service at all! On its reduction, the officers of the 2nd Rocket Troop were transferred to the Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers.

Up to this point, we have traced the growth, _numerically_, of the Royal Horse Artillery. The conclusion of hostilities after Waterloo led to very extensive reductions. In 1816, besides the 2nd Rocket Troop, D, K, L, and M Troops were [Sidenote: _Vide_ vol. i. p. 394.] reduced, with the consequent changes of designation in the surviving troops. From a total, of all ranks, amounting to 2675, in 1815, and 2621 horses, the Horse Artillery fell in 1816 to 1181 men and 959 horses. Of the six troops in France with the Army of Occupation, the following was the establishment per troop, each troop having 6 guns:--

5 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 56 drivers, 168 horses.

The troops on home service were allowed only 4 guns, and an establishment of 5 officers, 11 non-commissioned officers, 56 gunners, 24 drivers, 102 horses.

But this was merely a beginning. In 1819, B and G Troops were reduced; the troops in France were brought on the Home Establishment, and the number of guns per troop reduced to 2. The strength was then 5 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 47 gunners, 18 drivers, 36 horses, per troop; and the total strength of the Royal Horse Artillery did not exceed 616 of all ranks, and 317 horses.[2]

At this miserable establishment the troops remained for some years. In 1828, the two troops on service in Ireland were raised to 4 guns, and remained so; the relieving troops taking over 2 guns, and a suitable proportion of men, from those they relieved. In 1848, _all_ the troops were raised to 4 guns, with the required increase of men and horses; and this lasted until 1852, when each troop was raised to 6 guns, the present establishment.

In 1847, the Rocket Troop became I Troop: and rocket carriages were added to the equipment of the whole.[3]

[Sidenote: Communicated by Sir D. E. Wood.]

The 4-gun Troops in Ireland had 2 ammunition waggons, 1 forge and 1 store waggon. On the augmentation to 6 guns in 1852, there were allowed to each troop 6 waggons, 1 forge and 1 store waggon, and 1 captain’s cart.

[Sidenote: Sir E. C. Warde.]

The augmentations after 1847 were due to “the foresight and determination of Lord Hardinge, who was one of the best friends the Corps ever had, being utterly without [Sidenote: Reports to House of Commons, and to Lord Panmure, by Sir R. Gardiner, in 1848, 1849, and 1856.] and fully appreciating the value of an efficient, and of sufficient, artillery.” But he was warmly aided by one within the Corps, whose motives were as single as his arguments were sound, whose voice was ever ready to plead for the corps in which he had spent a long, pure, and illustrious life, Sir Robert Gardiner. Owing to these augmentations, 42 guns of Horse Artillery were available for service [Sidenote: R. H. A. Records.] in the field in 1854: and the total strength of the Brigade stood at 1175 of all ranks, and 1054 horses.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: Communicated by Sir D. E. Wood, K.C.B., Captain Gordon, C.B., and Colonel G. T. Field, R.A.]

The following was the establishment of a troop of Horse Artillery when sent on active service to the Crimea in the Spring of 1854:--

Officers 6
N.-C. Officers 15
Gunners 80
Drivers 77
Trumpeters 1
Farriers 1
Shoeing smiths 4
Collar-makers 2
Wheelers 2

_Equipment_--
Light 6-prs. 4
12-pr. howitzers 2
6-pr. ammunition waggons 5
12-pr. howitzers 4
6-pr. rocket carriage 1
Forge 1
Store-limber waggon 1
Store cart 1
Spare gun carriage 1 (not horsed).

_Horses_--
Officers 12
Troop 192
---
Total 204

On the 29th November, 1855, the following was laid down as the detail of a troop of Horse Artillery with the army in the Crimea.

Officers 6
N.-C. Officers 20
Gunners 97
Drivers 123
Trumpeters 1
---
Total 247

Farriers 1
Shoeing smiths 6
Collar-makers 3
Wheelers 2
---
Total 259
---

_Equipment_--4 9-pr. guns.
2 24-pr. howitzers.
6 gun ammunition waggons.
5 howitzer waggons.
1 store-limber waggon.
1 spare gun carriage.
1 forge.
1 rocket carriage.
1 store cart.
1 medicine cart.
2 forge waggons.
3 water carts.
--
Total 28 carriages.

