Chapter XI: Part I: General Moral Theology (4)

245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one wished this as a means to save the neighbor’s life, while he still desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.

246. The Causes of Sin.--The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e., those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which are without).

247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect; (b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.

248. Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults. Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized; breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law; imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b) Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against conscience.

249. Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, _Nich. Ethics_, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

250. Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary, more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.

252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice of virtue.

253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but rather virtue and merit.

254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being overcome by sin.

255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to the sin suggested. This resistance may be:

(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance, while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;

(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;

(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;

(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.

256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave, the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable; otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example: If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its appealing features.

257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is true as regards temptations against purity.

258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a) Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples: Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.

259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it will result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger, but only accidentally from its possibility.

260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs according to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to which he exposes himself--and this even though the sin does not actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not imply affection for grave sin.

261. It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities would follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one feared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence referred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.

262. It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for, since almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the possibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed in grace.

263. The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances--persons, places or things--which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.

264. The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate or remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they will lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one is able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example, one who chooses dishonest persons as his associates is in a free occasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary occasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the impossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A wife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up an employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great temporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition. (c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion with him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home are a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an absent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.

265. It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it be present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the danger of sin (see 258 sqq.).

266. It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to neglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion by which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and protections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252 sqq.). The means that should be used depend on circumstances, but prayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.

267. The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an occasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a necessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which he is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to which he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins gravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.

268. The Motives of Sin.--The purposes that lead men to sin can be considered as follows: (a) according to the predominant vices of individual men, which are for them motives for committing their other sins (particular motives)--e.g., a man whose chief sin is unbelief and who is led by it to intolerance, blasphemy, despair, etc.; (b) according to the natural relationship and sequence between sins themselves, by which some are usually the motives for others _in all men (general motives)_.

269. The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin, on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows: (a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued (the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved (the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the vices of envy and anger).

270. The seven vices mentioned above are usually calle the capital, or head vices, since the other sins are directed by them just as the other parts of the body are directed by the head.

271. Among the seven capital vices there are two that have principality over the others: (a) in the intention of the sinner the motive force that impels to sin is always some inordinate desire of his own personal excellence, and hence pride is the beginning of all sin; (b) in the execution of the sin the opportunity for satisfying every base desire is afforded by money, and thus avarice is the root of nourishment of all evils.

272. The Results of Sin.--There are two kinds of sins from the viewpoint of origin: (a) original sin, which is inherited from Adam by all his descendants (except Christ and the Blessed Virgin); (b) actual sin, which is committed by the personal will of each sinner.

273. The immediate consequences of original sin were that Adam lost for himself and his posterity the gifts of the state of original innocence. Thus: (a) the soul in subjection to God was endowed with the beauty of holiness, to which succeeded the deformity of enmity against Him; (b) the powers of the soul were in harmony, the lower subject to the higher, but to this succeeded a state of disunion and rebellion and what are called the four wounds of nature, the intellect and will becoming prone to error and sin, and the sensitive appetites tending inordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body which had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from suffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to pain and death.

274. The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and actual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is opposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul defiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner incurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the internal law of reason and against the external law of God and man.

275. The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace, for otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere passing shadow over the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act of sin.

276. The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of original sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the subjection of reason and will to God), as being a voluntary privation through the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin is the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the individual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial sin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin, inasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace from appearing in external acts.

277. The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it removes the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it takes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused habits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of the rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits already acquired).

278. The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a) it disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it lessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice of the virtues more difficult.

279. The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense of sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by remorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical, civil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is against divine law, it is punished by God.

280. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a) Grave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from his Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable disorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave sin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not inflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the Last End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs, not an eternal, but a temporal punishment.

281. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin by which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of loss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This pain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite Good. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created things, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through creatures. This pain is finite.

282. Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a former sin (e.g., God may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to become the servants of their passions); (b) if the commission of sin is accompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous indulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).

283. Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastisements. In the strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted by the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of justice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must distinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which is compensation willingly endured for one’s own sin, or freely offered for another’s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for his sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human race); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as reparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against sin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the calamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of the Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes happen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the natural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst, disease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original sin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity and corruption of nature produced by original sin.

Question III

LAW

284. In the previous Question we considered the internal principles of human acts--that is, habits, good and bad, from which they proceed. Now we shall turn to the external principles, good and bad, that move one to one’s acts. The external principle that moves to evil is the demon, who tempts us to sin; the external principle that moves to good is God, who instructs us by His law and helps us by His grace to fulfill it. Temptation has been discussed already, and grace belongs to Dogmatic Theology; the next Question to be considered, therefore, is Law.

Art. 1: LAW IN GENERAL

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 90-92.)

285. Definition.--Law is an ordinance of the reason for the common good promulgated by him who has authority in the community.

(a) It is an ordinance, that is, a command or prohibition which has obligatory and lasting force. Hence, advice is not a law, because not obligatory; a rule that binds only during the lifetime of the lawgiver or of those who received it is not strictly a law, because not enduring.

(b) It is an ordinance of the reason, since the rule and standard of human acts is reason (see 64 sqq.). Hence, the arbitrary will of a ruler commanding what is against reason would not be law, but rather iniquity.

(c) It is made for the common good, that is, it must tend to promote, directly or indirectly, general happiness, which is the end of society. Hence, the commands of a tyrant which benefit a few at the expense of public peace and prosperity are not truly laws.

(d) It is made by him who has authority, that is, by the person or persons who have the lawmaking power according to the form of government. Hence, the decisions of an advisory body or the decrees of a usurper are not laws.

(e) It is made by the proper authority in a community, that is, as here understood, in a self-sufficing community, which has its own means for attaining its end and is independent in its own order of other societies. Hence, the regulations made by parents for their family are not called laws, since the family is not a self-sufficing society.

(f) It is an ordinance that has been promulgated, that is, brought to the notice of those whom it binds. Hence, a law that has been drawn up but not published as such, is not obligatory even for those who know of its existence. A law becomes obligatory, however, as soon as it has been promulgated, and the presumption then is that the law is known; but he who is inculpably ignorant is not guilty of formal sin if he breaks the law.

286. Division.--According as the immediate lawgiver is God or man, laws are divine or human. Divine laws are threefold: (a) the eternal law is the ordinance of the divine mind which from eternity has directed the motions and actions of all creatures for the common good of the universe; (b) the natural law is the light of man’s reason as an impression and reflection of the eternal law; (c) the positive divine law is that which God of His free will has added to the natural law, viz., the Mosaic law under the Old Testament and the law of the Gospel under the New Testament.

287. Human laws are ecclesiastical or civil according to the authority from which they originate.

288. Collision of Laws.--Not infrequently it happens that opposite laws seem to call for fulfillment at the same time, as, when in case of unjust attack it seems that one is bound to defend oneself and bound not to injure the other party. Hence arises a conflict of obligations and rights. But the difficulty is only apparent; for, since God is a just and wise lawgiver, He does not intend either that one should be held to impossibilities, or that a superior obligation should yield to one that is inferior. Hence, the rule in such cases of apparent collision of laws is:

(a) if a person can recognize which of the two obligations is superior, he is bound to follow that one; (b) if he is unable to discover after careful examination which obligation has the greater claim, and must decide at once, he may decide for the law whose observance seems to him safer; or, if he sees no difference as regards safety, he may decide for either as he wishes. If the decision is wrong, the error is involuntary, and hence not imputable as sin.

289. When the contending precepts belong to different categories of law, the higher law must be followed. (a) The natural law has precedence over the positive law, divine or human. For example, the natural law of self-preservation allowed David to eat the loaves of proposition, a thing forbidden by the positive divine law. The same law of self-preservation allows a starving man to take what does not belong to him according to human laws, if it is necessary for his life. The same law of self-preservation excuses one from assisting at Mass, if one is very ill.

