Chapter VI (2)

So perished Walter N. Butler, one of the greatest scourges, as he was one of the most fearless men, of his native county. No other event of the whole war created so much joy in the Mohawk Valley as the news of his decease. He is represented to have been of a morose temperament, possessing strong passions, and of a vindictive disposition. He was disliked, as has already more than once appeared, by Joseph Brant, who included him among those whom he considered greater savages than the savages themselves. It is quite probable, however, that Walter Butler may have possessed other and better qualities, his friends being judges, than have been awarded to him by his enemies. It has been asserted, that after the massacre of Cherry Valley General Haldimand refused to see him. But this fact may well be questioned, inasmuch as Haldimand not only approved but encouraged the despatching of a similar expedition against the scarcely offending Oneidas, who had removed, and were living peaceably in the neighborhood of Schenectady.

This expedition of Ross and Butler closed the active warlike operations at the north for that year; but while the events traced in the few preceding pages were in progress, others were occurring in a different quarter of the country, both in themselves and in their results of far greater moment. In the bird's-eye glance taken of the progress of the war in other parts of the confederacy during the first quarter of the year, Arnold was left at Portsmouth, contiguous to Norfolk. He afterward made various movements of the character heretofore described; visiting Richmond again, and committing outrages there and elsewhere. On the death of the British Major General Phillips, the traitor succeeded to the command of the King's troops in Virginia, and maintained himself there against the Baron Steuben, and afterward against the Marquis de Lafayette, [FN-1] until Lord Cornwallis, having traversed North Carolina, and entered Virginia, formed a junction with him, and assumed the command; sending Arnold from his presence to Portsmouth as soon as possible. After his return to New-York, Arnold led another piratical expedition, early in September, against New London and Groton. The former town was burnt, and Fort Griswold, on the opposite side of the river, having been carried by assault, was the scene of a bloody massacre; the brave Ledyard, who commanded, being thrust through with his own sword. [FN-2]

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[FN-1] On succeeding to the command of Phillips, Arnold addressed a letter to the Marquis de Lafayette; but the latter informed the officer who bore it, that he would not receive a letter from the traitor. Indeed, Arnold was despised by the officers in the British service; and how could it be otherwise? Even Sir Henry Clinton had no confidence in him: and in detaching him to the south, had taken special care to send Colonel Dundas and Colonel Simcoe, two experienced officers, with him, with instructions to Arnold to consult them in regard to every measure and every operation he might desire to undertake.

[FN-2] "It has been said, that Arnold, while New London was in flames, stood in the belfry of a steeple and witnessed the conflagration; thus, like Nero, delighted with the ruin he had caused, the distresses he had inflicted, the blood of his slaughtered countrymen, the agonies of the expiring patriot, the widow's tears, and the orphan's cries. And, what adds to the enormity, is, that he stood almost in sight of the spot where he drew his first breath."--_Sparks._

Meantime, the American Commander-in-chief was meditating a blow, which, if successful, could not but have an important, and perhaps a decisive, bearing upon the great question of his country's final emancipation. While the Marquis de Lafayette was circumventing and perplexing Cornwallis in Virginia, Washington was preparing for an attempt upon the citadel of the British power in the United States--New-York. This design, as has been formerly stated, had been projected the season before, immediately after the arrival of the Count de Rochambeau with the French army of alliance, in Rhode Island. But so many difficulties arose, and so many supervening obstacles were to be overcome, that, in obedience to stern necessity, the project was for that year abandoned. With the opening of the Spring of the present year it was revived, and after the respective commanders had held another personal consultation, the French army moved from Rhode Island across the country to the Hudson. But other obstacles arose, which compelled an entire change in the plan of the campaign. Fortunately, however, the British commander in New-York was not quick to discover the change, and the demonstration served to divert his attention from the right object until it became too late to repair his error. The combined French and American forces, by an unsuspected but effectual basis of operations, had been tending as upon a central point toward Virginia, until, before he was aware of serious danger, Earl Cornwallis found himself shut up in Yorktown. The event was fatal to him and to the cause of his master. The post was completely invested by the 30th of September. On the 9th of October the French and Americans opened their batteries. And on the 19th, his two advanced redoubts having been carried by storm a few days before, despairing of receiving the promised succors from Sir Henry Clinton, and having, moreover, failed in a well-concerted attempt to evacuate the fortress by night, Lord Cornwallis, submitting to necessity, absolute and inevitable, surrendered by capitulation. The loss of the enemy during the siege was five hundred and fifty-two, killed, wounded, and missing; and the number of prisoners taken, exclusive of the seamen, who were surrendered to the Count de Grasse, was seven thousand and seventy-three, of of whom five thousand nine hundred and fifty were rank and file.

