Chapter XXXIX: Part II: SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued) (2)

1676. Sinfulness of the Prudence of the Flesh.--(a) If prudence of the fiesh be understood in its stricter meaning as designating the condition of those who make the things of this world the be-all and the end-all of existence, it is a mortal sin; for it is impossible that one should have two last ends or serve two masters whose interests are opposite: “The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be” (Rom., viii. 7).

(b) If prudence of the flesh be taken in a less strict sense as signifying the behavior of those who make God the supreme end of their lives, but who in some affair plan shrewdly for a particular end that does not entirely square with right reason, it is then a venial sin. An example is a host who is very practical in buying supplies and making all the arrangements for a banquet at which the guests will conduct themselves with too much hilarity.

(c) If prudence of the flesh be used in a wide or improper sense as signifying the care of the body and other temporal things for the sake of a good end, it is not sinful, but virtuous. Thus, a person who is careful about his diet in order that he may conserve his health and be enabled to work more efficiently and fruitfully, is virtuously prudent. The use of the term “prudence of the flesh,” for these last two cases is inaccurate and misleading.

1677. Astuteness, Trickery and Fraud.--The prudence whose means are bad is the sin of those who skillfully plan and carry out wicked ways and methods of securing some desired end, even though it be a good end.

(a) The planning of wicked means through which some design can be successfully achieved is the sin of astuteness, and the persons who are well-fitted for such things are known as schemers and plotters. The counsel of the Jews against Christ (Matt., xxvi. 3-5) and the bribery of the sepulchre guards (Matt., xxviii. 12-14) are examples of astuteness.

(b) The carrying out of astute plans may be done either by violence or by stealth; but, as evil loves to hide itself and to pose as good lest its success be endangered, schemers usually resort to trickery and fraud. Lord Bacon’s essay on “Dissimulation” is a good description of the method of worldly policy.

1678. Trickery in general is the secret employment of sinful means with the view to impose on others and thus gain some advantage one has in mind. Hence, it has a wide application and includes fraud as well as other uses of unlawful means. But trickery may be distinguished from fraud as follows:

(a) trickery is the execution of an astute plan by words calculated to deceive or circumvent another person. Words are the chief means of communication between men, and hence trickery is more usual than fraud. Examples of trickery are the artful traps prepared for Our Lord by the Pharisees when with apparent respect they asked His views about the condemnation of the adulteress (John, viii. 3 sqq.) and the payment of tribute (Matt., xxii. 17), their purpose being to obtain evidence that He spoke against the Law;

(b) fraud is the execution of astute plans by means of dishonest actions, as when a person cheats by not observing the rules of a game, or defrauds by selling inferior goods, or imposes on others by passing himself off as their friend, etc.

1679. Trickery may be used for good as well as evil ends, and thus St. Paul disowns the practice of persuading men to embrace the Faith by appealing to their prejudices or by toning down the Gospel: “We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God; but by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man’s consciousness in the sight of God” (II Cor., iv. 2).

1680. The gravity of the sins of astuteness, trickery and fraud depends on the character of the object, end and circumstances. (a) Thus, on account of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very bad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil (e.g., lies about unimportant matters); (b) on account of the end the sin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g., clever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the purpose is not so bad (e.g., cheating at cards in order to win a small sum); (c) on account of the circumstances the sin is made mortal by some grave defect or disorder in the act resulting from the condition of time, place, person, etc. Thus, there might easily be great scandal if a person of authority were known to lie habitually, as it suited his interests.

1681. Solicitude.--Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude, that is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the future. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.

(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: “Be not solicitous therefore saying: ‘What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?’ ... Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will be solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof” (Matt, vi. 31, 34).

(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason requires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in Divine Providence. Without any human care God bestows upon man the gift of life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole inanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume over the temporal things of one individual as if God were unable or unwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).

1682. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.--(a) Solicitude is sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things the end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business matter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.

(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of obtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity that the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much time and thought to business, politics, society or science that religion is more and more set aside in his life: “The cares of this world choked up the word” (Matt., xiii. 22).

(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a temporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that fidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life. Examples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend church or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who practise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.

1683. Cases of Lawful Solicitude.--(a) When the end is a genuine temporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty dictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who saves, spending economically for the support of himself and his dependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the true sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in money-making or too anxious about financial affairs: “Work must be attended to, but worry must be banished” (St. Jerome).

(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a duty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28), Timothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as almoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.

1684. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes temporal things one’s god, and is therefore perturbed about the future, as when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair means or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.

(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one seeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient means busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of peace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.