(b) The positive divine law has precedence over human law. Example: The command of Christ to his Apostles to preach His Name was to be obeyed rather than the command of the Sanhedrin to the contrary (Acts, v. 19). (c) The ecclesiastical law has precedence over civil law, for the end of the Church is higher than that of the State, and the Church’s judgment about the means to her end should prevail.

290. The precedence of ecclesiastical over civil law does not mean that the Church has the right to interfere in matters that belong to the jurisdiction of the State, or that the Church should insist on settling every dispute by its own action alone.

(a) A law on matters purely civil and political made by the Church in opposition to a law of the State would not prevail over the latter, for, as the Church admits, “whatever is to be ranged under the civil and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority” (Leo XIII).

(b) A law on matters directly or indirectly spiritual, made by the Church but not necessary to her end, can be made the subject of negotiation or even of compromise by the Church in order to avoid a conflict of laws; in fact, the Church has shown her willingness to make concessions, where possible, for the common peace and happiness.

291. When contending laws belong to the same category of laws, the more important, or more urgent, or more necessary law prevails.

(a) The law that defends greater goods (those that are spiritual, internal, or common) has precedence over the law that defends lesser goods (the temporal, external, or private). Examples: The natural law that one must save oneself from persecution and death yields to the natural law that one must not blaspheme or deny God, and hence one must prefer to die rather than blaspheme. The law that one may not expose one’s life to danger yields to the law that the common welfare must be defended; hence, citizens are obliged to go to war when the nation calls, pastors and physicians to remain at their posts in time of pestilence, disaster, etc.

(b) Obligations of justice have precedence over obligations of charity, for in the former case a stricter right is in question. Example: Titus is keeping $5.00 in order to pay a debt to Caius, who needs the money today; Balbus, who is very poor, asks Titus to give the money to him. Titus should pay Caius.

(c) Negative or prohibitory laws have precedence over affirmative or preceptive laws (see 371). Example: Titus is asked to write out a testimonial stating that he knows that Balbus is honest, competent, etc. Balbus has claims on the help of Titus on account of a promise made in the past; but Titus knows very well that Balbus is not competent, honest, etc. The law forbidding lies prevails here over the law that one keep a promise made.

292. Since rights and duties are correlative--there being a duty that corresponds to every right, and vice versa--and since both are regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.

(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example: Titus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the hospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.

(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because they are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc. Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to serve God or preserve one’s life.

293. The Basis of All Laws.--Prior to every other law and the ground and principle of all laws is the Eternal Law; for, since this is the plan of Divine Wisdom directing from eternity all acts and movements to their particular ends and to the end of the universe, it follows that all other laws are reflections of the eternal plan and realizations of the divine decree. The Eternal Law differs from other laws in various ways:

(a) as to duration. The Eternal Law existed before anything was made, whereas all other laws begin to exist when they are promulgated;

(b) as to breadth of application. The Eternal Law regulates, not only contingent things (such as actions) but also necessary things (such as that man should have a soul, hands and feet); for all things created, whether they be contingent or necessary, are subject to divine government. Human laws, as is evident, cannot regulate what is necessary (e.g., it would be foolish for them to decree that men must or must not have souls);

(c) as to subjects. The Eternal Law rules, not only rational creatures (i.e., angels and men), but also irrational creatures, such as matter, plants, and animals. The former are ruled through commands, which require that they direct themselves to their End; the latter are ruled through the inclinations given them by God, which move them to the ends He desires them to attain. Human laws cannot regulate the acts of irrational creatures, for these creatures cannot understand a command as such, and man cannot give them natural inclinations (e.g., it would be foolish to make a law for cats against the catching of birds).

294. The laws to be considered in the pages that follow are temporal and moral. Thus: (a) they are laws promulgated at some particular time, either from the beginning of humanity (as is the case with the Natural Law) or later (e.g., the Mosaic Law, the Christian Law, etc,); (b) they are laws regulating, not the necessary (as is the case with metaphysical or mathematical laws), but the contingent; (c) they are laws given, not to the irrational creature (as is the case with physical and biological laws), but to the rational, that it may attain its end through self-government in accordance with law.

Art. 2: THE NATURAL LAW

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 93, 94.)

