Chapter XX: Vittoria and San Sebastian (2)

San Sebastian is built on a neck of land jutting out into the sea; and the first point which it was necessary to secure on the land side was a place which had been fortified,--the convent of St. Bartholomew. This was taken, after four days’ vigorous cannonade, by assault, on the 17th July, 1813. [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson’s Diary; and Jones’s ‘Peninsular Sieges.’] The guns employed against the convent and the adjoining redoubt were placed in the batteries of the left attack, numbered 1 and 2, and were four 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers. Before the assault, however, Sir Thomas Graham, who had been left by Lord Wellington in command, [Sidenote: Sir Thomas Graham to Colonel Dickson, dated 15 July, 1813.] directed as many field guns as possible to be brought into play in support. This was done; and they were found to be of material assistance, and were served with great effect during the assault. The number of rounds expended against the convent and redoubt was 3000: a large [Sidenote: Jones’s ‘Sieges.’] quantity of hot shot was employed; and in his despatch announcing the success of the assault, Sir Thomas Graham [Sidenote: To Lord Wellington, dated 18 July, 1813.] said: “I cannot conclude this report without expressing my perfect satisfaction with all the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, both in the four-gun battery employed for three days against the convent, and on the opposite bank of the river, whence several field-pieces were served with great effect.”

The batteries against the town had been in course of preparation during the bombardment of the convent; and the following tables extracted from Sir A. Dickson’s letters and returns will show at a glance much that would otherwise occupy much space in description. The numbering of the batteries differs from that of the Engineers; but where possible, _both_ have been shown.

The batteries were divided into those of the right and left attacks. Lieut.-Colonel May assisted, during the first siege, under Colonel Dickson; the left or detached attack was under Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., and the batteries were armed, manned, and superintended as follows:--

RIGHT ATTACK.

No. 1 Battery (No 11 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) {2 24-pr. guns {Against the Mirador
{4 8-in. hows. {and castle,
{and to enfilade
{the land fronts.

No. 2 Battery (No. 12 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) 2 24-pr. guns {Against defences:
{only used two
{days.

No. 3 Battery (No. 13 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) 4 24-pr. guns For breaching.

No. 4 Battery (No. 14 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’[42]) 12 24-pr. guns For breaching.

No. 5 Battery (No. 15 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) {4 68-pr. {Against breach,
{carronades {and to annoy
{defences.

No. 6 Battery (No. 16 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) {4 10-inch {Against land front
{mortars {and castle.
--
Total 32 pieces.
--

Major Webber Smith, R.H.A., was in charge of Nos. 1, 2, and 6 Batteries.
Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, R.H.A., was in charge of Nos. 4 and 5
(the breaching) Batteries.
Major Arriaga, Portuguese Artillery, was in charge of No. 3.

The officers in the various batteries were as follows:--

No. 1 Battery.--Captain Macdonald, and Lieutenants Brereton, Heron,
and Williams.
No. 2 Battery.--Captain Deacon and Lieutenant England.
No. 3 Battery.--Captain Rosières and Lieutenant Costa (Portuguese).
No. 4 Battery.--Captains Dubourdieu and Parker, and Lieutenants
Hardinge and Bloomfield of the Royal Artillery, and
Lieutenants Silva and Judice of the Portuguese Artillery.
No. 5 Battery.--Captain Dansey and Lieutenant Johnstone.
No. 6 Battery.--This was not manned at first.

LEFT ATTACK.

No. 1 Battery 4 18-prs. {Against the convent up to
{ 17 July, 1813.

No. 2 Battery 2 8-inch hows. Ditto. ditto.

No. 3 Battery 6 18-prs. {To annoy defences of land
No. 4 Battery 2 8-inch hows. { front, and support attack.
{ Doubtless these included
{ the guns from Nos. 1 and
{ 2 Batteries.

The officers of the Royal Artillery engaged in the left attack,
were--

Captain Morrison.
” Power.
Lieutenant Shaw.
” Oldham.
” Story.
” Stanway.