No. of Horses.
Riding 92
Draught 180
---
Total 272
---

Of the troops which had been reduced after Waterloo, B was reformed as a reserve half troop in 1855, and completed in the following year: and G and K Troops were reformed in 1857.

The highest point reached between the reductions after Waterloo, and the year 1857, was in February 1856, when the total of all ranks reached 1950, and the number of horses was 1370. The amalgamation of the Royal with the Indian Artilleries brought the strength of Royal Horse Artillery available for service to an unprecedented standard: at the present moment there are in the regiment thirty-one _service_ and two _depôt_ Horse Artillery Batteries. But this chapter relates solely to the _old_ Royal Horse Artillery.

As yet the _numerical_ variations in the Royal Horse Artillery have alone been treated. But there are many other details, mainly of interior economy, which will doubtless be interesting to the modern representatives of the arm, and which may here be briefly stated.

[Sidenote: Maj.-Gen. Brome to the Duke of Richmond, 6/9/17.]

At first, it was directed that recruits might be taken who were 5 feet 6¾ inches in height: but before six months had passed, the standard was raised, at the urgent request of the Captains, to 5 feet 8 inches. There was often difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of suitable recruits, and even when the troops were complete, it was customary to attach to each, when in the field, a few of the Driver Corps, with [Sidenote: Lefroy.] additional horses or mules. Extra pay was granted from the first to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and gunners of Horse Artillery.

The exact relative _status_ of the new branch of the service was speedily settled. On 21st February, 1797, the Board of Ordnance granted the same allowance for forage to the officers, as was allowed to officers of Cavalry; and so early had it been decided that the Horse Artillery should take the right of all Cavalry, that, as will be seen by the following letter, the Master-General would not in 1804 allow the point to be disputed.

* * * * *

“Woolwich, June 9, 1804.

“DEAR COLONEL,

[Sidenote: D. A. Gen. R.A., to Colonel Cuppage.]

“I submitted to the Master General your letter of the 5th instant,
relating to a conversation which took place with General Sir David
Dundas, when the Horse Artillery marched past with the Cavalry, on
the King’s birthday, in which Sir David, though the Horse
Artillery _then_ led, expressed doubts as to the precedence and
rank of the Horse Artillery on such future occasions.

“Lord Chatham not being aware upon what circumstances Sir David’s
doubts have arisen, and not considering the communication from you
in any other light than as a wish to know how far, as commanding
officer of Artillery, you are justifiable in making a claim to the
right for the Horse Artillery when paraded with Cavalry, his
Lordship has desired me simply to say that he considers the
privilege so well established by practice, as well as opinion,
that he is unwilling to suppose it can be disputed.

“_His Majesty has never seen the Horse Artillery in any other
place_: they were encamped on the right of all the Cavalry (of the
Blues) at Windsor: and in all parades of ceremony and honour,
placed on the right of the Cavalry.

“I am, dear Colonel,
“Your obedient Servant,
“J. MACLEOD.”

* * * * *

Both by custom and regulation this precedence continued to belong to the Royal Horse Artillery until July 1869, when it was ordered that the Household Cavalry, _when the Sovereign should be present_, should have the precedence awarded to a body guard.

It was laid down as a rule, that no officer should be appointed to the Horse Brigade, who had not been on foreign service: but as this rule was occasionally broken, it was decided in July 1805 that any officers who had been appointed to the Horse Artillery, prior to having been on foreign service, should “(to avoid any officers being confined to one species of duty) be liable after three or four years’ service in the Horse Brigade to be exchanged again into the Battalions, so that they may take their share of duty on foreign service, and obtain that experience which is necessary to an Artillery officer, as he advances in the Regiment.” For the information of the general reader it should here be stated, that prior to 1861, when the amalgamation of the Imperial and East India Company’s armies took place, the Royal Horse Artillery never went abroad except on active service. Since 1861, however, India has opened a field of foreign service for this branch of the Regiment: and fifteen batteries of service Horse Artillery are to be found in that country, against sixteen at home.