295. Meaning.--The Natural Law is so called for the following reasons: (a) it is received by man, not through special promulgation, but along with his rational nature. Hence, St. Paul says that the Gentiles, who had not received the laws specially promulgated, were a law unto themselves, that is, through their rational nature (Rom., ii. 14); (b) it includes only such precepts as can be known or deduced from the very nature of man, and thus some pagans fulfilled the Law of Moses naturally, i.e., as regards its natural precepts (Rom., ii. 14); (c) it can be known from the natural light of reason without instruction, being a law written on the heart of man (Rom, ii. 15).

The Natural Law is defined theologically as a participation of the Eternal Law in man. Three elements constitute its essence in its integrity: (a) a passive participation of the Eternal Law consisting in man’s nature and faculties with their inclinations to their proper acts and ends. This man shares with all creatures. (b) an active participation in the Eternal Law proper to man. This consists in the activity of man’s intellect through which he shares in God’s providence and government in a special way as one who can rule himself and others. Reason, reflecting upon the natural inclinations and ordering them to their proper acts and ends, formulates (c) a dictate or command of the practical reason. This command constitutes the essence of Natural Law. “Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm, IV. 6): _Offer up the sacrifice of justice_, as though some one asked what the works of justice are, adds: _Many say, Who showeth us good things_, in answer to which he says: _The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us_. Thus the Psalmist implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and bad, which is the function of the Natural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light. It is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (_Summa Theol_. I-II, q. 91, a.2).

296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.-(a) The Natural Law is inferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the mind of God, underived from any other law and is regulative of all created things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a derivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man’s acts only. (b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction from or a determination of Natural Law.

297. Division.--Since Natural Law is the reflection of the eternal plan of Divine Wisdom in the reason of man, we cannot distinguish different species of it according to difference of lawgivers or subjects. The objects regulated are, however, different; and hence we may distinguish various precepts of Natural Law.

(a) According to the difference of persons to whom natural duties are owed, there are natural laws concerning God (e.g., that God must be honored), natural laws concerning self (e.g., that one must not commit suicide), and natural laws concerning the neighbor (e.g., that injustice must not be done).

(b) According to the difference of natural inclinations in man, there are, first, natural laws common to him with all beings (e.g., the law of self-preservation, and hence it is a natural duty of man to take sleep, food, drink, remedies, etc., as necessary for life); secondly, natural laws common to him with all sentient beings or animals (e.g., the law of preservation of the species, and hence it is a natural duty of man to rear and provide for his children); thirdly, natural laws proper to man as a rational being (e.g., the laws that he should cultivate his powers of mind and will, and hence it is a natural duty of man to further religion and education, and to organize into societies and to respect the rights of others).

298. According to their necessity for the primary or the secondary end of a natural inclination, the laws of nature are divided into primary and secondary. (a) The primary end of a natural inclination is the conservation of a natural good; and so it is a primary law of nature that man should take the food, drink, sleep and exercise necessary for life, and that he should avoid poison or other things that cause death. (b) The secondary end of a natural inclination is the betterment of a natural good, or its easier conservation; thus, it is a secondary law of nature that man should use those kinds of food or drink that promote his health, that he should be careful about his diet, practise moderation, etc.

299. Primary and secondary laws of nature are also explained as follows: (a) a primary law is one that expresses the principal purpose of a natural inclination (e.g., social good, that is, the begetting and rearing of children, is the primary law of the married state); (b) the secondary law is one that expresses a less important purpose of a natural inclination. For example, individual good (i.e., companionship, mutual assistance, the practice of virtue and freedom from temptation) is the secondary purpose to be promoted in the married state.

300. Precepts of the Natural Law may be divided also on account of the different relations they have to one another or to our knowledge.

(a) According to the priority they have among themselves, the laws of nature are divided into the first principle and the secondary principles. The first principle, which is general, which depends on no other, and which is the root of all the others, is: “Good must be done, evil omitted.” The secondary principles are particular, and they apply this general principle to the natural inclinations of man mentioned above, which reason indicates as ends of action--i.e., as goods to be sought.