The strength of the companies of Artillery before San Sebastian,
on the 18th July, 1813, was as follows:--

Captain Morrison’s (18-pr. brigade) 162 of all ranks.
Major Lawson’s 57 ”
Captain Dubourdieu’s 66 ”
Captain Parker’s 68 ”
Detachment 17 ”
Portuguese Artillery 107 ”
---
Total 476
---

The ammunition expended during the first siege amounted to 27,719
rounds, and, as the batteries did not open until the 20th July,
and the assault took place on the morning of the 25th, the
rapidity of fire must have been excessive. In alluding to this,
General Jones says: “The expenditure from the breaching battery
alone, on the 22nd July, amounted to 350 rounds a gun, expended in
about 15 hours of daylight. Such a rate of firing was probably
never equalled at any siege, great accuracy of range being at the
same time observed.” Captain Dubourdieu of the Royal Artillery was
mortally wounded in the batteries on the first day; and the total
loss of the Corps and the Portuguese Artillery during the first
operation was 12 _killed_, and 44 _wounded_.

On the morning of the 24th July, two breaches were deemed quite
practicable, but the assault which was first intended to take
place on that day was postponed until the 25th at 5 A.M. It
completely failed: a certain amount of gallantry was shown by the
attacking troops, but there was a feeling of depression among
them, which seemed to have arisen from exaggerated ideas of the
difficulty of the task. Sir Thomas Graham, while giving due credit
for the courage which was shown, and which was proved by the list
of casualties, felt that his troops were not in the same mood as
those who stormed Badajoz. In a letter to Colonel Dickson
[Sidenote: To Colonel Dickson, dated 8 p.m. 25 July, 1813.] on the
night of the assault, he said: “It is evident to me that _the
troops here_ never will carry this breach, unless every annoyance
but the castle fire (which is not come-at-able at present) be
removed.... The approach to the breach is certainly very
unfavourable, and does not admit of attempting to feed or renew
the attack, as all must go in one narrow column over rough,
slippery stones,--and _that_, with an enfilading and flanking
fire, occasioned the complete failure; nor would it have been
possible at last to get any other fresh men from the trenches to
have advanced.” Further than keeping up a fire which would not
interfere with the attacking party, the Artillery had nothing to
do with the assault; but Sir Thomas Graham in reporting the
failure took the opportunity of referring to their services on the
preceding days, in the following gratifying terms:--“The
[Sidenote: To Lord Wellington, dated 27 July, 1813.] conduct,
throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto, of
the officers and men of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, never
was exceeded in indefatigable zeal, activity, and gallantry; and I
beg to mention particularly to your Lordship Lieut.-Colonels
Dickson, Frazer, and May, and Major Webber Smith, of the Royal
Artillery”....

[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated 12 Aug. 1813.]

Lord Wellington came in person to look at the state of affairs,
and as it was not deemed prudent to repeat the assault, and the
ammunition of the Artillery was nearly expended, the operations
against the place were brought to a close;--greatly to the
disappointment of many. After the failure of the assault, Lord
Wellington ordered, for security, that all the guns, with the
exception of a few pieces, should be removed from the batteries,
and a blockade substituted for a siege. The forward movement of
Soult’s army, which will be discussed hereafter, produced a
further order to embark the guns and stores. On the French being
driven back, Colonel Dickson received orders to land them again;
the batteries also were repaired, new ones constructed, and
everything put in readiness for a second siege as soon as
ammunition should arrive from England. The arrival of this was,
however, delayed beyond the endurance of Sir Thomas Graham, who
was not so familiar with the dilatory habits of the Civil branch
of the Ordnance, as Colonel Dickson was. In one of his numerous
letters to the latter [Sidenote: Dated 7 Aug. 1813.] during this
period, he wrote: “It is too provoking to think of such mistakes
and delays at home, where they have nothing else to do or think
of, but the execution of demands made at an early enough period to
give full time for preparation.” Sir Thomas Graham’s
correspondence shows at this time a feverish, almost fretful,
anxiety about the preparations for the second siege, which was not
unnatural in a General anxious to wipe out the recollection of
failure. The reader of his letters cannot resist a wish to have
seen his face when the incident occurred, described by Napier:
“With characteristic negligence, this enormous armament (i.e. two
new battering trains) had been sent out from England with no more
shot and shells than would suffice for one day’s consumption.” At
length, everything was in readiness, and the batteries opened on
the 26th August, 1813. Before entering on the narrative of the
siege, a list of the batteries with their respective armaments
will be given, extracted not merely from Sir A. Dickson’s official
returns, but also from private letters written at the time,--with
all the necessary information at his hand.

