Chapter V (1)

Gloomy opening of the year--Distresses of the army--Revolt of the
Pennsylvania line--Negotiations--Revolt of the New Jersey
troops--Arnold's expedition to Virginia--Progress of the war at the
South--Distresses at the North--Active movements of Brant in the Mohawk
country--Meditated attack upon the Oneidas--Letter of Colonel
Claus--Destitution of the country--Letter of General
Schuyler--Destruction of Fort Schuyler by fire and flood--Suspicions of
design--General Clinton's correspondence respecting that
catastrophe--Hostile indications in the North--Indications of extensive
treachery--Arrest of the disaffected at Ballston and its
vicinity--Bearing of Washington in adversity--Colonel Willett appointed
to the command of the Mohawk District--Slender means at his
disposal--Burning of Currie-town--Battle of Durlagh--Defeat of the
Indians--Death of Captain McKean--Irruption into Palatine--Willett's
letter to Washington--Willett's influence upon the broken
militia--Battle near the German Flats--Death of Solomon
Woodworth--Story of John Christian Shell--Invasion of Ulster County by
Indians and Tories under Captain Cauldwell--Another case of individual
bravery--Incidents on the Kentucky border.

The sun of the new year was veiled by a cloud of deeper gloom than had previously darkened the prospects of the American arms at any period of the contest. The whole army, in all its divisions, at the North and in the South, was suffering severely both for clothing and provisions. Indeed, the accumulated sufferings and privations of "the army constitute a large and interesting portion of the history of the war of American independence. At the date now under review, Winter, without much lessening the toils of the soldiers, was adding to their sufferings. They were perpetually on the point of starving, were often entirely without food, were exposed without proper clothing to the rigors of the season, and had, moreover, now served almost twelve months without pay." [FN] Such was the general fact. The Pennsylvania troops had still farther grievances of which to complain. They had been enlisted in ambiguous terms--to "serve three years, or during the war." At the expiration of the stipulated period, "three years," the soldier claimed his discharge, while the officers insisted upon holding him to the other condition of the contract. The consequence was great dissatisfaction, increased, of course, by the much higher bounties subsequently paid for enlistments.

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[FN] Marshall's Life of Washington.

The Pennsylvania line, consisting of six regiments, was cantoned at Morristown, under the immediate command of Brigadier General Wayne. So long had they been brooding over their wrongs, so intense had become their sufferings, and so discouraging were the prospects of remedy or redress, that the discontents which, down to the last day of the preceding year, had only been nurtured, broke out into open mutiny on the evening of the next. The spirit of insubordination was from the first so decided, and the evidences of revolt were so general, as at once to jeopard the cause. An effort was made to quell the mutiny, in the course of which several of the turbulent soldiers were wounded, as also were some of the officers, who were endeavoring to repress the disorder. One of the officers, Captain Billings, was killed. But the cause of the revolt was too deeply seated, and the disaffection too extensive, to be easily overcome. Even Wayne himself, the favorite of the Pennsylvanians, was without power. Drawing a pistol and threatening one of the most turbulent of the revolters; a bayonet was presented at his own bosom. [FN-1] In a word, the authority of the commissioned officers was at an end. The non-commissioned officers were generally engaged in the mutiny, and one of their number being appointed Commander-in-chief, they moved off in the direction of Philadelphia, with their arms and six pieces of artillery--deaf to the arguments, the entreaties, and the utmost efforts of their officers to change their purposes. [FN-2] As a last resort, Wayne and his officers attempted to divide them, but without effect. Those who at first appeared reluctant, were soon persuaded to unite with their comrades, to march upon Philadelphia and demand a redress of their wrongs at the doors of Congress.

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[FN-1] Marshall.

[FN-2] Letter of Washington to President Weare of New Hampshire. This was a letter urging upon the government of New Hampshire to make some exertion to relieve the distresses of the army. A circular was sent to all the New England States to the same effect, and confided to General Knox, as a special agent to enforce the appeal. To President Weare, the Commander-in-chief said, plainly:--"I give it decidedly as my opinion, that it is in vain to think an army can be kept together much longer under such a variety of sufferings as ours has experienced; and that unless some immediate and spirited measures are adopted to furnish at least three months' pay to the troops in money, which will be of some value to them, and at tho same time provide ways and means to clothe and feed them better than they have been, the worst that can befall us may be expected." The Legislatures of Massachusetts and New Hampshire nobly responded to the call, and immediately voted a gratuity of twenty-four dollars in hard money to each of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers belonging to those States, who were engaged to serve daring the war.--_Sparks._

The number of the revolters was about thirteen hundred--a loss that would have been severe of itself. But the most unpleasant apprehensions arose from the danger, not only that the spirit of insubordination might spread to other corps of the army, but that the mutineers might fall away in a body to the enemy, who would, of course, lose not a moment in availing himself of such a diversion in his favor. Coercive measures having failed to bring the revolters back to the path of duty, Wayne, with his principal officers, determined to follow close upon their rear and after the first transports of their passion should subside, try what virtue might be found in the arts of persuasion. The General overtook them at night in the neighborhood of Middlebrook, but being advised in their present temper not to venture among them, he invited a deputation of one sergeant from each regiment to meet him in consultation. The deliberations were amicable, and the General suggested a mode of obtaining redress of their grievances, which satisfied the delegates, who, on retiring, promised to exert their influence in bringing the men back to duty. But the attempt was ineffectual; and on the day following the mutineers marched to Princeton--the few who were well disposed and willing to separate from the mutineers, continuing with the majority at the request of their officers, in the hope that their exertions might "moderate the violence of their leaders, and check the contagion of their example."

