Chapter LII: Part II: SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued) (15)

(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably depreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the vow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion lessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it imperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years exposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or four years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter religion.

2215. The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.--(a) A personal vow obliges only the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes on oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community may be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by ancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory custom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real) obliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower’s estate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of religion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of the estate.

2216. The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.--(a) As to Internal Disposition.--It is not necessary that one have at the time of fulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention exclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was promised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Mass and then hears a Mass out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take this assistance at Mass as a satisfaction of the vow.

(b) As to External Performance.--If a vow is personal, one must perform it personally, for one’s own act was promised, and hence, if personal performance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a proxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is not obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since one’s own goods were promised.

2217. The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.--(a) Conditional Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is fulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is equivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., Titus, who has to support his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts marriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and Titus is thus freed of her support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he prevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful means. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the condition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if non-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the vow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a year, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through frailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the exercise of one’s right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one’s parents consent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to consent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses unlawful means to prevent the condition’s fulfillment (e.g., if he gets drunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if he uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow which he has made dependent on their consent).

(b) Penal Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against which the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g., Claudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play after having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful (e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain occasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against the vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g., Caius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the promise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin against charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account of the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If the vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be paid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if the penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a distant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every fault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated (e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).

(c) Disjunctive Vow.--The vow is null if one of the objects to be chosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or to steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before his choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible (e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns, but before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if after his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius decided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give it, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower’s own fault (e.g., Claudius’ chalice was stolen before his choice because he had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen has become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give the large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).

(d) Doubtful Vow.--Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow was really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution, whether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the vow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly made was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for directing a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more probable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the decision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but if there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made, or whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the Probabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of this kind or that (e.g., the circumstances of quality, quantity, number, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of interpretation of the mind of the vower.

2218. General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.--(a) Private vows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive intention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the lawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound doctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.

2219. Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.--(a) A doubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is, from the language of the vow itself and the significance usually attached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant to express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of “virginity” usually means the same as a vow of “chastity,” and should be so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation. The language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose of the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a glass chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious metal); a vow to hear Mass daily does not mean that one must hear two Masses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pass without assistance at Mass.

(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal evidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the custom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is understood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise), from the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who vows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other than Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between fast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation of laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation, he who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to give, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that are implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others, change in circumstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a religious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept and keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without prejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).

2220. The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.--(a) A first advantage is that a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil. This is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and inconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and perseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in honor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim on divine assistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful ally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater sin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk attached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to the weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who thinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap (Eccles., xi. 4).

(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more meritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g., abstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine worship or religion, the most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers God a more perfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act here and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it acts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circumstance that gives perfection to virtue. All this should be understood _per se_, or with the qualification “other things being equal”; for if we suppose that a person who has no vow serves God with great charity and fervor, there is no doubt that he is better before God than one who has vows and performs them carelessly and reluctantly.

2221. When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.--A vow good in itself may be sinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the vower.

(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not taking into consideration the circumstances. Hence, before making a vow one should consider carefully and consult one’s confessor or director or some other prudent man.

(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets include the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one regrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up to it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives and wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingratitude towards God (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever took the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with obligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the obligation; the sin of ingratitude is venial. There is no sin at all, it seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or wishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation that one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and the danger of sinning against the vow.

2222. Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.--If one regrets having made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed better by reason of the vow?

(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive (e.g., the desire to please God or the fear to offend Him), the good work is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the double value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue, of a good work done and of a vow to do it.

(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive (e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some temporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but indeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for God’s sake.

2223. Who Can Make a Vow?--Every person living in the state of mortal existence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow, unless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.

(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of their own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a law which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those who have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not understand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other subject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while infants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.

(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the validity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate, etc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are incapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has been given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this power for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who take vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the Church has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are internal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever been made.

2224. Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.--Those who are not masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold dependence of this kind.

(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in the case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means, not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the just will of the superior.

(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents and is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he owes them to his family.

2225. The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.--(a) If the vow is against the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus, if a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband’s consent, the vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses his consent.

(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow is null, since it is better to keep the rule.

(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.

2226. Cessation of Vows.--Since a vow is a private law, it may cease, just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are, therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.

(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God. It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).

(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made (dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).

2227. Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for internal reasons are as follows:

(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage, but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g., Sempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change when circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.

(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of money to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end (see Canon 1311).

2228. Annulment of Vows.--The annulment of a vow is made in two ways, directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.

(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts. Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law (Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.

(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow, when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due the master.

2229. Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.--Is a just reason necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.

2230. Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.--(a) Direct annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service elsewhere.

(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it, or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no longer under his control.

2231. Dispensation.--A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted in the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.

(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401). Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation that a law is not binding.

(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total removal of the vow.

(c) It is granted in the name of God; that is, the dispenser acting for God remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow.

(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a vow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of those whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or domestic power.

2232. Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.--A dispensation is granted in the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise cannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason. A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient for a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult, if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).

2233. Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.--(a) The superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has become harmful or useless.

(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to the superior.

2234. Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.--The Church has the power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this power when He said: “Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of dispensation are the following:

(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;

(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not made principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of chastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been made for marriage (see Canon 1045).

2235. Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.--Does the Church dispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in the reception of Sacred Orders?

(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are granted from the religious vow of chastity.

(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical powers.

2236. Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third Party.--(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.

(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but is made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is dispensable.

(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions, however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope, in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just and sufficient reasons.

2237. Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.--(a) Dispensation may be granted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus, a superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see 403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from another person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local Ordinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but also outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).

(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of the confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It is more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.

(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to accept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may be made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that the vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds at least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.

2238. Commutation of Vows.--The commutation of a vow is the substitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage, but one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do what is less.

2239. Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.--(a) The good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which, if not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in favor of one’s father who is also poor.

(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance. But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.

(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into a Rosary.

2240. Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.--(a) The commutation of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally served. But ordinarily one should not commute one’s own vows, since for most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal or a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.

(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing (e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.

2241. The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.--(a) For commutation into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value, some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore displeasing to God to give over one’s promises without good reason. But a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value, a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for a full dispensation.

2242. Reversion to Original Vow.--The return to the original vow by one whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may be obligatory.

(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.

(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is immediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however, that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the vower’s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast, there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the institute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the vows revive (Canon 1315).

2243. Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.--(a) A confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows, since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation. A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of (see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow, the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a year or other fixed period.

(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations, and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment (e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).

2244. External Acts of Religion in Honor of God.--We now pass on to consider those external acts of religion in which the worshipper makes use of divine things in order to show honor to God (see 2175). These sacred things are of two classes, namely, objects whose use is the sanctification of man (Sacraments and sacramentals) and words whose use is the power they have on others or the manifestation of reverence towards God (the Divine Name). Sacraments and sacramentals will be dealt with later. For the present we shall speak of the honor shown to God by the use of His Name, and hence we shall take up in turn the following subjects: (a) use of the divine name to confirm before others one’s declarations or promises (oaths); (b) use of the divine name to move others to do or omit something (adjuration); (c) use of the divine name to express praise and invocation.

2245. Oaths.--An oath is the calling upon God to witness the truth of what we say.

(a) It is a calling upon God; that is, it is the selection of God as the witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to others or a declaration that a fact is known to God (e.g., “God knows she has been a good woman”); it is an address or invocation made to God Himself. Neither is it a mere prayer that God will in some way bring out the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to corroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it appeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of God found in Sacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present matter. A prayer to God to prove one’s innocence or the proof of a theological proposition from the Word of God is not, therefore, an oath.

(b) It is a calling on God, and hence if appeal is made to some creature (e.g., in the expression, “upon my word of honor”) or to some false deity (e.g., “By Jove, I’ll do that”), there is no oath.

(c) It calls on God to bear witness; that is, it confirms the truth of one’s words by God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He who swears does not ask that God intervene here and now by some visible or miraculous sign, but that God confirm, where and when it pleases Him, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the hidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv. 5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in God will not be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend iniquity and falsehood.

2246. The Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) By reason of the matter, an oath is either assertory or promissory. An assertory oath refers to the past or present (e.g,, “I swear that I saw the accident,” “I swear that I am insolvent”), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., “I swear that I will execute my office faithfully”). The promissory oath is either without a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, “I swear that I will prosecute, if you do that”) or with a pact. This latter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with God or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn contract, or a sworn vow and contract.

(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory) or execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on God as a witness (e.g., “God is my witness that this is true,” “I swear by God, etc.”). The execratory oath asks God, even though the Divine Name is not expressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the persons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true (e.g., “May God strike me dead, if this is not true!” “May the devil take my children, if I swear falsely!”). The form commonly used, “So help me God and these holy Gospels!” has an execratory sense, the meaning being “May God help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if I speak falsely!”

(c) By reason of the person invoked, an oath is either explicit or implicit. The former calls on God by name (e.g., “God is my witness,” “I speak the truth in Christ”); the latter calls on some creature as the reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the representative of God (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., xxx. 19: “I call upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you life and death”).

(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple, judicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony (e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised hand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form of words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in reference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or delinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc., which are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn or simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants strengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the Bible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, xxxiv. 18.

2247. Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) Essentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the principal features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there is a difference in circumstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one kind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account of the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its non-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have other species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to keep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).

2248. Lawfulness of Oaths.--(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has the necessary qualities, for in Scripture God Himself is represented as swearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men swear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23; Psalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin of oaths is man’s faith in God, and their purpose is the useful one of lending authority to important assertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of religion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and hence an oath is a profession of reverence for God’s superior knowledge, truth, and justice.

(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality. Here we should note an important difference between an oath and other acts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own sake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability; hence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it should be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act of religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor God, even apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This explains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii. 9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of these texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From the context and other passages it is clear that the Scriptures just cited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was lawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not used, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.

2249. Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.--The necessary qualities that should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: “And thou shalt swear, ‘As the Lord liveth,’ in truth, and in judgment and in justice.” Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who swears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which he swears.

(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears should do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and in a manner respectful to God whom he invokes. An oath that lacks judgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears about a trivial matter or swears jokingly.

(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to that which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been used in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false or perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be false, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that one is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely mental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a matter.

(c) An oath should have justice; that is, one should not promise what one has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not say what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter of the oath, then, both as to its object and its circumstances, must be good, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath that lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under oath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears about a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another person or to boast about one’s own crimes.

2250. Sinful Oaths.--(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from its nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any direct injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in levity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an oath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a serious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of standing swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to which it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is thereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On account of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing leads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth with simple assertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary, daily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be sufficient without his oath.

(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see 172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for God and disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask God to be an accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that God can be deceived. Hence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever escape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without sufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity. Pope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light sin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are debarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are subject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons 1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given before a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while subornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are also crimes or punishable offenses.