To commence with the _Left Attack_. The only batteries used before
the storming of the city on the 31st August were those numbered 5
and 6,--containing 7 24-pounders, 2 8-inch howitzers, and Captain
Morrison’s brigade of six 18-pounders. Others will be given,
hereafter, which were used at the bombardment of the castle. The
object of the fire of the left attack was to breach the right face
of the left demi-bastion, and the curtain over it; also, the face
of the left demi-bastion of the hornwork, and generally to annoy
the defences. Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., again commanded the
left attack.

The _Right Attack_ was under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Frazer,
and consisted of the following batteries, according to Colonel
Dickson’s numbering:--

No. 1 (evidently No. 11 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 2 8-inch howitzers.

{ 1 12-inch Spanish
No. 3 (evidently No. 13 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing { mortar, and 5 10-inch
{ mortars.

{ 5 8-inch howitzers.
No. 4 (evidently No. 14 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing { 4 68-pr. carronades.
{ 6 24-pr. guns.

No. 5 (evidently No. 15 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 15 24-pr. guns.

No. 6 (evidently No. 16 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 4 10-inch mortars.

No. 7 (evidently No. 17 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 6 10-inch mortars.

The breaching batteries were Nos. 4 and 5, but more especially the
latter. Field officers were detailed for duty alternately in these
two batteries, while the firing was going on: Majors Dyer and
Webber Smith being in No. 4, and Majors Buckner and Sympher,
K.G.A., in No. 5.

According to Sir J. Jones, the batteries opened with a general
salvo from 57 guns;--according, however, to Colonel Dickson, only
48 were in action. The whole commenced by signal, and as Sir
Thomas Graham wrote to Colonel Dickson, [Sidenote: Dated 26 Aug.
1813.] “Nothing could be more imposing than the opening of your
fire this morning.” The guns in the left attack were found to be
too distant for the effect required; but the fire from the
batteries of the right attack was so destructive, [Sidenote:
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 1 Sept. 1813.] that in the course of
five days, from the 26th to the 30th, the demi-bastion was
demolished, a breach made in the curtain behind it, the towers on
each side of the former breach laid down, and the wall laid open
which connected the curtain with the left of the first breach. The
batteries of the left attack laid open a hornwork; and four guns
having been brought forward into a battery (No. 7) which was much
nearer the works, they breached the right face of the
demi-bastion, and greatly assisted in bringing down the end of the
curtain.

About 11 o’clock A.M. on the 31st August, the column for the
assault, which had now been ordered, moved forward, and arrived at
the breach with comparatively little loss. The defence of the
French was such, however, that no lodgment could be
effected,--more than one attempt having been repulsed; and as the
enemy occupied a higher position than his assailants, he was able
to fire down upon them and inflict great loss. It was at this time
that Sir Thomas Graham ordered the Artillery to commence a fire,
which has received the greatest praise at the hands of historians,
and of which the following graphic description, from Colonel
Dickson’s pen, cannot fail to interest the reader:--“The great
body of our cannon, howitzers, and carronades fired upon the great
curtain and behind it--over the heads of our own men (_only a few
feet perpendicular lower down_), with a vigour and accuracy
probably unprecedented in the annals of artillery. It was the
admiration and surprise of Sir Thomas Graham, and Marshal
Beresford, and all who beheld it. No one could say there was a
single error to the disadvantage of our own people; and the force
of the fire entirely prevented the enemy making any effort along
the rampart to drive us from the breach. I must say the enemy
stood with great firmness, firing over the parapet as well as they
could, notwithstanding numbers had their heads taken off by our
round shot. In short, on this occasion, our artillery was served
in such a manner that I would not have believed it, had I not seen
it.”

Sir J. Jones says of the Artillery fire at this time, that it was
admirable, and occasioned no casualties among the assailants; and
Napier describes the stream of missiles, like a horrid tempest, in
its fearful course strewing the rampart with the mangled limbs of
the defenders. It was a critical time; and a want of precision on
the part of the Artillery [Sidenote: Dated Oyarzun, 1 Sept.
1813.] would have produced a fatal panic among the assailants. In
his despatch to Lord Wellington, announcing the success of the
assault, Sir Thomas Graham admitted that, prior to the Artillery
coming into action on this occasion, the state of the attack was
desperate; and he described the fire (which after consultation
with Colonel Dickson he ventured to order) as having been “kept up
with a precision of practice beyond all example.” The ultimate
success was almost accidental. A large number of shells and
combustible materials had been accumulated above the breach to
throw down on the storming party. This was fortunately ignited by
the fire of the Allied Artillery, and a great explosion followed,
killing many of the French, and producing a disorder which enabled
the troops to establish themselves on the curtain, which they
fought from traverse to traverse. Some additional troops having
entered the town by another breach near the Towers, the curtain
was abandoned, and the fighting confined to the streets; but very
soon the French were driven into the castle, which alone remained
in their hands at the end of the day. The Allies lost 500 killed,
and 1500 wounded in this assault.