It would have been perfectly natural, and in fact no more than even-handed justice, had the recent massacre at Fort Griswold been avenged on this occasion. But, happily, it was otherwise ordered; and the triumph was rendered still more memorable by the fact, that not a drop of blood was shed save in action. "Incapable," said Colonel Hamilton, (who led the advance of the Americans in the assault,) "of imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocation, the soldiers spared every man that ceased to resist." [FN]

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[FN] Colonel Alexander Hamilton's report--Marshall.

The joy at this surrender of a second army was as great as universal. The thanks of Congress were voted to the Commander-in-chief, to the Count de Rochambeau, and the Count de Grasse, and to the other principal officers of the different corps, and the men under them. It was also resolved by Congress to erect a marble column at Yorktown, with designs emblematic of the alliance of France and the United States--to be inscribed with a narrative of the event thus commemorated. But, like all other monumental structures by Congress, it yet exists only on paper.

The Commander-in-chief availed himself of the occasion to pardon and set at liberty all military offenders under arrest. Ever ready and forward to acknowledge the interposition of the hand of Providence in the direction of human events, this truly great commander closed his orders in reference to this event, in the following impressive manner: "Divine service shall be performed to-morrow in the different brigades and divisions. The Commander-in-chief recommends that all the troops not upon duty, do assist at it with a serious deportment, and that sensibility of heart, which the recollection of the surprising and particular interposition of Divine Providence in our favor claims."

Recurring, again, to the progress of events at the North, the enigmatical conduct of the British commander in Canada, and the mysterious movements of his forces upon Lake Champlain, remain to be explained. On the 9th of November, General Heath, commanding the department, issued the following general order; a copy of which has been preserved among General Gansevoort's papers:--

"_Head-Quarters, Continental Village, Nov._ 9, 1781.

"The General has the pleasure of acquainting this army, that the enemy have been completely disappointed in their designs on the northern frontiers of this State, in consequence of the measures adopted to receive them in the vicinity of the lakes, in which the General is much indebted to Major General Lord Stirling, Brigadier General Stark, and the other officers and soldiers, both of the regular troops and the militia, who, with great zeal and alertness, pressed to meet the enemy. That part of their force which was coming by way of the lakes has not dared to land on this side of them.

"Major Ross, who had advanced from the westward as far as Johnstown, with a body of between six and seven hundred regular troops, Rangers, Yagers, and Indians, was met by Colonel Willett, defeated, and pursued into the wilderness, where many of them probably must perish; the number of the enemy killed is not known. Major Butler, who has frequently distressed the frontiers, is among the slain. A number of prisoners, chiefly British, have been taken and sent in.

"The General presents his thanks to Colonel Willett, whose address, gallantry, and persevering activity exhibited on this occasion, do him the highest honor; and while the conduct of the officers and soldiers in general, who were with Colonel Willett, deserves high commendation, the General expresses a particular approbation of the behavior of Major Rowley, and the brave levies and militia under his immediate command, who, at a critical moment, not only did honor to themselves, but rendered a most essential service to their country.

"Transcript from general orders:
Thos. Fred. Jackson,
_Aid-de-camp._"

General Heath, and many others, doubtless supposed that the anticipated invasion had been averted by the dispositions of Lord Stirling, and Generals Stark and Gansevoort, as set forth in the first paragraph of these general orders; but the facts of the case, without detracting an iota from the distinguished merits of those officers, will inevitably lead to a different conclusion.