[Sidenote: General Orders and R. H. A. Records, and MS. Notes of General Belson, R.A., 1812.]

The changes in the dress of the Horse Artillery may be gathered from the following statistics. An order dated 1st November, 1806, lays down the following rules for the dress of officers:--“Except at dress parades the blue Regimental overalls are to be worn till dinner-time in place of the blue pantaloons, which is to be the afternoon dress when at home. At all parades, whether mounted or dismounted, and during the day, the black velvet stock is to be worn, with an inch of shirt collar over it: no other white to be shown. In the evenings, it is requested that black silk handkerchiefs may be substituted with the same proportion of shirt collar over them. When officers are dressed for a ball, evening party, or dine out, they are to wear the jacket open, white pantaloons, plain white waistcoat (with sash over it), light sword, regulation sword-knot, black belt, with cocked-hat and feather. In common a white leather sword-knot is to be worn. Spurs with horizontal rowels to be worn at all times.”

Prior to 1812, gaiters and knee-boots had been worn: but on the 14th January in that year his Royal Highness the Prince Regent issued the following order:--

“The officers of the Royal Horse Artillery are to wear jackets similar to the private men, with an aiguillette. In parade dress, they are to wear white leather pantaloons, and Hussar boots, with gold binding. On ordinary duties or on march, they are to wear overalls of a colour similar to the private men’s, and a short _surtout_, which is calculated to be worn likewise as a _pelisse_ on service. When attending a drawing-room or levee, they may appear in long coats, with lappels and aiguillettes, the same as are worn with the jacket, but without lace on the seams: or in the Regimental jacket, as they may prefer. The officers of the Horse Artillery are likewise to wear cocked-hats, with the star loop, with their _dress_ regimentals.”

[Sidenote: 1823.]

By General Order of 5th August, 1823, leather pantaloons and Hessian boots were abolished, blue-grey overalls and Wellington boots being substituted.

[Sidenote: 1827.]

By General Order of 22nd December, 1827, helmets were abolished, and chacos with tassels substituted.

[Sidenote: 1831.]

By General Order of 15th March, 1831, drivers’ jackets were assimilated to those of the gunners.

[Sidenote: 1831.]

By General Order of 20th December, 1831, steel spurs for officers were abolished, and brass spurs substituted.

[Sidenote: 1834.]

By General Order of 26th May, 1834, cross-belts were abolished, and waist-belts substituted.

[Sidenote: 1837.]

In 1837 bearskin busbies were substituted for chacos. The plumes were altered in 1839.

[Sidenote: 1853.]

Sealskin busbies were substituted for bearskin. The officers, however, continued to wear the bearskin until 1855, when the sable busby was adopted. The plume was shortened from 12 to 8 inches.

[Sidenote: 1854.]

The officers’ _pelisse_ was abolished in this year.

[Sidenote: 1855.]

The full-dress jacket was altered by reducing the amount of lace. A cross-belt of gold lace with pouch was instituted for the officers; as also a plain blue stable-jacket in place of the undress frock-coat and red embroidered waistcoat.

[Sidenote: 1857.]

In this year booted leather overalls were instituted; and swan-neck steel spurs for all ranks were substituted for the brass spurs of the officers, and the straight steel spurs of the men.

* * * * *

A more important thing, however, than the dress has been the armament of the Royal Horse Artillery. Its greatest deeds have been wrought with the 6-pounder; but that was not its invariable weapon. Talking merely of the pre-amalgamation days[4]--the days which belong to _history_ instead of _to-day_, when rifled ordnance was unknown in Horse Artillery--there were even then not unfrequent changes of armament. One troop, as we shall see hereafter, went on service with 12-pounders; on the eve of Waterloo, owing to the want of guns of position, three troops received 9-pounders, instead of the 6-pounders which they had brought from England; and coming to later days, at the commencement of the Crimean War, the two troops, C and I, which first left England were armed with 6-pounders; but, on reaching Varna, C Troop was ordered to exchange them for 9-pounders; and I Troop would have been left behind, for inability to do the same, had it not been that Lord Raglan yielded to the urgent entreaties of its commander, Colonel Maude, to allow it to accompany the expedition.