(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time, when one anticipates the season for care, as when a farmer worries during planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about the next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented (e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.

1685. Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) When the end is a lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good, for providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654). Scripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against the winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen., xii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself and His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses offerings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the end is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen in the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance that they might have the means to bestow assistance during a famine which had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).

1686. False Prudence and Avarice.--The sins of false prudence are caused chiefly by avarice. (a) They are sins in which reason plays a great part, though it is not put to a good use; and hence they do not naturally spring from carnal vices or cowardice, which obscure reason. Avarice, on the contrary, reasons much on how it may get and keep; it is shrewd, cunning, deliberate, foresighted. (b) They are sins that have recourse to stealth and secrecy, and thus are unlike pride, vainglory, and anger, which incline to display and openness. But avarice puts utility above considerations of glory or revenge, and prefers to be without fame or to bear with slights rather than lose profits.

1687. Commandments of Prudence.--Prudence is not expressly commanded in the Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other parts of Scripture.

(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten commandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest to all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.

(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: “Get wisdom and with all thy possession purchase prudence” (Prov., iv. 7); “Walk in the ways of prudence” (ibid, ix. 6); “Purchase prudence, for it is more precious than silver” (ibid, xvi. 16); “Be ye prudent as serpents” (Matt., x, 16); “Speak the things that become sound doctrine, that the aged men be sober, chaste, prudent” (Tit., ii. 1, 2); “Be prudent and Watch in prayers” (I Peter, iv. 7).

Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 57-60.)

1688. After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human actions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over fortitude and temperance, which govern the passions and make man virtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor. The logical order, then, is that justice should precede fortitude and temperance.

1689. Nature of Justice.--In God justice is an attribute in virtue of which He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded complaint against Him: “His own justice supported Him. He put on justice as a breastplate” (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness towards God or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by various names, such as “justice,” “equity,” “truth,” “righteousness.”

(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness, or the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)” (Matt., v. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is also called justice or justification: “The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him” (Rom., iii. 22).

(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or right: “Love justice, you that are judges of the earth” (Wis., i. 1); “If in every deed you speak justice” (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense the word “justice” is hereafter used.

1690. Definition of Right.--Right signifies originally that which follows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard, as in the expressions “right ahead,” “to be in the right.” But in moral matters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper, suitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective, the former being the foundation of the latter.

(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the law itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done, especially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense there is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason itself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).

(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by reason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives to one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right, right properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of respecting that authority (passive right, duty).

1691. Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing or possessing something.

(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law giving one a true title and forbidding others to interfere with its enjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make right; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered from exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere legal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an ethical power that enables one to act licitly before God and conscience.

(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own land). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action (e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what he owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property); while the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to transfer, etc.

1692. Divisions of Right.--(a) By reason of its source, or of the law from which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to life, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right to receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of parishioners that Mass be said for them by their pastor, the right of citizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of the power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict (moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it is one’s own by a proper and exclusive title (e.g., the right to life and property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one, only because it is something common that is to be distributed and one is a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an appointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to receive gratitude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue (e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or friendship by others) requires it.

1693. Natural rights are subdivided as follows:

(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being based on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its parent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being based on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g., the right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the nature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent fact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);

(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they are had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of life in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in course of time through some contingent fact. Thus, titles to goods of fortune which the owner is the first to possess (original titles) are obtained by occupation and accession; titles to goods obtained from others (derivative titles) are obtained through prescription, inheritance, contract;

(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is, they are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they are not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink alcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to renunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to repel temptation, the right to serve God).

1694. Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be Distinguished.--(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one as one’s own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The right of a beggar to receive some assistance from someone is not a strict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or any individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right, since it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.

(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence it may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical force. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of presents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a falling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a reconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries show signs of gratitude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be enforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his employer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means. It should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a proper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or positive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right (e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally not defensible, the right of a parent to his child’s respect) does not prove that the right is not strict.

1695. A strict right to have or to own is either _in re_ or _ad rem_. (a) A right _in re_ (real or complete right) is the right to that which one already lawfully has as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right _ad rem_ (personal or inchoate right) is the right to that which one is entitled to obtain as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised him by Balbus).

1696. Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.--(a) The right _in re_ authorizes recourse to a real action (_actio in rem_), that is, to a suit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be held, as when one sues to recover one’s property through the ejectment of a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically bound to him who has the right, as being his own.

(b) The right _ad rem_ enables one to enforce one’s claim by a personal action (_actio in personam_), that is, to bring a suit against a definite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic relationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery on account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.