A summary view of the controversy between New-York and the people of the New Hampshire Grants, has already been given--in addition to which several incidental allusions have been made to the equivocal movements and intentions of Ethan Allen. Reference was also made, by way of a note in the preceding chapter, to a special message from Governor Clinton to the Legislature of New-York, communicating important information respecting the designs of Allen and his associates, which had been derived from two prisoners who had escaped from Canada in the Autumn of the present year--John Edgar and David Abeel. The substance of the statements of these men was, that several of the leading men of the New Hampshire Grants were forming an alliance with the King's officers in Canada. Among these leaders were Ethan and Ira Allen, and the two Fays. A man named Sherwood, and Doctor Smith of Albany, whose name has already been mentioned, were the agents of the negotiation on the part of Great Britain, and their consultations were sometimes held at Castleton, on the Grants, and sometimes in Canada. According to the statement of Edgar, it was understood that the Grants were to furnish the King with a force of two thousand men. Mr. Abeel's information was, that fifteen hundred was the number of men to be furnished, under the command of Ethan Allen. Mr. Abeel also stated that Ethan Allen was then in Canada upon that business, and that he had seen Major Fay at the Isle au Noix, on board of one of the King's vessels; and that he, Fay, had exchanged upward of thirty Hessians, who had deserted from Burgoyne's army, delivering them up to the British authorities. The statements of Edgar and Abeel, the latter of whom had been taken a prisoner at Catskill the preceding Spring, were given under the sanction of an oath; and although they were not fellow-prisoners, and had derived their information from different sources; and although escaping at different times, under dissimilar circumstances, and by routes widely apart, yet there was a strong coincidence between them. A third account submitted to the Legislature by the Governor was somewhat different, and more particular as to the terms of the proposed arrangement. In this paper it was stated, first, that the territory claimed by the Vermontese should be formed into a distinct colony or government. Secondly, that the form of government should be similar to that of Connecticut, save that the nomination of the Governor should be vested in the crown. Thirdly, that they should be allowed to remain neutral, unless the war should be carried within their own territory. Fourthly, they were to raise two battalions, to be in the pay of the crown, but to be called into service only for the defence of the Colony. Fifthly, they were to be allowed a free trade with Canada. General Haldimand had not deemed himself at liberty to decide definitively upon propositions of so much importance, and had accordingly transmitted them to England for the royal consideration. An answer was then expected. Such was the purport of the intelligence; and such was the weight of the testimony, that the Governor did not hesitate to assert that they "proved a treasonable and dangerous intercourse and connexion between the leaders of the revolt in the north-eastern part of the State, and the common enemy." [FN]

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[FN] These and other documents may be found in Almon's Remembrancer, Vol. ix.--for 1732.

The fact is, according to the admissions, and the documents published by the Vermont historians themselves, [FN-1] that the people of Vermont, though doubtless for the most part attached to the cause of their country, nevertheless looked upon New-York "as a more detested enemy" than Great Britain; [FN-2] and the officers of the latter were not slow in their efforts to avail themselves of the schism. Accordingly, Colonel Beverley Robinson sought to open a correspondence with Ethan Allen as early as March, 1780. The first letter was handed to Allen in Arlington, but was not answered. A second letter from Robinson was received by Allen in February, 1781, which, with the first, he enclosed to Congress in March, accompanied by a letter plainly asserting the right of Vermont to agree to a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain, provided its claims, as a State, were still to be rejected by Congress. It does not appear, however, that the threat had any effect upon that body.

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[FN-1] Slade's State Papers.

[FN-2] Idem.

