Chapter LI: Part II: SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued) (14)

2175. The External Acts of Religion.--We proceed now to those acts of religion which are performed in an outward manner. But it should be noted that just as devotion and prayer find external expression (as in vocal prayer), so the external acts of religion should proceed from internal devotion. The outward religious acts may be classified under three groups: (a) the acts in which one offers one’s body as a mark of veneration to God (adoration); (b) the acts in which one offers external goods, whether given (sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits, tithes) or promised (vows); (c) the acts in which one makes use of divine things to honor God (Sacraments, oaths, adjuration, praises).

2176. Definition of Adoration.--Adoration or worship is honor shown to God through bodily acts offered in acknowledgment of His supreme excellence and of our dependence on Him.

(a) Thus, it is acknowledgment of dependence on God, and as such it differs from mere honor, which may be shown even to an equal.

(b) It is an acknowledgment of supreme excellence, and so it differs from veneration shown to creatures who are above us. Adoration (_latria_), therefore, is not the same thing as the sacred cult or veneration shown the Blessed Virgin (_hyperdulia_) and the Saints (_dulia_) on account of their supernatural grace and glory; much less is it the same thing as the civil cult shown to persons illustrious for natural qualities, such as acquired knowledge, political dignity or power, etc.: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve” (Matt, iv. 10).

2177. Unity and Variety of Adoration.--Adoration is but one, though it has various expressions. (a) The unity of adoration depends on the unity of its object. There is but one God to whom belong the various divine attributes, and the three Divine Persons share the same majesty. Hence, there is but one adoration. (b) The variety in adoration is in the expression. The higher expression of adoration is internal: it does not depend on bodily acts or places, and it is offered by Angels as well as by man. The lower expression of adoration is made through bodily acts, such as genuflections, prostrations, prayer with face to the east, and the use of sacred places for worship, all of which externals are employed as aids to devotion and symbols of the divine glory (Matt., xviii, 20; Luke, xix. 46). Some of the actions here mentioned are sometimes used in the religious or civil cult shown to creatures, but internal adoration belongs to God alone.

2178. Definition of Sacrifice.--Sacrifice is the offering to God and a real changing of a sensible thing, made by a lawful minister, in acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him.

(a) It is an offering or oblation; that is, one makes a gift directly to God Himself. Thus, sacrifice differs from contributions of the people made for the clergy or the church.

(b) It offers a sensible thing, that is, some object perceptible by the senses or hidden under sensible species; for sacrifice is an outward sign of the inner offering, by which the soul itself is subjected to God.

(c) It is made by a lawful minister, for sacrifice is a public act performed in the name of the community, and hence it may be offered only by those who represent the community. St. Paul declares that a high-priest is chosen from men to offer sacrifice, and that no one may take the honor to himself unless he is called as Aaron was (Heb., v. 4).

(d) It is made to God alone, since God alone is our First Beginning and Last End: “He who sacrifices to other gods besides the Lord shall be put to death” (Exod., xxii. 20). Mass in honor of the Blessed Virgin or the Saints means that sacrifice is offered God in thanksgiving for their merits or in petition that we may imitate their virtues. Oblations may be made to men, but sacrifice may be offered only to God.

(e) It is through a real change of the thing offered, which thus becomes the victim of sacrifice; for the supreme act of worship reserved to God acts upon the substance itself of an external thing to signify that the worshipper offers his own being to God. The change in the thing sacrificed consists in its being made sacred, or set apart as the central object in the supreme act of worship.

(f) It is made in acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him; that is, it is an act whose direct and proper end is the exercise of the virtue of religion. Thus, sacrifice differs from acts of self-sacrifice such as continence, abstinence, martyrdom, even when they are offered in honor of God, for the direct and proper end of these acts is some other virtue than that of religion. The act of sacrifice may have no purpose except worship, but other virtuous acts have their own ends to make them praiseworthy, even when they are used as acts of worship.

