Chapter XXVII: Part II: Special Moral Theology (8)

(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the sin--that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon--one is more guilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he reasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain pardon. Caius, when urged to repent, always replies that it will be a simple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius goes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is just as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a hundred sins as of ten.

1089. In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for example, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of presumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of his own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God’s mercy or his own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full consent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence is inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation without any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous thought as soon as he takes notice of it.

1090. Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed into venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent of the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter involved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly so-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the matter, for the matter, man’s eternal destiny, must always be an affair of the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and despair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of smallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to things other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in overcoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too much. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly in the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.

1091. The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption which depends too much on one’s own powers arises from vainglory, for, the more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things that are above one, especially such as are new and will attract applause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance seems to result from pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon without repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very exaggerated opinion of his own importance.

1092. The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.--Since hope is a necessary preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised that scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.

(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins with the words: “I am the Lord thy God” (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in the First and Fourth Commandments.

(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope, in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: “Hope in Him, all ye congregation of people” (Ps. lxi. 9); “Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God” (I Tim., vi. 17).

1093. Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life, the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and absolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence, man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be admitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be indifferent about one’s own salvation, or the means thereto. Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.

1094. Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of another’s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself, this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God’s book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it (such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip., i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain of salvation and die at once.

1095. At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest. (b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts of hope.

1096. By reason of the virtue of hope itself (i.e., on account of the response one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal life), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:

(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between God and creatures as the object of one’s happiness. This moment occurs for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in this connection the words of Christ: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice” (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning from creatures towards God: “Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day” (Ecclus, v. 8).

(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the act of hope: “The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world, looking for the blessed hope” (Titus, ii. 11, 12), “Serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope” (Rom., xii. 11, 12); “He that plougheth, should plough in hope” (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more perfect must have on “the helmet of hope” (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope all are saved (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi). But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).

1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the reception of the Sacraments.

1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made explicitly, when one expresses one’s confident expectation, the objects expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: “O my God, relying on Thy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life everlasting.” This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is made implicitly, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of hope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, “Thy Kingdom come,” utter the soul’s expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The implicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.

1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another virtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being contained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.

1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?

(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope (I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019, 1031).

(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of inordinate love of creatures.

(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.

1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.

(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he hopes in God’s mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven by his works and must pray to God in his necessities--things that are impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).

(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific vision.

1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.

(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine infusion, not on human acts (see 745).

(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues. For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same time not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one’s conduct conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to believe and yet not practise one’s belief (see 1016, 1030).

(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is living on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who is associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and restitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not contrary to, but beyond theological hope.

1103. Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.--(a) Servile fear was not commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments” (Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).

1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.

Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)

1105. Definition.--The word “charity” (_carum_, what is held dear, highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular sense.

(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for His own sake, and others on account of God.

1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true good.

(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him towards its possession.

(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or destroy what one loves.

(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the love one has of being entertained.

1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b) separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it from him.

1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results, not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own existence;

(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a species of sense love;

(c) Rational love (_dilectio_) arises from the reflection of the mind, and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the worth of the beloved object.

1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor concupiscentiae_), which is affection for an object which one desires for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else (thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence (_amor benevolentiae_), which is had for an object to which one wishes good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when one wishes to give him food or money).

1110. The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who is loved does not reciprocate the other party’s affection, they are not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties have common interests and that they delight in each other’s company, which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus, there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen, of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together, and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing special in common.

1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one’s friend, not for the friend’s sake, but for one’s own advantage or gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus, because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus, on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of each other’s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).

(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the other’s virtue.

1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God (John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: “I love them that love Me” (Prov., viii. 20); “He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir to glory in which he will share happiness with God.

1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: “God is charity, and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God” (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as love. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as “Fount of life, fire, charity, and spiritual anointing.” (b) Created charity is a supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: “The charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created charity.

1114. Created charity is defined: “A supernatural virtue infused by God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account of God.” Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

1115. The Excellence of Charity.--Human friendship of the lower kind is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship, however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: “These three: faith, hope and charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e., the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the beatific vision to be bestowed by God).

1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: “The greatest of these is charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.