In the months of April and May following, the Governor and Council of Vermont commissioned Colonel Ira Allen, a brother of Ethan, to proceed to the Isle au Noix, to settle a cartel with the British in Canada, and also, if possible, to negotiate an armistice in favor of Vermont. The arrangements for this negotiation were conducted with the most profound secrecy; only eight persons being cognizant of the procedure. [FN-1] Colonel Allen, accompanied by one subaltern, [FN-2] two sergeants, and sixteen privates, departed upon his mission on the first of May; and having arrived at the Isle au Noix, entered at once upon his business--negotiating with Major Dundas, the commander of that post, only on the subject of an exchange of prisoners, but more privately with Captain Sherwood and George Smith, Esq. on the subject of an armistice. The stay of Allen at the island was protracted for a considerable time, and the conferences with the two commissioners, Sherwood and Smith, on the subject of the political relations of Vermont, were frequent, but perfectly confidential; Allen carefully avoiding to write any thing, to guard against accidents. But from the beginning, it seems to have been perfectly understood by both parties that they were treating "for an armistice, and to concert measures to establish Vermont as a colony under the crown of Great Britain." [FN-3] In the course of the consultations, Allen freely declared "that such was the extreme hatred of Vermont to the state of New-York, that rather than yield to it, they would see Congress subjected to the British government, provided Vermont could be a distinct colony under the crown on safe and honorable terms." He added, "that the people of Vermont were not disposed any longer to assist in establishing a government in America which might subject them and their posterity to New-York, whose government was more detested than any other in the known world." [FN-4] These were encouraging representations in the ears of his Majesty's officers; and, after a negotiation of seventeen days, the cartel was arranged, and an armistice verbally agreed upon, by virtue of which hostilities were to cease between the British forces and the people under the jurisdiction of Vermont, until after the next session of the Legislature of Vermont, and even longer, if prospects were satisfactory to the Commander-in-chief in Canada. Moreover, as Vermont had then extended her claims of territory to the Hudson river, all that portion of New-York lying east of the river, and north of the western termination of the north line of Massachusetts, was included in the armistice. It was also stipulated that, during the armistice, the leaders in Vermont were to prepare the people by degrees for a change of government, and that the British officers were to have free communication through the territory of the new State--as it claimed to be. [FN-5]

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[FN-1] Thomas Chittenden, Moses Robinson, Samuel Safford, Ethan Allen, Ira Allen, Timothy Brownson, John Fassett, and Joseph Fay.

[FN-2] Lieutenant Simeon Lyman.

[FN-3] Political History of Vermont, published by Ira Allen in London, in 1798.

[FN-4] Allen's Political History of Vermont.

[FN-5] Idem.

But, notwithstanding the veil of secrecy drawn over the proceedings, dark suspicions got afloat that all was not right. The sincere Whigs among the people of the Grants became alarmed, and were apprehensive that they might be sold ere yet they were aware of it. When the Legislature met, the people whose jealousies had been awakened, flocked to the place of meeting to ascertain whether all was well; and it was only by much dissimulation on the part of those in the secret, that the friends of the Union were pacified. There were also other spectators present, from different States, who felt an equal interest to ascertain whether the great cause of the nation was not in danger of being compromised. The result was, that the agents succeeded in throwing dust into the eyes of the people; and so adroit was their management, that the Allens held communication with the enemy during the whole Summer without detection. On more than one occasion, British guards, of several men, came to the very precincts of Arlington, delivering and receiving packages in the twilight.

In September the negotiations were renewed, the commissioners of both parties meeting secretly at Skenesborough, within the territory of New-York, and farther progress was made in the terms of the arrangement, by which Vermont was in due time to throw herself "into the arms of her legitimate sovereign." Sir Frederick Haldimand, however, was becoming impatient of longer delay; and a strenuous effort was made for an immediate and open declaration on the part of Vermont. To this proposition the Vermont commissioners, Ira Allen, Joseph Fay, and a third person, whose name is not given, pleaded that there had not yet been time to prepare the people for so great a change, and that they should require the repose of the approaching Winter for that object. It was at length stipulated, however, that inasmuch as the royal authority had been received by Sir Frederick Haldimand for that purpose, an army might ascend the lake, with proclamations offering to confirm Vermont as a colony under the crown, upon the principles and conditions heretofore indicated, on the return of the people to their allegiance; the commissioners interposing a request, that the General commanding the expedition would endeavor to ascertain the temper of the people before the proclamation should be actually distributed.

The Legislature of the Grants assembled at Charlestown in October. Meantime General St. Leger, agreeably to the arrangement with Allen and Fay, ascended the lake to Ticonderoga with a strong force, where he rested. In order to save appearances, the Vermontese had stationed a military force on the opposite shore, under the command of General Enos, to whom was necessarily confided the secret. But on neither side would it answer to entrust that secret to the subordinates. _They_ must, of course, regard each other as enemies in good faith; and the fact that they did so consider themselves, was productive of an affair which placed the Vermontese in a peculiarly awkward predicament The circumstances were these: In order to preserve at least the mimicry of war, scouts and patrols were occasionally sent out by both parties. Unluckily one of these Vermont patrols happened one day to encounter a similar party from the army of St. Leger. Shots were exchanged with hearty goodwill; the Vermont sergeant fell, and his men retreated. The body was decently interred by order of General St. Leger, who sent his clothes to General Enos, accompanied by an open letter apologizing for the occurrence, and expressing his regret at the result.