(b) According to the priority they have with respect to our knowledge of them, the laws of nature are divided, first, into axiomatic precepts, which are evident and are granted by all (e.g., that good is to be done, that one should follow reason, that one should not do to others what one does not wish done to oneself etc.), and, secondly, into inferred precepts (e.g., that one should not steal from others, as one does not wish others to steal from oneself).

301. The inferred precepts are also of two kinds, namely, general and particular. (a) The general precepts are those that are deduced immediately from the axioms as universal conclusions (e.g., the commandments of the Decalogue, the principle that one should return what one borrowed). (b) The particular precepts are those that are deduced only remotely from the axioms as conclusions about cases in which many particular conditions and circumstances are involved (e.g., many conclusions about contracts, the conclusion that a loan is to be paid in some particular way, at this particular time, etc.).

302. According to the invariability or permanence of their subject-matter, the laws of nature are of two kinds, namely, necessary and contingent. (a) The necessary laws are those whose matter always bears the same relation of essential conformity to or difformity from reason. For example, the command, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord in vain,” is necessary, because God remains always worthy of honor, and there is no conceivable or possible case in which it could become useful to speak of Him with dishonor. (b) The contingent laws of nature are those whose matter generally, but not always, bears the same essential relation to right reason. For example, the command, “Thou shalt not kill,” is contingent, because, though man generally remains worthy of having his life respected by others, there are cases when it might be injurious to the common welfare, and hence to natural law, that an individual be permitted to live, as when he has committed and been convicted of a capital crime.

303. According to the manner in which they oblige, the laws of nature are twofold, namely, absolute and relative. (a) Absolute laws are those that oblige for every case and condition, because the matter with which they are concerned is intrinsically good or bad in every instance (e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between parent and child, the law against polyandry). (b) Relative laws of nature are those that oblige except in case of a most grave public necessity, because the matter with which they are concerned is generally and of its very nature becoming or unbecoming (e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between brother and sister, the law forbidding polygamy).

304. According to the manner in which the obligation is contracted, laws of nature are of two kinds, viz., those whose obligatory force depends entirely on the nature of things (e.g., the law that God must be honored), and those whose obligatory force depends upon, an act of the will of man freely undertaking an obligation, which the nature of things then demands that he fulfill (e.g., the laws that those who have made vows, oaths, contracts, etc., should live up to that which they have freely promised).

305. Properties.--Since the Natural Law is the reflection of God’s Eternal Law impressed on the rational nature of man, it has the following properties: (a) it is both declarative and imperative; being immanent in man, it declares to him his duty; being transcendent in its origin, it speaks with the voice of authority; (b) it is universal, or for all, for it declares the necessities of nature, which are the same in all men; (c) it is unchangeable, that is, it admits of neither abrogation, nor dispensation, nor emendatory interpretation, for the essences of things, on which it is based, do not change; (d) it is recognizable and indelible, that is, it cannot fail to be known and cannot be forgotten by mankind, for it is promulgated through the light of reason given to man.

306. The Natural Law is of universal obligation. It is in force in all places, at all times, and for all persons. (a) Thus, those who have not the use of reason, such as infants and the insane, are subject to the Natural Law on account of their human nature which is injured by any transgression of its inclinations. Their ignorance, of course, excuses them from formal sin (see 24 sqq., 97 sqq.). Example: It is sinful to induce or permit children to blaspheme or become intoxicated, not only because of scandal or of harm done to them, but also because such things are necessarily repugnant to their dignity as human beings. (b) those who have the use of reason are subject to the Natural Law, and their transgressions are imputable as formal sins and incur the debt of punishment.

307. The Natural Law is unchangeable, not as regards additions, but as regards subtractions. (a) Additions may be made to the Natural Law, for, in many points not determined by it, it is well that supplementary regulations be made to provide for particular situations. These additions, made by Positive Law, divine and human, are amplifications rather than changes, for they must not be out of harmony with Natural Law. (b) Subtractions may not be made from the Natural Law--that is, there can be no exception when it declares that a certain thing must always be observed, and there can be no abrogation when it declares that a certain thing must be observed usually.