2179. The Essentials of Sacrifice.--(a) The outward sign may be said to consist of matter and form. The matter is some sensible thing used as victim, whether it be inanimate (e.g., the bread and wine of Melchisedech), or animate (e.g., the paschal lamb), or human (e.g., Our Lord in His passion). The form is some sensible action that makes the victim sacred by dedicating it to sacrificial oblation (e.g., the breaking of bread, the libation of wine, the offering of the slain lamb, the voluntary and visible acceptance of death by Our Lord). In the Mass Christ is sacrificed, not as existing under His own appearances, but as present under the sacramental species and offered through His representatives; and hence in the Mass the Victim is sensible by means of the species that signify and contain Him, while the dedication by the Supreme Priest is made sensible through the words of the ministering priest who acts for Christ.

(b) The inner thing that is signified in sacrifice is primarily the offering of self to God, in recognition that from Him we have our being and in Him is our happiness. But secondarily it signifies the fruits we derive from union with God (e.g., the benefits of redemption and salvation). Thus, the sacrificial death of Christ is also a symbol of man’s death to sin and life in God (I Peter, iv. 1).

2180. The Obligation of Sacrifice.--(a) The internal or spiritual sacrifice is obligatory for all, since all are bound to offer God devotion of will, communion of mind, recognition of His supremacy. (b) The external sacrifice improperly so called, which consists in the practice of works of virtue, is obligatory for all in so far as commanded acts are concerned, but not when virtuous deeds are of supererogation. (c) The external sacrifice properly so called, which consists in an outward sign indicative of internal worship of God, is by natural law necessary, for reason itself shows to man that he is an inferior and dependent being, and so should acknowledge the superiority of God and his own submission by acts suitable to his nature as a being composed of body and soul, and for whom sensible things are signs of spiritual truths.

2181. Exemptions Based on the Natural Law.--Though the external sacrifice strictly so called is obligatory from natural law, it is not a primary precept of nature, nor does nature determine its details.

(a) Hence, the fact of the obligation may be unknown to an individual, since (though reason indicates it) it is not evident and rests upon a number of premises from which it has to be reasoned out. Unlike the duty of honoring parents, which is immediately inferred from natural principles, the duty of offering sacrifice is only remotely inferred, and hence admits of invincible ignorance (see 320).

(b) The manner of fulfilling the obligation, since not defined by natural law, has to be determined by positive laws, or, in the absence of these, by suitability to the circumstances in which one lives. Before the positive divine law was given, there was no obligatory rite for sacrifice and the oblation was not entrusted to any special body of men, and hence we read that in the times of the patriarchs there was great freedom as to the ceremonies and the ministry employed in sacrifice. But under the Mosaic Law the manner of sacrificing was minutely prescribed and its office entrusted to the sons of Aaron, even to the exclusion of monarchs; while under the law of Christ there is but the one sacrifice of the Cross perpetuated in the Mass in an unbloody manner, and the ministers who have power to offer sacrifice are only the bishops and priests.

2182. Is Sacrifice Superior to All the Other Acts of Religion?--(a) Sacrifice is not superior to the internal act of religion, for devotion or the internal sacrifice is the soul that animates and moves the external rites (see 2149): “The multitude offered victims and praises and holocausts with a devout mind” (II Par., xxix. 31); “Obedience is better than sacrifice” (I Kings, xv. 22).

(b) Sacrifice is preeminent among the external acts of religion. Some acts of religion are optional (e.g., vows, oaths, adjurations), but sacrifice is a natural obligation. Some acts of religion are obligatory, but marks of respect similar to them may also be shown to creatures (e.g., customary offerings, praises), whereas no kind of sacrifice may be offered to a creature. Some acts of religion are reserved to God, but they have no rite that is peculiar to the worship of God and that may not be exercised by all (e.g., acts of adoration), whereas sacrifice has a service reserved to God and which only priests can perform. Sacraments are primarily for the welfare of man; sacrifice is primarily for the honor of God. Non-sacrificial acts of religion may be performed in the name of an individual (e.g., adoration), whereas sacrifice is in the name of the community; other acts of religion may signify dependence on God for temporal and corporal things (e.g., offering of first-fruits), but sacrifice signifies the dependence of the soul itself on God for existence and beatitude.

2183. Offerings.--Offerings are gifts made immediately to God, to be employed without change for divine worship or for the needs of the ministers of divine worship, the purpose being to worship God by the tribute paid.

(a) Thus, offerings are gifts; that is, they are offered to God without the compulsion of any law, or at least without any determination by law of the amount to be given. Natural reason teaches man that he should bestow something from his goods in this manner as a thank offering for the divine bounty, when there are representatives of God to whom the gift may be given. The gift should be a free-will offering (Exod., xxv, 2), unless there are special circumstances that render it a debt, such as contract, promise, custom, or the need of the ministers of the Church.

(b) They are made immediately to God Himself, and so they differ from tithes or other dues that are paid to the clergy for their support.

(c) They are not changed at all in the act of worship (e.g., an offering of sacred vessels or altar furnishings), or at least they are not changed into the sacred condition of a sacrificial victim (e.g., offerings of candles, incense, etc., that are consumed during Mass). Thus, simple oblation differs from sacrificial oblation.

(d) They are devoted to the service of God, since they are gifts made to Him. Hence, they are used in divine worship and, if consecrated (e.g., chalices, vestments), may not be used for other purposes; or they are used for the needs of the ministers of divine worship or of the poor, since those who serve the altar should live by the altar (I Cor., ix. 14), and Our Lord shared His purse with the poor (Matt., xxvi. 9, 11).

(e) They are given as a mark of honor to God, especially in recognition of favors received from Him. Thus, in the Old Law the people were obliged to give the first-fruits of their fields and crops to God, in thanksgiving for the gift of the promised land and of its fruits (Deut., xxvi. 10).

2184. Goods Unsuitable as Offerings to God.--There are certain goods, however, that should not be used as offerings to God.

(a) Thus, those goods that are forbidden by positive law may not be offered to God. In the Old Law certain animals could not be offered to God, either because they were legally unclean (e.g., dogs were associated with pagan rites and were regarded as symbols of rapacity), or because they were of inferior quality (e.g., a blind or lame sheep or other animal worthless to its owner).

(b) Those goods that the offerer has no right to give away or that are unsuitable on account of circumstances may never be given as offerings to God. Thus, one may not make an offering to God of money that belongs to another (Ecclus., xxxiv. 21); a son may not give as a gift to God the money he should spend on his needy parents (Matt., xv. 3-6). Neither may one offer corrupted wine for the Mass, nor the wages of prostitution to the church if there will be scandal, nor gifts that are mean and contemptible, etc.

2185. Contributions.--Contributions to the support of the clergy and church causes are neither sacrifices nor offerings in the strict sense of these words, since they are given not directly to God but to the ministers of God. The manner of making contributions to the Church has varied with time.

(a) Thus, in the first ages of the Church clerics having the care of souls were supported by the voluntary gifts of the people. These gifts were made especially during Mass. Bread and wine and other things necessary for divine worship and the support of the clergy were brought at the Offertory (the origin of the present Offertory collection), while food for the agapae or for the poor was presented for a blessing towards the end of the Canon, or before Mass.

(b) After peace had been given to the Church and the number of the faithful and of the clergy had greatly increased, it was found necessary to devise means for a more regular and certain supply of income. As early as the sixth century the ancient customs of first-fruits and tithes were made the subjects of conciliar enactments and imposed as specific taxes on crops or revenues. A more permanent system of church support was that of endowments or benefices which, owing to the increasing difficulties of older methods, sprang up about the sixth century and became universal in the eleventh. Fees in connection with the administration of sacred rites and stipends for Masses were in use in the seventh century.

(c) Today the system of benefices is the rule, while first-fruits and tithes are rare, though recognized by Canon Law. In some countries where benefices have been confiscated, part compensation is made in the form of pensions; in other countries (e.g., in the United States) the free-will offerings of the faithful is the usual system.

2186. Obligation of Contributing to the Support of the Clergy.--(a) Natural Law.--Those who serve the common welfare, whether in spiritual or in temporal matters, should be supported by those whom they serve; for, as their time and labor is given to others, it is a duty of justice that these latter make a return for the benefits received. Hence, just as citizens are naturally bound to contribute to public officials, so are the faithful naturally bound to contribute according to their means to the ministers of religion.

(b) Divine Law.--Our Lord commanded His disciples to depend for their maintenance on those to whom they preached (“For the laborer is worthy of his meat,” Matt., x. 10); and hence St. Paul says (I Cor., ix. 13, 14): “They who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place, and they that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.”