It was hardly probable that an unsealed letter would pass through many hands, and its contents remain unknown to all save the person to whom it was addressed. Such, certainly, was not the fact in regard to the letter in question. Its contents transpired; and great was the surprise at the civility of General St. Leger in sending back the sergeant's clothes, and deploring his death. A messenger was despatched by General Enos to Governor Chittenden at Charlestown, who, not being in the secrets of his employers, failed not, with honest simplicity, to proclaim the circumstances of the sergeant's death, and the extraordinary message of General St. Leger. The consequence was excitement among the people assembled at Charlestown, attended with a kindling feeling of distrust. "Why should General St Leger send back the clothes?" "Why regret the death of an enemy?" were questions more easily asked by the people, than capable of being safely and ingenuously answered by their leaders. The consequence was, a popular clamor unpleasant to the ears of the initiated. Major Runnels confronted Colonel Ira Allen, and demanded to know why St. Leger was sorry for the death of the sergeant? Allen's answer was evasive and unsatisfactory. The Major repeated the question, and Allen replied that he had better go to St. Leger at the head of his regiment, and demand the reason, for his sorrow, in person. A sharp altercation ensued, which had the effect, for a short time, of diverting the attention of the people from the dispatches which they had been clamoring to have read. These were precious moments for the Governor and the negotiators with the enemy. The Board of War was convened, the members of which were all in the secret, and a set of pretended letters were hastily prepared from such portions of General Enos's dispatches as would serve the purpose in hand, which were read publicly to the Legislature and the people; and which had the effect of allaying the excitement and hushing suspicion into silence.

Meantime a rumor of the capture of Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown was wafted along upon the southern breeze; the effect of which was such upon the people, as to induce Allen and Fay to write to the British commissioners with St Leger, that it would be imprudent at that particular conjuncture for him to promulgate the royal proclamation, and urging delay to a more auspicious moment The messenger with these despatches had not been longer than an hour at the head-quarters of St. Leger at Ticonderoga, before the rumor respecting Cornwallis was confirmed by an express. The effect was prodigious. All ideas or farther operations in that quarter were instantly abandoned; and before evening of the same day, St. Leger's troops and stores were re-embarked, and with a fair wind he made sail immediately, back to St. John's.

From this narrative of facts, as disclosed in London many years afterward by Colonel Ira Allen himself, it will be seen at once that General Heath was in error, when, in his general orders of November 9th, he attributed the inaction of General St. Leger, and his ultimate retreat, to the preparations of Lord Stirling, and Generals Stark and Gansevoort, for his reception. The digression which has been judged necessary to elucidate this portion of the operations in the north, during the Summer and Autumn of 1781, may by some readers be thought wide of the leading design of the present work. Still, it is believed that to a majority of the public, the facts detailed in this connexion will be new, as they must be curious in the estimation of all. They are at the same time held to be essential to a just appreciation of the difficulties with which the military officers in the Northern Department, and the Government of the State of New-York, were obliged to contend during the period under consideration. Strong light is also reflected by them upon that portion of the history of the war itself with which they are interblended. Every close reader of American history is aware that there was a correspondence, of some description, between the leaders of the people occupying the New Hampshire Grants and the common enemy, during the later years of the Revolutionary war. But neither the precise character, nor the extent, of that correspondence, has been generally understood; while it has, for obvious reasons, been the desire of those most directly concerned in those matters, to represent the whole as a game of dissembling with an enemy who had attempted to tamper with the patriotic sons of the Green Mountains. [F-1] Be this as it may, it is in the secret proceedings of the Vermont conspirators, that the key is found to the mysterious movements of the enemy on Lake Champlain, which had so greatly harassed the American commanders at the north during that Autumn. It was known that St. Leger was upon the lake in great force; and having landed at Ticonderoga, to all human calculation an invasion was intended, which the country was then ill prepared to resist. At times he was apparently balancing upon what point to move. With the means of striking, he did not strike; and his dilatoriness, and apparent indecision, were alike inexplicable. The effect was to keep the northern part of the state in constant alarm, and to harass the militia by frequent calls to the field, against an enemy hovering upon the shore of the lake, always, apparently, just ready to make a descent, and yet idling away the season without farther demonstration. Much greater quietness might have been enjoyed by the people of New-York, so far as the common enemy was concerned, had it been known that his hands were fettered by an armistice with a contiguous territory, claiming to be an American state, and professing at the same time to be at open war with the self-same enemy with whom the government of the said territory was at that moment in secret alliance. [FN-2] When to this singularly embarrassing position, those other difficulties which have been passed in review are added, such as an exhausted and ravaged country; an unfed, unclothed, unpaid and deserting army; [FN-3] extensive disaffection among the people immediately at home; continual irruptions of hostile partisan bands in every quarter; mobs of insurgents setting the laws at defiance in one direction; the militia regiments in the district thus lawless, more than half disposed to join the disorganizers; with an actual and somewhat formidable invasion from the west; it must be conceived that both civil and military authorities were laboring under a complication of evils, requiring for their control all that prudence and energy, discretion, perseverance and courage, combined, could accomplish.

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[FN-1] Sparks, adopting the views of earlier writers, has noticed the case in this favorable aspect in his late sketch of the Life of Ethan Allen. The author certainly agrees with Mr. Sparks in the opinion that "there was never any serious intention on the part of the Vermontese to listen to the British proposals." But with great deference, after a full examination of the case, the same cannot be said of the _leaders_ of the Vermontese. _They_ had determined that New-York should be dismembered; and if they could not force themselves into the confederation as a State, they were willing to fall back into the arms of Great Britain as a Colony. But it is very certain, from the conduct of the people of the Grants when they heard of St. Leger's regrets at the killing of the sergeant, that they were prepared for no such arrangement.

[FN-2] Of course General Heath was not aware of the proceedings of the Vermontese when he issued his general orders above cited, nor was the Government of New-York acquainted with them. Although, from the necessity of the case, a considerable number of the Vermont leaders must have been in the secret, it was nevertheless exceedingly well kept. It was not until the month of March of the following year, (1782,) that Governor Clinton communicated the affidavits of Edgar and Abeel to the Legislature, the substance of which has been embodied in the preceding narrative. Those affidavits explained the threats murmured by Ethan Allen, when in Albany the Spring before. They also explained the threat contained in a letter from Governor Chittenden, referred to in a preceding page, while they strengthened the suspicions that had for months been entertained by General Schuyler and Governor Clinton. But it was not until years had elapsed that the whole truth came out.

[FN-3] "From the post of Saratoga to that of Dobbs's Ferry inclusive, I believe there it not at this moment one day's supply of meat for the army on hand. Supplies, particularly of beef cattle, must be speedily and regularly provided, or our posts cannot be maintained, nor the army kept in the field much longer."--_Letter of Washington to President Weere of New Hampshire._

With the discomfiture and retreat of Major Ross on the one hand, and the return of St. Leger to St. John's on the other, all active operations ceased with the enemy at the north. But the difficulties of the state Government with the New Hampshire Grants were on the increase; and the controversy ran so high, that by the 1st of December an insurrection broke out in the regiments of Colonel John Van Rensselaer and Colonel Henry K. Van Rensselaer, in the north-eastern towns of the State; while the regiment of Colonel Peter Yates--also belonging to the brigade of General Gansevoort--was in a condition not much better. These disturbances arose in Schaghticoke, Hoosic, and a place called St. Coych, and parts adjacent, belonging then to the county of Albany; but being on the east side of the Hudson, north of the parallel of the northern line of Massachusetts, the Government of the New Hampshire Grants had extended its aegis over that section of country, claiming jurisdiction, as heretofore stated, to the Hudson river. General Gansevoort was apprised of the insurrection on the 5th. He immediately directed Colonels Yates and Henry K. Van Rensselaer, whose regiments, at that time, were the least affected with the insurgent spirit, to collect such troops as they could, and repair to St. Coych, to the assistance of Colonel John Van Rensselaer. An express being dispatched to the Governor, at Poughkeepsie, with the unwelcome information, and a request for directions what course to pursue in the emergency, the return of the messenger brought very explicit orders from the indomitable chief magistrate:--"I perfectly approve of your conduct," said the Governor; "and have only to add, that should the force already detached prove insufficient to quell the insurrection, you will make such addition to it as to render it effectual. I have transmitted to General Robert Van Rensselaer the information, and have directed him, in case it should be necessary, on your application, to give assistance from his brigade." [FN-1] Although the fact had not been stated in the dispatches forwarded to Governor Clinton, that the movement was beyond doubt sympathetic with, or instigated from, the Grants, yet the Governor was at no loss at once to attribute it to the "usurped government of that pretended State;" [FN-2] and it was his resolute determination to oppose force to force, and, in regard to the Grants themselves, to repel force by force.