308. From the foregoing it follows that no precept of the Natural Law can be abrogated--that is, repealed and deprived of all force, so that what was today a precept of nature should no longer be such tomorrow; for the necessities of nature on which the Natural Law is based do not change.

309. As to the question whether any precepts of the Natural Law may be dispensed or not, distinction must be made between two kinds of dispensation.

(a) A dispensation in the strict sense is granted when a legislator relaxes for a particular case the obligation of a law, although the subject-matter of the law still remains. Example: Titus is in the class of those who are bound by the law of fast, but he is exempted by competent authority from the obligation of the law.

(b) A dispensation in the wide sense is granted when the subject-matter of the law is taken away by the legislator himself or by another, so that it ceases to be comprehended under the law, although the obligation of the law still remains. Example: Balbus owed money to Caius, but, as Caius forgave him the debt, he is no longer in the class of those who are bound by law as debtors to Caius; he is not exempted, however, from the obligation of the general law that one must pay one’s debts.

310. There are various opinions as to the possibility of a dispensation from the Natural Law granted by God, but the following doctrine seems the most probable.

(a) God Himself cannot dispense in any way from those precepts whose matter is necessary (see 302), such as axiomatic precepts (viz., those that prohibit malice and those that command duties to be fulfilled at a proper time and place). For all the subject-matter of these precepts is intrinsically either consonant with or dissonant from right reason. Example: God could not by decree abolish the Ten Commandments, for, as long as God is God, He must remain worthy of worship, praise and love; and, as long as man is man, it must be against his rational nature to murder, steal, lie. etc.

(b) God cannot grant a dispensation in the strict sense from those precepts of the Natural Law whose matter is contingent, such as the precepts against the taking of human life, against taking possessions from others against their will, etc. For, as long as the subject-matter of these precepts remains what it is supposed to be by the law, transgression of them is necessarily opposed to reason. Example: God cannot command the killing of a person who has the right to life, nor the taking of property that rightly belongs to another.

(c) God can grant a dispensation in the wide sense from contingent precepts of the Natural Law--that is, He can make a change as regards the subject-matter, so that it no longer falls under the law. Thus, since God is the supreme Lord of life and property, He can without injury to human rights command that a person be put to death or deprived of his property by another. These acts would not constitute murder (i.e., unjust homicide) or stealing (i.e., unlawful taking); for God has a higher claim on life and possessions than the immediate owners have. Examples: The command to Abraham to kill his son was not a dispensation from the law against murder any more than the sending of death to the first-born of Egypt was the commission of murder by God. The command given the Israelites to carry away with them the goods of the Egyptians was not a dispensation from the law against theft, any more than the destruction of the fruits of the Egyptians by plagues was the commission of theft by God.

311. Is God able to make a decree which sets up a most grave public necessity opposed to the observance of a law of nature?

(a) If there is question of absolute laws (see 303), this cannot be done, for God cannot deny Himself by making a disposition contrary to His Eternal Law. Example: We do not read that God ever sanctioned polyandry or marriage between parent and child, and it seems that He could never permit such things as lawful.

(b) If there is question of relative laws (see 303), the decree in question can be made by God; for the unbecomingness of that which is forbidden by a relative law passes away in the face of a great need. Example: Since God desired the propagation of the human race from one man and one woman, marriage between brothers and sisters was not against the Natural Law at the beginning. Since God desired the speedy multiplication of the chosen people after the patriarchal era, polygamy was not repugnant to nature among the Jews of that period.

312. Is God able to remove a natural obligation in a case of private necessity, that is, when the fulfillment would be harmful to an individual?

(a) Natural obligations that do not depend upon any free consent of the will given to them (see 304) cannot be removed except by a dispensation widely so-called and when their matter is contingent (as explained in 309-310). Examples: God could not dispense an individual from the duty of confessing Him in order to escape death, for the subject-matter of the law here is necessary. God, could dispense an individual from the obligation of not taking the property of another, for God is the principal owner of all things, including those possessed by others.