The crisis was most critical. The Commander-in-chief, on receiving the first advices of the revolt, was disposed to repair at once to the camp of the mutineers; but on advisement and reflection, this course was relinquished. The complaints of the Pennsylvania line, in regard to destitution of provisions and clothing, were common to the whole army, and it was doubtful how far the contagion of disaffection might already have spread. Nor could the Commander-in-chief, whose head-quarters were at New Windsor, venture upon a visit to the mutineers, without taking with him a sufficient force to compel obedience to his commands should the exertion of force become necessary. But a sufficient body of troops for such an object could not be spared without leaving the fortresses in the Highlands too weak to resist an attack from Sir Henry Clinton, who would be sure to strike upon those important works at the first favorable moment. The river being free from ice, Sir Henry would possess every facility for such a movement the instant the back of Washington should be turned upon the North. Under all the circumstances of the case, therefore, the Commander-in-chief remained at his post, neglecting, however, no measure of justice within his power to heal the discontents, or of precaution to prevent their farther extension.

Meantime the mutineers remained several days at Princeton, refusing to proceed to the Delaware and cross into Pennsylvania, while Sir Henry Clinton made every disposition to avail himself of the revolt, and lost not a moment in despatching emissaries to their camp, with tempting offers to induce them to join the armies of the King. But, mutineers as they were, they nevertheless spurned the proposition; and retaining the emissaries in custody, handed the communications, of which they were the bearers, over to General Wayne. Though in rebellion against their officers, the soldiers were nevertheless indignant at the idea of turning their arms, as Arnold had done, against their own country; and those about them who were well disposed, availed themselves of the occasion, with much address, to impress upon their minds the magnitude of the insult conveyed in propositions made to them in the character of traitors. [FN]

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[FN] Five days after their arrival among the mutineers, viz. on the 11th of January, Sir Henry's emissaries were tried by a court-martial, and executed.

News of the revolt had no sooner reached Philadelphia, than a committee was appointed by Congress, consisting of General Sullivan, [FN-1] and two other gentlemen, in conjunction with President Reed on behalf of the Council of Pennsylvania, to meet the revolters, and attempt to bring them back to reason. The demands of the mutineers were exorbitant, but were in the end acceded to with some unimportant modifications. They then moved forward to Trenton, and in the end, although better things were anticipated from the stipulations agreed upon, the Pennsylvania line was almost entirely disbanded. A voluntary performance, by Congress, of much less than was yielded by the committee, would have averted the evil, and saved the division. [FN-2]

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[FN-1] Very soon after he left the army, at the close of the Seneca campaign, General Sullivan was elected to Congress, of which body he was an efficient and patriotic member. Afterward, in the years 1786, 1787, and 1788, he was President of New Hampshire, in which situation, by his vigorous exertions, he quelled the spirit of the insurrection which exhibited itself at the time of the trouble with Shays in Massachusetts. In 1789 he was appointed a District Judge. He died in 1795, aged 54.

[FN-2] Although the Pennsylvania line was thus dissolved, the evil was surmounted much sooner than had been anticipated. Before the close of January, Wayne wrote to Washington that the disbanded soldiers were "as impatient of liberty as they had bean of service, and that they were as importunate to be re-enlisted as they had been to be discharged." A _reclaimed_ and formidable line was the result in the Spring.

The success of the Pennsylvania mutineers induced the New Jersey line, then stationed at Pompton, to follow the bad example; and on the night of the 20th of January a large portion of the brigade rose in arms. Their claims were precisely the same as those which had been yielded to the Pennsylvanians. By this time, however, the Commander-in-chief had satisfied himself that he could rely upon the eastern troops; and, chagrined as he had been by the result of the Pennsylvania revolt, he determined, not only that nothing more should be yielded to the spirit of insubordination, but that such an example should be made as would operate as a check to the like proceedings in future. A strong detachment of troops was accordingly led against the insurgents by General Howe, with instructions to make no terms whatsoever while they continued in a state of resistance. General Howe was farther instructed to seize a few of the ringleaders, and execute them on the spot. The orders were promptly complied with, and the insurrection was crushed at a blow. The mutinous brigade returned to its duty; and such vigorous measures were taken by the States to supply the wants of the army, as effectually checked the progress of discontent. [FN] But it was only by the strong process of impressment that those supplies could be wrung from the people, whose discontents, though less immediately alarming, were, nevertheless, as great as had been those of the army.

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[FN] Sir Henry Clinton endeavored to avail himself of this New Jersey insurrection, in like manner as he had attempted to tamper with the Pennsylvanians. But his emissary, who was in the American interest, delivered his papers to the first American officer with whom he met.