1697. The right _in re_ to property is either perfect or imperfect.

(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one to exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at will of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it (e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down, etc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one’s property to exclude the public).

(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is restricted as to the right of the disposition of one’s goods, for example, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of disposition without the right of use, for example, when one is forbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns (radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right of disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent alterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful dominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the right of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor’s flock from grazing in one’s pasture (ownership subject to servitude).

1698. The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It Exists.--(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called just because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b) nor is it in the sensitive appetite, since a sense faculty does not apprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice is in the rational appetite or will.

1699. The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.--(a) The material object of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is remotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and distribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are exchanged or distributed.

(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it principally intends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of others, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring, may be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is owed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the neighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self, while justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and gives him what belongs to him.

1700. Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so fully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.

(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the parent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that spring from their special relationship pertain to the virtue of filial and paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more strictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations that spring from relationships that are common (e.g., from a contract between a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these relationships they treat with one another, not as father and son, but as man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one, inasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and the same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.

(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and than master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and neither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal society and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another stricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another, although those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of justice.

1701. Division of Justice.--Justice is divided according to the rights it respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of law) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or subordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law and the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice (fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.

1702. Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a general condition found in all virtues?

(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch as its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe all the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as fortitude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of the courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man primarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as being that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It differs even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by one’s own debt to the source of one’s life) and from obedience (for legal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that are not commanded).

1703. Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.--(a) Particular justice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater distinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and the party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when the latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive characteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account of the independence or “otherness” of those between whom it exists, so much so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when only one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man and his soul, body, powers).

(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or filial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good as such) and is more voluntary.

1704. Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of its members one of legal or one of particular justice?

(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has over the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the common good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion the citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the community of which he is part.

(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation for their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an implicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will serve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the expenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals (see 1708).

1705. Distributive and Commutative Justice.--On account of the inequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists, particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative, which are distinct species of justice.

(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that this justice--that is, relations towards particular persons--is either the relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations are governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to portion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens (e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but according to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by commutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the individual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the rights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the right to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from the fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in exchanges, such as buying and selling).

(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and commutative is specific appears from the fact that the main characteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality between payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice in a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when a thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it is already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice, when a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it and a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or abilities.

1706. Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is arithmetical, or of quantity (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is just to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice is geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of 90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90, it is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays $80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and commutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private matters and unjust in public matters. Example: Titus, an office-holder, pays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends, whether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.

1707. Corrective Justice.--Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive) justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties adequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance or retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person the desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not justice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only a potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).

(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a punishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality between the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to another on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness by taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the party offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If the person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also practises commutative justice.

(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge may intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as of the individual who has been injured.

1708. Different Species of Justice in One Act.--Different species of justice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be elicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of justice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of vindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of justice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of distributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the payment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution from common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services contracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say that wages for services given the community are due in commutative justice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice equality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter between the proportion received by one and the proportion received by another, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value received in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).

1709. The Object of Justice.--The function of a moral virtue is to direct according to moderation all those things that are subject to the free will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions of man and the external things of which he makes use.

(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as to include both those internal affections that are accompanied by notable bodily changes (the passions, such as anger, sadness), and those actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations). Every virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is defined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but not every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since the virtues of fortitude and temperance regulate, not the operations, but the passions.

(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not communicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and external, by which men communicate with one another. These latter either have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money, produce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease and other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have such operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues have to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good election of the will; but there is this difference between justice and the other moral virtues, that fortitude and temperance merely dispose the intellectual appetite for a good choice by the regulation they give to the sensitive appetite, while justice has for its proper act to choose well the means for moderating external operations. As for external operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but not of the other two moral virtues.

1710. The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in himself; for the passions that are moderated by fortitude and temperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and not other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to regulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and things directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But both the passions and external operations have effects and consequent ends that give them new relationships, and hence we may distinguish between the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the secondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the effects of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external things; the primary object of fortitude and temperance is the passions, for justice seeks the good of others, whereas fortitude and temperance seek the good of the agent.

(b) The secondary object of justice is the passions, whenever its principal object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the passions. Thus, when lust urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice to the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue of temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the passion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fortitude and temperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the subject of the principal object (i.e., the passions) has reactions in reference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fortitude and desire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as combat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to others; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and if desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food or drink.