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[FN-1] MS. letter of Governor Clinton to General Gansevoort, Dec 11, 1781.

[FN-2] Idem.

Gansevoort did not receive his instructions from the Governor until the 15th. Meantime Colonels Yates and Henry Van Rensselaer had made no progress in quelling the insurrection; the insurgents, on the other hand, being on the increase, and having thrown up a block-house for defence. On the 16th General Gansevoort took the field himself, repairing in the first instance to the head-quarters of General Stark at Saratoga, in order to obtain a detachment of troops and a field-piece. But the troops of Stark were too naked to move from their quarters; and it was thought improper for him to interfere without an order from General Heath. [FN-1] Gansevoort then crossed over to the east side of the river, in order to place himself at the head of such militia as he could muster in Schaghticoke and Hoosic; but was soon met by Colonel Yates, in full retreat from the house of Colonel John Van Rensselaer. He had been able to raise but eighty men to put down the insurgents of John Van Rensselaer's regiment; and on arriving at St. Coych, he discovered a force of five hundred men advancing from the Grants to the assistance of the rebels. Gansevoort retired five miles farther, in order to find comfortable quarters for his men, and then attempted, but without success, to open a correspondence with the leader of the insurgents. Calls had been made upon four regiments, viz. those of Colonels Yates, and Henry K. Van Rensselaer, as heretofore stated, and upon Colonel Van Vechten and Major Taylor. But from the whole no greater force than eighty men could be raised. Of Colonel Van Vechten's regiment, only himself, a few officers, and one private could be brought into the field. Under these discouraging circumstances, the General was compelled to relinquish the expedition, and the insurgents remained the victors, to the no small terror of those of the inhabitants who were well-disposed, inasmuch as they were apprehensive of being taken prisoners and carried away, as had been the case with others, should they refuse taking the oath of allegiance to the government of Vermont. [FN-2] Thus terminated the military events of the north, of all descriptions, for the year 1781.

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[FN-1] In his official report upon the subject, Gansevoort rather distrusted whether Stark assigned the true reason for withholding his aid on this occasion. Governor Chittenden, of the Grants, having just addressed him a letter requesting him not to interfere with hie troops.

[FN-2] The materials for this rapid sketch of the insurrection of Dec. 1781, at the north-east of Albany, have been drawn from the Gansevoort papers, which are broken and imperfect. The controversy with Vermont was continued, with greater or less force, and in different ways, for several years. But a calm and powerful letter from General Washington to Governor Chittenden, written early in January, 1782, had great influence in causing the government of the Grants to relinquish the territory of New-York, twenty miles broad, upon the eastern side of the Hudson, upon which they had seized. The leaders who had entered upon the correspondence with the enemy in Canada, continued an interchange of communications during several months of the following year; but the course of things soon stripped that strange negotiation of its danger, and rendered it of no importance. Meantime, although Governor Clinton was fully determined to subdue the refractory spirits of the Green Mountains, the latter continued to gain strength and friends, and as their local government became settled, it was for the most part wisely and efficiently administered. Time and again the question was brought before Congress, where nobody cared to act upon it definitively. Hamilton, Jay, and Governeur Morris, all seemed to think it the part of wisdom to allow the secession and independence of Vermont. Things remained in an unsettled state, however, until after the adoption of the federal constitution by New-York in 1788, after which the controversy was amicably adjusted; Vermont agreeing to pay thirty thousand dollars as a full indemnification to persons in New-York holding titles to lands within its boundaries.