The first active demonstration of Sir Henry Clinton, on the opening of the new year, was the expedition against Virginia, under the conduct of General Arnold. The arch-traitor had, in fact, sailed from New-York toward the close of December, but he did not enter the Capes of Virginia until the beginning of January--landing at Westover on the 6th. He marched to Richmond, and after some trifling skirmishes on the way, destroyed the stores at that place, and also at Westham; whereupon he retired to Norfolk. This was a mere predatory expedition, attended by no important result. Farther south, events were continually occurring of greater moment. General Greene having been assigned to the command of that department, after the signal discomfiture of Gates, affairs soon wore a brighter aspect. The loss of the battle of Camden, a few months before, was balanced, and, in its moral effect, more than balanced, by the decisive victory over Tarleton, achieved by General Morgan at the Cowpens on the 17th of January. And although Greene was defeated at Guilford on the 15th of March, yet the victory was too dearly won by Earl Cornwallis to render it a just occasion of triumph. So likewise in the repulse of Greene by Lord Rawdon at Camden, owing to the misconduct of the militia, the British commander was nevertheless so roughly handled that, although he received a reinforcement in the course of the following night, he deemed it expedient to destroy the town, and retire farther down the Santee. But these apparent disadvantages were amply compensated by the masterly manoeuvres of Greene, and the brilliant succession of victories over the smaller works and detachments of the enemy. In these latter affairs, Forts Watkinson, Orangeburgh, Motte, Silver Bluff, Granby, and Cornwallis were successively taken, and the enemy was compelled to evacuate other forts. Lord Rawdon was likewise obliged to fall back upon Charleston, while Cornwallis was pursuing a doubtful march into Virginia. The great disadvantage labored under by General Greene, was the necessity of depending in a great measure upon the militia--not having regular troops sufficient to cope with the veterans from Europe. But, though not always victorious in battle, he was invariably so in the results. And his masterly movements proved him far in advance of any of his antagonists, in all the requisites of an able commander.

But while events thus propitious to the American arms were occurring at the South, the aspect of affairs, as has already been seen, was sadly discouraging at the North. In addition to the destitution of the main army, causing the insurrections in the Pennsylvania and New-Jersey lines, so wretchedly supplied were the small garrisons from Albany northward and westward, both in respect to food and clothing, that it was only with the utmost difficulty that the officers could keep the soldiers upon duty. Ravaged as the whole Mohawk country had been the preceding Summer and Autumn, no supplies could be drawn from the diminished and impoverished inhabitants remaining in those settlements; while it was equally difficult to procure supplies, either at Albany or below, or eastwardly beyond that city. It is painful to read the private correspondence of General Schuyler, and Governor and General Clinton upon this subject. Orders for impressing provisions were freely issued, particularly against the disaffected portion of the people, who had greatly increased in numbers in that section of the country; but some of the supplies thus taken were returned, from the knowledge of General Schuyler that they had nothing more for their own support. Meantime, emboldened by his successes the preceding year, the enemy hung around the skirts of the settlements, approaching almost beneath the very guns of the forts, cutting off all communication with them, unless by means of strong escorts, so that it was difficult and often impossible even to throw such scanty supplies into the garrisons as could be obtained.

The Oneidas having been driven from their country the preceding year, even the slight barrier against irruptions from the more western tribes, who were all hostile, into the Mohawk country, afforded by that slender people, was gone. On the 15th of January, the scouts of Thayendanegea appeared openly in the German Flats, and attacked some of the inhabitants. During the months of February and March, Brant was hovering about the Mohawk, ready to spring upon every load of supplies destined for Forts Plain, Dayton, and Schuyler, not too strongly guarded, and cutting off every straggling soldier or inhabitant so unfortunate as to fall within his grasp.

On the 6th of March, Major Nicholas Fish wrote to General Clinton, from Schenectady, informing him that a party of fifteen of Colonel Van Cortlandt's regiment, at Fort Schuyler, had fallen into the hands of Brant's Indians; and on the 2d of April, in moving to the neighborhood of that fort, to cut off another escort of supplies, the same lynx-eyed chieftain made prisoners of another detachment from that garrison of sixteen men. The difficulty of transporting the provisions, however, the unbeaten snow lying to a great depth, had so greatly retarded the progress of the scouts, that the intrepid warrior was disappointed in this portion of the spoils, having, as it subsequently appeared, attempted to strike too soon.

But the hunted Oneidas, notwithstanding the neutrality of the greater part of them, were not altogether safe in their new position near Schenectady. It seems to have chafed both Brant and his employers, that a single tribe of Indians had been detached from their influence or service; and their destruction was again seriously meditated, with the sanction of Sir Frederick Haldimand, as will more fully appear by the annexed letter from Colonel Daniel Claus, the brother-in-law of Sir John Johnson, to Captain Brant.

"Colonel Claus to Captain Brant.

"_Montreal,_ 3_d March,_ 1781.

"Dear Joseph,

"Captain John Odeserundiye, about a month ago, showed me a letter he received from you, with a proposal to him about the Oneidas, telling me he had answered you that he would join you with his party about the 20th of this month, desiring me at the same time to keep it a secret from the Mohawk Indians and others, for fear of being made public; he then asked me where the Oneidas now lived, which then I could not tell him; but since that I was informed that the rebels had posted themselves at a place called Palmerstown, about twelve or fifteen miles west of Saraghtoga, of which I acquainted His Excellency General Haldimand, together with your intentions and plan; whereupon I received His Excellency's answer enjoining the utmost secrecy to me, and which I hereby give you in the words of his letter, by Captain Mathews his secretary, and is the occasion of this express.

"His Excellency, General Haldimand, commands me to acquaint you that Captain Brant's intention meets highly with his approbation, and wishes to assist it; which might be done from this place in the following manner, but the General desires you will keep it inviolably secret. He has for some time intended sending a party of about sixty chosen loyalists, under the command of Major Jessup, toward Fort Edward; this party might join Joseph against Palmerstown could he ascertain the time and place, which might be nearly done by calculating the time his express would take to come from Carleton Island--his march from thence, and Major Jessup's from Point au Fez, alias Nikadiyooni. If Joseph wishes to have this assistance, he must confer with Major Ross, who will send off an active express; otherwise, if Joseph should prefer aid from that quarter, Major Ross and Captain Robertson are directed to afford it; and, indeed, the delays and uncertainty of the parties joining punctually, incline the General to think it more eligible.

"Should you upon this adopt the General's offer and opinion, and proceed from Carleton Island to Palmerstown, which place I am sure several of Major Ross's men and others at the island are well acquainted with, I wish you the aid of Providence with all the success imaginable; in which case it will be one of tho most essential services you have rendered your king this war, and cannot but by him be noticed and rewarded; your return by Canada will be the shortest and most eligible, and we shall be very happy to see you here. As I received the General's letter this afternoon only, I could not speak with Odeserundiye, but have wrote to him by express to let you know the precise time he intends meeting you. Mrs. Claus and all friends are well here, and salute you heartily; also your sister and daughters; the others here are well, and desire their love and duty. I hope she received the things safe which I sent lately by Anna. Adieu. God bless and prosper you.

"Yours most sincerely,
Dan'l. Claus.

"_Captain Brant._

"P. S. The great advantage of setting out from Carleton Island, is the route, which is so unexpected a one, that there is hardly any doubt but you will surprise them, which is a great point gained. Whereas, were you to set out from Canada, there are so many friends, both whites and Indians, to the rebel cause, that you could not well get to the place undiscovered, which would not do so well.

"D. C."

Happily, from some cause now unknown, this project, so well devised, and apparently so near its maturity, was never executed. The narrative is therefore resumed.

So great, and so universal, was the distress for provisions, already adverted to, that, on the 29th of March, General Clinton wrote to the Governor, "I am hourly under apprehensions that the remaining different posts occupied for the defence of the frontiers of this State, will be abandoned, and the country left open to the ravages of the enemy." Such continued suffering of course produced disaffection in this department also; and the greatest possible prudence was required, on the part of the officers, to prevent desertions of whole bodies. So critical was their situation, that in a letter to the Governor, of May 3d, General Clinton mentions the fact, that a small scout, commanded by a corporal, in the neighborhood of Port George, having captured a party of the enemy, "with a packet, had been bribed to release them for a guinea each and two silk handkerchiefs." Still worse than this was the fact that the General was afraid to proceed openly to punish the delinquency. On the 5th General Clinton again wrote to the Governor--"From the present appearance, I am convinced that the troops will abandon the frontier. It is absurd to suppose they can or will exist under the present circumstances. However, let what will be the consequences, I have nothing to reproach myself with. I have repeatedly called for assistance from every quarter, but could obtain none." On the 8th of May, General Schuyler, writing from Saratoga, said--"I wrote you this morning, since which, finding the troops exceedingly uneasy, Colonel Van Vechten and I turned out each one of the best cattle we had; the meat proved better than was expected, but the soldiers still continue troublesome; they have hung part of it on a pole with a red flag above a white one, and some of them hold very alarming a conversation. I dread the consequences, as they can so easily a join the enemy. If a body of nine-months men were here, it a would probably deter the others from going off to the northward, [the enemy meaning] if they should have such an intention."

Great blame was imputed to Congress; and likewise to the State governments, for allowing the commissariat to come to such a deplorable pass. The resources of the country were known to be abundant for the comfortable sustenance of a much larger army than was at that time in the field; but the efficient action of Congress was fettered by its want of power. The States, jealous of their own sovereignty, had withholden from the central government powers which were essential to the vigorous prosecution of the war, while it was but seldom that they could be brought into a simultaneous and harmonious exertion of those powers themselves. Hence the frequent and keen distresses of the army, and the complicated embarrassments under which the officers were compelled to struggle during the whole war. Still, the blame did not rest wholly with the States. There were jealousies, and heart-burnings, and intrigues, in the Congresses of that day, as in later times; and their conduct was often the subject of bitter complaint in the letters of the Commander-in-chief. The following letter from General Schuyler bears hard upon the officers of the federal government, while at the same time it depicts the extreme destitution of the country at the north, at the period under consideration:--

"General Schuyler to General Clinton.

"_Saratoga, May_ 13_th,_ 1781.

"Dear Sir,

"Your favor of the 8th instant, Captain Vernon delivered me last evening. The distress occasioned by the want of provisions in every quarter is truly alarming, but was the natural consequence of such a system as was adopted for supplying the army. It is probable, if we should be able to continue the war ten years longer, that our rulers will learn to conduct it with propriety and economy; at present they are certainly ignoramuses. Not a barrel of meat or fish is to be had in this quarter if an equal weight of silver was to be offered for it, and as there is not above a quarter of the flour or wheat sufficient for the use of the inhabitants, it would be needless to appoint persons here to impress those articles. I therefore return the blank warrants.