(c) Church Law.--The Canons reaffirm what is of natural and divine law, namely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy (Canon 1496); and as to the manner of making contributions they sanction local customs, such as parish payments (Canon 463) and tithes and first-fruits (Canon 1502), command the payment of _cathedraticum_ (Canon 1504), etc.

2187. The Church, the Apostolic See, individual churches and moral persons of ecclesiastical law have the right to the temporal means requisite for their mission; and hence the faithful have the duty to contribute to necessary church causes, such as divine worship, the spread of the Gospel, and charity (Canons 1495 sqq.).

2188. Quality of the Obligation of Contributing to the Church.--(a) The obligation is one of justice as well as of religion, for there is a quasi-contract between the faithful on the one side and the Church and its ministers on the other side, the latter being obliged to give spiritual ministries and benefits, the former to supply the temporal sustenance and means. Hence, St. Paul compares the salaries given to the clergy to the wages or fruits paid to the laborer. It is not strange that those who sow spiritual things for others, should reap from the temporal things of the latter: for a soldier does not serve at his own expense; a planter, a shepherd, a plowman, and a thresher expect a share from their labors; indeed, even the animal that serves man is worth its keep (cfr. I Cor., ix. 4 sqq.).

(b) The obligation is grave, because it arises both from justice and from religion (see 1748, 2148). He who refuses to contribute to the Church evades payment for services given him and also denies to divine worship his share of support.

2189. Attitude Towards Persons Refusing to Contribute.--The duties of the priest towards those who refuse to contribute their share to the support of the Church may be defined as follows:

(a) as to absolution, it should not be denied unless there is certainty that the penitent is in grave sin. Hence, according to Kenrick and the common opinion, unless there is a law fixing a tax or the delinquent church member is inflicting severe privation on the church or heavy burdens on others who have to contribute more than their share, the confessor should not enjoin payment under pain of denial of absolution. Apart from these cases, the Church, for the sake of souls, does not insist upon her right, as we see in the dealings of St. Paul with the Corinthians who neglected to give towards his support. The Apostle did not correct these men, although he would have done so had he considered them guilty of mortal sin;

(b) as to restitution, it seems it should not be insisted on. One who has guiltily refused to pay his church dues has offended justice, it is true, but the Church is concerned more with spiritual than with temporal things, and rather than place an obstacle to the conversion of a sinner or occasion scandal to the weak, she prefers to forego what is really her due (see 1487);

(c) as to administration of the Sacraments or sacramentals, it should not be denied to those who are unable or unwilling to pay the customary fees. The recipient of the rites disgraces himself by unwillingness to do what others do, but religion itself would be degraded if the rites were refused for reasons of money.

2190. Those to Whom Religious Contributions Are Due.--(a) The entire Church should contribute to the support of the Pope, the Pastor of the whole flock of Christ, who is charged with the welfare of all. In the Old Law the Levites themselves were obliged to pay tithes to the high-priest (Num, xviii. 26 sqq.); but the amount to be given to Peter’s Pence is left to the generosity and religious devotion of the contributors. (b) Each individual church or body in the Church should contribute to its own bishop or superior a just amount for necessary uses, as determined by law or lawful custom.

2191. Vows.--A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is better.

(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4), Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of performing one’s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses (e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one who swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow of chastity (see 2234, 2262).

(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the vow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one vows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the Saint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow principally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of obliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to the virtue of veneration (_dulia_), but it would not be an act of religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn circumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.

(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since a vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence, it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one’s steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood, for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.

2192. The Various Kinds of Vows.--(a) By reason of its object, a vow is either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine with an offering).

(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).

(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).

(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an unconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on pilgrimage, if one recovers one’s health; a vow to enter religion, if parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).

(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow, as when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e., manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and chastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).

(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious institutes.

2193. Vows in Canon Law.--The canonical dispositions in reference to vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.

2194. Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.--Is the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of ecclesiastical law?

(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place, age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these matters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change these conditions as she sees fit.

(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends, not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving over to God of one’s person itself and an internal spiritual consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied, however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense even in solemn vows.