To ensure the surrender of the castle, a bombardment from mortars
was kept up, until two batteries were made ready in the left
attack (Nos. 9 and 10), which were armed with 17 24-pounders,--and
2 24-pounders with 1 8-inch howitzer, respectively. No. 9 was to
breach the Mirador and Battery de la Reyna, and No. 10 to operate
against the lower defences of the castle, and to enfilade the
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 12 Sept. 1813.] back
of the hill. On the morning of the 8th September, the preparations
being complete, the whole of the batteries opened on the castle.
Colonel Dickson describes the bombardment as having been conducted
in beautiful style, and carried on so vigorously, that in two
hours the enemy hoisted a flag of truce. Sir J. Jones says that
the fire was so extremely rapid and well directed, and of so
overpowering a nature, that the castle scarcely returned a single
shot. The terms of the capitulation having been agreed to, two
batteries of the castle were delivered up the same evening, and on
the next day the garrison marched out with the honours of war,
and laid down their arms. Colonel Dickson was one of the three
officers detailed to arrange the terms of the capitulation.

The sufferings of the garrison, and of the prisoners in the
castle, during the bombardment, were excessive, as may [Sidenote:
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 12 Sept. 1813.] readily be imagined
when one learns that “they had not a bomb-proof in it except for
powder.”[43]

The siege of San Sebastian has an especial interest for the Royal
Artillery,--more especially for that part of the Regiment, the
duties of which are confined to the use of heavy ordnance. This
episode was selected by an able and dispassionate historian, as
one reflecting especial honour on [Sidenote: Gleig’s ‘Military
History.’] the Corps. “It offers,” he wrote, “an example of
precision of aim, and absolute coolness on the part of the
gunners, never surpassed.... Such services as these were rendered
thirty years ago by no other artillery in the world; and as the
same spirit still prevails, which prevailed then, in the
magnificent corps of which we are speaking, it cannot be doubted
but that when the opportunity offers again, they will prove
themselves worthy of the renown that attaches to them.”

These words corroborate what has been so frequently urged in this
work, that a regimental history differs essentially in its aim
from all others. The glow, which it endeavours to throw over past
events, is not meant to conceal defects, or to distort facts, but
to awaken the spirit of emulation;--the boastful way in which
special honours are recounted, and distinctive triumphs sung, is
not egotistical pride, or aggressive conceit, but merely the fond
treasuring of a glory which has been gained by others, and
transmitted to their successors for safe keeping;--and the anxious
gleaning among the fields of former action is but to find herbs,
which in times of peace shall brace the gleaner for coming days
of work or danger. The more truly a soldier knows and values the
deeds and honours of those who have gone before him in his
corps,--the more certain will he be to emulate them. There is no
jealousy of the dead. Admiration of their qualities passes
unconsciously into a love for their memories; and this love
inspires a longing not to be unworthy. It may seem to some but a
poor ambition, to use the weapons well which have been given to
us,--to sacrifice one’s will unmeaningly,--and never to be
downcast by discomfort or failure; but it is the highest ambition
to which a soldier can aspire. Nor is it easy for him to conceive
a higher. Cheerful obedience and conscientious zeal imply most of
the higher qualities of humanity; and a perfect soldier must
possess both. The great poet of England in these days has been the
noblest preacher, to whom her army has ever listened. As he places
before his readers the ideal of a true knight, the soldier sees a
standard which he should never cease to gaze upon. He sees, it may
be for the first time, that opposite virtues should not rebel, but
mingle; and that such should be found in himself as

“Utter hardihood, utter gentleness,
And loving, utter faithfulness in love,
And uttermost obedience to the king.”

And, once realising this,--with the knowledge, possibly, in his
heart that there have been in his corps before him men who
approached even the standard of Arthur’s knights,--he must, as he
reads of their deeds, long

“To sweep
In ever-highering eagle-circles up
To the great sun of glory, and thence swoop
Down upon all things base, and dash them dead.”