"It is probable that some flour may be obtained in the neighborhood of Schaghticoke, and _I am certain_ that a very considerable quantity of both wheat and flour is lodged in Albany. Major Lush could employ his assistant at the former place, and he might impress all at the latter _without much trouble._ A small collection of meat has been made at Stillwater for the troops here, but that is already expended. If there is any beef at Richmond, or Barrington, I think it would be well to send a party of nine-months men under an active spirited officer, to impress a number of wagons at Kinderhook and Claverack, and to attend them to the former places, and back again to the respective landings of the latter on Hudson's river. If an opportunity offers, pray send me some paper, as this is my last sheet. Captain Arson is not yet returned from Jessup's.

"I am, dear Sir,
Yours sincerely, &c., &c.
Ph. Schuyler.

"_Gen. Clinton._"

It was, indeed, a trying situation for brave and patriotic officers to find themselves in command of troops, driven, by destitution, to the very point of going over to the enemy almost in a body. But another disheartening occurrence was at hand. The works of Fort Schuyler, having become much out of repair, sustained great injury by the swelling of the waters in the early part of May. A council of officers was convened by Lt. Colonel Cochran, then in command, on the 12th of that month, to inquire and report what should be done in the premises. The council represented that more than two-thirds of the works had been broken down by the flood, and that the residue would be in the same condition in a very few days; that the only remaining strength of the fort was to be found in the outside pickets on the glacis; and that the strength of the garrison was altogether inadequate to attempt to rebuild or repair the works, for which purpose five or six hundred men, with an engineer, artificers, &c., would be indispensably necessary.

But even if the works were not altogether indefensible on the 12th, they were rendered so on the following day, when all that had been spared by the deluge was destroyed by fire. Intelligence of this disaster was received by General Clinton at Albany, on the 16th, in a letter from Colonel Cochran. The following is an extract from General Clinton's reply to that officer, from which it appears a strong suspicion was entertained that the conflagration was the work of design--a suspicion that was never removed:--"I have just received your favors of the 13th and 14th instants, with the disagreeable intelligence contained in them. I cannot find words to express my surprise at the unexpected accident, or how a fire should break out at noon-day, in a garrison where the troops could not possibly be absent, after a most violent and incessant rain of several days, and be permitted to do so much damage. I am sorry to say that the several circumstances which accompanied this melancholy affair, afford plausible ground for suspicion that it was not the effect of mere accident. I hope, when it comes to be examined in a closer point of view, such lights may be thrown upon it as will remove the suspicion, for which there appears too much reason. I have written to his Excellency on the subject, and requested his farther orders, which I expect in a few days; in the meantime I would request that you keep possession of the works, and endeavor to shelter the troops in the best manner possible."

In his letter to the Governor, enclosing the dispatches of Colonel Cochran, General Clinton suggested the expediency, under the circumstances of the case, of abandoning the post altogether, and falling back upon Fort Herkimer. On the following day he again wrote to his brother, renewing and re-enforcing this suggestion:--

"General Clinton to the Governor.

"_Albany, May_ 17_th,_ 1781.

"Dear Sir,

"Since my last to you of yesterday, another letter, by express, has been received from Fort Schuyler. Copies of the contents I enclose for your information, under cover, which I wish you to seal and forward to the Commander-in-chief. I informed you yesterday of the general prevailing opinion among the better part of the people in this quarter respecting Fort Schuyler. The recent loss of the barracks, and the ruinous situation of the works, have confirmed them in the propriety and even necessity of removing it to the German Flats near Fort Herkimer, where they are disposed to afford every assistance in their power to build a formidable work, confident that it will be able to afford more protection, not only in that particular quarter, but also to the whole western frontier in general. I must confess that I have long since been of this opinion. I have not mentioned this circumstance to the General, [Washington,] as I conceive it will come better from yourself, as you are acquainted with every particular circumstance respecting it, and the numberless difficulties which we shall labor under in putting it in any considerable state of defence. As I have directed the troops to remain in possession of the works until I shall receive instructions from head-quarters, I wish that you might have it in your power to have a conference with the General on the subject, and transmit to me the result of it without delay.

"I am, Sir, &c.
Jas. Clinton.

"_Governor Clinton._"

This suggestion was adopted, and the post so long considered the key to the Mohawk Valley was abandoned. [FN]

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[FN] After the war the fort was rebuilt, and the ancient name of Fort Stanwix restored. The works were repaired and substantially strengthened as being an important post, during the administration of the elder Adams.

In addition to this disheartening state of affairs at the westward of Albany, intelligence was received that another storm was about breaking upon the northern frontier. In a letter from General Schuyler to General Clinton, from Saratoga, May 18th, after speaking of the "chagrin" he felt at the destruction of the fort, Schuyler proceeds:--

"Last evening Major McCracken of White Creek came here, and delivered me a copy of a paper which had been found there, in the same hand-writing as one that was put in the same place last year, announcing the approach of Major Carleton with the troops under his command. This contains in substance--'That the writer had received a letter from a friend in Canada, to give him notice of the danger which threatened these parts; that 1500 men were gone to Ticonderoga, from whence they were to proceed to Fort Edward and White Creek; that they are to be down in this month, and from what he could learn, they were to desolate the country.' The Major thinks he knows the channel through which this intelligence is conveyed, and that it may be depended upon;--as it in some degree corroborates that given by Harris, and the person I had sent to Crown Point, it ought not to be slighted. Please to communicate it to the Governor and General Washington.