(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end. Nor are they meritorious without charity, for “if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (I Cor., xiii. 3).

(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues. Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money (false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his family duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).

1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by various titles.

(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues. This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are; otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of perfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the Last End.

(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii. 17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the sense that it supports and nourishes them.

(c) It is also spoken of as the end and the mother of the other virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and produces their acts by commanding their exercise: “The end of the commandment is charity” (I Tim., i. 5).

1119. Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil, affirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).

(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in deed: “Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.”

(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such as pride, ambition, greed, anger: “Charity is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.”

(c) It forbids that one harm one’s own soul by thoughts or desires of wrong: “Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.”

(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects, rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: “Charity is patient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.”

(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them: “Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

1120. Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes them perfect and meritorious.

(a) Actual direction--that is, the intention here and now to believe, or hope, etc., out of love for God--though more perfect, is not required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit would become extremely difficult and rare.

(b) Habitual direction--that is, the mere fact that one has the habit of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope, etc, now made--does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.

(c) Virtual direction--that is, the influence of an intention, once made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes, etc.--at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice, however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of charity, actual or virtual.

1121. Production of Charity.--The virtue of charity belongs to the appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph., iii. 19).

1122. The Origin of Charity.--(a) Charity is not caused by nature, nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed, is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).

1123. The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.

(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were lower, both in nature and in grace.

(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according “to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii. 8; I Cor., xii. 2).

(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, “everyone according to his proper ability” (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).

1124. Charity may be increased: “I pray that your charity may more and more abound” (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity, for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.

1125. With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.

1126. Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the act be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded by charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for God). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward (Matt., X. 42).

1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place, there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems more probable:

(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act is conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.

(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory, for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude one merited during life. Hence, those who make many--even though less fervent--acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree of reward for them hereafter.

1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life, when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was predestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II Cor., vi. 11).

1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same degree in which He is lovable--that is, infinitely; but it is clear that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect charity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17); but it has three degrees:

(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life, consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God and loving Him.

(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just, consists in this, that one gives all one’s time to divine things, as far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.

(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just, consists in this, that habitually one gives one’s whole heart to God, permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.

1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes: (a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the perfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of their love (Philip., i. 13).

1131. The Decline of Charity.--(a) Actual charity can decline, in the sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded (Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical habit decrease.

1132. The Loss of Charity.--(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man’s free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23). (b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a turning to God, the Last End: “He that hath My commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me” (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.

1133. The Object of Charity.--There is a threefold object of charity: (a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural illumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the chief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): “Thou shalt love the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment” (Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: “And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (ibid, 39).

1134. The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St. John says: “Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world” (I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity, even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit, and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of one’s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for in both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God Himself).

1135. Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109), that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.

(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one’s friends. The same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.

(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with charity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or the use of man).

1136. Love of self is of various kinds.

(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others. Of those who indulge their passions it is said: “In the last days shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves” (II Tim., iii. 1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: “All seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ’s” (Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.) to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one holds him as another self.

(c) Supernatural self-love is that love which one has for God, and consequently for self as a friend of God.

1137. If by “self” we understand the substance and nature of man, as composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by “self” we mean principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor., iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in beatitude: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (II Cor., v. 4); (e) according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints have shown their hatred of the body’s corruption by the mortifications to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c) supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of heavenly calling.

1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has for one’s friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of passion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts and graces which evoke them are participations of God’s goodness, which is the object of charity.

1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship, that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with them (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for they also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).

1142. Charity for Sinners.--Should we love with charity those who are sinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as enemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an offense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of God (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of charity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present life; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not restricted to loving the just.

1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32). (b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps. lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that are met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.

1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell, for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He who wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means to a spiritual awakening.

1145. Association with Sinners.--(a) It is never lawful to associate with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: “Go out from among them and be ye separate” (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to associate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not endangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance (Matt., ix. 10-13).

1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains to charity (Jer, xv. 19).

1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship. If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party, and may prove harmful.

1148. Charity towards Enemies.--Enemies can be considered in two senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for beatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with charity--that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings, enemies should be loved with charity--that is, their nature created by God and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us, for love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that which is not well disposed towards ourselves.