There yet remain a few occurrences, connected with the Indian operations of the year, to be noted before closing the present chapter. It was in the Spring of this year that what was called the Coshocton campaign of Colonel Brodhead was performed, and was attended by circumstances that cannot be recalled with other than painful emotions. [FN-1] It had at different times been the purpose of the Commander-in-chief that Colonel Brodhead should penetrate through the Ohio territory to Detroit; but that design was never accomplished. The expedition now under review was led by Brodhead against the villages of the unfriendly Delaware Indians at the forks of the Muskingum. In passing through the settlement of the Moravian Indians at Salem, under the religious care of the Rev. Mr. Heckewelder, some of Brodhead's men manifested a hostile disposition toward those inoffensive noncombatants; but their hostile feelings were repressed by Brodhead, whose exertions were seconded by Colonel Shepherd, of Wheeling. The towns against which the Americans were proceeding were under the control of Captain Pipe, who had espoused the cause of the crown at the instigation of McKee, Elliott, and Girty. On approaching Coshocton, Brodhead's forces were divided into three divisions; and so secret and rapid was their march, that the villages on the eastern bank of the river were fallen upon, and all the Indians who were at home taken, without firing a gun. [FN-2] The immediate object of this visitation was to punish, as it was alleged, the Indians of those towns for some recent cruelties of unwonted atrocity. They had made a late incursion upon the frontiers of Virginia, in the course of which a considerable number of prisoners were taken; but, having been disappointed in the measure of their success, in a moment of rage they bound all the adult male captives to trees, and put them to death by torture, amidst the tears and lamentations of their families. [FN-3] It was now Colonel Brodhead's design to inflict summary vengeance for those murders. He had with him a friendly Delaware chief, named _Pekillon,_ who pointed out sixteen of the captive warriors, upon whom he charged the murders in question. A council of war was convened in the evening, which decided that those sixteen warriors should be put to death. They were therefore bound, and despatched with tomahawk and spear, and scalped. [FN-4]

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[FN-1] Doddridge, in his Indian Wars, dates the expedition referred to in 1790. Drake, who follows Heckewelder, states that it occurred in 1781.

[FN-2] Doddridge.

[FN-3] Drake.

[FN-4] Doddridge.

A heavy rain had swollen the river, so that Colonel Brodhead could not cross over to the villages upon the opposite side. On the following morning an Indian presented himself upon the other side, and called for an interview with the "Great Captain," meaning the commander of the expedition. Colonel Brodhead presented himself, and inquired what he wanted. "I want peace," was the reply. "Send over some of your chiefs," said the Colonel. "Maybe you kill," rejoined the Indian. "They shall not be killed," was the answer. A fine-looking sachem thereupon crossed the river, and while engaged in conversation with Colonel Brodhead, a white savage, named Wetzel, stole treacherously behind the unsuspecting warrior, and struck him dead to the earth. [FN]

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[FN] Doddridge.

Some ten or twelve prisoners were taken from another village farther up the river; and Brodhead commenced his return on the same day, committing the prisoners to a guard of militia. They had not proceeded far, however, before the barbarian guards began to butcher their captives; and all, save a few women and children, were presently despatched in cold blood. [FN]

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[FN] Idem.

Glancing yet farther south, the Cherokee Indians having again become troublesome, and made an incursion into South Carolina, massacring some of the inhabitants and burning their houses, General Pickens proceeded into their own country, and inflicted upon them severe and summary chastisement. In the space of fourteen days, at the head of less than four hundred men, he killed upward of forty of the Indians, and destroyed thirteen towns. His troops were mounted men, who charged rapidly upon the Indians, cutting them down with their sabres with great effect. Unused to this mode of warfare, they sued immediately for peace.

The fall of Cornwallis was, in fact, the last important act of that great drama--The American Revolution. Although the British were yet in considerable force in New-York, and were likewise in the occupancy of various posts in the southern states, still the season for active operations was past; and after the loss of the army of Cornwallis, they were not in sufficient force in the north to resist the troops that could now be directed against them. The campaigning of the year 1781, and in fact of the war of the Revolution, were therefore at an end. Still, there were other belligerent incidents occurring for months afterward, the record of which will require another chapter.