"Fourteen of the nine months men have already deserted, two of whom are apprehended. There are now at this post only thirty-nine of them. As the Continental troops here are without shoes it is impossible to keep out the necessary scouts. Cannot a parcel of shoes be obtained at Albany, and sent up to them? It will be of importance to give the earliest intelligence if the party discovered by Colonel Lewis should appear on the Mohawk river, that we may with the troops here, and what militia we may be able to collect, try to intercept them."

In a postscript to a letter of the 21st, General Schuyler observed:--"Since the above I have been informed _from very good authority,_ that the enemy's morning and evening guns at Ticonderoga have been distinctly heard near Fort Anne for three or four days past" And on the 24th the General wrote more confidently still of the enemy's approach. "Captain Gray is returned. He has not been near enough to determine the enemy's force, but sufficiently so to discover, by the fires, that they are numerous. Is it not strange, and subject of suspicion, that the Vermonters should not afford us any intelligence of the enemy's approach, as they must certainly know of his arrival at Crown Point and Ticonderoga?" [FN]

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[FN] This ambiguous conduct of Vermont was the consequence of the quarrel between the settlers of the grants from New Hampshire, which were within the chartered limits, and the government of New-York. Colonel Allen, not long before, had been in Albany upon the business of the settlers, and had come away dissatisfied--having uttered a threat on his departure. He was at this time, as General Schuyler was informed, at the Isle Au Noix--sick--as was pretended.

This was alarming intelligence, more especially when taken in connexion with the reports simultaneously coming in from the west, of an expedition meditated against Pittsburgh, to be led by Sir John Johnson and Colonel Connelly; while other reports were rife, at the same time, of more extensive combinations among the hostile Indians than had previously marked the war. But even this was not all--nor by any means the worst of the case. Treachery was at work, and from the temper of great numbers of the people, the carriage of the disaffected, and the intelligence received by means of spies and intercepted despatches, there was just cause to apprehend that, should the enemy again invade the country, either from the north or the west, his standard would be joined by much larger numbers of the people than would have rallied beneath it at any former period. The poison was actively at work even in Albany. On the 24th of May, General Schuyler announced to General Clinton the return of a confidential agent from the north, "where he met with five of the enemy, whose confidence he so far obtained as to be entrusted with letters written on the spot to persons at Albany, whose names I forbear to mention," (says Schuyler,) "for fear of accidents. They contained nothing material, except the arrival of the enemy in force at Crown Point and Ticonderoga, with this expression in one,--'We shall make rare work with the rebels.'" But other, and more "material" despatches were soon afterward intercepted, from the tenor of which the conclusion was irresistible, not only that a powerful invasion was about taking place from the north, but that very extensive arrangements had been made in Albany, and the towns adjacent, for the reception of the invaders, whose standard the disaffected were to join, and whose wants they were to supply. Among the papers thus intercepted, was the following letter, supposed to have been addressed to General Haldimand:--

"_Albany,_ 9_th May,_ 1781.

"Your Excellency may learn from this that when I received your instructions, &c., I was obliged at that time to put myself into a place of security, as there were heavy charges laid against me. I thank God I have baffled that storm. Your commands are observed to the letter, part of them faithfully executed, the particulars of which I hope in a short time to have the honor to acquaint you verbally. Now is the season to strike a blow on this place, when multitudes will join, provided a considerable force comes down. The sooner the attempt is made the better. Let it be rapid and intrepid, carefully avoiding to sour the inhabitants' tempers by savage cruelties on their defenceless families. If a few handbills, intimating pardon, protection, &c., &c. were sent down, and distributed about this part of the country, they would effect wonders; and should your Excellency think proper to send an army against this den of persecutors, notice ought to be given ten days before, by some careful and intelligent person, to a certain Mr. McPherson in Ball's Town, who will immediately convey the intention to the well-affected of New Scotland, Norman's Kill, Hillbarack's, Neskayuna, &c., all in the vicinity of Albany. The plan is already fixed, and should a formidable force appear, I make no doubt provisions and other succors will immediately take place. A few lines of comfort, in print, from your Excellency to those people, would make them the more eager in prosecuting their designs; and if the Vermonters lie still, as I have some hopes they will, there is no fear of success. No troops are yet raised. There is a flag from this place shortly to be sent; perhaps I may go with it; I expected before this time I would 'be removed from my present situation,' &c.

"25th May. N. B. This I expected should reach you before now, but had no opportunity. Excuse haste." [FN]

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[FN] This document has been discovered by the author among the papers of General Clinton. It is endorsed as follows:--"A copy of a letter in Doctor Smyth's handwriting, supposed to General Haldimand. Intercepted 27th of May, 1781." The author has not been able to ascertain who Doctor Smith was, farther than that he hat been informed at Albany, that he was a brother to Smith the historian of New-York, afterward Chief Justice of New Brunswick. Some time afterward Governor Clinton transmitted a special message to the legislature, then sitting at Poughkeepsie, containing important information respecting the designs of the Vermonters, by which it appears that Dr. Smith was actively engaged in fomenting disaffection in that quarter, and had held interviews with Ethan Allen upon the subject in Albany, &c. Smith is spoken of in that message as having been appointed a Commissioner by the British officers to treat with the Vermonters.