1711. The Golden Mean of Virtue.--The golden mean of virtue is not the same in all the moral virtues (see 154).

(a) Thus, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions for the benefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of excess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined by reason from a consideration of the subject and his circumstances (the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with individual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying that what is one man’s meat is another man’s poison. It would be absurd to say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and that all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and quantity of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the contrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be moderate which agrees with the health, appetite, duties, manner of life, etc., of the person.

(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the benefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in order that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality, which means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the middle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of external things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and of the thing), and so it does not vary with the circumstances of the subject. If the real value of a horse is $100--it makes no difference whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich or poor--the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the buyer, deficiency to the seller.

1712. Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the person who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be that this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of the person to whom justice is owed.

(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of the thing in distributions consists in equality between relative proportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of persons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice must consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as compared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe equality by giving proper shares to all.

(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when the condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a ruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the mean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the payment and the debt.

1713. Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act just, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?

(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the affirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its mean is observed. The mean of fortitude and temperance cannot be observed without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is not brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength); but the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last penny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a sacrifice).

(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the negative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a virtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circumstances are agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely out of vainglory exercises fortitude materially, not formally; and likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.

1714. Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.--The differences between particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore, the following:

(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good of the agent himself;

(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the passions;

(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;

(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the circumstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.

1715. While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual virtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral virtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appetite. The superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed virtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.

(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they pursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good. “Great is the splendor of justice,” says St. Ambrose (_De Officiis_, lib. I, cap. 28), “which is born for others rather than for itself, and which aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all may be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow assistance, not refuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others.” Moreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the courageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal justice, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), is often regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it perfects a nobler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the good, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is impartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even though a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an injured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An indication that justice is nobler than regulation of the passions is seen by Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is more difficult and rarer: “Many people are capable of exhibiting virtue at home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor. Accordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that ‘office will reveal a man,’ for one who is in office is at once brought into relation and association with others. As then the worst of men is he who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to his friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his own life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task.”

1716. Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is nobler than they.

(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war, it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.

(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few, while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all; justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than liberality without justice.

1717. Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.

(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the worship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man; and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.

(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due to another.

1718. Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the objective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby they are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects), but also from the viewpoint of the subjective participation of them in the souls of their possessors.

(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor, since all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see 1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with the growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).

(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from the order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and promptitude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally on the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as natural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of God (see 135, 136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and enjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus, Abraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery, David in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is praised as “a just man” (Matt., i. 19).

1719. Injustice.--Just as the word “justice” is taken in a wide sense for holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict sense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word “injustice” is taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin (“He sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust,” Matt., v. 45), but strictly for violation of the special virtue of justice (“Hear what the unjust judge saith,” Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice that we now speak.

1720. Species of Injustice.--Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal injustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good or to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats merely to gratify a passion for money or for food, there is a certain condition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if one does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there is a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b) Particular injustice is a special vice against the private good of others that moves one to seek for more than is one’s share, or to desire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality appoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just price (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution of public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers public benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens with taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).

1721. The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.--(a) From its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a very great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very foundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done either to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice (unlike sins of mere passion), if the matter is serious, offend against charity, the life of the soul; for charity “envieth not, dealeth not perversely” (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and leads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of injustice: “Do not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God” (I Cor., vi. 10); and Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments” (Matt, xix. 18).

(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.), or from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice may be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on account of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes only a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is venial.

1722. Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.--The rule for judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small, is the quantity of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable unwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins against the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in proportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice offends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts of injustice are gravely sinful:

(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a matter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and gravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny, adultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the party offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only venial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin done against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing that the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will almost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity, etc.;

(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right in a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely averse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common good is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful government, or when the peace and security of the community is imperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one steals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though the latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a private person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the community, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous consequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were not gravely forbidden.

1723. Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.--These are distinguished according to the main classes of objects or rights that are injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four kinds of injustice:

(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or supernatural (e.g., superstition, idolatry, simony);

(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g., murder, mutilation);

(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or corporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).

1724. Accidental Forms of Injustice.--There are also many accidental forms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves change the moral species (see 200).

(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by action (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission (e.g., by allowing another to steal from one’s employer). In both cases the same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits theft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.

(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either merely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right is violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born), or with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is born). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the latter case restitution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (_damnum_) that results from violation of a strict right (_injuria_) may be in internal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in external goods (such as reputation, money, property).

(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice is either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or unprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is the same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by his injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he does not gain does not make the injury less.

1725. Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is done contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one cedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while neighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this as permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal maxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are necessary in order that there be a surrender of right: