Chapter C: J. F

We are all surprised at your not knowing the great news on the
24th, which was the date of your letter by Gregson.

Every account from Ireland is pleasant to the greatest degree.

St. James's, May 31st, 1782

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO MR. FOX.

Paris, June 4th, 1782.

Dear Charles,

The _public_ letter which I send to you by Lauzun, is, as you
will see, of no other use than that of accounting for his
journey, and enabling him to carry to you this _private_ one, of
which I had once almost determined to be myself the bearer; an
apprehension, however, that so sudden an arrival might be
embarrassing to you, has decided me not to take that step, till
I had explained to you my reasons for wishing to do so, though I
should not care to write them, except in the full confidence
that they will be seen by no person whatever but yourself.
Recollect always that this letter is written in that confidence,
and I am sure I never can repent of having sent it.

You will easily see, from the tenor of the correspondence we
have hitherto had, that what little use I could be of to you
here, appeared to me to be in the communication that I had with
Franklin; I considered the rest of the negotiation as dependent
upon that, and the only possible immediate advantages which were
to be expected, seemed to me to rest in the jealousy which the
French Court would entertain of not being thoroughly supported
in everything by America. The degree of confidence which
Franklin seemed inclined to place in me, and which he expressed
to me more than once in the strongest terms, very much favoured
this idea, and encouraged me in wishing to learn from him what
might be in future ground for a partial connection between
England and America; I say in future, because I have hitherto
never much believed in any treaty of the year 1782; and my
expectation, even from the strongest of Franklin's expressions,
was not of an immediate turn in our favour, or any positive
advantage from the Commissioners in Europe, till the people in
America should cry out to them, from seeing that England was
meeting their wishes. It was in this light, too, that I saw room
to hope for some good effects from a voluntary offer of
unconditional independence to America, a chance which looked the
more tempting as I own I considered the sacrifice as but a small
one, and such as, had I been an American, I had thought myself
little obliged to Great Britain in this moment for granting,
except from an idea that if it was an article of treaty, it
would have been as much given by France as by England. I repeat
this only to remind you that, from these considerations, the
whole of my attention has been given to Franklin, and that I
should have considered myself as losing my time here, if it had
not been directed to that subject.

I believe I told you in my last, that I had very sanguine
expectations of Franklin's being inclined to speak out when I
should see him next; indeed, he expressly told me, that he would
think over all the points likely to establish a solid
reconciliation between England and America, and that he would
write his mind upon them, in order that we might examine them
together more in order; confiding, as he said, in me, that I
would not state them as propositions from him, but as being my
own ideas of what would be useful to both countries. (I
interrupt myself here to remind you of the obligation I must put
you under not to mention this). For this very interesting
communication, which I had long laboured to get, he fixed the
fourth day, which was last Saturday; but on Friday morning, Mr.
Oswald came, and having given me your letters, he went
immediately to Franklin, to carry some to him. I kept my
appointment at Passy the next morning, and in order to give
Franklin the greatest confidence, and at the same time, too, not
knowing how much Mr. Oswald might have told him, I began with
saying, that though under the difficulty which M. de Ve. and he
himself had made to my full power, it was not the moment as a
politician, perhaps, to make farther explanations till that
difficulty should be relieved; yet, to show him the confidence I
put in him, I would begin by telling him that I was authorized
to offer the independence in the first instance, instead of
making it an article of general treaty. He expressed great
satisfaction at this, especially, he said, because, by having
done otherwise, we should have seemed to have considered America
as in the same degree of connection with France which she had
been under with us; whereas, America wished to be considered as
a power, free and clear to all the world. But when I came to
lead the discourse to the subject which he had promised four
days before, I was a good deal mortified to find him put it off
altogether till he should be more ready; and notwithstanding my
reminding him of his promise, he only answered that it should be
in some days. What passed between Mr. Oswald and me will explain
to you the reason of this disappointment.

Mr. Oswald told me that Lord Shelburne had proposed to him, when
last in England, to take a commission to treat with the American
Ministers; that upon his mentioning it to Franklin now, it
seemed perfectly agreeable to him, and even to be what he had
very much wished; Mr. Oswald adding that he wished only to
assist the business, and had no other view; he mixed with this a
few regrets that there should be any difference between the two
offices; and when I asked upon what subject, he said, owing to
the Buckingham party being too ready to give up everything.