Accompanying this letter were several pages of memoranda, in the same hand-writing, giving particular information upon every point which the enemy could desire. The deplorable situation of Albany, and the whole Mohawk country, was described; the temper of the people in the towns around Albany and elsewhere set forth; the strength of the main army in the Highlands given with all necessary accuracy; and the mission of Ethan Allen to Albany, and the probable defection of Vermont, announced. Indeed, the character of these communications showed but too plainly that treason was deeply and extensively at work, and that the enemy was, beyond doubt, correctly advised of the true situation of the country. [FN]

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[FN] See Appendix, No. II.

Under all these circumstances of internal and external danger--with but slender garrisons at the points of greatest exposure, and those so miserably provided that the soldiers were deserting by dozens, showing dispositions not equivocal of going over to the enemy--without provisions or the means of procuring them, and scarcely knowing whom to trust among their own people, lest the disaffection should prove to be even more extensive than recent disclosures had taught the officers to suppose,--the Spring of 1781 may well be counted as the darkest period of the revolution. Had it not been for the gleams of light shooting up from the south, all indeed would have been sullen blackness, if not despair. But the truth of the homely adage, that the darkest hour is always just before day, received a glorious illustration before the close of the year. "Accustomed to contemplate all public events which might grow out of the situation of the United States, and to prepare for them while at a distance, the American chief was not depressed by this state of affairs. With a mind happily tempered by nature and improved by experience, those fortunate events which had occasionally brightened the prospects of his country, never relaxed his exertions or lessened his precautions; nor could the most disastrous state of things drive him to despair." [FN] Fortunately, in the Clintons and their associate officers at the north, the American Commander had subordinates possessing in no small degree the same great characteristics. Every possible precaution against lurking treason within, was taken, and every practicable means of preparation means of preparation and defence against invasion from abroad, was adopted.

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[FN] Marshall.

Anticipating, from the presence of the enemy at Ticonderoga, that Tryon county might again be attacked from that direction by the way of the Sacondaga, Captain John Carlisle was despatched into the settlements of New Galway, Peasley, and Ballston, accompanied by Captain Oothout and a small party of Indians, to make prisoners of certain persons suspected of disaffection to the American cause, and to remove all the families from those towns to the south side of the Mohawk river. About sixty families were thus removed, and all the suspected persons arrested. The Captain, in his report of the expedition, gave a deplorable account of the poverty of the people. He could scarcely procure subsistence for his party during his mission. On arriving at Ballston, however, he drew more liberally upon the stores of the disaffected, and then arrested them. But their disposition, Captain Oothout was glad to inform the Commissioners, was such as to "prevent his setting fire to their houses agreeably to the letter of his orders." [FN] Happily these measures of precaution, and the other preparations, were for that time unnecessary--the enemy, if he was in actual force at Crown Point or Ticonderoga, not then venturing another invasion from that quarter.

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[FN] Manuscripts of Gen. Clinton. Indeed, the materials for this whole section of the northern history of the Spring of 1781, have principally been drawn from the Clinton papers, so often referred to.

But the Mohawk Valley was continually harassed by the Indians and Tories--even to the very precincts of the stockades and other small fortifications. The spirit of the people had in a great measure been crushed, and the militia broken down, during the repeated invasions of the preceding year. The Rev. Daniel Gros, [FN] writing to General Clinton from Canajoharie, upon the importance of having at least a small detachment of regular troops at Fort Rensselaer, observed--"It would serve to bring spirit, order, and regularity into our militia, where authority and subordination have vanished. If it should last a little longer, the shadow of it will dwindle away; and perhaps the best men in the state will be useless spectators of all the havoc the enemy is meditating against the country. The militia appears to me to be a body without a soul. Drafts from the neighboring counties, even of the levies under their own commanders, will not abate the fatal symptoms, but rather serve to produce a monster with as many heads as there are detachments." Having no other defenders than such as are here described, with the exception of a few scattered companies, or rather skeletons of companies, at the different posts extending along the Valley, the prospect of the opening Summer was indeed gloomy--more especially when men's thoughts reverted to the sufferings of the past. Nor were the inhabitants encouraged to expect any considerable reinforcements from head-quarters, since the Commander-in-chief, in concert with the Count de Rochambeau, was again evidently preparing for some enterprise of higher moment than the defence of those remote settlements against any force that could be brought down upon them from the north.

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[FN] Afterward a Professor in Columbia College, and author of a work on Moral Philosophy.

Still, there was one officer whose name, among the people of that district, was a tower of strength. That man was Colonel Marinus Willett; who, at the consolidation of the five New-York regiments into two--an event happening at about the same time--was induced by the strong solicitation of Governor Clinton to take the command of all the militia levies and State troops that might be raised for the protection of the country. It was only with great reluctance that Colonel Willett was persuaded to leave the main army, and enter upon this difficult and hazardous service. But the appeal of Governor Clinton was so strong, and enforced with so much earnestness, that he could not resist it. The Governor urged the high confidence reposed in him by the people of Tryon county--and reminded him of the cruelties of the Indians and Tories--speaking of the latter with great emphasis, as "cruel monsters worse than savages;" [FN-1] and Colonel Willett, feeling a hearty good-will to chastise such an enemy--the Tories especially--repaired to the north, and assumed the command. He arrived at Fort Rensselaer (Canajoharie), where he established his head-quarters, toward the close of June. The country he was to defend embraced all the settlements west of the county of Albany, including Catskill and the Hudson river. A fortnight after his arrival he ascertained that the following skeleton detachments composed the full complement of the forces under his command: one hundred and thirty levies, including officers, and Captain Moody's artillery, numbering twenty men, at the German Flats; at Schoharie he stationed a guard of twenty men; at Catskill about the same number, and about thirty men at Ballston. Exclusive of these diminutive fragments of corps, stationed at great distances apart, the levies of the county amounted to no more than ninety-six men. In a letter to Governor Clinton, making known the paucity of his numbers, Colonel Willett added:--"I confess myself not a little disappointed in having such a trifling force for such extensive business as I have on my hands; and also that nothing is done to enable me to avail myself of the militia. The prospect of a suffering country hurts me. Upon my own account I am not uneasy. Every thing I can do, shall be done; and more cannot be looked for. If it is, the reflection that I have done my a duty, must fix my own tranquility." [FN-2]