During the Peninsular Campaign, the armament of a troop was as follows:--2 9-pounders, or 2 heavy 6-pounders; 1 heavy 5½-inch howitzer; 3 light 6-pounders; 6 ammunition [Sidenote: Lefroy.] waggons; 3 reserve waggons, and 4 other carriages. Compared with the simplicity of modern Horse Artillery armament, the presence of three different guns in the same troop, with the consequent necessity of a variety of ammunition, seems a very complicated and undesirable arrangement. This was frequently felt at the time; and at the change of armament made before Waterloo, a foreshadowing of the modern harmony of weapons might be detected in the arming of I Troop--Bull’s--with 5½-inch howitzers only. And right noble was the service done by that troop on the 18th of June.

During the season of starvation between 1819 and 1848, the guns attached to the skeleton troops were 6-pounders. With the augmentations, a proportion of howitzers made its re-appearance.

The proper armament for Horse Artillery, in the days before the substitution of rifled ordnance put an end to the discussion, was exhaustively treated by Sir Robert Gardiner. His arguments are interesting even at the present day, when the perfection of Field Batteries, and their ability to carry more gunners into action by means of the new-pattern carriage, have combined to make not a few question the necessity of so expensive an arm as Horse Artillery being retained. If we substitute the 9-pounder rifled gun for the old 6-pounder, and the 16-pounder for the old 9-pounder, in Sir Robert’s remarks, we shall find his arguments as applicable [Sidenote: Report on the Artillery by Sir R. Gardiner, 31 Mar. 1848.] to the later as to the former controversy. “There can be no greater mistake than to put rivalry or comparisons, or to expect the same results from the employment of Horse Artillery as of Brigade (i. e. Field) Artillery. Though _one and the same arm_, they are equipped and intended for totally distinct purposes. The necessary quick movements of the Horse Artillery could not be attained by 9-pounders; the telling effect of 9-pounders could not be expected from Horse Artillery. One is intended to act with Cavalry, and, from the nature of its equipment and the lightness of its metal, is expected to maintain at all times, and under all circumstances, of bad roads, of rough, hilly, or broken ground, the same pace as Cavalry; and, in short, to bring artillery into action wherever Cavalry can act.... I can name two instances in which, while acting with cavalry, any other than Horse Artillery would have been perfectly useless. One, the affair of Morales, in Spain; the other, the movement from Quatre Bras to the position of Waterloo. Both were specially movements of Horse Artillery, and both tried the wind and speed of our horses. In the latter movement particularly, through a deep cross country, any Artillery differently equipped would have inevitably fallen into the hands of the enemy. In all light movements of the Infantry of an army, Horse Artillery is as indispensably necessary and as exclusively effective, as it is with cavalry. I have myself, in cases of reconnoissance, been withdrawn from the Cavalry for the moment, to cover movements in which heavier Artillery could bear no part.... On the other hand, if Horse Artillery has its distinct advantages over heavier guns, so likewise the latter have their distinct purposes, for which the employment of Horse Artillery would be wholly inapplicable and inadequate.... I have known Brigade Artillery as perfect, in its way, as Horse Artillery; but no more comparison can be drawn between them than between Cavalry and Infantry.”

Then follows a remark, which shows how the writer anticipated the changes which have come, and which have done so much to improve our Field Artillery: “Our present Brigades would be greatly advanced in efficiency if, like the Horse Artillery, or the Brigades with the Duke of Wellington’s army in the Peninsula, they were placed under the command and the responsibility of their captains. They should also, to become effective Field Artillery, be placed on the same footing as the Horse Artillery, for their contingent share in all garrison and general duties. They should march to and from the outposts in relief in the same manner as the Horse Artillery; they should combine, like the Horse Artillery, the knowledge of the duties of Cavalry with those of Artillery. They would thus gradually attain that perfection in their own distinctive service, which I believe to be unequalled in the few skeleton troops we possess of Horse Artillery.”