You will observe though, for it is on that account that I give
you this narrative, that this intended appointment has
effectually stopped Franklin's mouth to me; and that when he is
told that Mr. Oswald is to be the Commissioner to treat with
him, it is but natural that he should reserve his confidence for
the quarter so pointed out to him; nor does this secret seem
only known to Franklin; as Lafayette said, laughing, yesterday,
that he had just left _Lord Shelburne's ambassador_ at Passy.
Indeed, this is not the first moment of a separate and private
negotiation; for Mr. Oswald, suspecting, by something that I
dropped, that Franklin had talked to me about Canada, (though,
by the bye, he never had), told me this circumstance as follows.
When he was in England, the last time but one, he carried with
him a paper, entrusted to him by Franklin, under condition that
it should be shown only to Lord Shelburne, and returned into his
own hands at Passy; this paper, under the title of "Notes of a
Conversation," contained an idea of Canada being spontaneously
ceded by England to the Thirteen Provinces, in order that
Congress might sell the unappropriated lands, and make a fund
thereby, in order to compensate the damages done by the English
army, and even those sustained too by the royalists. This paper,
given with many precautions, for fear of its being known to the
French Court, to whom it was supposed not to be agreeable, Mr.
Oswald showed to Lord Shelburne, who, after keeping it a day, as
Mr. Oswald supposes to show to the King, returned it to him, and
it was by him brought back to Franklin.

I say nothing to the proposition itself, to the impolicy of
bringing a strange neighbourhood to the Newfoundland Fishery, or
to the little reason that England would naturally see in having
lost thirteen provinces to give away a fourteenth; but I mention
it to show you an early trace of separate negotiation, which
perhaps you did not before know. Under these circumstances, I
felt very much tempted to go over and explain them to you _vivâ
voce_ rather than by letter, and I must say, with the farther
intention of suggesting to you the only idea that seems likely
to answer your purpose, and it is this: the Spanish Ambassador
will in a day or two have the powers from his Court; the
Americans are here, so are the French; why should you not
consider this then as a Congress in full form, and send here a
person of rank, such as Lord Fitzwilliam, if he would come, so
as to have the whole negotiation in the hands of one person; you
would by that means recover within your compass the essential
part which is now out of it; nor do I see how Lord Shelburne
could object to such an appointment, which would in every
respect very much facilitate the business. Let me press this a
little strongly to you, for another reason: you may depend upon
it, people here have already got an idea of a difference between
the two offices, and consider how much that idea will be
assisted by the embarrassments arising from two people
negotiating to the same purpose, but under different and
differing authorities, concealing and disguising from each other
what with the best intentions they could hardly make known, and
common enough to each. I am almost afraid of pressing this as
strongly as I should, for fear you should think me writing
peevishly; but if I did not state the thing to you in the
situation in which I see it, I should think I was betraying your
interests instead of giving attention to them. I must entreat
you very earnestly to consider this, to see the impossibility of
my assisting you under this contrariety, to see how much the
business itself will suffer if carried on with the jealousy of
these clashing interests, and to see whether it may not all be
prevented by some such single appointment in high rank as that I
mentioned; _au reste_, I cannot but say that I feel much easier
with the hope of making over what remains of this business. I
begin to feel it weighty, and you know how much I dislike the
_publicity_ you packed off to me in that confounded silver box;
I could not bring myself to say anything civil about it in my
last letter, and you ought to give me credit for great
self-denial in not taking this opportunity of telling you my own
story at the Secretary's office, as nothing but the
embarrassment it might give you upon the sudden, prevented me.
Once more, I tell you I cannot fight a daily battle with Mr.
Oswald and _his secretary_; it would be neither for the
advantage of the business, for your interest, or your credit or
mine; and even if it was, I could not do it.

Concluding then the American business as out of the question,
which _personally_ I cannot be sorry for, you surely have but
one of two things to do: either to adopt the proposition of a
new _dignified_ peer's appointment, which being single, may
bring back the business to you by comprehending it all in one;
or Lord Shelburne must have his minister here, and Mr. Fox his;
by doing which, Mr. Fox will be pretty near as much out of the
secret, at least of what is most essential, as if he had nobody
here; and the only real gainers by it will be the other
Ministers, who cannot fail to profit of such a jumble. Besides
which, upon this latter part of the subject, I must very
seriously entreat you not to ask me to keep a situation here, in
no circumstances pleasant, and in none less so than those I have
described. The grievance is a very essential one, the remedy is
Lord Fitzwilliam.

Adieu. I recommend to Lauzun to make all the haste he can, as I
shall not stir a step till you answer this letter, and my step
then will, I hope, be towards you. Sheridan's letter of
suspicion was written, as you see, in the spirit of prophecy. I
owe him an answer, which, by word of mouth or word of letter, he
shall have very soon. The news of the day is, that the Cadiz
fleet, twenty-six of the line and five French, are sailed for
Brest, but I rather imagine they have no authentic account of it
yet.

I enclose to you P. Guemené's offer of some good champagne; if
you choose to have any, tell me what number of bottles, and let
Brooks or somebody let me know how they are to be sent to
England. I don't understand champagne, but this has a good
character.

Adieu. Let Lord Fitzwilliam answer my letter.

MR. FOX TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.)

St James's, June 10th, 1782.

Dear Grenville,

I received late the night before last your very interesting
letter of the 4th, and you will easily conceive am not a little
embarrassed by its contents. In the first place, it was not
possible to comply with your injunction of perfect secrecy in a
case where steps of such importance are necessary to be taken;
and therefore I have taken upon me (for which I must trust to
your friendship to excuse me) to show your letter to Lord
Rockingham, the Duke of Richmond and Lord John, who are all as
full of indignation at its contents as one might reasonably
expect honest men to be. We are perfectly resolved to come to an
explanation upon the business, if it is possible so to do,
without betraying any confidence reposed in me by you, or in you
by others.