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[FN-1] Willett's Narrative.

[FN-2] Idem.

Depressed, however, as were the people, and inefficient as, from the preceding descriptions, the militia must have become, these circumstances were, no doubt, in a great degree attributable to the want of officers in whom the people could repose confidence. Colonel Willett had very soon an opportunity to make trial of their spirit, and he found them "a people who, having experienced no inconsiderable portion of British barbarism, were become keen for revenge and properly determined." [FN-1] The occasion was the following:--On the 30th of June, several columns of smoke were discovered by the garrison of Fort Rensselaer, ascending as from a village on fire, in the direction of Currietown, lying eleven miles down the river, near the estuary of the Schoharie-kill. Having previously sent forth a scout of thirty men, commanded by Captain Gross, to patrol the country south as far as a settlement called Durlagh, [FN-2] an express was despatched to overtake that officer, with information of the probable presence of the enemy below, and with instructions, if possible, to fall upon his trail. Meantime Captain McKean was ordered to Currietown, with sixteen levies only, but with instructions to collect as many of the militia in his way as possible. Such was the celerity of McKean's movements, that he arrived at Currietown so soon after it had been ravaged and deserted by the enemy, as to enable him to assist in quenching the fires of some of the yet unconsumed buildings. Colonel Willett was himself actively employed during the day in collecting the militia, while, through the vigilance of Captain Gross, not only the trail of the Indians was discovered, but the place of their encampment. Having reason to suppose they would occupy the same encampment that night, and being joined before evening by the detachments of Gross and McKean, the Colonel determined, with these forces, and such few militia-men as he had been able to collect, to march directly for the encampment, and, if possible, take them by surprise before morning--perhaps while asleep. This encampment was in a thick cedar swamp, five or six miles to the north-east of Cherry Valley, and of course to reach it by a march through the woods, during an exceedingly dark night, and without any better road than a bridle-path, was no small undertaking. It had been ascertained that the Indians numbered between two and three hundred, commanded by a Tory named John Doxstader, in connexion with an Indian chief named Quackyack. Colonel Willett's strength, levies and militia included, did not exceed one hundred and fifty rank and file. The plan of falling upon the enemy while asleep did not exactly succeed, in consequence of the difficulties of the march--occasioned by the darkness, the thickness of the woods, and, worse than all, the losing of his way by the guide. It was therefore nearly six o'clock in the morning when they arrived in the vicinity of the encampment; and, instead of falling upon the enemy by surprise, they found him occupying a more favorable situation, and awaiting their reception. Immediate dispositions were made to engage the enemy, with a view to which a stratagem was laid to draw him from the advantageous situation which he had chosen. For this purpose, before the Indians had become fully aware of Willett's near approach, Jacob Sammons, now a lieutenant in the New-York levies, was detached with ten resolute men, to steal as near to them as possible, give them one well-directed fire, and retreat. The ruse succeeded. Sammons and his men turned their backs on the first yell of the Indians, and the latter sprang forward in pursuit. [FN-3] They were soon met by Colonel Willett in person, advancing at the head of his main division, which consisted of one hundred men, while Captain McKean was left with fifty more as a reserve, to act as occasion might require, on the right. The enemy did not wait an attack, however, but, with great appearance of determination, advanced with their wonted shouts and yells, and began the fire. The onset of the Indians was furious; but they were received with firmness, and in turn the Americans advanced upon them with loud huzzas, and such manifestations of spirit as soon caused them to give way. Simultaneously with their attack upon the main body in front, the Indians had made an equally desperate rush upon the right wing, which might have been attended with disaster, but for the destructive fire poured in upon them by the reserve of McKean. The Indians, thus driven back, now betook themselves to their old game of firing from behind the trees; but Willett's men understood that mode of fighting as well as themselves. They did not, however, practise it long. Willett pressed forward waving his hat and cheering his men--calling out that he could catch in his hat all the balls that the enemy might send; and in the same breath exclaiming, "the day is ours, my boys!" These inspiriting demonstrations being followed up by a timely and efficient use of the bayonet, the whole body of the enemy was put to flight in half an hour after the commencement of the action. They retreated upon their old path down the Susquehanna, and were pursued to a considerable distance. Their camp was, of course, taken, and the plunder they had gathered recaptured. The loss of the Indians was severe--nearly forty of their dead being left on the field. Colonel Willett's loss was five killed, and nine wounded and missing. Among the wounded was the brave Captain McKean, fatally. He received two balls early in the engagement, but kept at his post until it was over, and the rout of the enemy complete. [FN-4]

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