At the time these words were penned, Field Artillery had reached a point of degradation which had hardly been surpassed even in the old days of peasant drivers. Of the six batteries or brigades nominally at Woolwich, two existed on [Sidenote: Sir R. Gardiner’s Report.] paper, having neither men nor horses. “Two others,” wrote Sir R. Gardiner, “are so little advanced in their necessary drill and training as to be quite non-effective for the purposes of service, or even the common movements of parade and review. Two only might possibly move without causing interruption or confusion to other troops they might be acting with; but that is as much as can be said of them.... The riding and driving of our Brigade drivers is at this moment very bad. With the exception of the Brigades stationed in Dublin, where they have occasional opportunities of moving with other troops, they are unskilful, and ignorant of Artillery movements; at Woolwich they are employed in _carter’s work_ in the civil departments of the Arsenal; and, of course, as long as such a system is pursued they can never become Artillery drivers.... The Brigades in Ireland are more efficient, and fitted to move with other troops, than the Brigades in England. But it is a delusion to say that England has a Field Artillery. There is not a single 9-pounder horsed in the British service--an astounding fact. Nor will it be believed, except by those who know the truth, that the English army has been for years without Artillery attached either to Cavalry or Infantry, for the common purposes of drill and exercise in their combined movements.”

The progress of Field Artillery to its present excellence may be said to date from 1848. Already, before 1856, the Light Field Artillery had regained what it had lost during the economical era which followed Waterloo; and since 1859, when the new brigade system put an end to the incessant change of batteries from field to garrison service, the progress has been continuous. But this progress would have been impossible had it not been that a standard of Field Artillery excellence had been maintained, even under the most adverse and depressing circumstances, by those unequalled skeleton troops of Horse Artillery, whose officers have, by their influence and exertions, done so much to make what may be called _medium_ Field Artillery the admirable service which it now is. It has been said that the influence of the Horse Artillery, during the period between 1816 and 1848, was injurious to the Field Batteries. If it were so, it was in the most indirect manner possible. Economy in our military administration being peremptorily demanded, the only alternative left to the Board of Ordnance was between a very small force of admirable Field Artillery, and a larger force of batteries starved in equipment and incapable of service in the field. The officers of the Regiment, whose position entitled them to be the advisers of the Board, were undoubtedly men whose sympathies lay with the Horse Artillery, in which they had all served; but they were also men who had seen, during the campaigns in the Peninsula, Belgium, and France, what was possible with a well-equipped Field Artillery of less mobility. In deciding on a small but perfect force, rather than a larger and indifferent one, it must be admitted that they acted wisely. The brilliant Field Artillery of the great war would have otherwise become a mere tradition, whereas, under the system adopted, it remained a reality, a model, and a standard. The adoption of the other alternative would have vitally injured the Horse, without much benefit to the Field Artillery; and it would have rendered the reorganisation of both a more difficult, and a more tardy operation. That the Field Artillery suffered terribly during the period mentioned, is too true; but dispassionate study of the Regimental history proves, not what has often been asserted, that the suffering was due to the blighting influence of a _corps d’élite_ but merely to an unwise, an unprofitable, and a singularly short-sighted economy.[5]

A much larger question arises when the policy of a _corps d’élite_, as a part of a larger body on which it feeds, has to be considered. No subject has been so fruitful of discussion in the Regiment; and nowhere can a decision be more safely arrived at than in a careful study of the Regimental history. There are strong arguments in favour of, and also against, the policy which has existed since the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery; and the best way of arriving at a conclusion is to state these arguments, and to weigh their respective values.