2195. Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he who takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of the gravity of the sin (see 177).

(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g., Titus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms; Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father’s recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental (e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance; Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion, according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good demands that the religious state, like the married state, have stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the obligations that go with it.

(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g., vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation (e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its pronouncement).

2196. Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the will of the person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.

(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to the vow.

(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow. The reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made under unjust pressure.

(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, Sec.3) invalidates a vow given under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.

2197. Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.--(a) All admit that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause (e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g., vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).

(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his wish to evade punishment.

2198. Vows of Doubtful Validity.--In the following cases it is disputed whether fear invalidates a vow.

(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes). Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable to think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light, fear.

(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates, when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the aggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only the occasion of the vow.

2199. The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.--As was said in the explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.

(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded. On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).

(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to take a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep) does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius, foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation. On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit intention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make religious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).

2200. The Matter of a Vow.--(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.

2201. Vows that Promise Something Necessary.--(a) If the necessity is absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is impossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a vow that one’s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to which agreement is given, etc.

(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment (e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of precept, for example, to practise celibacy.

2202. When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.--(a) If the vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there would be no obligation.

(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the matter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really severable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to go barefooted).

(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption (cfr. 465).

2203. Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.--(a) Vows that promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe’s vow to immolate the first living being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to the part that is sinful.

2204. What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that have an evil end or other evil circumstances?

(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done (e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is the author of sin.

(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil circumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the vow is substantially licit.

(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circumstance affects neither the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus, it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel but to protect one’s life.

2205. Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.--(a) These vows are invalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to God (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one’s earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary, impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault _per se_, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and displeasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.

(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).

2206. Meaning of a Better Good.--It is also necessary for validity of a vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of God, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.

(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not true.

(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.

2207. Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.--(a) The vow to do what is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to embrace a counsel) is invalid _per se_. There may be cases, however, in which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g., when a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to make no other vows without advice).

(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more pleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.

2208. Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.--(a) If the vows are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige, being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of caring for those in distress.

2209. The Obligation of a Vow.--Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment, for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture declares that one must pay one’s vows, and that it is better not to vow than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).

(a) The Quality of the Obligation.--A vow is an act of religion, since it promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised (e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing dedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same species, namely, sins against religion.

(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.--A vow, as being a duty of religion (see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

2210. Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.--A vow has the nature of a private law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily imposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the subject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict obligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on the great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to assume a grave obligation.

(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself (e.g., chastity) or from its relation to divine worship (e.g., a fast, a communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a vow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance (e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).

(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin. He is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he elect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is of great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to penalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public vows taken in religious institutes and for the vow of chastity and celibacy taken in the reception of subdeaconship, for the law of the Church on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige under grave sin.

2211. Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.--(a) In personal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave obligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the Church (e.g., the hearing of Mass, Confession, Communion, a fast or abstinence, a Rosary).

(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for commutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable. The amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by the wealth of the person stolen from, but, since God is owner of all things, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to Him. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than that of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave matter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not grave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when the vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not inconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide as to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the circumstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to be taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).

2212. Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.--(a) If the vower has determined the relation of the items of the vow one to another, coalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower intends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is coalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and neglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the items as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows to say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are many venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others omitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to some as soon as a notable quantity is reached, but others believe that there is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or one-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.

(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of the vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows, non-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give fifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there are exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Saturday in honor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may be to show respect to the Mother of God and not to give a certain amount to the poor.

2213. The Time When a Vow Obliges.--(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to drink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).

(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for fulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as a principal circumstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of the Assumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance was culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a secondary circumstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made by one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the time set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Anticipation of fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed in the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain space and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this space; for example, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the whole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the forenoon (see 470, 471).

(c) An affirmative vow for which the vower has fixed no special time should be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for such is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better time for fulfillment can be assigned; “When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a sin” (Deut., xxiii. 21).

2214. Delay in Fulfilling Vow.--Sin may be committed by delaying to keep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.

(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the subject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or three days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000 miles for several months, etc.) or of the circumstances (e.g., if one has to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has closed up a business).

(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not notably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a Rosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and, apart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to constitute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.