The two principal points which occur are the paper relative to
Canada, of which I had never heard till I received your letter,
and the intended investment of Mr. Oswald with full powers,
which was certainly meant for the purpose of diverting
Franklin's confidence from you into another channel. With these
two points we wish to charge Shelburne directly; but pressing as
the King is, and interesting as it is both to our own situations
and to the affairs of the public--which are, I fear,
irretrievably injured by this intrigue, and which must be ruined
if it is suffered to go on--we are resolved not to stir a step
till we hear again from you, and know precisely how far we are
at liberty to make use of what you have discovered. If this
matter should produce a rupture, and consequently become more or
less the subject of public discussion, I am sensible the Canada
paper cannot be mentioned by name; but might it not be said that
we had discovered that Shelburne had withheld from our knowledge
matters of importance to the negotiation? And with respect to
the other point, might it not be said, without betraying
anybody, that while the King had one avowed and authorized
Minister at Paris, measures were taken for lessening his credit
and for obstructing his inquiries by announcing a new intended
commission, of which the Cabinet here had never been apprized.

Do, pray, my dear Grenville, consider the incredible importance
of this business in every view, and write me word precisely how
far you can authorize us to make use of your intelligence. It is
more than possible that, before this reaches you, many other
circumstances may have occurred which may afford further proofs
of this duplicity of conduct; and if they have, I am sure they
will not have escaped your observation. If this should be the
case, you will see the necessity of acquainting me with them as
soon as possible. You see what is our object, and you can easily
judge what sort of evidence will be most useful to us. When the
object is attained--that is, when the duplicity is proved--to
what consequences we ought to drive; whether to an absolute
rupture, or merely to the recal of Oswald and the simplification
of this negotiation, is a point that may be afterwards
considered. I own I incline to the more decisive measure, and so
I think do those with whom I must act in concert.

I am very happy indeed that you did not come yourself: the
mischief that would have happened from it to our affairs are
incredible; and I must beg of you, nay, entreat and conjure you,
not to think of taking any precipitate step of this nature. As
to the idea of replacing you with Lord Fitzwilliam, not only it
would be very objectionable on account of the mistaken notion it
would convey of things being much riper than they are, but it
would, as I conceive, be no remedy to the evil. Whether the
King's Minister at Paris be an Ambassador Extraordinary or a
Minister Plenipotentiary, can make no difference as to the
question. The clandestine manner of carrying on a separate
negotiation, which we complain of, would be equally practicable
and equally blameable if Lord Fitzwilliam was Ambassador, as it
is now that Mr. Grenville is Plenipotentiary. I must therefore
again entreat you, as a matter of personal kindness to me, to
remain a little longer at Paris; if you were to leave it, all
sorts of suspicions would be raised. It is of infinite
consequence that we should have it to say that we have done all
in our power to make peace, not only with regard to what may be
expected from America, but from Europe.

The King of Prussia is certainly inclined to be our friend; but
he urges and presses to make peace if possible. If we could once
bring the treaty to such a point as that, stating the demands on
each side to him, we could have his approbation for breaking it
off, I think it not impossible but the best consequences might
follow; and with regard to North America, it is surely clear to
demonstration, that it is of infinite consequence that it should
be publicly understood who is to blame if the war continues. I
do hope, therefore, that you will at all events stay long enough
to make your propositions, and to call upon them to make others
in return. I know your situation cannot be pleasant; but as you
first undertook it in a great measure from friendship to me, so
let me hope that the same motive will induce you to continue in
it at least for some time.

What will be the end of this, God knows; but I am sure you will
agree with me, that we cannot suffer a system to go on which is
not only dishonourable to us, but evidently ruinous to the
affairs of the country. In this instance, the mischief done by
intercepting, as it were, the very useful information we
expected through you from Franklin, is I fear in a great degree
irremediable; but it is our business, and indeed our duty, to
prevent such things for the future.

Everything in Ireland goes on very well; and I really think
there is good reason to entertain hopes from Prussia and Russia,
if your negotiation either goes on or goes off as it ought to
do.

I can hardly read Monsieur de Guemené's letter, but wish to have
two hundred bottles of the champagne, if there is really reason
to think it good. By the way, I beg you will remember me to
Monsieur de Guemené, and put him in mind of our former
acquaintance in the Rue St. Pierre. If the wine in question is
as good as that he used to rob from Monsieur de Soubise, I shall
be very well satisfied. I will give Brooks directions to
acquaint you with the proper manner of sending it. I am quite
ashamed of dwelling so long upon this, after the very serious
business of this letter; but you know I cannot help being a
friend to the _poor abuses_; and besides, in a political light,
good wine is no mean ingredient in keeping one's friends in good
humour and steady to the cause.

I am,

My dear Grenville,

Yours most affectionately,