It has been said that the existence of a _corps d’élite_ produces [Sidenote: Trochu.] “l’énervation de la masse au profit des groupes.” In [Sidenote: Hime.] stronger language it has also been said: “The more ruthlessly the system of selection is carried out, the more rapidly do the troops from amongst whom the selection is made lose their self-respect and become at first apathetic, and at last inefficient. The _corps d’élite_, the insatiable parasite, must degenerate in precisely the same degree as the body which feeds it; and the end is, that in the lapse of a few years the whole edifice crumbles, totters, and falls. When the oak falls, the ivy that killed it must fall too.”

But those who apply such language to the existence, in the Royal Artillery, of a _corps d’élite_ such as the Royal Horse Artillery, forget several important considerations which distinguish it from such a corps as the French _Chasseurs à pied_, of which it was said that everything that was good, everything that was efficient, everything that was soldierlike in the Infantry of the Line was seized upon with unsparing hands, and remorselessly drafted into it. In the first place, the selection for this branch of the Regiment is only made for the purpose of officering it. The field battery which rejoices in smart non-commissioned officers and men is in no dread of losing them to feed a favoured corps. From the day a recruit joins the Horse Artillery, his efficiency and his education depend on the officers of that arm; and therefore to them is the credit due if their efforts are successful.

There have been occasions when the Horse Artillery was permitted to select from the recruits of the other battalions; but these days have passed away. No service battery of Field or Garrison Artillery has to minister to the wants of our _corps d’élite_, and therefore the language employed in [Sidenote: Hime.] another place by the able author quoted above, in reference to the _Infantry corps d’élite_ in our service, is more applicable than that used by him in reference to our Field Artillery: “The recruits are selected with care; but they are selected from society at large, not from regiments of the Line; and the result is that this noble body of men, the Guards, are a source of wholesome emulation, instead of contentious rivalry, to the rest of the army.”

The whole question, therefore, may be condensed into one point--the wisdom or otherwise of _officering_ the Horse Artillery from the Regiment at large. Such petty considerations as higher pay, special privileges, &c., which are apt to embitter the minds of some, must be put aside as unworthy. In a question affecting not merely the Regiment, but our whole military life as well, we cannot be too careful in clearing the ground of all but the purest argument. The opposers of the existing system have always been able to argue with great force, because there are undoubted anomalies, which can easily be described in such a way as to appear ludicrous. As selection for employment in the Horse Brigade has always been conditional on previous zeal and efficiency, it follows that the reward for activity and knowledge in the performance of, it may be, Siege and Garrison Artillery duties, is often employment in a service totally dissimilar. This may be compared with rewarding an Infantry officer for skill in battalion drill, by giving him a troop of Horse! Yet, while admitting the anomaly, it is impossible to suggest a better test, if both branches of the Regiment are to be officered from the same list. The only test of efficiency which can be trusted is efficiency already proved. It must be believed that a man who has been faithful and zealous in one line of duty will display the same zeal and conscience in another; and if selection _has_ to be made,--if there are many candidates for any employment, their previous history, even under very different circumstances, is the best witness for or against them.

But another argument employed against the existing system is, that an officer, who has once served in the more brilliant branch, returns with reluctance, on promotion, to the others, and is restless and dissatisfied until he is reappointed. In other words, that _esprit_ for the particular branch drowns that for the Regiment. History is the best witness here.

Excluding the many living men, who have proved that Horse Artillery service has not affected their Regimental _esprit de corps_, let us recall the names of the men who have been most distinguished for professional talent of every description since the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery. Sir John Macleod, Sir Augustus Frazer, Sir Alexander Dickson, Sir John May, Sir Robert Gardiner, and Sir E. C. Whinyates, all served in the Horse Artillery, but never allowed themselves to be blinded, by their love of that service, to the interests of the Regiment at large. Their letters, their very lives, are witnesses to their devotion to the whole Corps; and while serving with the Siege or Garrison Artillery, their performance of duty was inspired by the same zeal, as when serving in what may be called the more attractive branch. They all saw and felt that the less showy was the more scientific, that Garrison Artillery was the backbone of the Regiment, and that, under favourable circumstances, it would dwarf, even in popularity, the mounted batteries. The Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns were conducive to the efficiency and popularity of Horse Artillery; but let Siege Artillery have as many years of such service as it went through at Sebastopol, with the mounted batteries acting merely as carriers of ammunition, and its efficiency and popularity would be quite as great.

History therefore does not support the theory that service in the Horse Brigade injures the capacity, or the _esprit de corps_, of an officer who returns to the other branches. The question at issue therefore condenses itself into a still narrower field; viz., admitting that the present system does not prevent Artillery officers from being _generally_ efficient, would they not be much _more_ efficient if they belonged to Field or Garrison Artillery during their whole career, without the power of interchanging their services? If ability in field battery service were rewarded by appointment to the Horse Artillery, and skill in Garrison Artillery service were rewarded, either by special employment or by appointment to some such corps as was recommended by Sir Robert Gardiner--an Artillery of the Guard--would we not have better officers of each branch than we now have? Logically, there can be but one answer; and were this the only consideration, the argument would terminate in favour of a separation of the officers of the various arms, similar to that already existing between the non-commissioned officers and men. We should then have probably _more_ skilled artillerists, in point of number, in each branch; although perhaps no _individual_ more skilled than those who have appeared under, or in spite of, the anomalous system which has hitherto existed.

But would the Regiment in the end be a gainer by the change? Has not the system of interchange been the best school possible for familiarising the Artillery officer with the duties and movements of other arms, and thus qualifying him for commands in the field? General Foy, in writing of the days when such a thing as a command being given to [Sidenote: Foy.] a General of Artillery was unknown, owing to jealousy of the Ordnance, said: “On a trop en horreur les avancements hors de la règle pour permettre qu’un artilleur qui se trouverait trop à l’étroit dans son arme s’élançât dans le service général de la ligne. Jamais de l’école de Woolwich ne sortira un Bonaparte.” The days of the Ordnance have passed away: public opinion points more surely every day to the employment of Generals who are not merely soldiers, but scientific soldiers as well; and it would be a suicidal policy which would recommend a change which, if carried out logically, would result in the _certainty_ of admirable officers of high but _narrow_ professional training, and the _impossibility_ of any whose experience of general service would qualify them for a mixed command. The Garrison Artilleryman who in his battery had attained a skill in his particular groove, hitherto but rare, would feel every day his association with the other arms getting less, and his consequent inability to command them getting greater. If this consideration be carefully borne in mind, even those who feel most strongly on the subject--and they are many--will hesitate ere they precipitate a result which would inscribe on the walls of the Academy the dismal prediction, “Jamais de l’école de Woolwich ne sortira un Bonaparte.”

* * * * *

_Note._--The extra rate of pay to non-commissioned officers and
gunners of the Royal Horse Artillery is based on the following
General Order, dated 21 January, 1793:--

“The Master-General directs that an allowance of twopence per day,
in addition to their Regimental pay, shall be made to each
non-commissioned officer and gunner of the Brigade of Horse
Artillery, when and so long as he continues mounted, and having
the care and management of an horse, in consideration of the
extraordinary and constant attention required of such persons for
the due performance of this particular service, which must deprive
them of the occasional advantages arising from their being
employed in works for which additional pay is given.

“The dismounted non-commissioned officers and gunners of this
Brigade not being in the same circumstances, nor deprived of their
share in the works, will not be entitled to the said allowance;
nor will the drivers of this Brigade, as they are to be enlisted
merely for that special service, and will have but little of other
duties to learn or perform.”

_Note 2._--The style of horse considered suitable for Horse
Artillery at first, may be ascertained from the following
instructions, dated Woolwich, March 1810:--“The horses to be from
four to six years old (when bought), to be short-legged,
open-chested, and broad-winded; not to exceed 15 hands 2 inches,
nor--four years old--under 15 hands ½ inch; to have good bone and
action, the colours to be bay, brown, and dark chestnut.” The
price allowed, after a month’s trial, was thirty guineas.